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Abstract
The Christian church proclaims that God has made himself known. It is the task 
o f a doctrine o f revelation to offer an account o f this claim. In this thesis we take 
Karl Barth's doctrine o f the Word o f God as our point o f departure. In critical 
engagement with it we address weaknesses in Barth's work and suggest some 
corrective strategies. In particular, we deal with his tendency to understate 
human participation in the event in which God makes himself known. In 
attempting to develop the doctrine we draw substantially upon the 
epistemological work o f Michael Polanyi, a philosopher who articulated, with 
considerable clarity, the forms o f participation out o f which knowledge arises. 
One o f the most innovative aspects o f Polanyi's work is his theory o f tacit 
knowledge. In this he demonstrates how our conceptual understanding arises 
out o f our 'indwelling' o f knowledge upon which we depend but can articulate 
only in part, i f  at all. This knowledge, or 'know-how', is established, in various 
ways, in and through our participation in life contexts. We reflect upon our 
participation in some aspects o f the ecclesial context, with which we are 
primarily concerned, including sacramental practice and the place o f music in 
worship. The thesis explores how Polanyi's insights illuminate the task o f 
articulating a doctrine o f revelation in which human participation is 
appropriately acknowledged. The last chapter deals with the question o f 
imagination and makes explicit some themes which have been implicit 
throughout the thesis. We suggest that our participation in revelation is 
necessarily imaginative, and that God, in making himself known, appeals to our 
imagination. The thesis does not seek to draw the themes it explores to a 
conclusion, but suggests trajectories o f reflection in which we can further 
explore our responsive and imaginative participation in revelation.
11
Declarations
(i) I, Tony Clark, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 100, 000 
words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out 
by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher 
degree.
Date 2 _ ^  Signature of Candidate
(ii) I was admitted as a research student in September, 2000 and as a candidate 
for the degree of Ph.D. in October, 2001; the higher study for which this is a 
record was carried out in the University of St. Andrews between October, 2001 
and October, 2004.
Date Signature of Candidate
(iii) I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions for the 
Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of Ph.D. in the University 
of St. Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in 
application for that degree.
Date 12 ^  /  \ Signature of Supervisor
2-00 s
Ill
Copyright Declaration
In submitting this thesis to the University of St. Andrews I understand that I am 
giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the 
regulations of the University Library for the time being in force, subject to any 
copyright vested in the work not being affected thereby. I also understand that 
the title and abstract will be published, and that a copy of the work may be made 
and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker.
Date Signature of Candidate
2-(3)4
© Tony Clark
IV
For the first mate, 
and the three crew members.
Acknowledgements
I wish of express my heartfelt thanks to a number of people who have 
encouraged and sustained me in the task of producing this thesis. I owe an 
immense debt of gratitude to my supervisors, Trevor Hart and Michael Partridge, 
and thank them for the wisdom, care and encouragement with which they have 
nurtured me in my work. I would also acknowledge my appreciation to other 
members of staff at St Mary's College who have been a support to me in various 
ways. Alan Torrance, in particular, has given generously of his time and 
learning.
The contribution of the secretaries at St Mary's must also be noted. Debbie 
Smith, Susan Millar and Margot Clement always go out of their way to be 
helpful, and do so with consistent good humour. I express my thanks, also, to 
the librarians of the King James Library in St Mary's, Colin Bovaird and Lynda 
Kinloch, whose efficiency is only matched by their friendliness.
I have benefited greatly from my interaction with fellow students. There are too 
many to mention by name, but their presence and our fellowship have prevented 
my doctoral research from being the lonely and isolating experience it so easily 
can be.
St Mary's provides an intellectually vibrant environment for study. The Institute 
for Theology, Imagination and the Arts (ITIA), with its weekly research seminar 
and annual colloquium, has drawn together scholars of diverse backgrounds and 
interests in a dynamic and creative way. The weekly Theology Research Seminar 
at St Mary's has also been a rich source of inspiration. It has been a privilege to 
be part of both.
I am grateful for the financial support provided by the Sir Richard Stapley 
Educational Trust. I express my thanks to St Mary's College for travel bursaries 
which made possible, among other things, my first short trip to research the 
Polanyi Papers lodged in the Special Collections section of the University of 
Chicago Regenstein Library, and to the Russell Trust whose generous support 
funded a second, extended research trip.
I wish to acknowledge the support of my parents, John and Enid Clark, whose 
love for me has been a constant, and also the support and fiiendship of my 
mother-in-law, Magdalene Tatham. All of them have been an inspiration. The 
greatest debt I owe is to my wife, Antonia. She has supported me in this venture, 
as always, with her characteristic grace. We arrived in Fife, together with our 
eldest son Tom, four years ago. Since then Jamie and Hannah have been bom to 
us. It has been a rich time, and I rejoice in them all -  more than I can tell.
VI
Table of Contents
Abstract i
Declarations ii
Copyright Declaration iii
Dedication iv
Acknowledgements v
Table o f Contents vi
Introduction 1
Chapter 1. An Exposition of Karl Barth's Doctrine of Revelation as it is 
Expressed in the First Three Part Volumes of Church Dogmatics
Introduction 6
1. The Nature of the Word of God 7
2. The Mystery of God 11
3. The Knowability of the Word of God 13
a) After the Event 13
b) Fulfilment of Humanity 16
c) The Holy Spirit 19
4. Religious Experience 21
5. Faith 28
6. The Community of the Church and the Word of God 31
7. Proclamation 33
8. The Word of God in its Threefold Form 35
a) The Word of God Preached 36
b) The Word of God Written 37
c) The Word of God Revealed 40
9. The Task of Dogmatics 41
Concluding Remark 47
Chapter 2. Critical Engagement with Barth's Doctrine of Revelation
Introduction 48
1. The Doctrine of Revelation in the Context of Modernity 50
2. Human Participation 51
3. Human Capacity 57
4. Communion and Communication 60
5. Torrance and Zizioulas 68
vil
6. From 'Revelation Model' to 'Worship Model' 74
7. Concepts, Words and Revelation 79
8. Semantics, Human Transformation and Indwelling 79
9. Analogy 88
10. The Significance of the Historical Jesus 89
Chapter 3. Michael Polanyi’s Theory of Knowledge
Introduction 96
1. Against 'Objectivism' 100
2. Problems and Discoveries 103
3. Intellectual Passions 108
4. The Narrative of the Scientific Community 113
5. Indwelling 117
6. Faith and Doubt 121
7. Commitment, Calling and Universal Intent 126
8. Tacit Knowledge 136
9. The Ubiquity of the Tacit 144
10. Language 145
Conclusion 150
Chapter 4. Polanyi and Religion
Introduction 154
1. Exposition 154
al Personal Knowledge 154
b) Meaning 160
c) Other Significant Articles 166
2. Evaluation 168
a) Working from Science to Religion 168
b) Polanyi's Failure to do justice
to the Phenomenon of Religion 170
c) An Emerging Theme 171
3. Polanyi and Theology 173
Chapter 5. Barth and Polanyi in Conversation
Introduction 178
1. Bringing Barth and Polanyi into Conversation 182
2. Reiteration of Barth's Method: Scripture and Revelation 186
3. Barth on Church Confessions: A Polanyian Reading 189
Concluding Comment 208
vin
Chapter 6. Revelation and Polanyi’s Epistemology: Forms of Participation
Introduction 210
1. Critical Engagement with Torrance 211
2. Epistemic Participation 216
a) The Historical Jesus 216
b) The Early Church 222
3. Bodily Participation 226
a) Why Sing? 229
b) Why Bread, Wine and Water? 233
4. Hermeneutical Participation 236
Concluding Comment 241
Chapter 7. Revelation, Participation and Imagination
Introduction 243
1. Gordon Kaufinan and the Theological Imagination 244
a) Theology as Imaginative Construction 244
b) Constructing the Concept of God 247
c) Christology 249
d) Kaufman and Kantian Influences 252
e) The Problem of Pragmatic Criteria 255
f) Concluding Thoughts 256
2. Critique of Kaufman's 'Theological Imagination' 257
Introduction 257
a) God: Is there a Referent? 257
b) Starting Points 260
c) Kaufman and Kant 262
d) Polanyi and Imagination 264
3. Conclusion: Revelation, Participation and Imagination 270
Closing Remarks 274
Bibliography 276
Page 1
Introduction
I first met with the thought of Michael Polanyi in the writings of Lesslie 
Newbigin in the late 1980s. Newbigin refers to Polanyi in many of his 
publications and makes extensive use of his ideas in the early chapters of The 
Gosnel in a Pluralist Societv\  Newbigin prompted me to take a closer look at 
Polanyi's work and I became increasingly fascinated with the project with which 
he was engaged.
Many authors have written on the interrelationship of Christian beliefs and 
science. Polanyi was doing something different. He was not primarily interested 
in religion^; his 'evangelical zeal' was for the life of science and for articulating a 
theory of knowledge, and a philosophy of science, which would authentically 
represent the practice of science.^ One of Polanyi's startling conclusions is that 
scientific practice and progress are possible only if scientists embrace and 
participate in the 'beliefs' which are intrinsic to the scientific community. What 
is more, these 'beliefs' cannot be fully articulated, yet they are 'known' and held 
through nurture and training within the scientific community. Science is, in this 
sense, a life of 'faith' which is expressed in a community. Such language comes 
explicitly to the fore in the title of the first book which Polanyi published on the 
theme. Science. Faith and Societv" .^ What Polanyi had done was to expose the 
fiduciary nature of scientific work. While it was clear that Polanyi was not 
engaged in any kind of Christian apologetic, it struck me -  as it had Newbigin 
and others before me -  that Polanyi's work might have important insights for 
Christian thought and self-understanding.
Just over a decade later I was confronted for the first time (in a substantial way) 
by the work of Karl Barth, in the context of a course on his thought taught by 
Alan Torrance. As had been the case with Polanyi I was struck by the originality 
and rigour of Barth's work. In particular, his doctrine of the Word of God, as it
‘ See Newbigin, L. (1989). The Gospel in a Pluralist Society. London, SPCK.
 ^Although, as we shall see in chapter 4, it is a significant secondary theme in his writings.
 ^He felt that the philosophy of science, in modem times, had served to obscure rather than 
illuminate scientific practice.
Polanyi, M. (1964). Science. Faith and Society. Chicago and London, University o f  Chicago 
Press.
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was expressed in the first part volume of Church Dogmatics^, seemed to me to 
clarify some key issues about what it might mean for God to make himself 
known. Revelation, for Barth, is not the text of Holy Scripture nor is it the 'inner 
light' by which we can choose to know God. Revelation is not some 'thing' 
which is, or can become, our 'possession' but an 'event' (as Barth would have it) 
in which God makes himself known to humanity by making himself present to 
them -  primarily in the person of Christ -  through the enabling of the Spirit.
Early on in my acquaintance with Barth's work I started to puzzle over how his 
work stood in relation to Polanyi's. Polanyi had written on religious and 
theological themes but those writings were, of all Polanyi's work, the most 
disappointing. He had described the life of science as participation in a 'faith 
community' but had somehow missed the significance of this for 'religion'. It 
seems that he lacked sufficient grounding in religious and theological traditions 
and the profound insights, evident in other aspects of his work, did not seem to 
flow into his treatment of these themes. Barth's work represents something of a 
counterpoint to Polanyi's in that his theology is expressed out of a rich awareness 
of, and engagement within, the Christian tradition. However, despite the rigour 
with which Barth expresses his doctrine of the Word of God, and the 
effectiveness with which he differentiated his own position from the liberal 
tradition in which he had been nurtured, his discussion of how it is that we 
participate in this reality (by the grace of God) is significantly understated in his 
treatment of the doctrine.
Reflecting upon these things it occurred to me that much was to be gained by 
bringing these two intellectual giants into dialogue. Although Polanyi and Barth 
were contemporaries there is no evidence that they met or that either of them was
 ^Barth, K., G. W. Bromiley, et al. (1975). Chiirch Dogmatics: The Doctrine o f the Word of God
I .l . Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark.
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influenced by the other.^ However, the possibilities remain, and this thesis
represents, as its major theme, an attempt to explore them/
The chapters of this thesis are far from uniform in their approach and a 
description of what I am attempting in each may be of assistance to the reader. 
The first chapter is expository in nature. It sets forth Barth’s doctrine of the 
Word of God on its own terms in an attempt to establish a ’point of departure' for 
the doctrine of revelation which I seek to develop.
In the second chapter I ask some critical questions of Barth's doctrine noting, 
among other things, that his acknowledgement of human participation in God's 
revelation is problematically understated. There are elements within his doctrine 
of the Word of God which threaten to eclipse the possibility of genuine human 
participation in revelation and these must be confronted. Here I draw upon the 
work of several theologians, and Alan Torrance's Persons in Communion^ in 
particular. Chapter 2 anticipates the significance of Polanyi's work but does not 
seek to establish or explore it.
The third chapter is an exposition of Polanyi's work. Paralleling, in certain 
respects, the first chapter, it seeks to set out the various components of Polanyi's 
epistemology as an essential and somewhat extended preparation for articulating 
its significance for our theme. Chapter 4 is parenthetic in that it extends the 
exposition of Polanyi to his treatment of religion and theology. Although my 
evaluation of this aspect of Polanyi's work is a negative one, it would seem 
inappropriate not to acknowledge his own contribution, before going on to 
explore what I  consider to be a more viable extension of his general
® Polanyi knew o f Barth. In a notebook made during a visit to Berlin: November 21^  -  
December 3''" 1947, Polanyi mentions a meeting with the brother o f Dietrich Bonhoeffer on the 
afternoon o f Sunday 30* November during which they "Talk about Brunner and K. Barth." See 
Polanyi Collection: Regenstein Library, University o f Chicago. Box 44, Folder 5. No mention is 
made of the content of the discussion.
 ^I am aware that some theologians have explored the possible interaction o f the work of Barth 
and Polanyi along different lines. T.F. Torrance is, perhaps, the most outstanding example of a 
theologian who has engaged with Polanyi. His work is marked, among other things, by his 
engagement with Polanyi's ontology.
 ^Toixance, A. (1996). Persons in Communion: Trinitarian Description and Human Participation. 
Edinburgh, T & T Clark.
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epistemology in the general field of theological work and the doctrine of 
revelation in particular.
Chapter 5 represents my first substantial attempt at a synthesis of the work of 
Barth and Polanyi. It takes the form of what I describe as a 'Polanyian reading' 
of Barth's discussion of church confessions in Church Dogmatics 1.2^  Here I 
attempt both to discern how some of the insights in Polanyi's work are already 
paralleled in Barth's method, and to suggest ways in which Polanyian insights 
might be adopted in order to develop and expand the kind of theological project 
in which Barth is here engaged.
The sixth chapter extends the intentions of chapter 5 but adopts a significantly 
different trajectory. Here I refer back to Alan Torrance's critique of Barth and 
suggest several lines along which it could be extended. A significant element of 
Torrance's proposal is found in his discussion of 'semantic participation'. I 
suggest that to the 'semantic' it is appropriate to add the 'epistemic', the 'bodily' 
and the 'hermeneutical', as further aspects which are integral to our participation 
in revelation.
The seventh and final chapter is an attempt to open up the question of 
imagination in relation to our theme. The first half of this chapter is an 
exposition of Gordon Kaufinan's treatment of imagination in theology. This 
fimctions as an example of how the relationship between theology and 
imagination can be seriously misconstrued. Out of my critique of Kaufinan the 
contours of an alternative approach are suggested in which, once again, I draw 
from the insights of Polanyi's work.
I believe that this thesis contains some important and original proposals for 
rearticulating a doctrine of revelation. It will be apparent that in bringing the 
work of Polanyi and Barth together one significant purpose of the thesis is to 
make suggestions for further development. As such, rather than drawing many
 ^Barth, K., G. W. Bromiley, et ai. (1956). Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of the Word of God
1.2. Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, pp.621-660
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threads together in a synthesising conclusion, it is deliberately open-ended, 
suggesting and provoking, I hope, further enquiry.
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Chapter 1. An Exposition of Karl Barth's Doctrine of Revelation as it is 
Expressed in the First Three Part Volumes of Church Dogmatics 
Introduction
111 the introduction to his book Christology  ^ Dietrich Bonhoeffer makes an 
observation which is indicative of some of the central themes which will unfold in 
this and the subsequent chapters of this thesis. He writes, "Teaching about Christ 
begins in silence. 'Be still, for that is the absolute', writes Kierkegaard. That has 
nothing to do with the silence of the mystics, who in their dumbness chatter away 
secretly in their souls by themselves. The silence of the Church is silence before the 
Word. In so far as the Church proclaims the Word, it falls down silently in truth 
before the inexpressible: 'In silence I worship before the unutterable' (Cyril of 
Alexandria)."^
In making this comment Bonhoeffer strikes at the heart of what must be said of 
revelation. We must begin with something which is given to us. We do not start 
with ourselves -  with our religious views or spiritual experience -  but with the 
Word which enters the sphere of our existence -  not at our bidding, but in the 
freedom of God. The Word is God in person: the transcendent one.
This Word -  the Logos -  cannot be circumscribed, defined or 'captured' in any 
human scheme of categorisation (human logoi) because it is a reality which 
transcends the human sphere in which these schemes are founded and established. 
Thus, to every human logos the Word is the 'counterlogos' and as such it calls all 
forms of human classification (and the forms of life in which they are established) 
into question.
Bonhoeffer goes on to point to the paradox that it is precisely this Word (which he 
calls 'inexpressible') which must be proclaimed by the church. Even as the Church 
proclaims this Word, Bonhoeffer claims, it remains inexpressible. The church can 
speak of the Word but its words cannot encompass the reality of which it speaks.
' Bonhoeffer, D. (1966). Christology. London, Collins.
 ^Ibid. p.27.
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The presence of the Word in the church is an ineffable presence. It can transform 
the life and the speech of the congregation but it cannot be assimilated, possessed or 
demarcated.
Bonhoeffer writes, "to speak of Christ will be to speak in the silent places of the 
Church. In the humble silence of the worshipping congregation we concern 
ourselves with christology."^ Christology may be taught in the academy but the 
reality of which the theologian speaks is the reality which confronts the church in its 
prayer and worship. On the one hand we are concerned with the objectivity and 
inexpressibility of the Word which is given to the worshipping community of the 
church and, on the other, the church's commission to proclaim this Word. This is 
the paradox which must shape ecclesial life, practice and self-understanding.
These themes will never be far from view as we proceed to expound Karl Barth's 
views in this chapter and as we seek to critique and develop them in the remainder 
of the thesis.
1. The Nature of the Word of God
"The reality in which the New Testament sees God's revelation taking place is 
utterly simple^ the simple reality of God.""  ^ It is Barth's belief that in revelation God 
is present and is present in his freedom. In a statement reminiscent of Bonhoeffer's 
Barth writes: "[W]e must first understand the reality of Jesus Christ as such, and 
then by reading from the tablet of this reality, understand the possibility involved in 
it, the freedom of God, established and maintained in it, to reveal Himself in 
precisely this reality and not otherwise, and so the unique possibility which we have 
to respect as divine necessity."^
The revelation of God is not God's answer to the religious questioning of humanity. 
In revelation humanity is confronted with the reality of God. This confrontation is 
God's decision and God's act and there is no possibility of such a revelation for
3 Ibid. p.27. I
Barth, K., G. W. Bromiley, et al. (1956). Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of the Word of God 1.2. |
Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, p. 11. i
 ^Ibid. p.8. i
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humanity apart from this decision and act of God. Nevertheless, "Real revelation 
puts man in God's presence."^ This is the gift of God's self-presentation to 
humanity, but because it is God's decision, and human decision has no part in it, it is 
a decision in the freedom of God.
Consequently, Barth is able to say, "When revelation takes place, it never does so 
by our insight and skill, but in the freedom of God to be free for us and to free us 
from ourselves, that is to say, to let His light shine in our darkness, which as such 
does not comprehend His light. In this miracle, which we can only acknowledge as 
having occurred, which we can only receive from the hand of God as it takes place 
by His hand. His kingdom comes for us, and this world passes for us."^ It is 
received 'as it takes place'. This is important for Barth. Revelation is not a 
commodity which passes from God to the person; it is the reality of God which 
becomes present to the person. It is an event. Barth says: "There is something God 
Himself must constantly tell us afresh."^ He further asserts that "there is no human 
knowing that corresponds to this divine telling."^ In this 'divine telling' there is an 
encounter: there is a human-divine fellowship but God does not give himself to 
humanity as a possession. Rather, there is a fresh divine telling. It is out of the 
encounter of these events that we must speak.
Because we are concerned with an event in which humanity is encountered we can 
say what God's Word is, but we can only say this indirectly: "We must remember 
the forms in which it is real for us and learn from these forms how it is. This How 
is the attainable human reflection of the unattainable divine What. Our concern 
here must be with this reflection.
The distinction here is a crucial one. Insofar as we are dealing with 'this reflection' 
we are dealing with what can be said on the human side of the event of God actually 
speaking. The Word of God does, indeed, mean that God speaks. And, in view of 
this, Barth says that, "For all its human inadequacy, for all the brokenness with
 ^Ibid. p.237.
’ Ibid. p.65.
® Barth, K., G. W. Bromiley, et al. (1975). Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of the Word of God I . l . 
Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, p. 132.
®Ibid. p. 132.
Ibid. p. 132.
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which alone human statements can correspond to the nature of the Word of God, 
this statement does correspond to the possibility which God has chosen and 
actualised at all events in His Church."
There is, in all forms of the Word of God, what Barth describes as an upper and 
lower aspect. First, there is the spiritual nature of the Word of God, as distinct from 
naturalness, or its nature as a physical event. Secondly, however, the Word of God 
is also natural and physical. Without this it would not be the Word of God that is 
directed to humanity. Were it not for this aspect there would be no possibility of 
speaking of human participation in revelation.
God speaks to humanity because he chooses to and not because he needs to. There 
is a distinction between what God says to himself and what he says to humanity. 
Barth suggests that, "What.. .[God] says by Himself and to Himself from eternity to 
eternity would really be said just as well and even better without our being there, as 
speech which for us would be eternal silence. Only when we are clear about this 
can we estimate what it means that God has actually, though not necessarily, 
created the world and us, that His love actually, though not necessarily, applies to 
us, that His Word has actually, though not necessarily, been spoken to us."^^
It is God's purpose to speak to us. He wills to speak to us, and his speech bears the 
weight of the one who encompasses our existence. The Word that is spoken to us 
by God is the Word of reconciliation. As we hear the Word of God so we are 
reconciled by the Word of God. He promises Himself as the content of humanity's 
future. He is the one who meets humanity on its way through time as at the end of 
time. Whatever God speaks to humanity he does so as the basis of the renewal of 
humanity's relationship with him. "We can only cling to the fact -  but we must cling 
to it -  that when He spoke it was, and when He will speak it will be, the Word of 
the Lord, the Word of our Creator, our Reconciler, our Redeemer.
"ibid. p.133.
Ibid. p. 140.
" Ibid. p. 143.
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It is possible to hear the words of Scripture -  the human words -  (which may or 
may not be understood) without there being an accompanying event. As such it is 
not the Word of God which has been heard. The Word of God is itself the act of 
God. In the Word is act: God's act is the Word. But this is out of God's freedom. 
When God's Word is heard and proclaimed something occurs which -  for all our 
hermeneutical skill -  cannot be produced by our hermeneutical skill. This act, in 
the freedom of God, is not ours to command.
But when the words of Scripture do become for us the Word of God, when Jesus 
Christ becomes contemporaneous through the Scripture or proclamation, the hearer 
'comes under a lordship'. This Word has a transforming power. Through it is 
created not only new light and a new situation, but a new person who did not exist 
before -  the one who has heard the Word. But all this is new. Humanity is not 
claimed for God on the basis of a possibility latent in creation (which would imply 
that the Fall had not been so radical in its consequences). It is not a matter of 
natural theology but of what Barth calls 'supernatural' theology. However, as 
humanity 'comes under a lordship' the significance of this event opens out to 
encompass every sphere of human existence.
'[S]upematural theology', bearing in mind the power of God's Word, will have to claim the world, 
history, and society as the world, history and society in the midst of which Christ was bom and died 
and rose again. Not in the light o f nature but in the light of grace, there is no self-enclosed and 
protected secular sphere, but only one which is called in question by God's Word, by the Gospel, by 
God's claim, judgment and blessing, and which is only provisionally and restrictedly abandoned to 
its own legalism and its own gods. Wliat the Word says stands whatever the world's attitude to it and 
whether it redound to it for salvation or perdition."
In the humanity of Christ, in the Bible and in proclamation the Word of God is also 
a human act and, therefore, temporal event. Nevertheless, it is in the decision of 
God that God's Word is identical with the humanity of Christ, Holy Scripture, and 
proclamation and, thus, temporal event. But certain distinctions must be made. The 
first is that the Word of God is not a reality in the same way as the so-called 'laws of 
nature'. Indeed, it is not a reality in the way in which we would apply the term to
" Ibid. p. 155.
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other phenomena. This must be said despite the fact that it shares in this reality and 
that we can know the Word of God only in the context of this reality. This must be 
said because, as Barth puts it, "[T]he Word of God is a reality only in its own 
d ec i s io n . "T h e  second is that the Word of God -  unlike created reality -  is not 
universally ascertainable. It is God's decision made in relation to humanity. The 
Word of God retains power over its own self-disclosure like no other object. It is 
new in each new situation and it caimot be anticipated in advance of its reality.
In the Word of God a decision is made, but it is not the choice or the resolve of the 
individual. It is the decision of God in which judgment and acceptance are 
announced in relation to a particular person. There is, also, a decision made on the 
part of the particular person, but this can only be made within the decision of God. 
Barth says: "I am what I am in virtue of the divine decision. In virtue of the divine 
decision I am a believer or an unbeliever in my own decision.
2. The Mystery of God
The speech of God is, in Barth's terminology, a mystery. Crucially, there is no 
possibility of proving the Word of God because there is no external basis upon 
which the Word of God can be judged. In this sense the mystery of God is the 
concealment of God. Here we touch again upon the paradoxical presence of God in 
the form of creaturely reality. When God speaks he uses human words, and because 
he uses human words they can be understood as no more than just that. As Barth 
puts it: "Its form is not a suitable but an unsuitable medium for God's self­
presentation. It does not correspond to the matter but contradicts it."^  ^ If God's 
revelation is really to come to us it must come to us by way of a creaturely reality 
which is de facto opposed to God in its corruption and fallenness. This is to say that 
if the Word of God is to come to us it must come in creaturely form or it will not 
come to us at all.
"ibid. p. 159.
" Ibid. p. 162.
" Ibid. p. 166.
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Even our knowledge of the Word of God is not tlirough reason that has somehow remained pure and 
can thus pierce the mystery o f God in creaturely reality. It is wholly through our fallen reason. The 
place where God's Word is revealed is objectively and subjectively the cosmos in which sin reigns. 
The form of God's Word, then, is in fact the form of the cosmos which stands in contradiction to 
God. It has as little ability to reveal God to us as we have to see God in it. If God's Word is revealed 
in it, it is revealed "through it," o f course, but in such a way that this "through it" means "in spite of 
it.'II t s
Revelation means the incarnation of the Word of God. Implied in this is God’s 
actual entry into secular reality. If God did not speak to us in this way he would not 
speak to us at all. To evade or deny the secularity of the Word of God is to evade 
Christ. God's unveiling of himself in secularity is His grace towards us. The desire 
to know God in a direct way is, therefore, a desire for righteousness by works: 
"We... must cleave to the true and actual Christ as He lies in the crib and in the 
Virgin's lap."^^
In relation to this paradox Barth introduces the conceptuality of 'veiling' and 
'unveiling'. When God's Word is spoken to us it comes to us veiled or unveiled -  
not partly veiled and partly unveiled. We do not receive God's speech as partly God 
and partly human but as wholly God or wholly human -  either veiled in its 
unveiling or unveiled in its veiling. This must always be the case as the secular 
form apart from the divine content cannot be the Word of God. But, equally, the 
divine content without the secular form cannot be the Word of God. The secular 
cannot suffice but nor can it be left behind. The former would give us realistic 
theology, the latter idealistic. Both would be bad theology. The convergence of 
form and content is discernible to God, but not to us: "What is discernible by us is 
always form without content or content without form. Our thinking can be realistic 
or idealistic but it cannot be Christian. Obviously the concept of synthesis would be 
the least Cliristian of all, for it would mean no more and no less than trying to do 
God's miraculous act ou rse lv es .A cco rd in g  to Barth, "believing means either 
hearing the divine content of God's Word even though nothing but the secular form 
is discernible by us or it means hearing the secular form of God's Word even though
"Ibid. p. 166.
" Ibid. p.169.
Ibid. p. 175.
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only its divine content is discernible by us,"^  ^ It is only in the consummation of 
God's purposes for his creation that we will be relieved of this alternation. To 
abandon the indirectness of the knowledge of God is to abandon true faith.
The speech of God is and remains, for us, a mystery. Concluding his account of 
speech as the mystery of God, Barth draws attention to the person of the Holy 
Spirit. "To say Holy Spirit in preaching or theology is always to say a final 
Word."^^ hi Barth's view our hearing of the Word of God is a possibility only in 
and through the miracle which is the work of the Holy Spirit. To say that we can 
only hear the Word of God in faith is the same thing as to say we can only hear the 
Word of God by the Holy Spirit. There is no method whatsoever which can assure 
us of hearing the Word of God as it is not a possibility we have of ourselves. It is 
only by the Holy Spirit -  by faith -  that this is possible. We may speak only of how 
this event -  our hearing of the Word of God -  occurred after the event. In this way 
we may speak of 'experiencing the Word of God', but, as Barth says, the only 
method of which we may speak is the 'method of faith'.
3. The Knowability of the Word of God
Barth prefers to speak of the 'knowability of God' rather than the 'knowledge of 
God'. In so doing he hopes to guard against any idea that there is a method which 
can be adopted in which the knowledge of God may be achieved. "We cannot 
produce this event and so we cannot give the basis for our reference; we could do so 
only by producing the event to which it points and letting it speak for itself.
a) After the Event
The knowability of the Word of God is the presupposition of the church. If this 
were not so both proclamation and dogmatics would be a pointless and meaningless 
activity. So, when we ask about the 'knowability' of God we "look back from the 
knowledge of God and... ask about the presuppositions and conditions on the basis
"Ibid. p. 176.
"  Ibid. p. 182.
" Ibid. p.228.
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of which it comes about that God is known. Revelation is an event in the sphere 
of human experience but it is always a movement from God and all that we say of 
revelation must work from this 'givenness'. "God's revelation breaks through the 
emptiness of the movement of thought which we call our knowledge of God."^^
We do not speak in universal terms here. We do not ask, 'How can all people know 
the Word of God?' because this is not a matter of universality. We do not speak of 
people in general, but rather, we speak very concretely and specifically of people in 
the church. In the context of the church the Word of God is known and therefore 
can be known. This being so, it must have been spoken and it must have come as a 
divine call to specific people.
If the Word of God is addressed to humanity, it is because it is intended that the 
Word of God be known in the sphere of human existence. It is given to men and 
women in order that they may hear it and be transformed by it. Barth does not 
generalise the point and insists that humankind in general has no capacity for 
receiving the Word of God. Barth explicitly rejects the suggestion that God's 
encounter with humanity is to be understood as a human religious experience which 
can be established historically and psychologically -  an experience understood as 
the actualisation of a general demonstrable religious human capacity. Understood 
in this way, knowledge of the Word of God is the actualisation of a specific 
possibility residing in human nature. Barth is fundamentally opposed to the idea 
that the knowledge of God is an anthropological possibility.
Barth does not deny that the Word of God may become an experience for humanity. 
What concerns him is how such an experience can come about. He writes:
There can be no objection in principle to describing this event as "experience" and even as "religious 
experience". The quarrel is not with the term nor with the true and important thing the term might 
finally denote, namely, the supremely real and determinative entry of the Word o f God into the 
reality of man. But the term is burdened -  this is why we avoided it -  with the underlying idea that
"  Barth, K., G. W. Bromiley, et al. (1957). Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of God II. 1. p.63. 
" Ibid. p.74.
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man generally is capable of religious experience or that this capability has the critical significance of 
a norm/^
The issue at stake here is whether or not the event in which the Word of God is 
experienced can be placed alongside other events of human experience. Does it 
require a human potential which must be employed to make it an event? Is it bound 
up with some human property? Barth is clear that the human capacity to hear the 
Word of God cannot be attributed to humanity in general or any human being in 
particular. "God's Word is no longer grace, and grace itself no longer grace, if we 
ascribe to man a predisposition towards this Word, a possibility of knowledge 
regarding it that is intrinsically and independently native to him."^^ The Word 
which God speaks is one of reconciliation between God and humanity and if this 
Word leans upon a human potential then we cannot speak of a radical renewal. 
Such a radical renewal is not possible unless men and women understand 
themselves as sinners living by grace and therefore sinners closed up against God. 
"[Tjhere can be no question of any ability to hear or understand or know on his part, 
of any capability that he the creature, the sinner, the one who waits, has to bring to 
this Word, but that the possibility of knowledge corresponding to the real Word of 
God has come to him, that it represents an inconceivable novum compared to all his 
ability and capability, and that it is to be understood as a pure fact, in exactly the 
same way as the real Word of God itself.
Barth discerns the ubiquitous influence of Renaissance philosopher Descartes in 
'modernist' theology. His proof of the existence of God derives from human self­
certainty. For Barth this will not do. He states, quite emphatically, that in theology 
it is impossible to think along Cartesian lines. "For we do not find the Word of God 
in the reality present to us. Rather -  and this is something quite different -  the 
Word of God finds us in the reality present to us. Again it cannot be produced 
again [sic] out of our direct experience. Whenever we know it, we are rather 
begotten by it according to Jas. 1.18."^  ^ The Word of God, because it is not a 
human possibility (deriving from a human capacity), is grounded and established in
Barth, Bromiley, et al. CD 1.1. p. 193.
"  Ibid. p. 194.
Ibid. p. 194.
Ibid. pp.l95f.
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itself. We do not ask, therefore, of the will or intent of humanity with regard to the 
Word of God but of the will and intent of God. "Men can know the Word of God 
because and in so far as God wills that they know it"^ ®
In explicating his rejection of the 'human possibility' Barth asserts that, "We possess 
no analogy on the basis of which the nature and being of God as the Lord can be 
accessible to us."^  ^ But we do have a concept of lordship. Why should that not be 
extended 'to the infinite and the absolute' of the lordship of God? Barth rejects this 
line of reasoning. Our ideas of lordship cannot help but rather hinder our 
understanding of the lordship of God. "For in the last resort they do not point us to 
God, but to ourselves, to our God-alienated souls, to our threatened life on this side 
of death, to a mere possibility set in the sphere of our c h o o s i n g . I f  we know of 
the lordship of God it is through revelation alone to which our understanding of 
human lordship cannot make any contribution. Barth extends this analysis to reject, 
in the same way, any continuity between our human concepts of creation and 
reconciliation and what we know of God as creator and reconciler through 
revelation.
These observations, which we will take up in the next chapter, underline Barth's 
fundamental rejection of the supposition or speculation that, "behind or above the 
fact of the real knowledge of God there is a kind of empty space which can be filled 
up by assertions of an overlapping doctrine of being and knowledge in general."^^ 
The knowledge of God is known in the event of God making himself known. Apart 
from this event there is neither knowledge of God, nor knowledge that there is no 
knowledge of God.
b) The Fulfilment in Hnmanity
Barth affirms that God is known. Knowledge of God is a possibility for humanity 
because of God's grace and mercy. Barth refers to this as the 'readiness of God'.
Ibid. p. 196.
Barth, Bromiley, et al. CD II. 1. p.75. 
Ibid. p.76.
Ibid. p.65.
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If we are to enquire of the 'readiness of humanity’, as Barth does, it is necessary to 
affirm that this latter 'readiness' is a possibility only insofar as it is encompassed by 
the former. Barth opposes natural theology because it attributes to the readiness of 
humanity an autonomous status. "In its own way all natural theology circles about 
the problem of the readiness of man to know God. It does so in its own way, i.e., by 
elevating the readiness of man into an independent factor, so that the readiness of 
God is not understood as the only one that comes under consideration, nor is the 
readiness of man regarded as included within it, and completely dependent upon 
it."^ "^  However, if  in the readiness of God grace and mercy are bestowed upon 
humanity, the assertion of the readiness of humanity -  qua autonomous humanity -  
is an assertion in defiance of God's grace and mercy. The person who makes such 
an assertion is one "who wants to carry everything, even -  a very atlas -  the whole 
world. Under no circumstances will he let himself be carried. Therefore finally and 
at the deepest level he will always be an enemy of grace and a hater and denier of 
his real neediness."^^
If there is no autonomous readiness there must be, nevertheless, a readiness of 
humanity and as such a positive statement to be made. To reach this positive 
statement we must reach beyond our anthropology and ecclesiology to the readiness 
of humanity which is found in the one individual, Jesus Christ. "In Christian 
doctrine, and therefore in the doctrine of the knowledge and knowability of God, we 
have always to take in blind seriousness the basic Pauline perception of Colossians 
3.3 which is that of all Scripture -  that our life is hid with Christ in God."^^ Here 
the central christological aspect comes decisively into view. Barth explains, "Jesus 
Christ is the knowability of God on our side, as He is the grace of God itself, and 
therefore also the knowability of God on God's side."^  ^ In this it may seem that 
humanity is still left to 'stand outside'^^, but God in Jesus Christ is man, and as a 
consequence, "In our flesh God knows himself. Therefore in Him it is a fact that
Ibid. p. 128. 
Ibid. p. 136. 
Ibid. p. 149. 
Ibid. p. 150.
See ibid. p.151.
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our flesh knows God Himself. In Jesus Christ what is impossible for humanity 
is, nevertheless, fulfilled in humanity.
We have only to speak... die name of Jesus Christ, and in this name we say the one thing, but also 
the most positive thing, which is to be said about man's readiness for God. In Him the enmity of 
man against the grace o f God is overcome, therefore man is no more outside, where God must be 
unknowable to him because he does not accept the grace in which God makes Himself knowable to 
him. He is inside, where God is knowable to Himself, the Father to the Son and the Son to the 
Father, where in the Son, therefore, God is also knowable to him, man."'^ °
The question which now emerges is how humanity can participate in Jesus Christ. 
The answer which Barth gives is that not only has Jesus Christ participated in our 
humanity as an event in time and space and been revelation among us, he now -  and 
for all eternity -  stands before the Father as our representative. "Jesus Christ sees to 
it that in Him and by Him we are not outside but inside. He Himself sees to it that 
His readiness is valid for us who are not identical with Him, and who in ourselves 
are not ready for God. He sees to it that what is true in Him in the height is and 
remains true in our depth.
The readiness of humanity for God is in Jesus Christ. The participation of humanity 
in Jesus Christ is the work of the Holy Spirit. Here we must acknowledge the 
eschatological aspect of the work of the Holy Spirit in human lives: the outpouring 
of the Holy Spirit must be understood as anticipation rather than a fulfilment. We 
walk by faith and not by sight. Barth writes, "Faith does not consist in an inward 
and immanent transformation of man, although there can be no faith without such a 
transformation. Basically, faith is more than all the transformation which follows it. 
As the work of the Holy Spirit it is man's new birth from God, on the basis of which 
man can already live here by what he is there in Jesus Christ and therefore in 
truth.
If humanity knows God there must be a readiness of humanity for God. We have 
established that this is the humanity of God in Jesus Christ. Having touched on the
Ibid. p.151. 
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work of the Holy Spirit in the context of human participation in Christ, we must 
now offer a fuller exposition of the work of the Holy Spirit in God's revelation as 
we find it in Barth's work.
c) The Holy Spirit
As a further explication of what has already been said Barth speaks of the Holy 
Spirit as the subjective reality of revelation. "The revelation of God in its subjective 
reality consists in the existence of men who have been led by God Himself to a 
certain conviction. They believe that the objective reality of revelation exists for 
them. They believe that it exists for them in such a way that they can no longer 
understand their own existence by itself, but only in the light of that reality: not 
apart from it, therefore, but only in relation to it.""^ ^
As christology must follow the fact of Jesus Christ, and has no other grounds, so it 
must be with the work of the Holy Spirit in which the objective reality of revelation 
becomes a subjective reality. We cannot peer behind the event -  we must accept it 
as the point from which we must make our departure. "All that we have to consider 
is that the leap has already been made, the unheard-of and to us impossible leap 
from God to man."^^ If revelation is truly revelation the gap is bridged. "If it really 
is revelation, if it does attain its goal, if there is in fact a revealedness of revelation, 
then necessarily it must be revealed -  and previously was not revealed -  both in the 
being and, in fact, as the being, of men.""^  ^ Thus the objective reality of revelation 
becomes a subjective reality of human beings.
Barth's use of the terms 'objective' and 'subjective' is very particular to his own 
dogmatic development. Because of the givenness of the subjective reality of 
revelation there is a kind of objectivity about this. Barth certainly rules out an 
interpretation in which the reality of revelation is the convergence of the 'divine 
objective giving' and the 'human subjective receiving' if the latter is understood as 
an autonomous act. It must be noted, also, that while in abstraction the 'objective'
Barth, Bromiley, et al. CD 1.2. p.232. 
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and 'subjective' of revelation may be considered separately, the distinction may not 
be made into a separation. Barth writes, "If we think of the subjective as something 
which later has to be added, then necessarily we have thought of the objective as an 
idol.""^  ^But Barth also insists that, "the subjective reality of revelation can as such 
never be made into an independent theme.
Barth starts with the subjective reality of revelation and moves on to the subjective 
possibility of revelation. Again Barth adopts an a posteriori method asking about 
the possibility in the light of the reality. "It is possible as it is real.""^  ^ It is possible 
not because it is a possibility for humanity but because it is a possibility for God in 
the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. Barth identifies three ways in which revelation 
becomes a possibility for humanity in its freedom. Firstly, God's word is brought to 
the hearing of humanity. "The reason, and the only reason, why man can receive 
revelation in the Holy Spirit is that God's Word is brought to his hearing in the Holy 
Spirit. For the capacity of man to do this depends upon the fact, and only upon the 
fact, that it is God's Word which is brought to his hearing in revelation.Secondly, 
God comes to be the saviour of humanity in person and does what humanity is 
incapable of doing. And thirdly, it is because in the outpouring of the Holy Spirit 
the Word of God becomes the master of humanity.
If the subjectivity as well as the objectivity of revelation is of God, what is the 
meaning of the participation of humanity in this possibility? Barth insists that we 
can never comprehend our participation, as something established on our side, but 
we can know that the possibility has been given to us. And it is genuinely our 
participation in the possibility given to us by God and not an eclipsing of our 
humanity. "Participation... does not signify an abolition of our identity with 
ourselves. It is a frightful misunderstanding to try to interpret it along the lines of a 
possession or trance. There are such states, but only when the consciousness of 
identity is removed.
Ibid. p.238. 
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This leads us to a consideration of the theme of experience. We have already noted 
Barth's hesitance about using the terms 'experience' and 'religious experience'. His 
concern is that they are conceived in terms of an autonomous human capacity for 
God. However, against this concern is another which is to acknowledge that the 
Word of God is a reality which becomes determinative in the experience of 
humanity.
4. Religious Experience
As we have seen, according to Barth the knowledge of God's Word becomes 
possible for humanity in the reality of God's Word. If the knowledge of God's 
Word is possible it follows from this that an experience of God's Word is possible. 
Barth affirms this explicitly:
We have defined knowledge as the confirmation of human acquaintance with an object whereby its 
tmth becomes a determination of the existence of the man who has the knowledge. This 
determination of the existence of the man who has the knowledge we call experience. Man does not 
exist abstractly but concretely, i.e., in experiences, in determinations of his existence by objects, by 
things outside him and distinct from him ... If knowledge of God's Word can become possible for 
men, this must mean that they can have experience o f God's Word, that they can be what they are as 
determined by God's Word.^*
Barth affirms in the strongest possible way that the Word of God is grounded and 
established in itself, but this does not mean that (despite the radical distinction 
between God and humanity) it cannot be a reality in the lives of men and women. 
Barth believes that a person cannot know the revelation of God without the Spirit's 
action (the Spirit being the subjective reality and the subjective possibility of 
revelation). Certainly, there is no capacity for God in humanity (there is no analogy 
of being) but there is a possibility for God in his freedom to establish a point of 
contact with human beings (the 'analogy of faith'). This is established in the event 
in which it becomes a reality. As a reality in the lives of men and women the Word 
of God becomes a determination of their lives.
Barth, Bromiley, et al. CD I . l . p. 198.
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Barth reminds us that, "If there is a determination of human existence by God's 
Word, the primary point to be made is that this is not to be confused with a 
determination man can give his own existence. He goes on to explain: "No 
determination man can give himself is as such determination by God's Word. Nor 
is there any place here for the view that this experience is a kind of co-operation 
between divine determining and human self-determining."^^
Rather than setting revelation and experience in opposition, Barth affirms the 
necessity of experience. It is not an immanent human possibility but it is a 
possibility which can be established and made a reality by God. Barth explains: "If 
man lets himself be told by the Word of God that he has a Lord, that he is the 
creature of this Lord, that he is a lost sinner blessed by Him, that he awaits eternal 
redemption and is thus a stranger in this sphere of time, this specific content of the 
Word experienced by him will flatly prohibit him from ascribing the possibility of 
this experience to himself either wholly or in part or from dialectically equating the 
divine possibility actualised in this experience with a possibility of his own."^ "^
Barth has no concern to set up experience and revelation in opposition, as he is 
sometimes accused of doing, or to present them as alternatives. He wishes only to 
establish with clarity that the human self-determination must itself be determined by 
God if in it we are to experience God's Word. "[M]en in their self-determination 
can be determined by God's Word: not just determined by any external factor that 
comes upon them, though naturally this can be true as well, but also determined by 
the Word of God."^^
In his discussion of the experience of the Word of God Barth warns against looking 
exclusively towards any one particular anthropological 'centre' or 'locus'. What is at 
issue here is nothing less than the whole person. "We may quietly regard the will 
and the conscience and feeling and all other possible anthropological centres as 
possibilities of human self-determination and then understand them in their totality
Ibid. p. 199. 
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as determined by the Word of God which affects the whole man."^^ Barth quotes an 
illustration of Eduard Bôhl to clarify his point:
"It is only in appearance that the rainbow stands on the earth, in reality it arches over the earth; true, 
it stoops down to the earth, yet it does not stand on our earth, but is only perceived from it. So it is 
with divine truth: this needs no human support, as the rainbow does not need the earth. True, it 
shines on man and he receives it; yet it is not dependent on man. It withdraws and man remains in 
darkness; it returns and man walks in the light. But man is not its assistant; he cannot produce the 
light; similarly he cannot store it."®’
Barth also deals with the issue of revelation and experience elsewhere. In his 
discussion, in §16, of the Holy Spirit as the subjective possibility of revelation 
Barth asks: "[Wjhat is the significance of this miracle of Jesus Christ actualised in 
us in the outpouring of the Holy Spirit; what is the import of this encounter, so that 
we can and must assert positively that it can confront us, that we do acquire a part 
in the divine possibility which is realised in it?"^  ^ In response to the problem which 
Barth raises here he writes:
[I]t is a question of us taking, receiving, laying hold of, appropriating the share in the divine 
possibility which is allotted to us. Moreover, we can and must realise that this participation is 
achieved in our own experience and activity, in that act of self-determination which we call our 
human existence. This participation has nothing whatever to do with a magical invasion o f the inter­
related totality of our physico-psychical human life by supernatural factors and forces. It does 
signify a limitation and interruption of our existence. Our existence is confronted by something 
outside and over against it, by which it is determined, and indeed totally determined. But it is 
determined as the act o f our self-determination in the totality of its possibilities.®^
For Barth the outpouring of the Holy Spirit of God is the event in which the whole 
person is confronted. It is not the infilling of a 'God-shaped hole' or anything of the 
sort. "Man is confronted in the totality of his own possibilities, and therefore in all 
possible conditions and attitudes... In view of this totality of revelation to us we 
must not refer the revealedness in us to some obscure or even luminous place apart 
from our own experience and activity. We must not refer it to a place where we can
®® Ibid. p.202. 
®’ Ibid. p.223.
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exempt ourselves from all responsibility."^® Revelation is not and cannot be a 
passing by or hovering above; it is the radical confrontation of the human being in 
its totality. It must be regarded as a miracle, for it is no human possibility, but as 
Barth says: "this does not mean that it is not we ourselves who are participators, we 
ourselves in our own experience and activity."^^
In this confrontation there is an 'acknowledgement'. Acknowledgement entails the 
concept of knowledge. Barth believes that the Word of God is primarily and 
predominantly speech -  communication from person to person. It expresses the fact 
that experience of God's Word involves the relation of a person to another person — 
the person of God. Acknowledgement is in the control of the person who 
acknowledges. This means not only subjection to a necessity, but adaptation to the 
meaningfulness of this necessity, approval of it and not just acquiescence. Here we 
refer to the purposiveness of God's Word and to its content as the Word of the Lord
-  the Word of humankind's Creator, Reconciler and Redeemer. Barth says that the 
Word of God does not break people but it does bend them in order to bring them 
into conformity with itself.
Human acknowledgement of the Word of God is human approval of the Word of 
God. However, the acknowledgment is not established on the basis of persuasion 
between equals. In this acknowledgement there is a yielding of the one who 
acknowledges before the one acknowledged. This is submission to authority. Barth 
insists that this does not contradict self-determination, but it does mean that the 
human self-determination takes place in a particular place in and at a particular 
point. It finds its beginning and its basis in another higher determination. He 
writes: "In the act of acknowledgement, the life of man, without ceasing to be the 
self-determining life of this man, has now its centre, its whence, the meaning of its 
attitude, and the criterion whether this attitude really has the corresponding meaning
-  it has all this outside itself, in the thing or person acknowledged. So far as it has 
all this, it has it from the thing or person acknowledged."®^ There is a human 
appropriation of the Word of God but this is a possibility only as God gives it to be
Ibid. p.267. 
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a possibility in the Holy Spirit: "Therewith we are... brought up against the frontier 
of what we can say about experience of God's Word as such. The final thing to be 
said is that while the attitude of acknowledgement vis-à-vis God's Word is really an 
attitude of man, an act of his self-determination, nevertheless it is the act of that 
self-determination of man whose meaning and basis, whose final seriousness and 
true content, whose truth and reality, cannot be ascribed to man himself but only to 
his determination by the Word of God."®^
Barth is aware that many evangelicals will go along with him in his doctrine of 
revelation insofar as he affirms that there can be no faith unless God bestows it. 
But disagreement arises when Barth insists that faith must always come anew and 
can never become a possession:
Tell them... that for man generally, for man without faith or before faith, the epistemological order 
must... be from God to man, that without preceding revelation there can be no faith, and they will 
concede your point, not yet being affected themselves. But tell them that this epistemological order 
applies also and particularly to the religious man, that he also and particularly has no possibility, not 
even a received possibility, but can only receive the possibility of experience o f God's Word, can use 
it only as it is conferred in the actuality of reception, tell them that this possibility is and remains 
God's possibility and does not pass out o f His hands into any other hands, tell them this and at once 
bitter and irreconcilable controversy breaks out. When we tell them this, when we oppose to that 
thesis OUI" counterthesis, which is separated from it only by a blade's breath and yet by a chasm's 
depth, then an impressive majority among both the leaders and the led in the modem Evangelical 
Church is passionately against us.®'*
This view, which Barth opposes, he calls, 'indirect Christian Cartesianism'.®® It is 
'indirect' in the sense that it does not look to itself but to the God who gives. But in 
the giving there is what Barth describes as an "influxus" into the one to whom God 
speaks. In the acknowledgement of the Word of God there is, associated with it, a 
possession: 'revelation' passes from God to humanity. Barth opposes this view.
If this 'indirect Christian Cartesianism' were true to the reality of the Word of God -  
if we were dealing with the possibility of knowledge of things which enter into the
® Ibid. p.208.
®"* Ibid. p.213.
®® Ibid. p.214.
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human sphere -  it would be appropriate and reasonable to seek out the appropriate 
experts and specialists as it would be in any other field. But with regard to the 
possibility of the knowledge of the Word of God Barth insists that the situation is 
different. There are certainly experts -  theologians and dogmaticians -  who reflect 
upon the echo of its reality in the event of experiencing it. But if, in doing this, 
there is suggested an infusion, a problem immediately arises: "When we try to find 
the content of divine Spirit in the (pardoned) consciousness of man, are we not like 
the man who wanted to scoop out in a sieve the reflection of the beautiful silvery 
moon found in a pond?"®®
This is a key issue for Barth. He wishes to affirm that there is a human 
acknowledgment of what comes to humanity firom God in his revelation. But if 
what comes also remains as a human possession, how will it be possible to sustain 
that this is God's free and sovereign activity in a fallen cosmos which is alienated 
from him? God retains power over his self-disclosure completely. Humanity 
cannot, by any means, come to know God if he does not give himself to be known.
Human acknowledgement of the Word of God may be regarded as part of the 
sphere of human religious history. As such it is susceptible to being interpreted as 
an aspect of the cultural life of humanity and an entirely this-worldly attempt to 
establish religious culture as an element of civilisation. As such it is human 
endeavour -  human work. But human acknowledgement cannot be taken in this 
way. Barth warns, "If we cling to what we can affirm and investigate as the human 
acknowledgement of God's Word, to what can be experienced in Christian 
experience, where shall we find there the criterion by which to distinguish this 
experience fi*om others, the authentic firom the inauthentic? What is there to stop us 
interpreting everything in terms of the religious, the cultural, the human generally, 
or finally indeed the biological?"®^ The point which Barth emphasises is that it is 
not what humanity can establish as such which distinguishes what must be said of 
the event in which the Word of God becomes the determination of human existence.
®® Ibid. p.216.
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As man knows God's Word, all that we have said about this act can be and is experienced. It 
becomes real and can be established psychologically. There takes place an understanding, a personal 
involvement, an acceptance, an assent, an approval, a making present of remote times, an obedience, 
a decision, a halting before the mystery, a stimulation by the inner life, the basing of man's whole life 
on this mystery that is beyond himself. All this takes place and has to do so... But the fact that all 
this happens and must happen does not mean in the least that the possibility o f experience of God's 
Word is to be seen and found in this event, that in it human self-determination becomes the opposite 
pole of the divine determination, that man becomes a "word-bound ego" in contemplation of which 
we must orientate ourselves in the question of the Word of God.®®
God calls us in the totality of our human existence, but no response to this call can 
be conceived as being a counterpart to the event which God initiates. In this way 
the Word of God is a limit. It is not possible to look behind it and, insofar as human 
self-determination does happen in acknowledgment of God's Word -  in the human 
experience of God's Word -  it will not be able to understand itself, if it is real. As 
Barth puts it:
It will just be true from God that human existence is engaged here in acknowledgement of the Word 
of God. For it will be true that God has spoken and man has heard. A new, regenerate man will 
arise in the act o f this acknowledgement as the man whom God has addressed and who hears God, 
unknown, of course, to himself and others, in a newness that cannot be ascertained, for what can be 
ascertained in him will always be the old, not possessing himself, for to the extent that he possesses 
himself he certainly does not possess this regenerate man.®®*
The knowability of God's Word is only to be found within God's Word. It can take 
place as an event but it cannot be explained. We cannot anticipate it; but we can 
know it when it comes into view for us. "The knowability of the Word of God 
stands or falls, then, with the act of its real knowledge, which is not under our 
control."^® In experiencing the Word of God we turn away from ourselves because 
we are orientated towards the Word of God. God makes himself known to us and, 
thus, we are moved. This is the knowability of the Word of God: recollection of 
the event in which it came into view and expectation that God will again, in his self­
manifestation, come into view.
®® Ibid.pp.219f.
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If a man, the Church, Church proclamation and dogmatics think they can handle the Word and faith 
like capital at their disposal, they simply prove thereby that they have neither the Word nor faith. 
When we have them, we do not regard them as a possession but strain after them, hungering and 
thirsting, and for that reason blessed. The same is true of the possibility o f knowledge of God's 
Word. When we know it, we expect to know it. The assurance o f its affirmation is thus the 
assurance o f its expectation -  the expectation which rests on its previous presence, on the 
apprehended promise, or, as we can already say here, on received and believed baptism -  but still the 
expectation.’*
In this way Barth shows that one must let go of the assurance that one brings 
oneself in order to be thrown back completely on God's grace. In this we see the 
dynamic of faith in assurance and expectation.
5. Faith
We must briefly consider Barth's treatment of the Word of God and faith. Faith is 
experience; a particular experience of a particular person at a particular time. Faith 
refers to the Word, Christ. Jesus Christ presents himself to faith as its object. Faith 
is faith by virtue of the fact that this object is given:
[T]his object is the free God who is hidden from man because he is a sinner, who has, o f course, put 
man in the new state of faith in which He can be known by him, but who in this very state -  it is 
indeed that of faith -  wills to be sought and found anew and then anew again. For Faith, He is and 
remains enclosed in objectivity, in the extemahty o f the Word of God, in Jesus Christ. He must 
teach man to seek Him and He must show Himself to him in order that he may find Him. But it is by 
this external object that the Christian faith lives.’^
Barth explicitly rejects a symmetrical formulation in which faith is the human 
contribution to the knowledge of God -  humanity's addition to the act of God. But 
Barth says: "What makes Him the true God is that one believes in Him in true faith. 
And the fact that the faith in which the true God is believed is true faith is not due in 
any way or in any sense to itself but to the fact that the true God has revealed 
Himself to it, i.e., it is due to the Word of God."^^ Barth insists that it is quite plain
’* Ibid. p.225.
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that faith has nothing to do with the shifting of the reality of faith from its object to 
the believing subject:
[0]ne may say of the knowability o f the Word of God given in the event o f faith that it is not a 
possibility which man for his part brings to real knowledge, nor is it a possibility which in real 
knowledge accrues to man from some source as an enrichment of his existence. But as faith has its 
absolute and unconditional beginning in God's Word independently o f the inborn or acquired 
characteristics and possibilities of man, and as it, as faith, never in any respect lives from or by 
anything other than the Word, so it is in every respect with the knowability of the Word o f God into 
which we are now inquirmg.’'*
We must not conceive of the knowability of the Word of God as some extraordinary 
art or skill. Its practice does not presuppose a special natural or supernatural facility 
or capacity. The Word of God comes as grace in God's freedom and it does not 
come according to the condition of the recipient. This is the scandal of the Gospel:
The believer is the same ungifted and idle or gifted and busy man he was as an unbeliever and may 
become again. He believes as the man he is, with the inventory corresponding to his condition. 
There is no question o f an altering or abasing of his existence; what is at issue is the grace or 
judgment of God on his existence... It is all highly extraordinary, o f course, in so fai" as the Word of 
God becomes the truth here to this man and his knowledge. But whether extraordinary or not it is at 
least a possibility given to us, a possibility given for use, not for putting in an inventory or catalogue, 
not for storing on ice or placing in a museum.’®
In faith there is a sense in which humanity conforms to God. This is not deification, 
but an adaptation of humanity to the Word of God. In faith a person really does 
receive the Word of God and has been made able to receive it. But this ability is 
not his or her own but is on loan from God. Again this is essential if there is to be 
real knowledge of the Word of God -  if there is to be a point of contact between 
God and humanity. "There can be no receiving of God's Word unless there is 
something common to the speaking God and hearing man in this event, a similarity 
for all the dissimilarity implied by the distinction between God and man, a point of 
contact between God and man, if  we may now adopt this term too."^ ®
Ibid. p.236.
’® Ibid. p.237.
’® Ibid. p.238.
Page 30
And so, despite rejecting the possibility of receiving the Word of God on the basis 
of an acquired or native capacity of man, Barth affirms that there is, indeed, a point 
of contact which God makes possible; he must make this possible if a person is to 
receive the Word of God. At this point in his argument Barth makes reference to 
the image of God in humanity. Barth believes that the imago Dei in humanity is not 
merely distorted but totally annihilated. Humanity has totally lost its capacity for 
God. The possibility that comes through faith is not one which provides the basis 
for any common ground for discussion with philosophical and theological 
anthropology:
The image of God in man o f which we must speak here and which forms the real point of contact for 
God's Word is the rectitudo which through Christ is raised up from real death and thus restored or 
created anew, and which is real as man's possibility for the Word of God. The reconciliation o f man 
with God in Christ also includes, or already begins with, the restitution of the lost point of contact. 
Hence this point of contact is not real outside faith; it is real only in faith. In faith man is created by 
the Word o f God for the Word o f God, existing in the Word of God and not in himself, not in virtue 
of his humanity and personality, not even on the basis o f creation, for that which by creation was 
possible for man in relation to God has been lost by the fall. Hence one can only speak theologically 
and not both theologically and also philosophically of this point o f contact, as o f all else that is real 
in faith, i.e., through the grace of reconciliation."”
This new possibility which faith brings is a new person. Romans 6.3f suggests that 
this is to be understood in terms of 'death' and 're-birth', and a new birth which is 
from God. But Barth is clear, as we have seen, that we cannot think of this 're-birth' 
as something which becomes a human possession: it is not a received status which 
is acquired and established. "The statement about the indwelling of Christ that 
takes place in faith must not be turned into an anthropological statement.
What happens in faith is a 'capacity' of the 'incapable'. And, although the event of 
God's revelation can never become a human possession, the reality of it is not 
without its effect. Indeed, Barth suggests, "The proof of the knowability of the 
Word consists in confessing it. In faith and confession the Word of God becomes a 
human thought and a human word, certainly in infinite dissimilarity and
”  Ibid. p.239.
”  Ibid. p.240.
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inadequacy, yet not in total alienation from its real prototype, but a true copy for all 
its human and sinful perversion, an unveiling of it even as its veiling."^® Barth says 
of the believing person that they have not 'conle to faith'; 'faith has come to them'. 
The believer does not adopt faith; faith adopts them. The believer cannot be seen as 
the acting subject. However, although the Word is given to the believer, the 
believer's response is not passive. In faith we must in freedom become the people 
who apart from faith we were not free to be. We must participate in the revelation 
of God.
6. The Community of the Church and the Word of God
In the context of his discussion of the Holy Spirit as the subjective reality of 
revelation Barth touches on the church as the community of the Word of God. This 
is a theme which is explored in surprisingly modest scope. However, what Barth 
has to say at this point is certainly of significance and the importance of the theme 
will be developed later in the thesis.
It must be recognised that the church does not establish its members as the 
recipients of revelation. And because one is outside the church does not mean that 
one is excluded from receiving God's revelation. On the one hand, in the New 
Testament and in the Old Testament in particular, there are those who appear 'at the 
given place' (in the church or as members of the Israelite nation) and yet appear not 
to be recipients of revelation. On the other hand, however, "in the Old Testament... 
figures are constantly turning up, who, quite away from the given place, outside the 
nation of Israel, seem nevertheless to have become genuine recipients of God's 
revelation."^® Barth suggests that, "this last possibility appears more and more to 
have the significance of a corrective. Those who perhaps boast of their membership 
instead of boasting in God must be checked and shamed. Those who within its 
membership do not become recipients of revelation must be given a sign of 
judgment."^^
”  Ibid. p.241.
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In addition to this point we must note an asymmetry in the relationship between 
God and the church. The church is bound to the Word of God in a way which must 
be distinguished radically from the way in which the Word is bound to the church. 
As Barth notes elsewhere, the Word is bound to the church, "only so far as the 
Word, in once bestowing itself upon the Church, has bound itself to it as promise 
for the future.Returning,  now, to 1.2 Barth writes:
While God is as little bound to the Church as to the Synagogue, the recipients o f His revelation are. 
They are what they are because the Church is what it is, and because they are in the Church and not 
apart from the Church and not outside the Church. And when we say "Church" we do not mean 
merely the inward and invisible coherence of those whom God in Christ calls His own, but also the 
outward and visible coherence of those who have heard m time, and have confessed to their hearing, 
that in Christ they are God's. The reception of revelation occurs within, not without, this twofold 
coherence. 8^3
Implicit in this is that although God may choose to reveal himself outside the 
synagogue and the church (and that is, of course, God's business and not ours) the 
life of the community is of central importance. Barth himself makes this explicit in 
his comment that, "Not secondarily, but primarily and radically, [the life of the 
children of God]... is the life of a c o m m u n i t y .T h e  church corresponds, on the 
human side, with the objective reality of revelation in Jesus Christ. The church, 
despite the fact that it is a human institution, cannot be regarded as the product of 
humanity. "Although it is in the world, it cannot be thought of as owing its 
existence to this world. Although we are in the Church, are indeed ourselves the 
Church, the Church cannot be thought of otherwise than as the reality of God's 
revelation for us, i.e., it is in strict relation to the revelation of God in us, it is in 
complete subordination to it, yet in that relation and subordination it is equally 
revelation, it is equally God's own act."^ ®
The existence of the church cannot be understood apart from the outpouring of the 
Holy Spirit. This is the mystery of Pentecost: "the gift which men who themselves 
are not Christ now receive in their entire humanity for Christ's sake, the gift of
82 Barth, Bromiley, et al. CD ILL p.5. 
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existing from Christ's standpoint for Christ and unto Christ, "the power to become 
the sons of God" (Jn. 1^ )^."^ ® It is in the power of the Holy Spirit that the church 
proclaims the source of its life and it is to the theme of the church's proclamation 
that we now turn.
7. Proclamation
As we noted at the beginning of the chapter, Bonhoeffer spoke of the Word as the 
'inexpressible'. But it is just this inexpressible Word that must be proclaimed by the 
church. This is Barth's understanding of the task of the church also, but what is 
'proclamation'? Barth answers: "Proclamation is human speech in and by which 
God Himself speaks like a king through the mouth of His herald, and which is 
meant to he heard and accepted as speech in and by which God Himself speaks."^^ 
The proclamation of the church, while remaining a creaturely voice, becomes the 
means by which God makes himself known. God makes himself real in the 
proclamation of the church.
As such human talk about God must desire to serve the Word of God if it is to be 
proclamation and it must point to a prior utterance by God himself. The 
proclamation cannot, as a human act, assume or presume that it is itself the Word of 
God; it can only take up the task. Creaturely utterance about God (intended as 
proclamation) is not itself grace, but it is placed in the service of grace. As a 
consequence, "[P]roclamation is not asked concerning its formal or material 
perfection, since even the highest possible perfection would not make human 
utterance proclamation, nor could the least imposing prevent it from being 
proclamation. It is simply asked whether it is service, whether it is 
commissioned."^^
One can gain the impression that, for Barth, proclamation is to be exclusively 
identified with the preaching of the church. This might be reinforced by his 
trenchant criticism of the practice of the Roman Catholic Church in which Barth
®® Ibid. pp.221f.
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perceived an overemphasis on the Mass and insufficient emphasis on preaching. 
However, despite the priority which he attaches to oral proclamation Barth does say 
that, "what we are to understand by "proclamation of the Word of God" is primarily 
and decisively preaching and the s a c ra m e n t s .A n d ,  turning to what is beyond 
what is 'primary' Barth claims, "The other, sacrificial and generally responsive 
elements in the Church's life may also be proclamation."®® We shall have much to 
say of these 'other elements' later in the thesis.
We must remember that what Barth works towards at this point in the Church 
Dogmatics is an understanding of the relation between proclamation and dogmatics. 
For Barth the role of dogmatics is the humble questioning and testing of what the 
church intends as proclamation. To the extent that human words are intended as the 
means by which God will reveal himself to the church they are to be considered as 
proclamation and the concern of the dogmatician. In this way the practical or 
pastoral theology of the church come into view as do its liturgy and hymnody. 
Indeed, Barth makes the tart comment, "It is a strange thing that when there are 
revisions of books of order and hymn-books in the Evangelical churches every 
possible authority is usually consulted as a standard but not dogmatic science. The 
results naturally correspond."®^
Of course, the church is not in a position to question its own proclamation in an 
absolute way, and therefore it cannot correct its proclamation in an absolute way. 
However, this does not preclude the possibility of a self-critical stance of church 
vis-à-vis its proclamation and this is the service which dogmatics has to offer to the 
church. We will give further consideration to Barth's understanding of the place of 
dogmatics at the end of this chapter.
God is not obliged to use what the church intends as proclamation, nor is God 
limited to using what the church intends as proclamation. The proclamation of the 
church is a means of grace but the decision regarding its use resides in the sovereign 
freedom of God. God will do what God will do in his freedom: "God may speak to
Ibid. p.80. Our emphasis.
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us through Russian Communism, a flute concerto, a blossoming shrub, or a dead 
dog. We do well to listen to Him if He really does."®^
Barth criticises 'modernist’ dogmatics for its lack of awareness that God must 
constantly say something to humanity which it is unable to say to itself. Barth sees 
in such dogmatics humanity speaking to itself. Here proclamation is conceived as 
an expression of the life of the community known as the church. It is an expression 
in which it draws from the treasures of those in the church and the interpretation of 
its own life. This is a view which Barth rejects. He comments: "Is it not plain that 
there is here a fateful confusion between the man of the present, the man of the 
regnum gratiae, and the man of eternal glory, who... neither needs nor will need 
any special talk about God, and consequently any being addressed by God, and 
consequently any Church? If we are not this man, whence does the Modernist 
doctrine get its legal ground?"®®
We must now turn to Barth's exposition of the forms in which God's revelation is 
mediated to humanity in terms of the scheme of his 'threefold form'. Barth begins 
this theme by taking up again the theme of the church's proclamation.
8. The Word of God in its Threefold Form
In the event of revelation that which is creaturely becomes the means by which God 
reveals himself to humanity. In this way creaturely realities come to serve the 
purpose of God and achieve, in the grace of God, that which they have no power to 
do according to their own nature. As we have already noted, this is not only the 
way in which revelation does come to us, it is the way in which revelation must 
come if it is to reach us. God's revelation is mediated through creaturely realities.
It is appropriate to make a distinction between what God says to himself and what 
he says to humanity. In the former we are concerned with God's primary objectivity 
and in the latter, God's secondary objectivity. "In His triune life as such,
^  Ibid. p.55. Barth does not hereby imply that these are the places in which we might anticipate that 
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93 Ibid. p.64.
Page 36
objectivity, and with it knowledge, is divine reality before creaturely objectivity and 
knowledge exist. We call this the primary objectivity of God, and distinguish from 
it the secondary, i.e., the objectivity which He has for us too in His revelation, in 
which He gives Himself to be known by us as He knows Himself."®"  ^ It is important 
to note that the former is to be differentiated from the latter, "not by a lesser degree 
of truth, but by its particular form suitable for us, the creature."®®
a) The Word of God Preached
Here Barth considers the relation between 'real proclamation' and the church's 
preaching. Four points can be made:
Firstly, the church's proclamation is visible as the bread and wine of communion are 
visible. However, "They are not simply and visibly there... as what they want to be 
and should be, as theologically relevant entities, as realities of revelation and faith. 
They have ever and again to come into being as this."®® As proclamation does 
become 'what it wants to be and should be' several things can be said of it. In the 
first place it must be the Word of God which commissions the proclamation rather 
than a scale of values immanent in human existence. There will be human 
motivations but no proclamation is authentic unless over and above such 
motivations it rests on a commission which the church can only receive and have in 
the act of receiving.
Secondly, the Word of God must be the theme given to proclamation, if it is to be 
real proclamation. In this we are not saying that the Word of God is primarily the 
object of human perception, although it must become an object of human perception 
if it is to be proclaimed. Real proclamation does not rest in the fact that it is the 
object of human perception but in the fact that it is the Word of God -  which can 
never be our possession.
^ Barth, Bromiley, et al. CD II. 1. p. 16.
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Thirdly, the Word of God must judge the proclamation. There are no criteria by 
which we can ultimately substantiate the reality of proclamation. Its truth is given 
in itself as the act of God. The criterion is the Word of God. This may be both 
recollected and expected, but it is not at our disposal. We are not able to handle the 
criterion. The criterion must handle itself.
Finally, and crucially for Barth, the Word of God must be event: the event in which 
proclamation becomes real proclamation. This is the condition sine qua non if 
proclamation is to be true proclamation. Barth writes, "It is the miracle of 
revelation and faith when the misunderstanding does not constantly recur, when 
proclamation is for us not just human willing and doing characterised in some way 
but also and primarily and decisively God's own act, when human talk about God is 
for us not just that, but also and primarily and decisively God's own speech."®^
In his exposition of proclamation Barth is careful to guard against docetism. If 
proclamation is real proclamation it is speech which follows the speech of God -  
but it is concretely human speech which follows the divine speech:
The miracle o f real proclamation does not consist in the fact that the willing and doing of 
proclaiming man with all its conditioning and in all its problems is set aside, that in some way a 
disappearance takes place and a gap arises in the reality of nature, and that in some way there steps 
into this gap naked divine reality scarcely concealed by a mere remaining appearance of human 
reality... The willing and doing of proclaiming man... is not in any sense set aside in real 
proclamation. As Christ became true man and rerrmins true man to all eternity, real proclamation 
becomes an event on the level o f all other human events
b) The Word of God Written
Barth explains that proclamation must be ventured in recollection of previous 
revelation and in expectation of revelation in the future. In other words church 
proclamation is based both upon the belief that revelation has already taken place 
and that it will take place again. What kind of recollection is in mind here? Could 
it be the recollection of a revelation immanent in humanity's existence (a natural
”  Ibid. p.93.
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and original awareness of God)? Barth says that we cannot dismiss this possibility 
a priori. "The concept of divine freedom of potency provides no reason why this 
should be impossible."®® However, Barth continues, "The real reason is that God 
did not make this specific use of His freedom and potency."^®® In support of his 
view Barth points to the fact that the church does not appeal to itself as the source 
of the divine Word in support of the proclamation it seeks to make. It does not look 
to any hidden depths of its own. The church looks to itself only insofar as it looks 
to its own transcendent being -  Jesus Christ -  the one who establishes its existence. 
"He is immanent in it [the church] only as He is transcendent to it. This is the fact 
which makes the recollection of God's past revelation different from reflection on 
its own timeless ground of being. It has pleased God to be its God in another way 
than that o f pure immanence.
The church is confronted by the Scripture and in this confrontation it is reminded 
that recollection of revelation relates not to a timeless truth immanent in the church 
but to the scriptural canon. Barth emphasises that proclamation cannot be 'free- 
floating' and does not 'start from scratch' but recollects a specific revelation in 
history which is quite distinct from the church.
With its acknowledgement of the presence o f the Canon the Church expresses the fact that it is not 
left to itself in its proclamation, that the commission on the ground of which it proclaims, the object 
which it proclaims, the judgment under which its proclamation stands and the event of real 
proclamation must all come from elsewhere, from without, and very concretely from without, in all 
the externality of the concrete Canon as a categorical imperative which is also historical, which 
speaks in time.*®’
It is not the words of Holy Scripture per se, which are primary. These words are a 
deposit of the words of proclamation originally spoken by prophet and apostle. 
Barth quotes, with hearty approval, the words of Martin Luther: "The Gospel 
simply means a preaching and crying out loud of God's grace and mercy merited 
and won by the Lord Jesus Christ with His death. And it is properly not what stands 
in books or is made up of letters, but rather an oral preaching and lively word and
Ibid. p. 100.
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voice that rings out in the whole world and is publicly cried out loud that it may 
everywhere be heard.
Barth distinguishes between canonical Scripture and the on-going proclamation of 
the church by pointing to the supremacy and 'absolutely constitutive significance' of 
the former over the latter. He goes on to write, "if the Church is not alone in respect 
of its proclamation but finds itself in a concrete confrontation in which it is mindful 
of the past revelation of God, and if the concrete form of its opposite is really the 
biblical word of the prophets and apostles, then obviously the latter must have a 
fundamental distinction in relation to it."^ ®"^
The thrust of Barth's argument here is not to give reasons for his positioning of the 
canon of Scripture in relation to the proclamation of the church so much as present 
it as an event which is to be described. To the question, 'Why does the Canon, 
comprising the Old and New Testaments, have this authority?' Barth answers:
It is the Canon because it imposed itself upon the Church as such, and continually does so. The 
Church's recollection o f God's past revelation has the Bible specifically as its object because in fact 
this object and no other is the promise of future divine revelation which can make proclamation a 
duty for the Church and which can give it joy and courage for this duty. If  we thought we could say 
why this is so, we should again be acting as if  we had in our hands a measure by which we could 
measure the Bible and on this basis assign it its distinctive position. Our ultimate and decisive 
wisdom would then be... the wisdom o f a self-dialogue, even if  a self-dialogue about the Bible. No, 
the Bible is the Canon just because it is so.*®®
Canonical Scripture is, or becomes, the Word of God in exactly the same way that 
real proclamation is, or becomes, the Word of God. It is an event, and can be 
understood only as an event. But the fact that God's own address becomes the 
human Word of the Bible is God's concern and not ours. In this way, as in 
proclamation, the Bible is God's Word to the extent that God causes it to be his 
Word, to the extent that he speaks through it. The point is not that we can grasp the 
words o f the Bible, but the Bible grasps us by being the Word o f God.
*®’ Ibid. p. 102.
*®“* Ibid. p.102.
*®® Ibid. p. 107. Our emphasis.
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c) The Word of God Revealed
In view of what has been said in the previous two sections about the Word 
proclaimed and written, it is clear that neither Scripture nor proclamation are in and 
of themselves revelation. The Bible is not God's past revelation and church 
proclamation is not expected future revelation. The Bible is God's Word as it really 
bears witness to revelation, and proclamation is God's Word as it really promises 
revelation. Indeed, we dishonour the Bible if we equate it with revelation. It is 
only in the event of God's Word that revelation and the Bible become one. Barth 
writes, "[T]he revelation to which the biblical witnesses direct their gaze as they 
look and point away from themselves is to be distinguished from the word of the 
witnesses in exactly the same way as an event itself is to be distinguished from even 
the best and most faithful account of it. But this distinction is trifling compared 
with the fact, for which there is no analogy, that in revelation our concern is with 
the coming Jesus Christ and finally, when the time was fulfilled, the Jesus Christ 
who has come."^ ®®
The Bible attests to what has happened truly and once-for-all: the Word became 
flesh -  our flesh. For Barth the Bible is a fallible human word but it possesses 'the 
most unheard-of authority'^®  ^because it bears witness to the supreme event in which 
God becomes one with alienated humanity in order to bring salvation.
Barth illuminates further the relationship between the first two categories (the Word 
proclaimed and written) and the third (the Word revealed) when he writes: "If 
"written" and "preached" denote the twofold concrete relation in which the Word of 
God is spoken to us, revelation denotes the Word of God itself in the act of it being 
spoken in time. Above this act there is nothing other or higher on which it might be 
based or from which it might be derived unless it was from the transcendence of the 
eternal Word of God that it came forth in revelation. It is the condition which 
conditions all things without itself being c o n d i t i o n e d .For Barth, revelation is 
not something different from Jesus Christ or the reconciliation which was
Ibid. p. 113.
*®’ See ibid. p. 116. 
108 Ibid. p. 118. Our emphasis.
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accomplished in him. "To say revelation is to say "The Word became flesh."" 
Jesus Christ speaks for himself. He requires no witness other than the witness of 
the Holy Spirit.
In concluding his discussion about the Word of God in its threefold form Barth 
suggests that the Word preached, written and revealed corresponds to -  or may be 
substituted by -  the names of the divine persons -  Father, Son and Holy Spirit. In 
this way Barth makes an early link between the doctrine of revelation and that of 
the trinity. This is an interesting suggestion although one wonders whether this 
'reading-off of a trinitarian doctrine from the exposition of revelation is 
substantially supplemented by the 'reading-in' of a prior trinitarianism. The 
consistent and rigorous implementation of an a posteriori method is not easy to 
maintain.
9. The Task of Dogmatics
In answer to the question, 'What is dogmatics?' Barth answers that it is reflection 
upon and examination of the distinctive talk about God in the context of the church. 
Dogmatics, in following and questioning the language of the church, has for its 
measure, 'its own source and object'. If we ask what is this 'source and object' we 
must answer, 'the revelation of God'.
Dogmatics is not the revelation of God; indeed, it is always a fallible human 
exercise. It must be conducted in the obedience of grace by the standard of what 
has been given to it by God. It does not anticipate, it responds; it does not proceed 
a priori, but a posteriori
Is dogmatics a science? Barth suggests that dogmatics does not need to legitimate 
itself as a science at all, but it does describe itself as a science because it has no 
interest in segregating itself from other pursuits of human knowledge that bear this 
name. As a science its object must be clearly stated: "Its scientific character 
consists in its orientation, in its conscious orientation, in what must always be its
Ibid. p. 119.
At least this is the methodological ideal to which dogmatics ought to aspire.
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conscious orientation, to the question of dogma which is raised by the existence of 
the Church."^
As such dogmatics, like other sciences, is a human endeavour with its own definite 
object of knowledge; it follows its own definite and self-consistent path to 
knowledge and must be able to give an account of that path. Dogmatics may learn 
from the rigour practised in other sciences but is not subject to their methods, it 
certainly must not justify itself on the basis of alien scientific method. Its object 
must determine its method. Indeed, the only way in which dogmatics can prove its 
own scientific character is by devoting itself to the task of knowledge as determined 
by its actual theme.
Barth suggests three practical (we might say pragmatic) reasons why we should 
describe theology as a science:
• as a human concern for truth it recognises its solidarity with disciplines 
which are concerned with other areas of reflection
• so as not to resign its title to others and remind the academy of the Christian 
church
• to show that it does not take the secularity of the other sciences seriously 
enough to place itself under a separate name
Dogmatics is the science of dogma. Dogmatic enquiry presupposes that the true 
content of Christian talk about God can be known by human beings. It makes this 
assumption in and with the church's affirmation of Jesus Christ as the revealing and 
reconciling address of God to man. This is a point which is of crucial significance 
for Barth. Dogmatics is concerned with what is given to it in this revelation, and 
with this alone. Barth writes of the discipline of dogmatics: "[I]t does not have to 
begin by finding or inventing the standard by which it measures. It sees and 
recognises that this is given with the Church. It is given in its own peculiar way, as
111 Barth, Bromiley, et al. CD I . l . p.275.
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Jesus Christ is given, as God in His revelation gives Himself to faith. But it is 
given. It is complete in itself.
God's revelation becomes an event in human life and existence. As this event is 
apprehended in faith it may, and indeed must, be spoken of as a kind of echo of the 
event. But all Christian speech must be tested according to its conformity to Christ, 
and it must be said and understood that this conformity is never clear and 
unambiguous. This distinction between the event of God's revelation and human 
participation must be clearly grasped. The 'echo' is a matter of human enquiry:
It knows the light which is intrinsically perfect and reveals everything in a flash. Yet it knows it 
only in the prism o f this act, which, however radically or existentially it may be understood, is still 
human act, which in itself is no kind o f surety for the correctness of the appropriation in question, 
which is by nature fallible and therefore stands in need of criticism, of correction, o f critical 
amendment and repetition. For this reason that creaturely form which the revealing action of God 
assumes in dogmatics is never that of knowledge attained in a flash, which it would have to be to 
correspond to the divine gift, but a laborious movement ftom one partial human insight to another 
with the intention though with no guarantee of advance.
Barth insists that the truth comes, but it is not a stable datum which we hold in our 
possession. It is necessary to start time and again. Therefore the task of dogmatics 
is not to set out a number of truths of revelation already to hand which have been 
expressed once for all and the meanings of which are authentically defined. "The 
freely acting God Himself and alone is the truth of revelation."
Two things follow from this. Firstly: the church is not the recipient of a fixed body 
of knowledge which is defined and delimited. As such, it does not ask what the 
apostles and prophets said, but what we must say on the basis of what they said. 
The authority of the tradition is not an infallible authority. Secondly: dogmatics is 
not possible apart from the act of faith. Without faith it would be irrelevant and 
meaningless because it is only in faith that the revelation of God is known.
Ibid. p. 12.
Ibid. p. 14.
Ibid. p. 15.
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We have already expounded Barth's understanding of the church's proclamation and 
have indicated the relationship between proclamation and dogmatics. Four further 
things may be said for the purposes of reinforcement and closure:
(1) Dogmatics is different from the proclamation of the church. The church 
must proclaim in obedience to the command of God. Dogmatics is required 
because this response to God's command is a human response and is therefore 
fallible. Given this relationship it is clear that dogmatics is secondary and the 
proclamation of the church is primary. The proclamation of the church begins with 
God, revelation, and faith; dogmatics begins with the proclamation of the church. 
As such it has its own peculiar function to fulfil. As has already been said, God, 
revelation and faith are talked about in fallible human ways and yet the church has a 
responsibility to speak the truth in purity. As such it cannot shirk the responsibility 
of questioning and correcting its own speech. It is in this way that dogmatics serves 
the preaching of the church.
(2) Dogmatics serves church proclamation. It serves a different function to 
proclamation, but in no sense does it represent a higher knowledge of faith. 
Authentic proclamation of the truth is not to do with sophistication on the part of 
the hearer or the speaker, and dogmatics is not the technique of certain people with 
a particular spiritual skill. As it must serve the church, the role of dogmatics is 
never, primarily, the service of a particular form of critical thought or philosophy. 
"[W]e always need the insight that critically reflective thought, even though it be 
that of human reason, and no matter what philosophical tints it has, must still be set 
in relation to the theme of the Church's proclamation, and its execution must be 
governed, not by its human origin and nature, but by its divine object." 
Dogmatics is not an end in itself. God, revelation and faith are given to 
proclamation; dogmatics takes them up from the church.
(3) Dogmatics informs the content of proclamation. It is the role of dogmatics to 
consider how, in the church's proclamation, we may best speak of God, revelation 
and faith to the extent that human talk about these things is to count as church
115 Ibid, p.84.
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proclamation. (Although it must not think that it can lay down what God, revelation 
and faith are in themselves.) Barth explains: "[W]hat dogmatics has to give does 
not consist of contents but of guidelines, directions, insights, principles and limits 
for correct speech by human estimate. It can be called doctrinal law in this sense. 
But its presupposition is that preaching acquires its content elsewhere. For that 
reason it cannot be Lord and judge... It can and should give counsel in all 
seriousness but it neither can nor should seek to give orders in the C hurch ."^ I t  is 
essential that the church's proclamation, even in view of what it might receive from 
dogmatics, remains free to receive afresh God's own free giving of himself in his 
revelation. "Church proclamation and not dogmatics is immediate to God in the 
Church. Proclamation is essential, dogmatics is needed only for the sake of it."^^^
(4) Dogmatics disturbs the church. Dogmatics, in its own work, cannot be 
satisfied with merely repeating church proclamation. "Dogmatics cannot just be a 
historical account of the classical expression of the faith proclaimed by this or that 
period in the Church's past. Nor can it just be the clarification and presentation of 
the faith as the dogmatician concerned personally thinks it should be proclaimed. 
Nor again can it be just the phenomenology of a cross-section of the common faith 
proclaimed in a given present."^Dogmatics exists to unsettle rather than confiim 
the church's proclamation. This is its service to church's proclamation. Its role must 
be to challenge and correct, and it will be thus as long as the church is a church of 
sinners. What the church requires of dogmatics must be more vital and dynamic 
than bland affirmation if its problems are in any way to be confronted.
Barth suggests that the decisive point for dogmatics is that it is inquiring into the 
agreement of church proclamation with the revelation which is attested in Scripture:
Dogmatic work stands or falls by whether the standard by which Church proclamation is measured is 
the revelation attested in Holy Scripture and not a philosophical, ethical, psychological or political 
tlieory. Now it is obvious that everyone who works at dogmatics works more or less with specific 
intellectual presuppositions. The only question is whether in addition to this he also knows the sign 
of the divine promise which is set up in the Church and whether he is able and willing, in a way that
Ibid. pp.86f.
Ibid. p.87.
lbid.p.281.
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admits o f no proof, to take this science so seriously that in this context its direction takes absolute 
precedence over all the directions he might owe to the humanities.
Dogmaticians belong to an age and culture and this will inevitably colour their 
work. But what singles out dogmaticians is that they must give their unerring 
attention to the sign of canonical Scripture as it forms the church. Barth insists that 
the dogmatician has no right to disregard this: "If anyone resolutely refuses to 
accept this but insists on deriving the final standard in this field, too, from this or 
that logic, ontology, and psychology, or sociology, his attention must be kindly 
called to the fact that all the rest of the land is open to him but he should desist from 
working here, where he can only cause confusion with these other final 
standards."
Dogmatics must be true to itself in being dogmatics. Barth underlines this by 
reinforcing his point about Scripture: "What finally counts is whether a dogmatics is 
scriptural. If it is not, then it will definitely be futile, for we shall definitely have to 
say regarding it that in it the Church is distracted, i.e., it is busy about other matters 
and is not doing justice to the scientific task set for it by the problematic nature of 
its p ro c la m a t io n . " H e  goes on to say, "The whole point of the correspondence 
between Holy Scripture and proclamation, and therefore the whole point of the path 
of knowledge in dogmatics, consists in the fact that in both Holy Scripture and 
Church dogmatics we are dealing with the Word of God."^^^
The question is not, of course, one of establishing an external basis because one 
cannot be given. If a correspondence exists between the Bible and proclamation 
and if dogmatics is illuminated by this route, this is no accident and no result of 
general dialectic considerations; it must arise out of the matter itself, which is to say 
out of the fact that the Bible and proclamation may become God's Word. It is as the 
Word of God reveals itself that the Bible and proclamation are the Word of God. It 
is the concept of revelation which must give us the key to an understanding of the 
relations between the two and how we must approach them. "We have to do with
Ibid. p.283. 
Ibid. p.285. 
Ibid. p.287. 
Ibid. p.288.
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the concrete concept of revelation which the Bible attests to have taken place and 
proclamation promises will come, with the concrete bracket which embraces a 
specific past, the epiphany of Jesus Christ, and what is always a specific future, the 
moment when men will hear God's Word, in the Scripture that is adopted by the 
proclamation of the Church or in the proclamation of the Church which is set in 
motion by Scripture."
The reality of revelation clearly stands beyond any concept of it. In this sense we 
cannot try to deal with the reality. We are, rather, dealing with the concept of the 
revelation of God and according to Scripture and proclamation this is the Father of 
Jesus Christ, Jesus Clirist Himself, and the Spirit of the Father and the Son. Barth 
does not deny the possibility of investigating other revelations, or even the 
possibility of developing a general concept of revelation. However, in doing this, 
one inevitably abandons the task of church dogmatics.
Concluding Remark
The task of this chapter has been to offer an exposition of Karl Barth's doctrine of 
revelation and it has attempted to do no more than that. Barth's contribution to the 
doctrine of revelation is, in our estimation, of seminal importance for the 
contemporary church and the choice to make an exposition of his doctrine our point 
of departure is indicative of the significance we attach to his achievement.
So far we have postponed any critical engagement with Barth's position and so it is 
to this that we must now turn. The task of the next chapter and a significant 
proportion of the remainder of the thesis will be to criticise and develop Barth's 
doctrine of revelation as it has been expounded in this chapter.
123 Ibid. pp.290f.
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Chapter 2. Critical Engagement with Barth's Doctrine of Revelation 
Introduction
In the first chapter we offered an exposition of Barth's doctrine of revelation. In 
this chapter we will engage in a critical evaluation of certain aspects of Barth's 
work. This chapter represents the first part of a two stage process in which we will 
seek to revise and develop some aspects of the understanding of revelation as we 
find it in the early volumes of Barth's Church Dogmatics. The second stage will be 
pursued in the light of our exposition of the work of Michael Polanyi in chapters 3 
and 4. In the course of this chapter we will also suggest some similarities between 
the work of Barth and Polanyi which will serve as preparation for and anticipation 
of the themes which will be later developed.
We will introduce this chapter by making a few comments about the philosophical 
context in which Barth was working. It may be impossible to offer anything more 
than a highly generalised picture, but this modest portrait will be helpful in setting 
the scene both for an evaluation of Barth's doctrine of revelation, and a provisional 
assessment of how Michael Polanyi's philosophical and epistemological insights 
might coherently expand Barth's vision.
The philosophers of the Enlightenment may not have spoken with one voice but 
despite the distinctions which might be made between particular philosophers^ there 
are common themes which indicate the pervasive ethos of the movement. 
Enlightenment thinkers were united in the belief that the employment of reason and 
critical thought was a prerequisite for the pursuit of truth and the establishment of 
greater human freedom and dignity. The concomitant negative belief was a 
rejection of what was perceived to be an uncritical submission to authority in 
general and, in particular, the 'dogmatically' held beliefs and traditions of the 
church. As such criticism and autonomy represent two of the most significant 
principles of thought for the Eighteenth century and the two centuries that followed.
‘ Distinctions might also be made on the basis o f geography: the 'Enlightenments' o f the Continent, 
Scotland, England or Russia for example, may be regarded as distinguishable strands o f a broader 
movement.
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We do not have space to trace the development of the doctrine of revelation as 
theologians sought to express it in these circumstances, but it will be apparent that -  
to the extent that the doctrine was conceived in terms of an 'uncritically received 
authority' -  it fared very poorly in the intellectual ethos in which the themes of 
criticism and autonomy were dominant. If philosophers set for themselves, in the 
name of truth and human freedom, the task of establishing rational justification for 
the knowledge they claimed, it is not surprising that theologians -  in speaking of the 
knowledge of God -generally sought to produce similar fonns of justification.
Insofar as this was the case we may describe this theological task as one in which 
'faith seeks rational foundation'. This carries with it the implicit assumption that 
faith, if  it is to be authenticated, must be both received and commended on the basis 
of an extrinsic justification. In its turn this implies that the rational justification of 
faith is, epistemically, more basic than the faith which it seeks to justify.^
In Barth's doctrine of revelation we may discern, among other things, an attempt to 
extricate theology from this kind of approach. It may not have been entirely 
successful for various reasons, but it does represent a substantial move away from 
epistemologies which have sought to establish an independent basis and 
justification for belief. To the extent to which it is successful Barth's approach 
might be described as 'post-Enlightenment'.^ It is, self-consciously, an approach in 
which faith seeks after understanding, as opposed to one in which faith seeks 
independent 'rational foundation'.
At this early stage we want to suggest that there is an important parallel here 
between Barth's work and that of Michael Polanyi. The latter sought to establish a 
non-foundational post-critical epistemology focussing initially upon the natural 
sciences and then proceeding to consider a wide range of questions outside science.
 ^We do not intend to give an argument, at this point, for why we believe this to be problematic. 
This task will be postponed until we come to an exposition of the thought o f Michael Polanyi. 
Polanyi's critique o f 'belief seeking justification' and his commendation of 'faith seeking ■ 
understanding' will be of particular interest because it is established primarily in the context of the 
natural sciences,
 ^Although the term is, far as we are aware, unknown to Barth, his theological method might also 
appropriately be called 'post-critical' -  in the sense in which it is adopted by Polanyi.
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Barth sought to establish a theology in which the absolute priority of God in his 
revelation is fully established and the epistemic priority of faith recognised.
There is something of an irony in that Barth did not appear to see the significance of 
his approach'^ for areas outside theology^ while Polanyi's attempt to apply his own 
post-critical approach in theology was lacking in the extreme.^ We believe that 
there are important parallels in the work of Barth and Polanyi and, more than this, it 
seems that there is a case to make that each might contribute significantly to that 
which is lacking in the other.^
We will, in due course, expand upon the terms and concepts which we have adopted 
here in the form of a rough sketch. At this point we only wish to indicate a 
particular kinship between the projects of Barth and Polanyi and suggest, thereby, 
the potential for bringing their projects into fhiitful conversation.
1. The Doctrine of Revelation in the Context of Modernity
In the modem era questions about the ground and nature of human understanding 
have bulked large in philosophy and this has had its impact upon the theological 
agenda. As Ronald Thiemann points out, "It would be misleading to say that Calvin 
offers an epistemology in the Institutes, because he has no interest in placing 
knowledge of God in a general theory of human knowing... He is interested in 
faith's particular knowledge of God and the fact that all such knowledge is a gift of 
God's g r a c e . B u t  in the context of the Enlightenment such an approach appears 
naïve and calls for justification. Modem doctrines of revelation have responded to 
this call by developing justifications for their speech about the knowledge of God. 
While this task might be conceived as an extension of the work of the reformers in a
Methodologically a posteriori 
 ^Indeed, it appears that Barth wished to affirm an essentially Kantian approach in spheres outside 
theology. This may have had, for Barth, the incidental or perhaps pragmatic value o f emphasising 
the distinctiveness o f the knowledge o f God with respect to other forms o f human knowing.
 ^This assertion will be explicated and supported below in chapter 4.
 ^The theology o f Barth and the philosophy o f Michael Polanyi both represent bold, expansive and 
imaginative ventures along what might be called (in very general terms) 'post-Enlightenment' or 
'post-critical' lines and in very substantial discontinuity with the predominant modes o f thought 
inhabited by their contemporaries.
* Thiemann, R. F. (1985). Revelation and Theology: The Gospel as Narrated Promise. Notre Dame, 
University of Notre Dame Press, p. 10.
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new context, in the pursuit of it a significant shift occurs whereby the assumptions 
made by a Calvin or a Luther are adjudged in need of external justification in this 
later period. In the atmosphere of modernity it was no longer acceptable, as it was 
for the reformers, to assume knowledge of God as a 'background belief and in such 
circumstances it was perhaps inevitable that the strategy of 'faith seeking 
understanding' becomes 'faith seeking foundation' or 'faith seeking justification'. 
Colin Gunton underlines this point when he comments that one of the key features 
of the modem tradition is, "a deep-seated belief in the existence of an intuitively 
intellectual basis for all thought."^
But Barth's project is not to call for a retum to pre-Enlightenment thinking, it is an 
attempt to move beyond it. While Gunton sees Barth's achievement in this regard 
as only a partial success he suggests that it is, nevertheless, "something of a tour de 
force, plucked from the intellectual air by an act of intuitive genius." In this there 
are parallels to be discemed between the projects of Barth and Polanyi. Some of 
these will be elucidated as we proceed.
2. Human Participation
A criticism which has been made of Barth's doctrine of revelation is thait it leaves 
little room for human response or participation. Indeed, as we shall see in the 
criticism of Barth offered by Jürgen Moltmann, it has been questioned how far it is 
possible to speak of human knowledge of God at all within Barth's scheme of divine 
revelation. This is a serious criticism if it can be substantiated. It would certainly 
cut short any project which seeks to bring Barth's work into a meaningful 
conversation with Polanyi's post-critical philosophy. Personal participation and 
self-involvement are intrinsic to Polanyi's epistemology.
Thiemann writes of Barth's Epistle to the Romans. "A position which stresses both 
God's sovereign transcendence and his knowability is hard pressed to give an 
account of how we can come to know such a God. Barth's solution... is to grant
 ^Gunton, C. E. (1996). Theology Through the Theologians. Edinburgh, T & T Clark, p.52. Gunton's 
emphasis.
10 Ibid. p.53.
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God's Spirit the mediating power to bring divine object and human subject together. 
The Spirit of God dwells within the believing interpreter and bestows the capacity 
to know the unknowable."^^ The difficulty is, of course, that the Spirit is not the 
human subject. Consequently, says Thiemann, "Human subjectivity... becomes 
nothing more than the vessel through which God knows himself. Whenever I 
contribute anything to the interpretation of God's being, it is the contribution of sin 
and falsity. True interpretation comes at the expense of the denial of the goodness 
of creaturely reality."^^
If Thiemann makes this criticism of Barth in Epistle to the Romans. Moltmann 
makes a related complaint about Barth's doctrine of revelation in general.*^ 
Moltmann criticises Barth for offering a false alternative between divine revelation 
and human experience of the Holy Spirit. If the Holy Spirit is the subjective reality 
and possibility of revelation, humanity is essentially 'bypassed' in the revelatory 
event. If the 'being revealedness' of revelation is the Spirit of God, can 'revelation' 
be any more than an exclusively intra-Trinitarian event? He writes, "if God- 
consciousness only comes into being at all because the Wholly Other God reveals 
himself, then the Spirit of God is the being revealed of this self-revelation of God in 
us; and it... [is] for us just as inexperiencable, hidden and 'other' as God himself, hi 
this case there is a permanent discontinuity between God's Spirit and the spirit of 
human beings."M oltm ann goes on to say, "I cannot see that there is any 
fundamental alternative between God's revelation to human beings, and human 
experience of God. How is a man or a woman supposed to be able to talk about 
God if God does not reveal himself? How are men and women supposed to be able 
to talk about a God of whom there is no human experience?"
Moltmann interprets Barth's position as one m which revelation and experience are 
set in opposition to each other, and this is what Moltmann rejects. "Anyone who
Thiemann Revelation and Theology, p.42.
Ibid. p.42.
Interestingly, in Spirit o f Life Moltmann chooses to draw on Barth's 1929 lecture, 'The Holy Spirit 
and the Christian Life' rather than making reference to Church Dogmatics or other later works. It is 
clear, however, that Moltmann directs his criticism to Barth's work as a whole and not just to its 
earlier forms and expression.
Moltmann, J. (1992). The Spirit o f Life: A Universal Affirmation, p.5.
Ibid. p.6.
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stylizes revelation and experiences into alternatives, ends up with revelations that 
cannot be experienced, and experiences without revelation."This is the insoluble 
dilemma in which Barth finds himself if Moltmann is correct. But does Barth set up 
revelation and experience as alternatives? We think it is clear that Barth does not 
intend this as, we believe, our exposition under the subheading 'Religious 
Experience' in chapter 1 has shown. In consideration of Church Dogmatics § 6 'The 
Word of God and Experience' and our comments on it made in the first chapter 1, 
we would suggest that we are compelled to say that Barth has no concern to set up 
experience and revelation in opposition or to present them as alternatives. Barth 
wishes to establish not that revelation and experience are incompatible (or 
alternatives) but that revelation, as it becomes an experience in the life of faith, does 
so on the basis of an event in which God makes himself known and not on the basis 
of a 'natural' human religious capacity.
Moltmann's reading clearly goes against Barth's intentions. What might 'knowledge 
of God' (of which Barth freely and frequently speaks) mean without a human 
experience through which the knowledge of God is mediated? It is basic to Barth's 
methodology that the question of the possibility of the Word of God is raised a 
posteriori in the actual knowledge of the Word of God. If there can be no 
knowledge of the Word of God apart from some mediate revelatory experience it is 
clear that Barth is not setting up experience and revelation as mutually exclusive 
alternatives.
In the form in which he puts it, Moltmann's criticism of Barth can be answered. 
Barth's insistence that for a person to participate in the Word of God that person 
must be given the capacity for the Word of God by God is, essentially, the insight of 
John 6.44.^  ^ To 'come to Christ' cannot be conceived as a human choice since it is a 
possibility which can only be realised in the decision of God. Moltmann's criticism 
appears to be posited upon the assumption that such a state of affairs must exclude 
human participation in the event of revelation. But why should this be so? To say
that a person can know the Word of God only if the capacity for this knowledge is
Ibid. p.7.
"No one can come to me unless drawn by the Father who sent me." 
Indeed, Moltmann seems to think such a conclusion is self-evident.
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given does not exclude the possibility that there might be a perichoretic relationship 
between the person and the Word of God which is established precisely in the 
bestowing of this capacity. Since Barth does wish to affirm knowledge of the Word 
of God as a human experience (as God's gracious gift) and one in which human 
beings do participate as human beings, it is not only more appropriate but necessary 
to interpret Barth in this way.
Although Moltmann's criticism of Barth may be unsatisfactory we think there is a 
problem with Barth's theology in this area which does require attention. Stated 
briefly, the difficulty is to be located in Barth's understatement of the subjective 
human participation in revelation. It is not, as we will show, an absence, but the 
degree of understatement has caused some interpreters of Barth (and Moltmann is 
one) to miss this point. Gunton, who does not miss the point, observes: "For Barth, 
despite the fi*equent assertions or at least suggestions to the contrary in the 
secondary literature, human knowledge of God is not the conditioned reflex of the 
automaton. It is free personal action in relation, deriving fi*om an indwelling of 
Christ and taking the form of thanksgiving, awe and the ordered employment of 
human concepts.
Earlier in his argument Gunton asserts that, "for Barth, the fundamental reality of 
our being is our indwelling in Christ. The significance of this statement must not 
be overlooked. Here the relational aspect of human existence in Christ is 
established as primary. This does not exclude the possibility of propositional 
knowledge but it does imply that such knowledge is derivative of knowledge gained 
through a personal participation or indwelling. Again it must be acknowledged that 
this is an understated theme in Barth and yet we do find evidence of it as early as 
the first part volume of Church Dogmatics. In the context of a discussion of the 
Filioque Barth comments: "The intra-divine two-sided fellowship of the Spirit, 
which proceeds firom the Father and the Son, is the basis of the fact that there is in 
revelation a fellowship in which not only is God there for man but in very truth -
This is more particularly the case in his explicit treatment of the Word of God in the early parts of 
Church Dogmatics. We will have more to say about this later in the thesis.
Gunton Theology Through the Theologians. pp.58f. 
Ibid. p.54. Our emphasis.
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this is the donum Spiritus sancti -  man is also there for God."^^ Barth 
acknowledges the intra-divine fellowship in the event of revelation but, over against 
Moltmann’s interpretation of Barth, the communion of humanity with God is also 
involved -  and explicitly so.
Barth insists, of course, that the fellowship established between humanity and God 
is established by the free initiative of God, but God wills to establish fellowship. 
"He wills to be ours, and He wills that we should be His. He wills to belong to us 
and He wills that we should belong to Him... His attitude and action is always that 
He seeks and creates fellowship between Himself and us."^  ^ This is so despite the 
darkness of human sinfulness. The human perspective of this fellowship is 
disturbed by sin and Barth acknowledges that: "For large stretches it may be fo r us 
doubtful, dark and incomprehensible. For large stretches it will seem to us like the 
very opposite of this relationship. It will reveal itself as such through judgment and 
grace, through dying and making alive, through veiling and unveiling... We shall 
have to learn ever and again what it really means to say that God seeks and creates 
fellowship between Himself and us."^ "^
Although our indwelling in Christ may be fundamental for Barth this is articulated 
in the context of a theology in which the knowledge of God is radically tied to the 
decision and act of God in which he makes himself known. The sovereignty and 
freedom of God in his revelation, and the incapacity of an unassisted humanity to 
know God, are unmistakable and weighty emphases in Barth's doctrine of 
revelation. His description of revelation as 'miracle', his insistence that humans 
have no capacity for revelation, and his designation of the Holy Spirit as the 
subjective reality and possibility of revelation, all place emphasis upon the initiative 
of God in his revelation rather than upon human participation. It is doubtless 
because of this emphasis that some critics of Barth's doctrine of revelation have 
accused his view as one in which human subjectivity is essentially by-passed. But 
does Barth's insistence on God's prior decision and continuing presence in
Barth, K., G. W. Bromiley, at al. (1975). Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine o f the Word of God I .l . 
Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark. p.480.
^ Barth, K., G. W. Bromiley, et al. (1956). Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of the Word o f God 1.2. 
Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, p.274.
Ibid. pp.274f. Our emphasis.
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revelation imply that human participation is excluded? Surely, it implies only that 
human participation is contingent upon God's grace in establishing the relationship. 
As Gunton has noted, Barth does have things to say about human participation in 
revelation, and although this emphasis may be understated it is not absent. In his 
discussion of the hiddenness of God Barth makes an observation in which both the 
sovereignty of God and human participation in revelation are acknowledged in a 
particular relation:
If we keep to the fact that God is known only by God, then whatever may be the function of our 
viewing and conceiving, and however necessary this function may be, it is fixed that we certainly do 
not know Him by these views and concepts of ours: that is to say, not by their inner power; not in 
virtue o f their own capacity, i.e., o f the capacity o f human viewing and conceiving as such; not in 
virtue of a potentiality o f our cognition which has perhaps to be actualised by revelation. We 
definitely cannot deny to this the character and function of an instrument in this event. In the act of 
the knowledge of God, as in any other cognitive act, we are definitely active as receivers of images 
and creators of counter-images. Yet while this is true, it must definitely be contested that our 
receiving and creating owes its truth to any capacity o f our own to be truly recipients and creators in 
relation to God. It is indeed our own viewing and conceiving. But we ourselves have no capacity 
for fellowship with God.^^
In this passage we see Barth's familiar denial of a human capacity for the 
knowledge of God but we also see, circumscribed within the limits of what is made 
possible by God, not only the possibility but the necessity of an active human 
reception of and participation in God's revelation. There is no suggestion here of 
God by-passing our humanity in his revelation nor even of a muting of human 
participation. Human participation is recognised and acknowledged: what is denied 
is that such a participation is a possibility apart from the decision and act of God in 
relation to a person. The relationship is an asymmetrical one: there is no knowledge 
of God if God does not reveal himself. However, in God's revelation there is active, 
responsive human participation.
Gunton comments that, in relation to this and a handful of other passages in the 
same volume of Church Dogmatics. "Barth uses language which is quite startling in
Barth, K., G. W. Bromiley, et al. (1957). Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of God 111, p.182.
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its claims for the extent of the human side of the en te rp r i se .Gunt on  concludes 
that, "Barth intends to set before us a conception of the knowledge of a personal 
God by free and thinking persons. The talk is of active human knowledge in the 
context of a relationship, one indeed in which there is a measure of reciprocity."^^
While acknowledging that the theme of responsive participation in revelation is 
present in Barth's theology, it is clear that, in the context in which he found himself, 
his prior concern was to establish that the knowledge of God was not a 'natural' or 
innate human capacity, but a possibility which is established in God's good 
pleasure.
We believe that we have now established that to speak of human participation in the 
Word of God is essential to Barth's general approach to the doctrine of revelation. 
Our indwelling of Christ is not to be conceived as a passive but an active, 
responsive relationship. In this way it is appropriate to speak of a relationship 
between humanity and God in which there is activity on both sides.
3. Human Capacity
In the above section, which was concerned with human participation in divine 
revelation, we spoke at various points about 'human capacity' for God's revelation 
or more particularly, the lack of it. But if  there is knowledge of God, isn't the denial 
of a human capacity a contradiction? In this section we will clarify what is and 
what is not implied in this denial and in doing so we will draw on Trevor Hart's 
exposition of this theme.^^
Hart's discussion of 'capacity' comes at the close of his review and examination of 
the public disagreement between Karl Barth and Emil Brunner concerning the 
relationship between nature and grace, creation and redemption, and church and 
state. The particulars of this debate need not detain us but his treatment of'capacity'
Gunton Theology Through the Theologians, p.59.26
Ibid. p.59.
^ See Hart, T. (1999). Regarding Karl Barth. Carlisle, The Paternoster Press, pp.164-172.
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is helpful in clarifying certain issues relating to the term and its implications for 
participation in particular.
'Capacity', as Hart points out, can carry both active and passive connotations.^^ 
Following his scheme we will refer to the former as 'capacity 1' and the latter 
'capacity!'. Borrowing Barth's illustration Hart remarks that Mary, as a virgin, had 
no capacityl for childbearing. "Her womb did not, that is to say, apart from the 
conditions furnished by extrinsic factors -  either coming together with a man, or 
else the direct creative action of the Holy Spirit -  have the active capacity... to 
produce a fertile ovum. But passively, insofar as she was a woman and not a slab of 
granite, she might properly be said to have a passive capacity (capacity!) for what 
happened to her to h a p p e n . I n  the incarnation God determines that it is from the 
womb of the virgin Mary that Jesus is to be bom. Although Mary has no capacityl 
for becoming the mother of Jesus, she has a capacity! for this in a way that other 
objects do not -  or, at least, not in the same way. Mary's womanhood is not 
arbitrary or insignificant.
Extending his argument Hart goes on to suggest that Jesus' body in the tomb has no 
capacityl for life while it does have the capacity! in a way that the stone that was 
rolled from the tomb does not. Here we note a differentiation within the category, 
'capacity!', because in this case the 'opposition' of nature and grace is more clearly 
to the fore. What God must do in bringing Jesus' body back to life is to oppose 
natural propensities -  which only bring physical decay -  rather than rely upon them 
or seek their cooperation.
Similarly humanity has no capacityl for revelation but, because God does reveal 
himself in a redemptive way to human beings, we may speak of a capacity!. It is 
not impossible for God's redemptive Word to reach human beings (that would be to 
say that what is so is not possible). What is impossible is that this might happen as 
the realisation of a 'natural' human potential (i.e., that this should happen apart from 
the will and the act of God).
See ibid. p. 166.
Ibid. pp.l66f. Hart's emphasis.
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As will be apparent from the discussion in the first chapter, Barth's concern is not, 
and quite explicitly not, a priori speculation about what may be possible for God or 
for human beings. He is concerned to construct a theology on the basis of what 
God has done. This is the way in which we must understand the positing of a 
human capacity! for the reconciling knowledge of God. An a posteriori approach 
must work from the actual knowledge of the Word of God to a consideration of its 
possibility.
To establish that human beings can have a capacity! for God's Word (while 
maintaining that there can be no capacityl) is, according to Hart, 'vitally 
important'^ ^  because it enables us to see that, "What is impossible for humanity as 
such is rendered possible by the God who calls new life into being out of nothing. 
God is capable of uniting us to himself. God is capable of revealing himself to 
us."^  ^ This is the 'point of contact' between creature and creator -  the breaching of 
the gap which exists because the creature is not like the creator -  which is 
established when the creator comes to the creature in transforming grace. Without 
this point of contact God would not be revealed to human beings and there would 
be no relationship in which humanity could be reconciled to God. Without a 
genuine point of contact there could be no responsive human participation in the life 
of God. Hart comments, "The fact that the miracle of grace interrupts and is 
discontinuous with the normal pattern of nature does not make it any less a point of 
contact -  it simply characterizes its shape."^^
As we have seen in our exposition of Barth under the subheading 'Religious 
Experience', the point of contact does not refer to a particular aspect of our 
humanity but, as Hart puts it, "Rather it is ourselves in our entirety which 
constitutes the locus of contact; and, more precisely, us in our sinful and rebellious 
entirety.
See ibid. p. 171. 
Ibid. p. 171. 
Ibid. p.l71. 
Ibid. p.l72.
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4. Communication and Communion
In the second subsection we attempted to show that Barth's doctrine of revelation 
does not imply that human reception of revelation is the work of the Holy Spirit in 
such a way that we cannot, in any meaningful way, speak of 'human participation'. 
Barth does speak of human participation (even if in an understated way) and he 
does speak, also, of experience of the Word of God. The third section of this 
chapter sought to show that such participation and experience is a possibility -  but 
only as God gives himself in revelation. In other words it is a possibility only as 
God makes it a possibility in his freedom. There is no possibility of a human 
knowledge of God apart from God's decision to make himself known in particular 
circumstances to particular people.
The misunderstanding of Barth's position in this regard may be, in part, located in a 
confusion of the issues raised in the respective subsections. Barth clearly rejects 
any idea that knowledge of God is a 'natural' autonomous human capacity. God is 
known in the event in which he gives himself to be known and therefore it is not 
appropriate to think of the knowledge of God in terms of a possibility apart from 
divine revelation. Nevertheless, it is clearly appropriate to acknowledge that 
humans are the kind of beings to whom God can make himself known. In this sense 
human beings do have a capacity for revelation and this is a receptive possibility 
whose actualisation^^ rests in the decision of God. The task of theology is posited 
upon the belief that there is knowledge of God in the human sphere, and it is this 
which raises the question of how it is possible.
It may be Barth's insistence that the 'capacity' is one which must be received from 
the grace of God which leads some of his critics to assume that in the event of 
revelation there is no responsive, human participation. And because Barth's 
exposition of the human participatory element is muted he does, in our opinion, 
leave himself exposed to such criticism. However, an insistence that the possibility 
of the knowledge of God must be given by God does not exclude the possibility of 
active human participation in the revelation that is given. Barth does not place
Both objectively and subjectively.
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sufficient emphasis upon active and responsive participation, but such an emphasis 
does not appear to be intrinsically inconsistent with his insistence on the 
sovereignty of God in his revelation.^^
A further weakness in Barth’s position (which, again, we would contend is a matter 
of understatement rather than omission) is his failure to expand on the relationship 
in which God gives himself to be known to human persons. It may be that Barth 
believes that it is our indwelling of Christ which is the 'fundamental reality of our 
being'^^ but in his exposition of the doctrine of revelation the emphasis upon 
relationship is insufficiently developed. It is our intention to develop an 
understanding of divine revelation in which the relational aspects of the knowledge 
of God, and the various contexts in which it is established, are more fully 
articulated. In order to achieve this we wish to draw on both critical and 
constructive comments on this theme expressed in Alan Torrance's Persons in 
Communion.^ ^
Much of the force of Torrance's argument is indicated in the following introductory 
comment: "Although a doctrine of revelation is essential for Christian theology not 
only materially but also formally, divine communication cannot be separated from a 
proper theology of divine communion. Theologically interpreted, communication 
presupposes the category of communion and not the other way around. 
Torrance's criticism of Barth is precisely that his tendency is to invert the proper 
relationship between communion and communication and that as a result the shape 
of his theology is distorted.
Torrance suggests that we must locate divine revelation, including divine self­
communication, in the context of the intia-trinitarian communion of God and in 
acknowledgement of the openness of this divine communion to humanity. Torrance
^ Without collapsing the distinctions which we have acknowledged between our knowledge of God 
and knowledge o f other objects, it must be noted that a 'self-involving' knowledge o f any object is 
contingent upon the object being present to us 'as object'. In this sense there is continuity between 
knowledge of God and knowledge o f other things.
See Gunton Theologv Through the Theologians, p.54 -  aheady quoted above.
Torrance, A. (1996). Persons in Communion: Trinitarian Description and Human Participation. 
Edinburgh, T & T Clark.
Ibid. pp.3f.
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claims that apart from this acknowledgment it is not possible to understand the 
meaning of 'the revelation of God'. Consequently Torrance criticises what he calls 
Baifh's 'revelation model' as the source of theological distortions and commends, 
instead, a 'worship model' in which the priority of relationality in communication is 
articulated. Torrance believes the latter will yield a theological construction which 
is more faithful to the self-presentation of God as this is attested to in Holy 
Scripture.
Some care must be taken in interpreting the terms 'revelation model' and 'worship 
model'. What Torrance intends in developing the 'worship model' is an articulation 
of the context in which God's revelation occurs. As such Torrance is not opposing 
all the theological contours of Barth's conception of revelation, but he is criticising 
and developing some of the detailed contours and some of the ways in which they 
are expressed. Although Torrance does not extend his argument along these lines, it 
seems appropriate to consider whether his 'worship model' might be supplemented 
or extended by further 'models' in which other aspects of the life of the church (as 
participations in the Spirit) are recognised as loci in which God makes himself 
known in his revelation."^® Alternatively, a similar end might be achieved by 
making it clear that 'worship' is not to be understood narrowly in terms of 'private 
devotions' and the 'Sunday service', but in terms of a person's self-offering of their 
life in the service of God.'^  ^ In this way it becomes a much broader 'umbrella-like' 
term.
Torrance concurs with Barth in his belief that the critical controls of dogmatics do 
not belong to dogmatics itself. It is the task of theology to serve the Word, and it is 
in this that dogmatics finds its point of reference. It is not entitled to look anywhere 
else for it. Torrance quotes Barth: "In both its investigations and its conclusions it 
must keep in view that God is in heaven and not on earth, and that God, His
Matthew 25:31-46 might encourage us to think along such lines. The individuals depicted at the 
judgement at the coming o f the 'Son of Man' (whether commended or condemned) appear to be 
unaware of the divine presence in the hungry, the thirsty, the naked and the outcast. However, one 
function o f the pericope is to alert and inform the reader of that o f which the figures at the judgement 
were ignorant. An implication of this would seem to be that our activity in the service o f those in 
need is a participation in the life o f God. As such it seems that what Torrance says o f our 
doxological participation in the intra-divine communion in his 'worship model' might be extended 
and paralleled in a 'service model'.
Which is the meaning o f worship adopted in Romans 12.1.
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revelation and faith always live in their own free life over against all human talk, 
including that of the best d o g m a t i c s . A s  such both Barth and Torrance stress the 
importance of an tz posteriori theological method. What Torrance is questioning is 
the degree to which Barth was successful in articulating a radically a posteriori 
definition of divine personhood through his modelling of revelation.
In this section we shall be concentrating upon Torrance's criticism of Barth, but it is 
important to recognise that this is intended not as a rejection but rather an extension 
of Barth's broader theological trajectory, as Torrance makes clear:
Our critique of Barth amounts essentially to a modification which seeks to support rather than 
repudiate his primary aims and central concerns. What we would suggest, however, is quite specific, 
namely that a) Barth's exposition o f the Trinity as we have it in Volume One of his Church 
Dogmatics-, b) the influence on it o f what we have termed his 'revelation model' and, in particular, c) 
the outworking of this on the manner in which he explores the question of triune personhood require 
a degree of controlled reinterpretation.'*^
This 'controlled reinterpretation' must take Barth's theology on from the limitations 
of the 'revelation model'. Within the constraints of this 'model' his exposition of the 
Trinity and the Word of God are unsatisfactorily delimited, and this frustrâtes the 
development of a fuller understanding of ecclesial life as participation in revelation.
Torrance believes that a weakness in Barth which 'haunts' the Church Dogmatics is 
that God's triple reiteration o f himself is much more prominent than his relation to 
himself As Torrance puts it, "tritheism is sensed to be a greater threat than 
Sabellianism.""^"  ^ Torrance is troubled with Barth's 'inordinate stress' on divine 
singularity. "Even if Barth may be defended against the charge of modalism... it is 
difficult to deny that there is at least a detrimental 'anhypostaticism' in his doctrine 
of revelation. In this way the communion within God, into which humanity is 
taken by the Spirit in and through the vicarious humanity of the Word made flesh.
Quoted in Torrance Persons in Communion, p.47. 
Ibid, pp.364f. Torrance's emphasis.
Ibid. p. 103.
Ibid. p. 104.
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becomes disturbingly marginal to revelation."^® Torrance believes that Barth's 
emphasis on the singularity of the divine subject leads him to understate the 
importance of the notion of triune perichoresis. As such Barth has a tendency to 
interpret unity in terms of singular identity rather than divine communion.
Related to this is Barth's decision, in referring to the Trinity, to reject the term 
'persons' in favour of 'Seinsweisen'. His reason for doing this is to avoid the danger 
of projecting an anthropologically rooted concept onto the being of God. But 
Barth's alternative has its own problems. Torrance points out, "The metaphor does 
not imply that the category of communion is appropriate to conceiving of the 
relationship between these eternal 'repetitions', indeed, rather the opposite. 
Barth's 'threefold repetition' similarly offers little promise of opening up for us the 
dynamic communion within God. Torrance believes that if the metaphor of 
repetition is to be used to establish the singularity of the divine identity in the 
thieeness it must be qualified by a much more profound doctrine of perichoresis 
than Barth offers in this context. Torrance believes that Barth's adoption of the term 
Seinsweisen effectively obscures the concept of communion in God and this is 
problematic as the New Testament suggests, at its heart, that there is indeed 
communion between the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Can there be 
communion between Seinsweisen? The answer to this question is less than clear.
A further justification for adopting the term Seinsweisen was Barth's conviction 
that the term was more neutral than 'persons'. But Torrance believes that this was 
mistaken. Torrance suggests that, far from being neutral, the term is potent in 
undermining notions of mutuality and relation within the divine identity. Torrance 
asks whether there is not an a priori element here, stemming from his analysis of
Trevor Hart challenges Torrance's charge of'a detrimental anhypostaticism'. He writes, "The 
doctrine of the anhypostasia as such is concerned to deny the independent subsistence of Jesus' 
humanity; it makes no prescription concerning its particular shape or content. The organs of human 
response and reciprocity belong to the category of 'nature' rather than 'hypostasis'. The affirmation 
of a fully human experience and relation to God, therefore is wholly compatible with 
'anliypostaticism': the point of such a juxtaposition would simply be that in this particular case we 
have to do with God*s fully human experience and relation to God. The suggestion that in Jesus we 
have to do with a human 'hypostasis' distinct from and independent o f God's own hypostatically 
differentiated existence as Father, Son and Holy Spirit was one Barth was determined at all costs to 
avoid." See Hart's essay, 'Revelation' in Webster, J. (2000). The Cambridge Companion to Karl 
Barth. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p.56.
ToiTance Persons in Communion, p. 115.
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the logical structure of revelation, which threatens to shape his doctrine of God? 
Torrance conceives the danger of this move as the separation of the priestly and 
prophetic offices of Christ, by which he means that it risks separating worship and 
proclamation; koinonia and the divine address; and the sacraments and preaching. 
Tonance concludes:
In this light it may be justifiable to argue that for Barth the revelation model received prominence... 
at the cost o f other models. It is, indeed, our view that a 'worship' or 'communion' model is 
preferable to the extent that this would offer, on the one hand, a more integrative conception of the 
theological programme as a whole and, on the other, a profound exposition o f the one 
Anknüpjungspunkt, the point of contact... between the divine and human, which is not simply an 
event o f divine address but the whole humanity o f Christ in his life o f communion with the Father, as 
we are brought not merely to 'contact with' it but to participate in it by the Spirit.''^
As we established in the first chapter in our exposition of Barth and re-affirm now, 
when humankind meets (or is met by) God in his revelation it meets not with a part 
of God, or an instantiation of God or some other 'thing' which is distinct from God 
and humanity. Rather, we meet with God in person: he is relationally present to us. 
In this revelatory event God is what he is eternally and antecedently in himself. 
Torrance's question is whether Barth has established and sufficiently elaborated the 
relations within the divine Trinity. This is an important question because it has 
consequences which extend beyond the doctrine of revelation.
Barth refers to the Trinity as the name of a single being and Torrance suggests that 
this comes closer than is helpful to using the term 'single' in a manner which 
threatens to subsume God within a class of 'single beings', where singularity is 
conceived with reference to its application within our own sphere of existence. 
Barth says, "The wonder of God's inner trinitarian life is that the numerically single 
personal "I" of the one being that God is... has his being only in the true community 
of a personal "we"... The basic meaning of the begetting of the Son is that God 
posits community in h i m s e l f . B u t  Torrance comments:
Ibid. pp.llSf.
Quoted in ibid. pp.219f.
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What Barth's conception of unity fails to take due cognisance of is the extent to which the New  
Testament accounts make it difficult to avoid affirming that God is a Thou to himself and an I in 
relation to himself, and that this eternal mutuality is opened to the world so that we are brought into 
communion within the union not of a 'we' but of the one, eternal and primordial We -  'The Father 
and I (i.e. "we") are one.' There is, after all, a substantial grammatical difference between a) 'The 
Father and I are one', and b) ' The Father and I are single' -  or, indeed, as Barth's conception of 
identity would suggest might be said, ' The Father and I is/am one.'^°
Torrance moves towards a crucial part of his thesis when he writes:
When the Son reveals the Father to a person this revealing is considerably more than the heuristic 
bridging o f an epistemic gap by way o f a 'revealedness' which is identified with the Spirit. The event 
requires to be explained in more radically personal categories. We are taken to share in the Son's 
personal communion with the Father in and through the personal agency o f the Spirit. Theologically 
this should be interpreted as an ecclesial event in which the eucharist is inseparable from the 
proclamation of the Word.^*
What Torrance is saying here is that in his revelation God is drawing human 
persons into what he calls "provisional, participatory communion with the intra­
divine communion"^^. This is the element which Torrance believes is lacking in 
Barth's exposition in the first volume of Church Dogmatics.
Torrance suggests that there is an 'Aristotelian tinge' to Barth's 'categorical' way of 
posing the question. He points out that it is not necessarily the case that the term 
'person' must apply to the Father in the same way that it applies to the Son and the 
Holy Spirit. Barth's choice of the term Seinsweise is essentially a negative move 
which he makes in order to defend himself from perceived dangers.^^ As we have 
already intimated, his choice may not be as safe as he appears to think. Torrance 
warns:
Ibid. p.220. Torrance's emphasis. 
Ibid. p.223.
52 Ibid. p.224.
It is interesting to note that the terms 'Father' and 'Son' and 'Spirit', are not questioned by Barth in 
the way that he questions the term 'person'. Although these terms (unlike the term 'person') find 
expression in the biblical witness this fact alone is no guarantee that the anthropologically conceived 
meanings of these terms will not be mapped on to theological terms which are linguistically co­
terminus with them.
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Barth underestimates the extent to which the language of Seinsweise risks sterilising rather than 
communicating an appreciation of the dynamic, perichoretic and participative presence of the 
Triunity. It is inappropriate, not least in theology, to dissociate the meaning o f the word from its 
('performative') effect, its conditioning o f the apperception of the theological community. A false 
conditioning is a false communication and thus a semantic distortion. Polluting language which 
communicates divine 'communing' into that which communicates mere 'being' can have that effect!^ '*
Torrance acknowledges that Barth is correct in guarding against a literalism or a 
nominalism which implies non-allegorical parallelisms between human and the 
divine which are not commandeered^^ by the revelation event and the participative 
life of the church. This fails to adopt an appropriate opened-endedness of 
theological conceptuality. But Torrance does not see that these considerations 
warrant the exclusion of the term 'person' any more than the terms, 'Father', 'Son' 
and 'Holy Spirit' (or, indeed, 'Seinsweise'). Torrance believes that it is not at all 
clear that Barth's decision at this point is driven by a posteriori considerations of 
the inner triune relations and he suggests that, "it seems at this point that Barth risks 
failing to be true to the content of biblical revelation through his concern with the 
biblical concept of revelation.
Torrance is unhappy about the lack of dynamic mutuality in the 'interconnections' of 
the Seinsweisen and believes that it is a failing which leaves Barth too close to 
modalism -  closer that Barth himself considered himself to be. Certainly, for Barth, 
none of the modes of being would be what it is if  it were not in coexistence with the 
others. No one mode exists as a single individual -  this is Barth's understanding of 
perichoresis. But Torrance says:
The question we are left with is whether it should be conceived dialectically or, rather, dynamically 
in terms o f the category o f communion. Despite Barth's occasional association o f the notions of 
perichoresis, communion and modes of being, he fails to ground his exposition in Volume One in 
anything like as dynamic a conception o f the perichoretic communion o f the Trinity as is to be 
found, for example, in the writings of John Zizioulas and others from the Eastern tradition,^’
^ Torrance Persons in Communion, p.232.
We shall consider the meaning o f the 'commandeering' o f language below. 
^  Torrance Persons in Communion, p.239. Torrance's emphasis.
”  Ibid. p.256.
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Torrance regrets that Barth did not establish a more adequately integrated concept 
of 'koinonia' and ’being’. He believes that Barth's weakness at this point leads him 
into a concomitant failing in his concept of divine economy and the integration of 
communion and communication. Torrance thinks that such problems could have 
been effectively avoided by the employment of a 'worship model' rather than a 
'revelation model'. He suggests: "A doctrine of the Trinity which takes seriously the 
mutuality of loving communion opened up for humanity in Christ by the Spirit 
suggests the ultimate identification of the source of being and the communion of the 
Triunity.
5. Torrance and Zizioulas
John Zizioulas has made a considerable contribution to our understanding and 
conceptualisation of the term 'person'.^^ And it is clear that, in Torrance's 
evaluation, his work represents a substantial corrective to Barth's weaknesses in the 
aieas we have discussed.
Zizioulas finds it necessary to reject any rigid or static definition of 'person' because 
the 'person' is not for him (as so often is the case) defined in terms of internal 
features or qualities but in terms of relationships. Persons are in relationship: that is 
what they are. Any concept of the person apart from relationship is either distorting 
or, more probably, meaningless. Zizioulas himself writes: "the person cannot be 
conceived in itself as a static entity, but only as it relates to''^^
The Roman conception of personhood failed adequately to progress beyond the 
original concept of persona in which the theatrical nuances of the word, and its 
associations with theatrical masks and the roles of actors in plays, were in view. In 
this way the ontology of personliood was not taken on board in the west. The 
radical development of the Greek Fathers was to develop the concept of the person
Ibid. p.258.
See Zizioulas, J. D. (1993). Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church.
Crestwood, NY, St Vladimir's Seminary Press, and Torrance Persons in Communion, pp. 283-306 
Quoted in Torrance Persons in Communion, p.284. j
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with absolute and ontological content^\ The consequences of this move were 
considerable as Torrance explains: "The result was the admission of a relational 
term {prosopon) into ontology and the drawing of an ontological category 
{hypostasis) into the relational categories of existence. The culmination of this 
process was the identification of being and communion. To be and to be in relation 
became identical.'"^^ Torrance quotes Zizioulas' own summary, "In other words 
from an adjunct to a being (a kind of mask) the person becomes the being itself and 
is simultaneously -  a most significant point -  the constitutive element (the 
'principle' or 'cause') of being.^^
The first thing to be said in the light of Zizioulas' understanding of 'person' is that 
Jesus Christ must be conceived of as 'saviour' not only because of his teaching and 
example but because he realises in history the reality of the 'person' (true person) 
and provides the possibility and the hypostasis for all people. Torrance suggests, 
"In doing this Zizioulas does a great deal to take theology beyond the obsession 
with epistemological concerns which has characterised so much theology since the 
Enlightenment -  even, as Colin Gunton suggests, Karl Barth's theology.
It is clear that Zizioulas' contribution is of considerable importance to Torrance in 
establishing an understanding of both intra-trinitarian relations and human 
participation in God but, nevertheless, Torrance has some concerns that Zizioulas 
has overdrawn the distinction between persons in communion with God and persons 
not in communion with God and he asks whether this approach is open to a charge 
of operating an ontological 'positivism of communion' or 'personalist 
foundationalism'. What is the meaning of the Gospel of grace for those who reside 
on the outside of the circle of revelation -  outside the church? Torrance points out:
The story of Jesus' life and death testifies to a divine immanence which is much more than an ek- 
static participation with people whose personhood is thus realised in an event o f communion. An 
adequate account of the grace o f God must speak o f that unheard-of immanence: God's presence,
This is the source o f Zizioulas' inspiration in the development of his understanding of the term 
'person'.
Torrance Persons in Communion. p,286.
Quoted in ibid. p.286.
^ Ibid. p.299. We would suggest tliat rather than taking theology 'beyond' epistemological concerns 
it substantially transforms the way in which those concerns are understood and expressed.
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incarnate and unseen, in that godless world, among its criminals and cripples, its villains and victims, 
beside whom and as whom Jesus lived and died and was interred.^^
Jesus' death is more than a preliminary to his exaltation, and his resurrection more 
than a gloss on his crucifixion and death on the cross. Torrance complains that the 
suffering of Jesus appears to bear little significance for God's being in the thought 
of Zizioulas. In his rigorous focus upon the function of the 'person' within the 
context of the church and the eucharist the distinction which Zizioulas makes 
between those within and those without the church is very clearly drawn, and in 
Torrance's view, overdrawn.
Tonance wonders whether Zizioulas' theological ontology takes on an a priori role 
in the way that parallels the function of Barth's revelation model. But, despite these 
concerns, Torrance is able to say that Zizioulas' contribution remains, "very 
substantial i n d e e d . M o r e  specifically Torrance suggests that "Supremely 
important is his establishing the primacy of communion over revelation and 
affirmation of the integral relationship between truth and communion -  'the 
essential thing about a person lies precisely in his being a revelation of truth, not as 
"substance" or "nature" but as "mode of e x i s t e n c e " T h e  relationship between 
truth and communion, albeit cast in the form of different terminology, is one which 
we will have cause to explore in considerable detail when we come to our 
exposition of the epistemology of Michael Polanyi.
6. From 'Revelation Model' to 'Worship Model'
Torrance believes that Barth's decision to reject the concept of'person' vis-à-vis the 
Trinitarian life was driven by his model of divine revelation. What Barth lacks, in 
Torrance's evaluation, is a sufficiently profound concept of the 'person' on the one 
hand and of the intra-divine communion on the other.
Tonance refers to the work of Jürgen Moltmann who (as a committed social 
Trinitarian theologian) argues for an essential connection between theological
Ibid. pp.SOlf.
Ibid. p.304.
Ibid. p.304.
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knowing, theological participation and, also, doxology. But Torrance believes that 
there are weaknesses in Moltmann's discussion, the most significant of which is that 
he assumes that worship is something which we do and which we initiate, albeit by 
the Spirit and in the fellowship of Jesus. This fails to recognise, according to j
Torrance, the mediatorial priesthood of Christ. Over against Moltmann's view j
Torrance asserts that our worship is: "the gift o f participating, through the Spirit, in 
what Christ has done and is doing for us in his intercessions and communion with 
the Father
Torrance wishes to establish that worship is human participation in the transcendent 
life of the trinitarian God: "Doxological participation is an event of grace.
Understood as such, worship cannot be conceived as something for which human 
beings have a 'natural' capacity. Here we must refer back to our discussion and 
conclusions under the subheading 'Human Capacity'. What was said of revelation 
must now be said of worship. We cannot speak of an active capacity to worship 
God, if by that we mean that we can participate in worship out of an ability which is 
native to us as creatures, and regardless of God's decision to be present to us as we 
come before him. But as God makes himself present to us we do participate and 
enter into communion with the trinitarian life of God.
Torrance wishes to avoid a Pelagianism in which worship is conceived in terms of 
the creature's approach to God. He insists that, on the contrary, worship is the "free 
participation by the Spirit in something that God perfects on our behalf It is, "a 
mediated gift of participating in the intra-divine communion wherein it is the one 
High Priest alone who offers that worship and 'worthship' that the unconditional 
grace of God unconditionally requires of us."^  ^ Later he writes, "Communion is not 
something into which we 'enter' so much as something into which we are drawn by 
the Spirit. It is, moreover, neither a form of 'praxis' nor a mode of doing, but a
68 Ibid. p.311. Torrance's emphasis.
Ibid.p.313.
Ibid. p.314.
Ibid. p.313.
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dynamic in which we find ourselves. It is a mode of being... but one which is 
discovered a posteriori in and through the event of our participation within it."^^
Torrance speculates that it may be appropriate to speak of a vestigium trinitatis 
insofar as, "the Father is the author of worship, the Son is the worshipper and the 
Spirit is the agent of worship."^^ Indeed, he suggests that it is more appropriate to 
speak of a vestigium here than in relation to the structure of revelation -  as Barth 
does in Volume One of Church Dogmatics.^ "* Torrance justifies this by claiming 
that the 'worship model' (conceived in terms of the inclusive economy of the Trinity 
ad intra) meets three criteria in relation to which, by comparison, Barth's 'revelation 
model' falls short. Firstly, it indicates more fully the openness and inclusiveness of 
the communion of the Trinity with respect to human beings. Secondly, it affirms 
more effectively the communal or personal nature of the intra-trinitarian relations 
and, finally, it offers a fuller explication of the agency of the Holy Spirit which 
moves beyond the tendency in Barth to reduce the role of the Spirit to providing for 
persons the condition for the reception of revelation. Torrance goes on to explain 
that the event of grace does not stop at the beginning of the human response; the 
human response is included in the act of grace to the extent that the human response 
is completed on our behalf in Christ. The human creature desires to worship and 
serve the living God when the desire is given by the living God and this desire is 
given in our indwelling of Christ.
[A]s we are brought to participate in his human life and live 'out o f the vicarious worship (as this 
includes the totality o f human 'worthship') provided in him by the Spirit on our behalf -  and where 
we are thereby recreated to live out o f  this event o f grace in all its objectivity. It is as we find 
ourselves {post factum) subjectively caught up in this event of participation that the implications of 
God's covenant commitment to humanity are subjectively (and subliminally) realised in us such that 
there may be brought about, by grace, a reforming and transforming of our lives and apperceptions -  
where this is rooted in subjective desire, that is, a desiring that is given, a 'desire' that is not 'desired' 
in advance o f its being realised in us.’^
Ibid. p.320. Although there is a 'mode of doing' and a 'praxis' and these are far from insignificant. 
These are the forms o f activity in which we are incorporated into the intra-trinitarian communion in 
worship. The point is that it is by the free act of God that in this activity we are drawn into worship. 
Ibid. p.314.
See Barth, Bromiley, et al. CD I . l . pp.295-347.
Torrance Persons in Communion. p.319. Torrance's emphases.
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The apostle Paul insists that it is not the Christian who lives, but Christ. The 
Christian does not pray, it is the Spirit who intercedes. The Christian does not 
understand, but is brought into participation in the understanding that is Christ's. 
This does not mean that we are 'overshadowed', or that our human will is withdrawn 
and replaced. Rather we take this to mean that the 'shape' of our humanity is 
transformed and enabled, by the Spirit, to participate in the life of Christ. It is a 
participation in the life, prayer and knowledge which is complete in Christ and 
which is offered by him on behalf of humanity.
Torrance's position might be summed up in three affirmations: that the trinitarian 
relations ad intra are to be conceived as open to humanity, that the 'human- 
Godward' (or 'enhypostatic') movement is achieved and made complete in the Son 
(the true worship of the Father), and that this is the communion into which we are 
drawn -  as human creatures -  by the Spirit.
The shength o f the doxological approach -  a 'worship orientated paradigm' as opposed to a 
'revelation-oriented paradigm' -  is its capacity to direct us to that event of triune communion which 
is conceived not as a 'mode of being' to be appropriated or taken on by the human subject, but as the 
gift o f sharing in the life o f the Second Adam as it is constitutive of the New Humanity -  o f sharing 
in and living out o f his life lived in place of ours (his worthship), his continuing and vicarious 
priesthood (his worship) and in his union and communion with the Father in the Spirit.
What Torrance's 'worship model' cannot do -  and in this there is an equivalence 
with Barth's 'revelation model' -  is resolve the difficulties felt by those who see in 
such views a privileged access to God for those who have been caught up in what 
has been derogatorily described as the 'magic circle'. Torrance makes several 
responses to those entertaining such concems^^ and suggests that the most coherent 
response in defence of Barth, and, by extension, his own position, points to the fact 
that 'possession'^^ of such knowledge bears no concomitant sense of moral 
commendation, nor does the lack of it imply moral condemnation. Torrance writes,
Ibid. p.324. Torrance's emphasis.76
See ibid. pp.93f.
We would prefer to use the word 'participation' in this context.
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"the self-authenticating event of Self-disclosure is simply an event and never an 
accomplishment at the human level."^^
It is our contention that Torrance's 'modification' and 'controlled reinterpretation' of 
Barth's 'revelation model' contains certain important insights and correctives. His 
particular strategy for réintroduction of the term 'person' into the articulation of the 
trinitarian life guards against a tendency towards modalism and appears to be more 
faithful to the New Testament witness from which it is drawn. It is clear that 
Torrance's method is not the projection of an anthropologically conditioned 
understanding of 'persons' onto the 'Father', the 'Son' and the 'Holy Spirit'. Rather, 
he adopts the term and adapts it in the light of the way in which God has made 
himself known.Also ,  and significantly for our project, in elucidating a dynamic 
and open model of the Trinity Torrance is able to articulate with greater clarity than 
Barth, by way of his 'doxological model', the form and the possibility of human 
participation in the intra-trinitarian communion.
7. Concepts, Words and Revelation
According to Barth there is a sphere in which human beings may know God. 
Human beings participate in this sphere as God gives himself to them. Apart from 
the event in which God gives himself to be known, knowledge of God is not 
possible. But in this event there is, according to Barth, a linguistic participation. 
But how can we conceive the function of language in this sphere of revelatory 
knowledge? We must return, briefly, to Barth's Church Dogmatics in order to 
consider his response to this problem.
Can human language be brought into correspondence with revelation? Barth 
characteristically reminds his readers that, insofar as this is a possibility, it is a 
possibility given to us by God. "To the question how we come to know God by 
means of our thinking and language, we must give the answer that of ourselves we 
do not come to know Him, that, on the contrary, this happens only as the grace of
Torrance Persons in Communion, p.94. Torrance's emphasis.
In the next section we will consider in some depth the way in which language is used in relation to 
God.
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the revelation of God comes to us and therefore to the means of our thinking and 
language, adopting us and them, pardoning, saving, protecting and making good."^^
But, given that Barth believes that this is a possibility which is given by God, what 
is the relationship between our language and concepts and the God who gives 
himself as object? Barth claims, "this relationship is to be regarded as a positive 
relationship, i.e., one in which there exists a real fellowship between knower and his 
knowing on the one hand and the known on the other."^^
If we are to affirm this relationship we do not, according to Barth, suppose that 
there is parity between the way in which we apply our words and concepts to God 
and the way in which we apply them to creaturely reality. "For this would mean a 
denial of God's hiddenness, and His revelation would no longer be understood as an 
unveiling in veiling."^^ If there were parity it would be because God was no longer 
God or because humanity had become God. However, if Barth refuses parity, he |
also refuses disparity. If there were disparity it would mean that there was no 
knowledge of God. Barth wishes to affirm that there is knowledge of God. He 
claims, "The fact that we know Him must mean that, with our views, concepts and 
words, we do not describe and express something quite different from Himself, but 
in and by these means of ours -  the only ones we have -  we describe and express 
God Himself. Otherwise, without this relationship, under the presupposition of a 
simple disparity, there cannot possibly be any question of the veracity of our 
knowledge of God." '^  ^ As such Barth resists the description of the relationship as 
one of simple parity or disparity. He suggests, "We have stumbled again on the co­
existence and co-inherence of veiling and unveiling in God's revelation. That God 
also veils Himself in His revelation certainly excludes the concept of parity as a 
designation of the relationship between our word and God's being. And that God 
also unveils Himself in His revelation excludes the concepts of disparity.
If this is so, how does the partial correspondence arise? It is, in Barth's view, the 
result of an active human response to God's revelation. Human concepts can be
Barth, Bromiley, et al. CD II. 1. p.223. 
Ibid. p.224.
Ibid. p.224.
Ibid. p.225.
Ibid. pp.235f.
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adapted by us to apply to God.^  ^ Barth claims that, "Our views, concepts and 
words, grounded in God's revelation, can become a successful work."^^ This task is 
according to Barth 'authorised' and 'commanded' by God. "[I]t is not the case that 
when He authorises and commands us in His revelation to make use of our views, 
concepts and words God is doing something, so to speak, inappropriate, because if 
they are to be applied to Him, our views, concepts and words have to be alienated 
from their proper and original sense and usage. No, He takes to himself something 
that already belongs originally and properly to Him."^^ Because God is creator he 
has an appropriate claim on our words and concepts and claims them precisely in 
his revelation. "And disposing of them as His property. He places them at our 
disposal -  at the disposal of our grateful obedience -  when He allows us and 
commands us to make use of them in this relationship too."^^ But we must take 
careful note of the way in which our words and concepts are adopted in this 
relationship:
For example, the words "father" and "son" do not first and properly have their truth at the point of 
reference to the underlying views and concepts in our thought and language, i.e., in their application 
to the two nearest male members in the succession of physical generations o f man or of animal 
creation generally. They have it first and properly at a point to which, as our words, they cannot 
refer at all, but to which, on the basis o f the grace of the revelation of God, they may refer, and on 
the basis o f the lawful claim o f God the Creator they even must refer, and therefore, on the basis of 
this permission and compulsion, they can actually refer -  in their application to God, in the doctrine 
of the Trinity. '^’
Another example, offered by Barth, is the word "patience". He insists that the 
meaning with which we should be primarily concerned is not the virtue as it is (or is 
not) practised by us, "but the incomprehensible being and attitude of God which is 
shown in the fact that He gives us time to believe in Him."^^ Barth makes the more 
general point that, "Their proper use obviously consists in the fact that they point
Although it is not a theme pursued by Barth in this context it is clear that this process of 
'adaptation' is to be understood as a task of the church. As a task of the ecclesial community it is 
executed under the guidance o f Holy Scriptures and in conversation with credal formulations and 
broader theological expressions of its various traditions.
Barth, Bromiley, et al. CD II. 1. p.227.
Ibid. p.228.
Ibid. p.229.
Ibid. p.229.
Ibid. p.230.
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away and beyond themselves, taking on a new pregnancy, referring to that to which 
they cannot refer at all as our views and concepts.
It is the error of natural theology to imagine that we can say things of God which 
we say of things in the creaturely realm. But, in his revelation, a new possibility 
arises for us with regard to our use of language. The point is not that there are 
analogies which we know but that there are analogies of which God knows. 
"Analogy of truth between Him and us is present in His knowing, which 
comprehends ours, but not in ours which does not comprehend His."^^ It is in God's 
movement towards humanity in the decision of his grace and in our encounter that 
the analogous meaning of our words and concepts can be discerned. It is because 
God does make this movement, "the relationship between the knower and the 
known on the basis of revelation is to be understood as a positive one."^ "^
The correspondence between our words and concepts and God is perceived in 
relational terms. We cannot think of the relationship between our words and 
concepts apart from the relationship in which humanity is confronted by God. "[A 
person] is drawn into the light that is given with the fact that God has entered into 
relationship with him."^^ Because humanity is confronted by God in this 
relationship (and because God veils himself in his unveiling and unveils himself in 
his veiling) we must not only say that the correspondence is partial, but, also, that it 
is not possible to say how it is partial.
Because God is always God in this relationship, He is (in His entirety, in the quantitatively as well as 
qualitatively quite unlimited truth o f His being) the object of tlie views, concepts and words which 
He places at man's disposal in His revelation, which in His revelation He allows and commands him 
to use to designate Him. He is this in so far as He is gracious to man and actually accepts him in 
grace. But because God is always God, He is also in His revelation (again in His entirety and 
therefore without deduction o f a part of His being, o f which something else might be said) the 
hidden God, who is definitely not the object o f the views, concepts and words which we may apply
Ibid. p.230. 
Ibid. p.230. 
Ibid. p.233. 
Ibid. p.234.
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to Him, and who has certainly not given Himself by His permission and command even into the 
sphere of our apprehension and disposal, much less into our hands.^ ®
In knowing God in his revelation, we know him in his gracious movement towards 
us. We do not and cannot know him apart from this and therefore should not seek 
to know him apart from this, "[W]e must not and will not leave the grace of His 
revelation. We must not dispense with it. Nor will it become superfluous to us. 
Each step that we take as we come from the hiddenness of God must, and will, 
consist in a new reception of grace of revelation.
In this brief revisitation of Barth's Church Dogmatics we can see, with some clarity, 
the relational aspect of his thinking. While it is clear that, for Barth, there is no 
possibility of a correspondence between our concepts and words and God 
independently of his revelation, in God's revelation -  which Barth conceives in 
relational terms -  the task is a genuine human task in relationship.
In Moltmann's criticism of Barth, which we noted earlier in this chapter, he 
complains that revelation bypasses genuine human experience. And yet Barth, as 
we have seen, wishes to affirm that God's revelation can be experienced. Although 
we are entirely dependent upon God to make himself known to us, this does not 
mean that in the event in which he does make himself known to us we have no 
active part to play in response. In this related issue, in which we consider the 
correspondence of our words and thoughts with the being of God, we must again 
acknowledge that there is no possibility of our establishing such a correspondence 
apart from the relationship in which God, by his grace, confronts us and makes 
himself known. But, similarly, this does not mean that in God's gracious 
confrontation of humanity our human capacities are bypassed and our participation 
reduced to zero. On the contrary, Barth affirms that in this relationship the 
establishment of such a correlation is not only possible but is 'commanded' of us by 
God. Our response, in this regard, is required and we may be either obedient or 
disobedient to this command. This is our work and our participation.
Ibid. p.235.
Ibid. p.235.
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The confusion stems from an assumption that what God achieves in his revelation is 
opposed to human participation, whereas what God achieves in his revelation ought, 
rather, to be conceived as the establishing of a possibility for humanity which would 
not be present apart from God's revelation. Such an understanding corresponds 
with Barth's rejection of natural theology. But in the event of God's revelation and 
the relationship which is established through it, humanity receives, by grace, a 
possibility in which genuine human participation is both possible and required. As 
we develop this point we will consider the transformative aspect of this 
participation.
8. Semantics, Human Transformation and Indwelling
Following on from our exposition of Barth's understanding of the relationship 
between human concepts and God's being, we will now take up Alan Torrance's 
discussion of 'semantic participation'^^. Having established a positive relationship 
between human words and concepts, we must now consider the dynamic nature of 
this relationship and its part in human transformation. Torrance's comments 
represent something of an extension of Barth's position and draw on insights in the 
linguistic philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein.
Torrance believes that theologians have generally been too ready to adopt naïve 
referential and uncritically realist conceptions of the meaning of terms. It is too 
often assumed that the meaning of a term is simply to be understood as that to 
which it refers. It has too often been assumed that there are 'things' which are 
known 'pre-linguistically' by 'pure thought' to which terms are subsequently 
attached in the mental act of referring. Augustine, for example, adopts this sort of 
position. Torrance quotes Wittgenstein: "Augustine describes the learning of 
human language as if the child came into a strange country and it did not understand 
the language of the country; that is, as if it already had a language, only not this one. 
Or again: as if the child could already think, only not yet speak. And 'think' would 
here mean something like talk to 'itself
See Torrance Persons in Communion, pp.325-355. 
^ Quoted in ibid, p.328.
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But this is an inadequate description of the way things are. Children do not have 
'another' language and do not 'speak to themselves'. The use of language is a skill 
which is learned by children as they are nurtured in a particular life context. 
Language helps us to make distinctions but, although these distinctions are certainly 
not arbitrary (in that they are grounded in the structure of reality), the way in which 
they are made bears an intrinsic relation to the particular life context (or, better, 
contexts) in which the child par t icipates.Torrance says: "Despite the extensive 
commonalities which characterise humanity as a whole and which are reflected in 
the fact that we can translate one language into another -  a factor with which the 
relativism of 'post-modern' theology has failed to come to grips -  there are 
differences to be found between different societies and the manner in which they 
distinguish objects and 'divide up' r e a l i t y . " T h e  learning of a language is less a 
process in which we leam to attach particular terms to particular things and more 
like learning to participate in a game.
The significance of these observations for Torrance's broader argument now 
emerges. If we use the term 'person' of the members of the Trinity and use it of 
human beings, this does not necessarily imply that in each case the meaning of the 
term must be the same. It may be that there are indeed 'family resemblances', not 
between the referents, but between the ways in which the term functions. The rules 
by which such connections are made are open and not closed. There are 'fuzzy 
boundaries' between terms and this semantic openness must not be ignored if one is 
to avoid misinterpreting what one is doing when one engages in theological 
description and affirmation. Torrance suggests that: "Allowing for this stands to 
serve a proper theology of communion rather than the opposite. It reminds us when 
using the term 'person', for example not to suppose that the whole 'family' of its 
rules of use in the human context applies appropriately when it is used of the intra-
It is worth noting, in parenthesis, that this analysis corresponds closely to Michael Polanyi's 
concept of'calling'. Polanyi's concept o f  calling' denotes our 'placement' -  both historically and 
geographically -  our rootedness in the linguistic and cultural life o f the context or contexts in which 
we are nurtured. Although we are profoundly 'shaped' by this participation our knowledge of this 
context is largely tacit. This is a theme which we will explore in more detail later in the thesis.
Torrance Persons in Communion. pp.328f.
Although this is clearly part o f the process.
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divine communion and that the degree of continuity between the two sets of rules of 
use must be determined reverently.
In this context we must now consider Torrance's use of the phrase 'commandeering 
of language'. In a position which parallels Barth's, Torrance explains that 
theology, which is bound to work out of the context in which God's revelation is 
known, takes up terms which are meaningful in public discourse, and allows them 
to be commandeered in the light of revelation. We have considered in some detail 
Barth's view that human words and concepts are able, in the event of revelation, to 
correspond to it. Torrance wishes to proceed beyond this affirmation to consider 
the transformative process in which this may be so.
With regard to the use of the term 'person' -  which is something of a 'paradigm case' 
-  Torrance suggests that, "the whole conceptuality of personhood is semper 
reformanda and must not, without collapsing theology into anthropomorphism, be 
conceived in terms of the subliminal operation of categories which are 
anthropologically or ethically predetermined". ^ Theological construction will
inevitably be distorted if its categories are not sufficiently 'commandeered' in the 
event of God's self-presentation. Torrance concedes that there have been times 
when this has indeed been the case with theological terms being significantly 
shaped by metaphysical systems, such as Aristotelianism. However, Torrance 
believes, in contradistinction to Barth, that the use of the term 'person' (as it is used 
to denote the triune God), ought not to be considered intrinsically problematic. Its 
meaning may be appropriately extended as it is commandeered in the event of 
revelation.
Ibid. pp.332f. Torrance's emphasis. In speaking o f  reverent' use we may take Torrance to mean 
'a posteriori' -  in the light o f revelation.
What is in view, here, is akin to Barth's discussion o f the way in which words and terms are 
adopted and adapted in the event o f God's revelation.
Torrance Persons in Communion, p.333.
It is important to note at this point that it is not the case that the term 'person' must be adopted. 
The obligation under which we fall in faithfulness to God's self-presentation is to ensure that the 
language-games function as effectively as possible in reflecting the triune life as it is ecclesially 
known. It is this question o f faithfulness which is the key to determining the appropriateness of 
theological description.
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One ^pect of Torrance's exposition of this theme, which is not emphasised by 
Barth, is the ecclesial aspect of the revelation event. The commandeering of words 
and concepts is not to be understood as a private matter or in terms of a private 
language (which, arguably, has no meaning). It is a process which happens in the 
context in which God makes himself known and the primary identification which 
Torrance makes in this regard is the church community. The church is a 
worshipping community and in its worship it participates in the life of the God it 
worships. This is the mode of existence of the church community and it is as this 
community that it develops and establishes a mode of language and discourse which 
is consonant with its life.^ ®^  The task of 'language shaping' is a human task -  it is 
the task of establishing appropriate forms of theological articulation -  but it is 
contingent upon a participation in the trinitarian life of God. Torrance draws 
several strands of his argument together when he writes:
[T]he use of a theological term presupposes a community which provides the context o f its use, that 
is, the rules of the use of the term. Terms are used in the context of social participation with respect 
to which certain rules o f use apply. This adds support... to the insistence (implicit in the analogia 
fldei) that the commandeering o f terms for theological usage takes place within the Church, that is, 
witliin the community of Christ. There is no unilateral, esoteric or inner transformation of meaning, 
there is simply the language-game which is constituted, which 'takes place' within the body o f Christ 
by the Spirit and which we are brought to indwell as the means o f the communion which stems from 
the triune life.'108
An implication of the relationship between the language of the church and the life 
of the church is that the words and terms which are established within the 
community will not coincide with the meanings which are associated with the same 
terms outside the community. This is not unique since dissonance (with regard to 
the meaning of terms) will arise in differing ways and to differing degrees between 
all mamier of different communities of practice. But the particular form of semantic 
formation which is established in the church is unique (and must be distinguished as 
such) in that its possibility is only a possibility insofar as God draws the church, in
As we have mentioned above, there are other aspects o f the church's life which might 
appropriately be distinguished from its worship. Such aspects, alongside the worship of the church, 
combine to establish the form of the community's life.
Torrance Persons in Communion, p.336.
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the various aspects of its life, into communion with himself. As such it is a 
'language-game' which cannot arise apart from the decision and act of God.
One important dynamic aspect of the church's 'language-game' is that it is 
established in the event in which God confronts people in reconciling grace. 
Human transformation is a possibility as we are drawn into participation in the life 
of God by the Spirit of God. Such an encounter requires human transformation -  
one in which the transformation of language is also implied. The significance of the 
distinctiveness of the 'language-game' should not be underplayed. Baptism into the 
Body of Christ means the sharing of a metanoia which necessitates the taking up of 
language-games appropriate to the ecclesial context. If we assume more continuity 
than is actually the case with regard to the use of language, this will only serve to 
subvert a proper appreciation of the discontinuity between life in and outside the 
church and understate the distinctions which ought appropriately to be made. 
Torrance writes:
[A] coherent exposition of revelation... requires... an 'in-depth' exposition o f human, semantic 
participation as it is created by the bestowal of communion and as it involves the creation of human 
participation in new forms and levels o f (ecclesial) language-games as these are constituted by the 
Logos in and through the Body of Christ and by the creative presence of the Holy Spirit working a 
meta-noia with respect to our noiein, logein and semainein such that they may be brought into foil 
participation with the one Semeion who is the incarnate Logos.
We might reflect upon the way in which Jesus, in what he taught and what he did, 
undermined the assumptions of the scribes and the Pharisees. The parables of Jesus 
represent a radical method for calling people to reconsider the form of life which 
they inhabit, and the use of language associated with it, and introducing them to 
another form of life -  life in the Spirit. This implies human transformation -  
metanoia -  in which life and language are radically re-shaped. The reconfiguring 
of language is not, of course, peculiar to the church. Torrance points out that the 
'commandeering' of language is an important element quite generally in human 
discovery. Language functions in such a way as to extend knowledge, and this is 
particularly true of metaphors. As such language is an agent of discovery. In this
109 Ibid. p.342. As we shall note below, Torrance's emphasis is very much on the 'semainein'.
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connection Torrance quotes Janet Soskice: "New knowledge is a product of the 
formation of new relationships between ourselves, our language and the rest of 
reality."
In extending his understanding of the significance of the community Torrance 
offers a criticism of Kant which strongly echoes that of Michael Polanyi:
Kant saw that perceptions without conceptual categories of understanding are 'blind' events. The 
transcendental condition of understanding he interpreted in subjective terms. Consequently, his 
Critique o f  Pure Reason did not succeed in breaking adequately with the Cartesianism that had 
shaped European thought before him -  and its interpretation of semantics. Wittgenstein, however, 
shows the extent to which our conceptual processes of interpretation belong to the public domain and 
take the form o f obeying rules -  a form of obedience that we do not choose but are bom into,"'
By 'obeying rules' Torrance means not so much 'obeying laws' as 'playing in accord 
with the spirit of the game'.^^^ The categories by which we interpret things are not 
just 'given' but are rooted in particular life contexts. The categories that we use are 
established in our participation in such contexts.^Torrance makes the point that 
implied in 'playing the game' (participation in the 'life-forms' of a community) is the 
development of skills and this is only meaningful in terms of 'public practice'. 
Torrance also claims that the participation is 'b lind ':partic ipation  precedes 
interpretation. As a consequence Torrance acknowledges that, "To a significant 
degree we are socially 'created' at the cognitive level prior to any decision to acquire 
these ski l l s . "^This  latter observation has important consequences for the way in 
which we think about participation in the ecclesial community, Torrance writes:
Quoted in ibid. p.347. Although Torrance does not pursue the matter, it is, nevertheless, 
interesting to reflect on the ways in which scientific discovery has led to the commandeering of 
terms and language. It might also be interesting to explore the role o f language in the facilitation of 
scientific discovery.
"'Ibid. p.338.
Although there are aspects o f language which are 'tighter' and more specific than this metaphor 
might imply.
By way of clarification it should be noted that our knowledge o f the life contexts in which we 
participate is largely tacit. This is to say that although we may be skilled in 'playing according to the 
spirit o f the game' (and, indeed, a variety of'games') we may be able to articulate only a small part of 
what we know. Here we anticipate Polanyi's distinction between focal and tacit knowledge and his 
aphorism, 'we know more than we can tell'.
' See Torrance Persons in Communion, p.339.
Ibid. p.339.
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The stress on the priority of participation over interpretation and understanding is paralleled in the 
ecclesial context in various ways. The 'performative' logic of grace as held forth in infant baptism is 
irreducibly bound up with its purpose of training a child (in and through its being brought up to 
understand what its baptism means) in the 'skill' o f interpreting the world from the perspective o f the 
paradigms associated with the ontological and existential realities held forth in baptism."^ -
Torrance is not saying that as human beings we are socially determined; just that we 
are social beings. To attempt to understand human being apart from human 
sociality can only lead to distortions and misconceptions. The semantic aspect of 
the social contexts in which we participate is clearly an important one in relation to 
this sociality. As Torrance points out, "There is no Archimedean point outside of 
language from which we can speak or state or describe the relationship between 
language and the world."^^* It is certainly the case that from within the context of 
our semantic participation we are able to 'isolate' and reflect upon a particular 
aspects of our practice but we may only do this as part of our continued 
participation in some or other 'language-game'. It is, therefore, our participation -  
and primarily our uncritical participation -  which has a logical priority over any 
possible critical internal evaluation and this cannot be ignored by dogmatics. The 
point which Torrance makes here -  a point which has particular prominence in 
Michael Polanyi's work -  is that language is something which, primarily, we 
indwell.
We indwell the world by means o f words and by the use o f language as much as we 'indwell' the 
world by means o f visual, audial and tactile means. To this extent, language becomes essential to 
our being as persons. To put it in other words, to the extent that our 'indwelling' the world is a 
formal condition of our being persons, language, which is the ground of the 'immediacy' o f this 
indwelling, becomes a (socially mediated) 'given' constitutive of our personhood."^
Here we recall one of the emphases of Zizioulas' work: we cannot think of a person 
as somehow 'existing' and then, out of this existence, proceeding to 'relate'. As we 
have already seen, relating is intrinsic to our existence. This point is significant for
Ibid. p.339.
We agree with Torrance in this but feel that his emphasis upon the semantic is inadequately 
supplemented with emphases upon other aspects of our participation in a context of life. We will 
expand upon this concern, and offer what we believe is a corrective, later in the thesis.
"® Torrance Persons in Communion. p.340.
"Ubid. p.343.
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understanding the way in which language functions. Torrance insists, "It is not the 
case, therefore, that we exist as persons, conceptualise, think and analyse and then 
attach words to our thoughts and express or communicate our conceptualising in 
language... [0]ur very thinking and analysing presupposes our obedience to social 
rules, that participation within the community.
Torrance insists that this does not lead us into relativity. Indeed, it is our indwelling 
in which our claim to objectivity is rooted. Once again, this analysis resonates 
strongly with the ideas of Michael Polanyi who conceives of indwelling as the only 
way in which it is possible to move towards 'objective' knowledge. Again we must 
say that there is no Archimedean point from which we are able evaluate our 
indwelling. Any evaluation of that which we indwell can be made only from within 
that which we indwell. Torrance explains:
The (Cartesian) fear that the failure to be able to indwell our 'indwelling' in certain objectivistic ways 
may lead to relativism and uncertainty is as foolish as believing that if  we cannot visually see that 
OUI" seeing is veridical while seeing something then our visual capacities may not be trusted. The 
very quest amounts essentially to a failure to appreciate the irreducible given-ness o f our there-being 
or Da-sein (Heidegger). In other words, the self is not a detached thinking 'I* who attaches terms to 
thoughts about God and the world and infallibly checks out all one's stepping-stones to the 'outside 
world' before standing on them.'^'
The conclusion that we must draw is that theological criticism issues forth from 
ecclesial being and not vice versa. This is certainly in harmony with Barth's 
position in that he asserts, "there is no possibility of dogmatics at all outside the 
Church. We must begin by standing within the Body of Christ. Therefore it is 
'relative' in the sense that it is relational rather than self-sustaining. It is also 
relative in the sense that it must be provisional, before God. But, again, we must 
insist that this is not 'relativism'. It is what Michael Polanyi calls post-critical 
realism and a post-critical realist view is able to sustain the integration of subject 
and object, language and world. Torrance writes.
Ibid. p.344. Torrance's emphasis. 
Ibid. p.346.
Barth, Bromiley, et al. CD I .l . p. 17. Barth's dogmatics is, after all, a church dogmatics.
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Post-critical realism conceives of the world as giving itself to be known -  taking hold of our 
language, revising and extending our terminology and conceptualities, and compelling us to use 
semantically incremental metaphors in such a way that they receive a new and a posteriori propriety 
from the given structure o f the world. The way in which these things are is seen, therefore, as 
epistemically invasive, instituting heuristic leaps in our processes of understanding -  an invasiveness 
that is, again, conceptually mediated by our language and language-games (as these include the 
grammar of scientific models).
Without denying our own participation (which is, in fact, essential), we may 
conceive nature as imposing, albeit in an incremental way, its form upon our 
language-games. Insofar as this is true, a deeper engagement with reality is made 
possible. This conceptuality is extended in a profound way by Michael Polanyi 
through his concept of the tacit dimension. Through this it becomes clear that our 
knowledge is not limited to that which is explicit. The tacit dimension is the sine 
qua non of heuristic leaps of discovery. It is this that provides Polanyi with his 
resolution to the problem posed by Plato's Meno Paradox
According to Polanyi, our awareness of the techniques of using the 'tools' by which 
we indwell the world, of which language is one, are subliminal so that we do not 
attend to them but attend from  them. Taking as an example a blind man with a stick, 
we would say that he does not attend to the stick but attends from  it. Hence Polanyi 
makes the case that meaning tends to be displaced away from ourselves. When we 
indwell language (that is, when we use a language) we do not attend to it, from  
it.'''
In his analysis Torrance brings together insights from both Polanyi and 
Wittgenstein. The significance of these two influences for his own theological task 
are further illuminated when he writes, "Semantic participation, as it includes -  and, 
indeed, constitutes -  our epistemic 'indwelling', is an essential coefficient of 
doxological participation in communion to the extent that worship is cognitive.
Torrance Persons in Communion, p.349. Torrance’s emphasis.
See Polanyi, M. (1983). The Tacit Dimension. Gloucester, Mass., Peter Smith, p.22. We will 
give further consideration to Polanyi's treatment o f the Meno in chapter 3.
Tliis is ordinarily the situation. We can desist from using that which we indwell in order to attend 
directly to it (as we do, for example, when we think about how we have used a word or how we have 
constructed a sentence) but this inevitably interrupts the satisfactory performance o f the activity. We 
will offer a more detailed explanation o f this phenomenon in our exposition of Polanyi.
Page 88
conceptual and social (ecclesial), and thus grounded in the creative reconstitution in 
Christ, by the Spirit, of the language-games which constitute our 'capacity' for 
communion.""^
As we seek to develop the doctrine of revelation in this thesis, we will affirm 
Torrance's emphasis upon semantic participation and transformation, while 
suggesting that such an emphasis must be supplemented in recognition of other 
aspects of our participation which are not adequately developed in Torrance's work.
9. Analogy
Torrance believes that there is an analogia entis but that this must be conceived in 
eschatological terms. It will be only in the eschaton that human participation will 
be complete and where God will be all in all. As we have seen, we can make no 
claims that our own words circumscribe God. The claim is, in the terminology 
adopted by Bonhoeffer, that the human logos is confronted by the 'counterlogos' -  
the Logos. And so, "Our language becomes 'God-talk'... given the creation and 
redefinition of our language-games instituted in and through the Word and which 
take place within the ecclesial community as the reconciled Body of the Word.""^
But a parallelism is suggested between the intra-divine communion (a communion 
which is opened to us in Christ) and the communion of human persons in the Body 
of Christ. But what of an analogy beyond the community of the church? What of 
human interrelationships on a wider scale? Torrance thinks that the answer to this 
question depends upon, "the extent to which we can interpret obedience to social 
rules, which is the ground of semantic interaction, as a form of unconditional, 
'covenantal' commitment to others, that is, a form of communion in itself.""^ He is 
clearly uncertain about this. He writes: "It would appear to be difficult to argue for 
an easy identification between 'sociality' and 'communion' that does not commit us 
to a generic concept of k o i n o n i a . Nevertheless, he does make the comment: 
"The interesting feature of semantic sociality is that it would seem to repose on a
Torrance Persons in Communion, p.356. Torrance's emphasis. 
Ibid. p.357. Torrance's emphasis.
128 Ibid. p.358.
Ibid. p.358.
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degree of unconditional commitment at the subliminal level — although one which 
may only manifest in a 'marriage of convenience' rather than an intentional 
covenant commitment! One might suggest, instead of invoking a 'generic 
concepts of koinonia', that it would be appropriate to speak of 'family resemblances' 
in the use of 'community' inside and outside the church. Torrance is trying to avoid 
the position adopted by Zizioulas in which communion is regarded as possible only 
for those who are located within the ecclesial community; a position which implies 
a strong discontinuity with all other forms of social interrelatedness. Torrance 
makes the comment:
Only an over-realised eschatology (and the resulting isolationist ecclesiology) combined with a 
grossly inadequate doctrine of creation will suppose that the boundaries between semantic sociality 
within the secular context and the semantic participation within the Church can or should be clearly 
drawn. Continuities between ecclesial communion and created sociality beyond the Body of Christ 
are the sine qua non o f communicating with and hence loving -  and hence hearing and speaking to -  
our neighbour. As such they are divinely intended.'^*
Affirming the appropriateness of a stronger doctrine of creation than we find in 
Zizioulas, and with the essential qualification that 'created sociality' is to be 
interpreted in the light of the ecclesial community, Torrance ventures that it is 
appropriate to speak of an analogy between the intra-trinitarian communion (which, 
in Christ, is open to human participation) and forms of sociality we fin d beyond the 
ecclesial context.
10. The Significance of the Historical Jesus
In this chapter we have suggested that Barth has been the recipient of criticism as a 
result of failing to give due weight and recognition to responsive human 
participation in revelation. We have suggested that the problem here is one of 
understatement and it has been possible to show that such human activity is both 
consistent with his theological scheme and, to a modest degree, acknowledged 
within it. We need not concern ourselves unduly with the reasons for this 
imbalance beyond pointing to the particular theological challenges of his time and
130 Ibid. pp.358f.
Ibid. p.359.
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the energetic and radical way in which he engaged with them, but we have, by way 
of a corrective, sought to place greater emphasis upon human participation in a 
variety of ways. As we come to the final section of this chapter we turn our 
attention to another theme within the doctrine of revelation in which it is possible to 
discern an understatement in Barth's account. We will consider now the 
significance for revelation of the historical Jesus.
In the first three part volumes of Church Dogmatics Barth strives to articulate an 
account of revelation as relationship. Revelation occurs in the relationship which 
God establishes with humanity in his sovereignty and freedom. Revelation is, to 
refer again to Barth's phrase, "the simple reality of God".'^' The church's intention, 
in its proclamation, is revelation but this is not in the church's gift. Proclamation is 
revelation because God is present in it and makes it so. The biblical testimony 
witnesses to the revelation of God and may become the locus of revelation but it is 
not revelation in and of itself. Both that to which it witnesses and that to which it 
may become was and will be revelation in the decision of God. Furthermore, Jesus 
of Nazareth is not revelation by virtue of being God 'in the flesh'. Jesus becomes 
revelation in the decision of God.'^^
The things of this world become the mediators of God's revelation. Church 
proclamation. Holy Scripture and the person of Jesus are not in themselves 
revelation, but they become revelation in the free decision of God. Mediation is 
necessary in revelation and there is no revelation without it, but as these things 
become the mediators of revelation they become what they are not 'in themselves': 
they are taken up by God as he accommodates himself to their fleshy reality. This 
is Barth's doctrine of the two natures.
We have already discussed some of Barth's theological reasons for adopting this 
position; we now wish to identify a particular problem which emerges in the way in 
which he sustains this position in the first three part volumes of Church Dogmatics. 
The problem, briefly stated, is that if  what is required for revelation to occur is that
Barth, Bromiley, at al. CD 1.2. p. 11.
This point is made with some clarity in Matthew's Gospel in the account of Peter's confession, at 
Caesarea Phillippi, that Jesus is the Cluist (Matthew 16.13-17). "Blessed are you, Simon son of 
Jonah! For flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father in heaven."
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some fleshy reality is taken up by God for the purpose of making himself known, 
the significance of the particular fleshy substance which is taken up by God in his 
revelation is not immediately clear. We noted in the first chapter that Barth does 
reflect upon the possibility that "God may speak to us through Russian 
Communism, a flute concerto, a blossoming shrub, or a dead dog."^^  ^ So, given the 
theological structure of revelation which Barth gives us, can we attribute any 
particular significance to church proclamation. Holy Scripture and, in particular, 
Jesus of Nazareth which might not be attributed to a decaying canine given that God 
may choose to speak to us through any one of them?
This is the problem which Trevor Hart addresses in his essay, "Was God in 
Christ?"^^^ Hart expresses the problem in this way: "If Barth’s Logos becomes sarx, 
the particular way in which the ’becoming' or the union between the two is 
consistently construed in his theology nonetheless risks reducing it to the point 
where it loses all purchase in the real world, thereby robbing it of any genuine 
redemptive and revelatory force, and finally robbing theology of both its theme and 
its form as talk about God."^^^ What is the significance of the historical figure, Jesus 
of Nazareth, beyond the fact that he may be the locus of an event in which God 
makes himself known at some particular point in time to some particular person?
Hart suggests, "This... is where the two-natures doctrine is vulnerable if it is to be 
adopted as a satisfactory christological framework in and of i t s e l f . T h i s  is 
because, "In itself it does not offer any clear framework for identifying and 
evaluating what in positive terms it might mean for the flesh that God is in it."^ ^^  
While it may be claimed that this is not the purpose of the two-natures d o c t r i n e i t  
is, nevertheless, the case that, "its interest in the humanity of Jesus tends ever 
towards the general and the shared, that ’humanity’ which all humans indwell rather 
than the particular character of the man from N a z a r e t h . A l t h o u g h  Barth is 
vitally concerned with the incarnate Christ as the one in which the ’readiness for
Barth, Bromiley, et al. CD I .l . p. 55.
Hart Regarding Karl Bartli. pp. 1-27.
Ibid. p.4.
Ibid. p. 18.
Ibid. p. 18.
Its purpose was to expand upon the doctrine of the hypostatic union. 
Hart Regarding Karl Barth, p. 18.
Page 92
God' is established this concern does not lead in the direction of a consideration of 
the way in which this is established in the life of a particular man. Hart comments 
that, "in its constant careful segregation of Jesus' 'human' from his 'divine' 
predicates this doctrine shifts attention away from the role of the humanity of Jesus 
in revealing God to us."^ "^ ^
The difficulty is that if everything which might be said of Jesus of Nazareth equates 
only to his human nature, what basis can we have for claiming that this historical 
figure points us in the direction of the character of God? Whatever might be said of 
Jesus' life must be subject to the qualification that while this is true of his human 
nature it does not pertain to his divine nature. Hart comments that, "This... taken 
alone, rather short-circuits the revelatory role of his humanity as such." '^^  ^ But is 
the particular flesh and blood which Christ put on merely arbitrary? Hart believes 
that there are elements of what Barth has to say in this regard which incline him in 
such a direction.
Despite these emphases in Barth it is, in fact, clear that the life of Jesus is important 
for his theology. Hart maintains that he "eschewed any form of docetic lack of 
interest in Jesus, his character, teaching, actions and passion. The point for 
Barth is not that the particular form in which revelation comes to humanity is 
arbitrary or irrelevant but that it is not, and cannot be, in itself revelatory as "its 
creaturely and phenomenal v e h i c l e . T h e  positive significance of Jesus of 
Nazareth for Barth is indicated in the first part of the second volume of Church 
Dogmatics:
In becoming the same as we are, the Son of God is the same in quite a different way from us; in 
other words, in our human being what we do is omitted, and what we omit is done. This Man would 
not be God's revelation to us, God's reconciliation with us, if  He were not, as true Man, the true, 
unchangeable, perfect God Himself... How can God sin, deny Himself to Himself, be against 
Himself as God? ... Therefore in our state and condition He does not do what underlies and produces
Ibid. p. 18.
Ibid. p. 19.
Hart points out, for example, that for Barth the form o f revelation is not just distinguishable from 
its content, but is a contradiction o f its content. (See ibid. p. 19.)
Hart Regarding Karl Barth. p.20.
Ibid. p.21. !I
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that state and condition, or what we in that state and condition continually do. Our unholy human 
existence, assumed and adopted by the Word of God, is a hallowed and therefore a sinless human 
existence.''*^
But in saying this Barth is precisely not saying that in the humanity of Christ we 
have a miniaturised God present to us or, as Hart puts it, "a representation or icon of 
the divine ousia under the form of the human ousia."^^^ What we have is God's 
hypostatic presence within the sphere of created things as a human being, "the 
Word who becomes, precisely, not-God, and not 'micro-God'.
This particular hypostasis, far from being arbitrary or irrelevant, is charged with 
significance because in it -  in the human flesh with which Christ is clothed -  a form 
of humanity is established which corresponds to God in a way which is proper to its 
'nature'. The primary distinction to be made between the humanity of Christ and 
our humanity is not that in the former we see what God is like and in the latter we 
do not, but that in the former we see what true humanity is like whereas in the latter 
we do not.^ "^  ^ In Christ we have the first fruits of a humanity brought into proper 
relationship with its God. As such Hart suggests that, "When God speaks his Word 
into the realm of flesh... it results not in an echo, but precisely in a reply, a response 
from the side of the creature to the Creator's call."^^  ^ As a consequence, if  we are to 
enquire into the proper relationship between human creature and creator, our 
warrant is not to engage in a priori reasoning and generalisations but to consider the 
particularity of Jesus' life in the context in which we find it in the gospels and the 
broader contours of the biblical narrative.
Quoted in ibid. p.21.
Ibid. p.22.
Ibid. p.22.
This is an important theme for Barth, clearly anticipated in the above quote and worked out in 
great detail in his anthropology in the Church Dogmatics III.2. It is, o f course, a theme which is 
intrinsically connected to Barth's understanding of'the readiness of man', expounded in the first 
chapter.
Hart Regarding Karl Barth, p.22.
In this exposition of Barth, Hart emphasises the humanity of Christ in order to guard against 
docetic tendencies. It must be acknowledged, however, that in doing so his acknowledgement of the 
divinity o f Christ becomes somewhat muted. Jesus may show us true humanity but there is more to 
be said: he also shows us something o f God. ("Whoever has seen me has seen the Father." John 
14.9.)
■I
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This is an emphasis that ought not be understated and in Barth -  particularly in the 
earlier volumes of the Church Dogmatics -  it is. Here Hart's criticisms echo those 
made by Alan Torrance: "It must be admitted that Barth's christology suffers from 
a relative lack of development in this respect. For reasons having to do largely with 
his absolute determination to avoid all forms of subordinationism he fails to develop 
the model of divine self-communication as inherently relational. A relationality 
which embraces humanity into the network of its own rich dynamics, and witnesses 
God not just as human speaker of the Word, but also as its hearer and respondent 
from the human side."^^^
In emphasising this, however, Barth's fundamental insights into the nature of 
revelation must not now be lost. We must not say that Jesus of Nazareth is the 
revelation of God on the basis of the hypostatic union in which Christ's humanity 
and divinity are co-terminus. Jesus becomes the revelation of God through the 
activity of the Spirit: a person is given the ability to see that in this person the 
purposes of God for humanity are fulfilled. We must follow Barth in his 
insistence: finitum non capax inflniti but, on the basis of the humanity of Christ, we 
must also acknowledge: infinitum capax finiti. Hart explains that we may take the 
characteristics that we find in the person of Jesus to be indicative of who and what 
God is like -  although they do not do this directly. "[T]hey point beyond 
themselves to the reality of God, and the nature of this 'pointing beyond', and the 
precise points at which it does and does not occur, are not knowable in isolation 
from the relationship of faith in which we are properly related to God himself.
This brings us back to Barth's insight that revelation must be conceived in terms of 
a relationship between God and human being; and if this is to mean anything to us it 
must be known to us in particular life-contexts. In this relationship God is present 
to persons and, through the Spirit, they are enabled to respond to their creator. The 
point which we have tried to establish in this section of the chapter is that insofar as 
the historical Jesus, as he is presented to us in the gospels, is the locus of revelation, 
his character, teaching and example -  far from being irrelevant -  are of crucial
Ibid. p.23.
Here we may remind ourselves again of this point as it is expressed in Matthew 16.13-17.
154 Hart Regarding Karl Barth, p.24.
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importance. Jesus does not only represent the one authentic human response to 
God^^  ^ but also provides for us the pattern for true human existence as it is 
sustained in relationship with God in the power of the Spirit.
As we have claimed, Barth is not uninterested in the historical Jesus: he is no 
docetist. However, in the first three volumes of Church Dogmatics Barth offers an 
exposition of the doctrine of revelation in which the character, teaching and 
example of Jesus occupy a rather marginal position -  they are understated. But it is 
not inconsistent with the doctrine of revelation which Barth has established. Our 
purpose here is, negatively, to guard against concepts of revelation which deny the 
importance of the historical Jesus and, positively, to explore the significance of the 
historical Jesus for revelation as we seek to establish something of human 
participation in it.
We have in this chapter hinted at parallels between the work of Barth and Michael 
Polanyi. In chapters 5 and 6 we will turn our full attention to the ways in which 
Polanyi's thought may aid us in expanding upon the understanding of revelation 
which we have been developing in this chapter. By way of preparation for this we 
must, in the two chapters which follow, offer a full exposition of the themes in 
Polanyi's work which will be employed when we turn our attention to this task.
Representing, tliereby, the one human being who fulfils the covenant on the human side and, as a 
brother, does this vicariously on behalf o f all others.
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Chapter 3. Michael Polanyi’s Theory of Knowledge 
Introduction
Michael Polanyi's distinctive theory of knowledge was the fruit of his career as a 
philosopher. But philosophy was not Polanyi's first career: having trained as a 
medical doctor he switched focus to become a research scientist in the field of 
physical chemistry. It was only after a distinguished career in scientific research 
that he turned his full attentions to philosophical questions. Polanyi's grounding in 
science and passion for scientific research proved to be crucial both in his turn to 
philosophy and the shape of his philosophising. In his philosophical work he 
constantly refers back to his science and as the philosopher he does not cease to 
think as a scientist. Paul Ignotus, a fiiend of Polanyi's, said of him, "while others 
excelled in extolling science, he excelled in practising it."* Marjorie Grene, a 
philosopher and associate of Polanyi's, in her assessment of his contribution to 
epistemology, distinguishes his approach from those of others in the field. Grene 
writes:
[H]e came to the problem, raised it and grappled with it from within the life of science. It was 
knowledge in the concrete context o f existence, the existence of science and scientists, that he was 
concerned to vindicate. What resulted was often obscure, sometimes mistaken, and couched in a 
rhetoric that most professional philosophers find hard to tolerate; but it was a philosophy rooted in 
reality, neither the clever gymnastics of analysis, nor the prophylactic debate of a philosophy of 
science based on a grave misconception of, and almost entirely out of contact with its alleged subject 
matter.^
Polanyi's turn to philosophy was in response to what he regarded as a significant 
philosophical threat to the freedom of science. He writes:
I first met questions of philosophy when I came up against Soviet ideology under Stalin which 
denied justification to tlie pursuit o f science. I remember a conversation I had with Bukharin in 
Moscow in 1935. Though he was heading towards his fall and execution three years later, he was
’ See Polanyi Festschrift (1961). The Logic o f Personal knowledge: essavs presented to Michael 
Polanyi on his seventieth birthdav. 11th March 1961. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. p. 12.
 ^Grene, M. (1977). "Tacit Knowing: Grounds for a Revolution in Philosophy." Journal of the British 
Society for Phenomenology 8f3J: 164-171. pp. 166f.
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still a leading theoretician of the Communist party. When I asked him about the pursuit o f pure 
science in Soviet Russia, he said that pure science was a morbid symptom of a class society; under 
socialism the conception o f science pursued for its own sake would disappear, for the interests of 
scientists would spontaneously turn to problems o f the current Five-Year Plan.^
This encounter is mentioned on many occasions in Polanyi's writings and appears to 
have a representative significance for him. As Drusilla Scott has noted, "Polanyi 
was challenged in his whole outlook by this attitude, and astonished that a socialist 
theory which claimed to be scientific could so misunderstand science, denying the 
reality of independent scientific thought.""* It was out of a concern to confront this 
threat to pure science (already established in Soviet ideology but attracting interest 
in Britain during the 1930s) and to defend the freedom of scientists from the 
hegemony of the social planners that Polanyi turned his attentions from scientific 
research to philosophy. He left his career as a scientist in order to construct a robust 
philosophical critique of the view that Bukharin had articulated and various other 
views which he thought were deeply mistaken. In his studies he sought to develop a 
theory of knowledge that would authentically reflect the practice of science.
It is not possible, given the limitations of this present work, to describe the 
development of this work.^ It is important to acknowledge, however, that Polanyi's 
epistemology developed out of this project and that all of his philosophical writings 
are profoundly influenced by the issue which caused him to turn from science to 
philosophy.
In his published work Polanyi sustains a substantially consistent position although 
there are some changes in emphasis. The most significant of these is the shift from 
a stress on the 'fiduciary' component in Personal Knowledge to that of the 'tacit' in 
The Tacit Dimension. In the introduction to The Tacit Dimension Polanyi writes 
that, "Viewing the content of these pages from the position reached in Personal 
Knowledge and The Studv of Man eight years ago, I see that my reliance on the 
necessity of commitment has been reduced by working out the structure of tacit
 ^Polanyi, M. (1983). The Tacit Dimension. Gloucester, Mass., Peter Smith, p.3,
 ^Scott, D. (1996). Michael Polanvi. London, SPCK. p.5.
 ^For a thorough presentation of Polanyi's early defence o f liberty and freedom in science see: 
Polanyi, M. (1951). The Logic of Liberty: Reflections and Rejoinders. Indianapolis, Liberty Fund.
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knowing."^ If, as Polanyi claims in Personal Knowledge. "It is the act of 
commitment in its full structure that saves personal knowledge from being merely 
subjective"^, we can understand Martin Moleski's comment that, "The shift in 
emphasis is somewhat disquieting."^ However, as Moleski notes, when 
"commitment" does appear in The Tacit Dimension. "Polanyi continues to use the 
concept very much as he had in Personal Knowledge."'^ Indeed, in concluding his 
own introduction to The Tacit Dimension, Polanyi holds that, "any attempt to avoid 
the responsibility for shaping the beliefs which we accept as true is absurd... 
Thought can live only on grounds which we adopt in the service of a reality to 
which we submit."*** This appears to echo the concept of "commitment" we find in 
Personal Knowledge.**
So, to trace the succession of emphases that we find in Polanyi's major publications 
(in broad brush style), we may say that in Science. Faith and Societv. a short and 
early statement of his epistemology, and Personal Knowledge. Polanyi's magnum 
opus based on his Gifford Lectures at the University of Aberdeen (1951-2), the 
'fiduciary' component is to the fore while in The Tacit Dimension and Knowing and 
Being 'the structure of tacit knowledge' is more dominant. In Meaning*^  (written 
with Harry Prosch towards the end of his life) there is a development of the 
structure of tacit knowledge in which a sub-theme of 'integration of incompatibles' 
comes into focus. As these emphases are substantially consistent in their inter­
relations our exposition of Polanyi's epistemology will attempt to illuminate various
 ^Polanyi The Tacit Dimension, p.x.
’ Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. London, Routledge, 
and Kegan Paul. p.65.
 ^Moleski, M. X. (2000). Personal Catholicism: The Theological Epistemologies o f John Henry 
Newman and Michael Polanvi. Washington, D.C., Catholic University of America Press, p.57 
® Ibid. p.57.
Polanyi The Tacit Dimension, p.xi.
There are clearly strong linkages between the themes of commitment and tacit knowledge.
Perhaps we can say that Polanyi somewhat overstates what is certainly a change in emphasis.
Polanyi is not saying, for instance, Üiat one can only be committed to that which is explicit.
This is the last book that Polanyi published. Due to his advancing years and waning powers of 
concentration, the work was co-authored by philosopher Harry Prosch, In the preface Prosch insists 
that, "Substantively... this is Michael Polanyi's work. These are his ideas, expressed for the greater 
part in his own language. In the work I have done on his lectures I have not consciously altered any 
of the ideas he has expressed in his numerous published and unpublished works." Polanyi, M. and H. 
Prosch (1975). Meaning. Chicago, University o f Chicago Press, p.x. This being the case the text of 
the book cannot be attributed to Polanyi's hand without this qualification. In the next chapter we 
shall consider the extent to which Prosch's evaluation o f his own role in the writing of Meaning 
might be questioned.
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themes within his work as a whole rather than suggest a substantial progression or 
development of thought.
In view of the fact that our interest in Polanyi in this thesis relates to our 
development of the doctrine of revelation, our exposition of the themes in his 
published works will be shaped by this concern and we must forfeit any claim to a 
general presentation of Polanyi’s work. His extensive analysis of totalitarian 
regimes and his theory of hierarchy, for example, cannot be dealt with here despite 
these being important themes in his work.
We must now turn our attention to the various themes which comprise Polanyi's 
theory of knowledge. This will prepare us for the chapter in which we will assess 
how Polanyi's work might further illuminate and develop the doctrine of revelation 
as it has been expressed in the previous two chapters. Before coming to this we 
will, in a shorter chapter, expound Polanyi's own work on the theme of religion. As 
we have already intimated, Polanyi's treatment of rehgion is disappointing but it is 
important to acknowledge Polanyi's religious writings as they emerge from his 
epistemological concerns. The theme was one which Polanyi regarded as 
significant and he did pay considerable attention to it. As we shall deal with this 
aspect of his work in a separate chapter we will postpone comment on Polanyi's 
discussion of religious themes until we come to it.*^
Polanyi's work is not presented and ordered according to a structured systematic 
development. While, for the purposes of exposition, we have separated out a 
number of themes these are not clearly delineated and distinct. There is an 
interweaving of many strands in Polanyi's epistemology and it is both inevitable and 
appropriate that these interconnections are represented in our own exposition of his 
work.
Polanyi tends to place his discussion o f religion and theology in the midst o f his exposition of 
others themes.
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1. Against ’Objectivism’
Polanyi's scientific and philosophical work were both conducted within a context 
significantly influenced and shaped by logical positivism, a philosophy which 
sought to free itself from all metaphysical concerns and found itself upon two 
sources: empirical experience and the reasoning of logic. This was but a particular 
manifestation of the forms of Enlightenment thought which we commented upon in 
the previous chapter but one which, because of its particular concentration upon 
explicit operations, was often to the fore in Polanyi's critique of philosophy. But 
Polanyi's particular interest in logical positivism must be seen in the broader context 
of (rather than in abstraction from) the strands of epistemology which were 
associated with the Enlightenment -  the philosophy of 'modernity'. The kind of 
epistemological approach to which Polanyi was opposed -  and which he sought to 
replace with his post-critical philosophy -  we shall call 'objectivism'.
Jerry Gill explains the situation succinctly when he writes, "The chief 
epistemological dilemma of modernism is that it forces us to choose between an 
indubitable grounding and open-ended relativism, between objectivity and 
subjectivity. Unfortunately the former is impossible, and the latter yields no 
knowledge."*"* What we find in Polanyi's work, among other things, is a substantial 
proposal for resolving this dilemma.
If Barth sought to establish a 'post-Enlightenment', 'confessional' theology it is not 
far from the mark to say that Polanyi sought to do something broadly parallel in his 
'post-critical' philosophy.*^ He saw himself as one reacting against a broad 
philosophical tradition (as well as more specific developments within it -  such as 
logical positivism), illuminating its distortions and offering a renewed vision of 
human knowing. We may describe Polanyi's intentions in his own words, as he 
expresses them toward the end of Personal Knowledge:
Gill, J. H. (2000). The Tacit Mode: Michael Polanyi's Postmodern Philosophy. Albany, State 
University of New York Press, p.29.
See, for example. Grant, P. (1974). "Michael Polanyi: The Augustinian Component." New 
Scholasticism 48: 438-463. Grant follows up Polanyi's suggestion that Augustine was the author of 
the first 'post-critical' philosophy and that his own philosophy is, in important respects, a similar 
movement. Grant claims that the 'strong Augustinian component' o f Polanyi's work reflects his 
study of Augustine over many years. (See p.462.)
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[My] aim is to re-equip men with the faculties which centuries of critical thought have taught them 
to distrust. The reader has been invited to use these faculties and contemplate thus a picture of 
things restored to their fairly obvious nature. This is all the book was meant to do. For once men 
have been made to realize the crippling mutilations imposed by an objectivist framework -  once the 
veil o f ambiguities covering up these mutilations has been definitively dissolved -  many fresh minds 
will turn to the task of reinterpreting the world as it is, and as it then once more will be seen to be.*^
The first theme which we want to consider in this chapter is Polanyi's critique of 
'objectivism'.*^ The dominant position which he sought to refute entailed a belief 
that in scientific knowledge all 'subjective' elements should be purged in the pursuit 
of 'objectivity'. Polanyi sets the scene in a passage towards the beginning of 
Personal Knowledge:
[T]he prevailing conception of science, based on the disjunction of subjectivity and objectivity, seeks 
-  and must seek at all costs -  to eliminate from science. . . passionate, personal, human appraisals of 
theories, or at least to minimize their function to that o f a negligible by-play. For modem man has 
set up as the ideal o f knowledge the conception o f natural science as a set o f statements which is 
'objective' in the sense that its substance is entirely determined by observations, even while its 
presentation may be shaped by conventions.^®
The philosophy against which Polanyi was reacting placed exclusive emphasis upon 
empirical observation and logic. It denied that the theories of physics could have 
any inherent rationality and held that such theories had no jurisdiction beyond that 
which could be established by observation. Objectivism placed an embargo on 
'theories running ahead of the facts'. If there is more to a theory than the facts a 
'contribution' to the theory is being made by the scientist. For the objectivist this is 
fundamentally unacceptable: it compromises objectivity by admitting subjective 
elements into scientific theory. Polanyi, in contradistinction, regards such 'personal'
Polanyi Personal Knowledge. p.381.
It is important to note that Polanyi's use of'objective' and 'subjective' (and cognates) can be 
idiosyncratic and has the potential to mislead. In reading him one must be careful to attend to the 
author's meaning as it emerges from the context o f the argument. His use of the term 'objective' may 
hold negative or positive connotations depending upon whether, in context, it is associated with 
objectivist claims to impersonal knowledge or with 'personal contact with reality'. For Polanyi the 
term 'subjective' is not to be equated with 'personal' (which has entirely positive connotations) as it 
denotes individualistic or idiosyncratic perceptions or conceptions which reflect inadequate personal 
epistemic participation.
Polanyi Personal Knowledge. pp.lSf.
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contributions as intrinsic to the way in which we know things. For him the desire to 
purge personal participation is nonsensical and an epistemology which upholds such 
an approach as capturing the ideal of knowledge can only serve to distort our 
understanding.
Positivists believe that a theory should be abandoned as soon as an observation is 
made which contradicts it. But do we always get our observations right? Even the 
most hard-bitten logical positivist would recognise the potential for observational 
error. This problem cannot easily be swept aside. Polanyi points out that, "there is 
no rule -  and can be no rule -  on which we can rely for deciding whether the 
discrepancies between theory and observation should be shrugged aside as 
observational errors or be recognized, on the contrary, as actual deviations from the 
theory. The assessment in each case is a j u d g m e n t . " * ^
Polanyi insists that the scientist has a responsible role both in the construction of a 
theory and in the accreditation of observational data. The scientist is not just a 'fact 
gatherer' who allows the facts to 'speak for themselves'. Nothing that the scientist 
can investigate has a label, 'fact', placed upon it. Concepts such as 'simplicity', 
'economy' and 'symmetry' must guide the scientist in the development of a theory. 
"[T]he act of knowing includes an appraisal; and this personal co-efficient, which 
shapes all factual knowledge, bridges in doing so the disjunction between 
subjectivity and objectivity. It implies the claim that man can transcend his own 
subjectivity by striving passionately to fulfil his personal obligations to universal 
standards."^** For Polanyi the objectivist view of the scientist as a disinterested fact- 
gatherer is a profound misrepresentation of the role of the scientist.
The disjunction between objective and subjective, so central to the objectivist 
outlook which has permeated western culture in many ways, is, according to 
Polanyi, untrue to the way in which science does and must proceed. The scientist 
must make choices about what to look at and which experiments to do. Which 
facts are going to be regarded as significant? Science per se cannot direct how this
Polanyi and Prosch Meaning. p.30. First emphasis Polanyi's, second emphasis ours. In such 
judgement there is a significant -  perhaps predominant -  tacit component.
20 Polanyi Personal Knowledge, p. 17.
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should be done; the scientist must make a choice. Before the observations and the 
collecting of data can start, the significance of the personal co-efficient is already 
clearly apparent and operative. The factors which actually determine which 
observations will be made and which data will be collected are many: the interests 
of the scientific community (influenced by inherited traditions and currents of 
contemporary concerns) will inevitably have a bearing on the matter as will a 
particular scientist's interests, experience, aspirations and abilities. But the fact is -  
and this is what has already been established -  there is no sense in which this 
process can be understood as purely 'objective' -  if by that we mean: 'no personal 
involvement'.
In this brief discussion of 'factual knowledge' and empirical observation we see the 
thrust of Polanyi's critique of'objectivisms' cast in the form of a powerful argument 
for the presence of an active personal co-efficient in processes which were held by 
those he opposed to be impersonal. This is a crucial component o f Polanyi's 
epistemology: all knowledge is personal knowledge and cannot be conceived in 
impersonal terms without distortion.
We may also note at this point that the personal participation of which we have 
spoken is skilful participation. Polanyi has much to say about such skilful 
participation and this point will emerge more fully as we proceed. It is sufficient 
here to note that scientific knowledge and all other knowledge is a human 
achievement -  the product of training, practice and ingenuity which is 
predominantly tacit in its operation. Clearly there is a great range of levels of 
achievement, but Polanyi believes that whether we speak of a modest achievement, 
such as the recognition of a face, or of a profound scientific discovery, such as that 
of the theory of relativity, we necessarily speak of a human achievement facilitated 
by the skills -  the tacit skills -  of the knower.
2. Problems and Discoveries
For Polanyi the personal co-efficient in knowledge is a vital force of great 
consequence. Polanyi points to a fundamental urge which takes hold of humanity 
and all 'fully awake' animals: to make sense of their situation. This is to be
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understood both intellectually and practically. It is in this urge that Polanyi locates 
the capacity for discovery, and this is a theme of quintessential significance for him.
To recognise a problem is, in itself, an addition to knowledge. "To recognize a 
problem which can be solved and is worth solving is in fact a discovery in its own 
right. Polanyi points out that even an animal will not start solving a problem, 
finding its way in the maze, for example, unless it is aware of the fact that there may 
be a way through, and a way through to something which would represent a reward. 
A problem or discovery does not exist 'in itself but only if it presents itself to 
someone as something which needs to be solved. Once conceived as a puzzle, or a 
problem, it commands the attention of the one who noticed it and draws them into a 
period of wrestling with it and reflecting upon it: "An extensive preoccupation with 
a problem imposes an emotional strain, and a discovery which releases from it is a 
great joy. The story of Archimedes rushing out from his bath into the streets of 
Syracuse shouting 'Eureka' is a witness to this."^^
There is, of course, nothing inevitable about a discovery. A search for the solution 
to a problem may end in failure. It is impossible to know at the outset whether or 
not an intuition will prove fruitful. Even if a genuine discovery is made, the path to 
it may be long and difficult and there may be many detours and wrong turnings en 
route. And yet discoveries are made. In an attempt to illuminate further the stages 
of the process Polanyi draws attention to Henri Poincare's schema for discovery in 
mathematics which, Polanyi believes, is of significance in other areas in which 
discoveries are made. The sequence is as follows: 'preparation' (evaluation of the 
problem which has been discerned); 'incubation' (a time when nothing appears to 
happen and the 'work' is being done by the unconscious mind); 'illumination' (the 
dawning awareness of a solution) and 'verification' (by which the validity of what 
appears to be a solution is t e s t e d ) . O n c e  a solution to the problem is seen and 
realised the puzzlement evaporates and the urge is satisfied. A discovery has been 
made. And this represents, on the part of the discoverer (be it an animal or a 
human), a new intellectual power; for once the discovery is made the problem
Ibid. p. 120. 
Ibid. p. 122.
23 See ibid. pp.l21f.
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ceases to exist. No matter how difficult or long the process toward making the 
breakthrough, once made it can no longer be the source of puzzlement. "Heuristic 
progress is irreversible."^"* Polanyi expands, "The irreversible character of 
discovery suggests that no solution of a problem can be accredited as a discovery if 
it is achieved by a procedure following definite rules. For such a procedure would 
be reversible in the sense that it could be traced back stepwise to its beginning and 
repeated at will any number of times, like any arithmetical computation. 
Accordingly, any strictly formalized procedure would also be excluded as a means 
of achieving discovery. Discovery cannot be understood as a strictly logical 
performance because it can be achieved only by crossing over what Polanyi calls a 
'logical gap'. "'Illumination' is then the leap by which the logical gap is crossed. It 
is the plunge by which we gain a foothold at another shore of reality. On such 
plunges the scientist has to stake bit by bit his entire professional life."^^
As we have suggested, one motivation which sustains the would-be discoverer is 
the sense that there is a solution to the problem. Polanyi says, "We are looking for 
it as if it were pre-existent."^^ This is part of the process in which we are trying to 
make sense of things and this is posited upon the belief that things do make sense. 
Polanyi describes a problem as 'an intellectual desire'^^. He writes: "[L]ike every 
desire it postulates the existence of something that can satisfy it; in the case of a 
problem its satisfier is its solution. As all desire stimulates the imagination to dwell 
on the means of satisfying it, and is stirred up in its turn by the play of the 
imagination it has fostered, so also by taking interest in a problem we start 
speculating about its possible solution and in doing so become further engrossed in 
the problem.
Ibid. p.l23.
Ibid. p. 123.
Ibid. p. 123, Polanyi does not deny the importance o f the use of logical operations in certain 
circumstances whether in mathematics, science or elsewhere. What he is concerned to demonstrate 
is that there are many situations in which explicit logical operations will prove either incapable or 
inefficient in the pursuit o f the solution to a problem. We shall see in the final chapter that for 
Polanyi illumination must be coupled with imagination.
Ibid. p. 126.
See ibid. p. 127.
Ibid. p. 127.
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Although discovery is an intrinsic part of the sciences and is understood to be the 
goal of much scientific work, it has been considered a much more problematic 
category among philosophers. It will be apparent that the objectivist philosophy, 
detailed above, cannot accept the description of discovery that Polanyi offers. At 
the heart of Polanyi's analysis is the recognition that the process is unspecifiable and 
it affirms the existence of a reality which we only partially comprehend, or which 
we comprehend in such a way that we are left dissatisfied with our understanding. 
If the phenomenon of scientific discovery plays an important part in Polanyi's 
epistemology it is unsurprising since while its importance in the history of science 
is of great consequence it is, at the same time, "a most striking concrete example of 
an experience that cannot possibly be represented by any exact theory."^** hi The 
Tacit Dimension Polanyi expands these ideas about discovery in the framework of 
his theory of tacit knowledge and we will revisit the theme of discovery when we 
deal with this theory later in the chapter.
Polanyi states that it is a commonplace that good science requires good problems. 
"[T]o see a problem is to see something that is hidden. It is to have an intimation of 
the coherence of hitherto not comprehended particulars."^* To identify a problem 
which will lead to an important discovery is not only to see something which is 
hidden, "but to see something of which the rest of humanity cannot have even an 
inkling. But how is it possible to identify a good problem? Indeed, how is it 
possible to identify any problem at all? This was the question which Plato 
considered in the Meno. Polanyi summarises the paradox of the Meno by stating, 
"that to search for the solution of a problem is an absurdity; for either you know 
what you are looking for, and then there is no problem; or you do not know what 
you are looking for, and then you cannot expect to find anything. Polanyi notes 
that Plato's solution to the paradox (the remembering of past lives) has not generally 
proved acceptable but alternative explanations have not been forthcoming. To 
conclude that the Meno cannot be resolved appears to render the discoveries of over 
two thousand years of human history "either meaningless or impossible."^"* Polanyi
Polanyi The Tacit Dimension, p.21. 
®‘ lbid. p.21.
Ibid. p.22.
Ibid. p.22.
Ibid. p.22.
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thinks that such a conclusion is unnecessary if we are prepared to acknowledge the 
tacit dimension of knowing. He suggests: "[T]he Meno shows conclusively that if 
all knowledge is explicit, i.e., capable of being clearly stated, then we cannot know 
a problem or look for its solution. And the Meno also shows, therefore, that if 
problems nevertheless exist, and discoveries can be made by solving them, we can 
know things, and important things, that we cannot tell."^^
This is a substantial response to the problem that Plato raises, but Michael Bradie 
has objected that Polanyi's formulation of the Meno is in part false,^^ and Bradie 
gains support for his criticism from Herbert Simon.^^ Bradie says, "Suppose a 
mathematician is trying to refute Goldbach's conjecture which claims that every 
even number is representable as the sum of two primes. Then he knows that what 
he is looking for is a number which is not the sum of two primes."^^ In other words 
the mathematician knows what he or she is looking for but there is still a problem. 
This criticism, though formally correct, seems to miss the force of Polanyi's case. 
Polanyi is not offering an a priori analytical argument but an a posteriori 
observation. Polanyi is interested in exposing the inadequacy of a philosophy of 
science, which holds that all knowledge is explicit, to explain the phenomenon of 
scientific discovery. As such the formal correctness of the criticisms of Bradie and 
Simon does not seriously detract from the force of Polanyi's answer to Plato insofar 
as Polanyi’s purpose in the endeavour is kept in mind.
Great scientific discovery will be marked by its fruitfulness. But how can such 
fruitfulness be recognised? If we hold to the view that all knowledge must be
Ibid. p.22. Polanyi later came to see this formulation as inadequate. Although his subsequent 
reflections upon the Meno were never published they are revealed in a letter to Marjorie Grene dated 
26**' April 1965. See Polanyi Collection: Regenstein Library, University o f Chicago. Box 16: Folder 
1. Polanyi states that his resolution of the Meno in the Terry Lectures of 1962 (and published in
The Tacit Dimension) is lacking because it is "purely verbal, rashly identifying [tire] unspecifiability 
of tacit knowing with indeterminacy". Polanyi describes to Grene how he came to see his earlier 
account as inadequate: "It came to me when I identified James's description of voluntary action with 
the effects of the imagination in producing the erection o f the penis, and Hefferline's observation that 
the sight o f the galvanometer's deflections greatly assists the production o f conditioned subliminal 
twitches. I saw then the full solution to the problem." In other words the tacit knowledge which 
brings resolution to the Meno paradox must not be limited to that of indeterminate articulation but be 
located much more broadly in our bodily indwelling. The significance of this insight will be 
explored in greater detail in chapter 6.
Bradie, M. (1974). "Polanyi on the Meno Paradox." Philosonhv o f Science 41: 203.
Simon, H. A. (1976). "Bradie on Polanyi on the Meno Paradox." Ibid. 43: 147-150.
Bradie, M. (1974), "Polanyi on the Meno Paradox." Ibid. 41: 203.
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explicit it is meaningless to speak of fruitfulness if, by it, we mean to refer to things 
which are as yet undiscovered. But it can make sense if we believe that we can 
have what Polanyi calls 'foreknowledge' of as yet undiscovered things. Polanyi 
suggests that, "to know that a statement is true is to know more than we can tell and 
that hence, when a discovery solves a problem, it is itself fraught with further 
intimations of an indeterminate range, and that furthermore, when we accept a 
discovery as true, we commit ourselves to a belief in all these as yet undisclosed, 
perhaps as yet unthinkable, consequences."^^
It will be apparent that implied in Polanyi's epistemological convictions are certain 
ontological convictions. "[A]s we can know a problem, and feel sure that it is 
pointing to something hidden behind it, we can be aware also of the hidden 
implications of a scientific discovery, and feel confident that they will prove right. 
We feel sure of this because in contemplating the discovery we are looking at it not 
only in itself but, more significantly, as a clue to a reality of which it is a 
manifestation.""*** In making a discovery we claim to have made contact with 
reality, "a reality which, being real, may yet reveal itself to future eyes in an 
indefinite range of unexpected manifestations.""** We will only make significant 
discoveries if we are, "deeply committed to the conviction that there is something to 
be discovered.""*^
3. Intellectual Passions"*^
We have now considered some of the ways in which Polanyi has shown the 
inadequacies of the objectivist understanding of science. In his discussion of 
intellectual passions he seeks to expound a more authentic description of the 
dynamics of science.
Polanyi The Tacit Dimension, p.23. 
Ibid. pp.23f.
Ibid. p.24. 
Ibid. p.25.
43 As with 'objective' and 'subjective' Polanyi's use of the word 'passions' is somewhat idiosyncratic 
and must be understood within the context in which it is used. It must be said, however, that part of 
the problem here stems from the popular misconception that scientific work is 'dispassionate' and 
'detached'.
Page 109
The notion of the scientist, central to the objectivist philosophy and of considerable 
influence in our own day, is that of the detached, dispassionate researcher resisting 
any temptation to allow his or her own personal concerns or interests to influence 
and thereby sully the purity of the scientific work. Over against this Polanyi 
believes that the passions of the scientist are an intrinsic element of scientific 
endeavour.
The function which I attribute... to scientific passion is that of distinguishing between demonstrable 
facts which are of scientific interest, and those which are not. Only a tiny fraction of all knowable 
facts are of interest to scientists, and scientific passion serves also as a guide in the assessment of 
what is o f higher and what is o f lesser interest; what is great in science, and what is relatively slight. 
I want to show that this appreciation depends ultimately on a sense of intellectual beauty; that it is an 
emotional response which can never be dispassionately defined, any more than we can 
dispassionately define the beauty o f a work o f art or the excellence of a noble action.'*'*
A scientific discovery represents the advent of new knowledge. This knowledge is 
accompanied by a vision which is not knowledge."*  ^ In one sense it is less than 
knowledge in that it is a 'guess', but in another sense it is more than knowledge in 
that it is an anticipation or 'fore-grasping' of things as yet unknown or even 
inconceivable. "Our vision of the general nature of things is our guide for the 
interpretation of all future experience. Such guidance is indispensable.""*^ Any 
attempt to establish scientific truth by formal, objective criteria must fail as, "Any 
process of enquiry unguided by intellectual passions would inevitably spread out 
into a desert of trivialities.""*  ^ Commenting on the practice of scientists to ignore 
evidence incompatible with current scientific theory, Polanyi says: "The wise 
neglect of such evidence prevents scientific laboratories from being plunged for 
ever into a turmoil of incoherent and futile efforts to verify false allegations. But 
there is, unfortunately, no rule by which to avoid the risk of occasionally
Polanyi Personal Knowledge, p. 135. Although Polanyi uses the definite article here this is one of 
the several functions of 'scientific passion', as shall see,
Polanyi illustrates this point by tracing the developments which followed on from the 'vision' 
established in Copernicus’ heliocentric view of the universe. See Polanyi, M. (1967-8). "Science and 
Realitv." British Journal for the Philosonhv of Science 33(2): 177-196.
^  Polanyi Personal Knowledge, p. 135.
'*’ lbid. p.135.
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disregarding thereby true evidence which conflicts (or seems to conflict) with the 
current teachings of science.""*^
The vision of which Polanyi speaks is of fundamental significance because, 
"Without the scale of interest and plausibility based on a vision of reality, nothing 
can be discovered that is of value to science; and only our grasp of scientific beauty, 
responding to the evidence of our senses, can evoke this vision.""*  ^ This analysis 
flows from Polanyi's belief that the scientist must be able to distinguish that which 
is trivial from that which is not, as well as being able to distinguish between that 
which is true and that which is false. The ability flows from the scientist's 
knowledge of science but it also implies the scientist's antecedent interest in the 
subject matter. Polanyi makes the simple point that animals were not discovered by 
zoologists, nor plants by botanists. The scientific study of animals and plants 
represents an extension of a pre-scientific interest, and in the absence of such a pre- 
scientific interest it is inconceivable that a scientific interest would have emerged.
Polanyi, as a seasoned scientific researcher, draws attention to the fact that the 
pursuit of a discovery will often place heavy demands upon a scientist and may do 
so for long periods of time. What sustains the scientist in such protracted and 
exacting pursuits? The dedicated pursuit of a solution to a problem over extended 
periods of time can only be sustained by the intellectual passion evoked by the 
intimation of a discovery: the prospect of uncovering something which is hidden. 
The intimation may prove to be right or it may prove to be wrong; this is a risk 
which is intrinsic to the work of the scientist in pursuit of discovery. Polanyi 
comments: "Intellectual passions do not merely affirm the existence of harmonies 
which foreshadow an indeterminate range of future discoveries, but can also evoke 
intimations of specific discoveries and sustain their persistent pursuit through years 
of labour. The appreciation of scientific values merges here into the capacity for 
discovering it; even as the artist's sensibility merges into his creative powers. Such 
is the heuristic function of scientific passion."^**
"*® Ibid. p. 138.
Ibid. p.135.
Ibid. p. 143. Polanyi's emphasis.
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The scientist is, to use Polanyi’s terminology, 'trying to guess right'. The 
accomplishment of this end is sustained by a 'heuristic passion'. This work is 
creative in that in its attainment it changes the world as we see it. As a result of it 
our understanding of the world is deepened. As has already been stated, an act of 
discovery is irreversible and once made the world is forever seen as with different 
eyes. A heuristic gap, which stands between the formulation of a problem and a 
discovery, is crossed. Polanyi re-emphasises the passionate and personal roots of 
the advancement of scientific principles:
Major discoveries change our interpretive framework. Hence it is logically impossible to arrive at 
these by the continued application of our previous interpretive framework. So we see once more that 
discovery is creative, in the sense that it is not to be achieved by the diligent performance o f any 
previously known and specifiable procedure. This strengthens our conception of originality. The 
application of existing rules can produce valuable surveys, but does not advance the principles of 
science. We have to cross the logical gap between a problem and its solution by relying on the 
unspecifiable impulse of our heuristic passion, and must undergo as we do so a change of our 
intellectual personality. Like all ventures in which we comprehensively dispose o f ourselves, such 
an intentional change of our personality requires a passionate motive to accomplish it. Originality 
must be passionate.^*
What emerges from this -  and most emphatically so -  is the personal nature of 
discovery. The passions and the beliefs that lead scientists to discovery are passions 
and beliefs which are personally held. Does this imply that science, and the pursuit 
of discovery in science, is 'subjective', as the objectivist would fear? Polanyi says 
not. The reason for this is that the scientist is constrained by the nature of that 
which is being explored. This is the external pole of truth which the discoverer 
wishes to establish. There is always the possibility that the discoverer may be 
mistaken; nevertheless, discovery is never presented as private opinion, it is 
commended by the discoverer as the truth. It is held with what Polanyi terms 
'universal intent'.^^ A further reason for rejecting the accusation of 'subjectivity' is 
that the scientist works within the discipline of a tradition in a community of 
explorers which provides both peer support and criticism.
***Ibid. p. 143.
This is a concept to which we will return later in the chapter.
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An implication of this is that the scientist who propounds the truth of his or her 
theory is making a demand that it is accepted as such by others. This demand will 
not always be met, as Polanyi knew from his own experiences in science, and this is 
a consequential matter. It is doubtless because of his own experiences that he 
describes the situation of the discoverer in impassioned terms: "In order to be 
satisfied, our intellectual passions must find response. The universal intent creates a 
tension: we suffer when a vision of reality to which we have committed ourselves is 
contemptuously ignored by others. For a general unbelief imperils our own 
convictions by evoking an echo in us. Our vision must conquer or die."^^ Hence, in 
addition to the function of scientific passion in selection and the heuristic passion in 
moving to a discovery, there is the persuasive passion in calling others to become 
fellow participants in a new vision. The processes involved in discovery are not 
only personal but, in this significant sense, inter-personal.
The divide between two systems of thought bears some similarities to the gap which 
exists between a problem and its solution. "Formal operations relying on one 
framework of interpretation cannot demonstrate a proposition to persons who rely 
on another framework."^"* The proponents of a new system of thought, in order to 
defend their own credibility and gain the support of others, must win the intellectual 
sympathy of their opponents. Those who listen sympathetically may gain what they 
would never have gained for themselves, and this is what Polanyi variously 
describes as a 'self-modifying act', a 'heuristic process' and a 'conversion'. It is not 
difficult to see why such a process might fail, or imagine circumstances in which 
those on either side of a divide are reduced to an engagement in which the 
wholesale discrediting of one another becomes the modus operandi. We might 
readily style such conflicts as 'personal attacks', and this is indicative of the personal 
nature of the way in which views are held by both sides and the passions which 
attend them. This is why science cannot be free from controversy and conflict. In 
an article dealing with passions in science he writes: "Not that I like to see a 
scientist trying to bring an opponent into intellectual contempt, but I acknowledge 
that such means of controversy may be tragically inevitable. I certainly affirm that 
passion, and controversy moved by passion, must continue in science and that a
Polanyi Personal Knowledge. p.l50. 
Ibid. p. 151 Polanyi's emphasis.
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comprehensive revision of our philosophy of science is needed to give due weight 
to this essential aspect of scientific truth.
Polanyi points to the example of extra-sensory perception (ESP) in order to 
illustrate his point. At the time of writing Personal Knowledge Polanyi believed the 
credibility of ESP to be an open question, but he was aware that the great majority 
of scientists rejected the phenomenon. Polanyi makes the observation that: "The 
evidence for it is ignored today by scientists in the hope that it will one day find 
some trivial explanation. In this they may be right, but I respect those too who 
think they may be wrong; and no profitable discussion is possible between the two 
sides at this stage.
4. The Narrative of the Scientific Community
Science grows and expands. New theories are advanced and the possibilities of old 
visions ai e explored. There is also the 'telling of the story' of what has gone before. 
Polanyi writes, "In the history of science, as in that of all other human activities, it 
falls finally to him who tells their story, to endorse or revise all previous 
assessments of their outcome -  while simultaneously responding to contemporary 
issues unthought of before. Traditions are transmitted to us from the past, but they 
are our own interpretations of the past, at which we have arrived within the context 
of our own immediate problems.
Polanyi recognises that the context and the flow of the scientific tradition is of great 
importance. Issues of procedure and beliefs in science are mutually determined. 
Our expectations determine how we proceed and our anticipations are shaped in 
response to the results which have heen achieved by the procedures that we have 
adopted. Polanyi reminds us that, by and large, the concerns of science are shaped 
by, among other things, the concerns of common experience. "The methods by 
which we establish facts in everyday life are... logically anterior to the special 
premisses of science, and should be included in a full statement of these
Polanyi, M. (1957). "Passions and Controversy in Science." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 13: 
114-119.p.ll9.
Polanyi Personal Knowledge, p. 158. 
”  Ibid. p. 160.
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premisses."^^ Of course, the standards adopted in dealing with the subject matter in 
science will differ from those used in the context of everyday experience. 
However, our belief about the nature of things, as it is expressed in the realm of 
common experience, can certainly not be excluded from our account of science.
fri connection with this Polanyi notes the significance of common experience for 
establishing which facts are significant for science: "The logical premisses of
factuality are not known to us or believed by us before we start establishing facts, 
but are recognised on the contrary by reflecting on the way we establish facts. He
continues:
Our acceptance of facts which make sense of the clues offered by experience to our eyes and ears 
must be presupposed first, and the premisses underlying this process of making sense must be 
deduced from this afterwards. Since the process of discovering the logical antecedent from an 
analysis o f its logical derivative cannot fail to introduce a measure of uncertainty, the knowledge o f  
this antecedent will always be less certain than that of its consequent. We do not believe in the 
existence o f facts because of our anterior and securer belief in any explicit logical presuppositions of 
such a belief; but on the contrary, we believe in certain explicit presuppositions of factuality only 
because we have discovered that they are implied in our belief in the existence o f facts.**°
Polanyi shows that this point is illustrated in the performance of skills. We perform 
a skill -  making a golf shot, for example -  without any antecedent focal knowledge 
of how it is that we do it. But we do, and must, have a subsidiary knowledge as part 
of our competence in performing the skill. It is possible to reflect upon the 
accomplishment after the event even if during the performance of it we were 
'focally ignorant’. It is in the reflection upon the event that it is possible to develop 
maxims -  'keep your head still'; 'do not look up too soon*; 'do not try to hit the ball 
too hard', etc. -  which may prove helpful as self-reminders or in giving advice to 
others who wish to develop the skill. Nevertheless it is quite impossible to perform 
any skill on the basis of explicit rules alone or to articulate a 'total set of rules' on 
the basis of which we are able to perform the skill. In applying this observation to 
the realm of science Polanyi explains: "The logical antecedents of an informal 
mental process like fact-finding, or more particularly, the finding of a fact of
Ibid. p. 161.
Ibid. p. 162. Polanyi's emphasis.
60 Ibid. p. 162.
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science, come to be known subsidiarily in the very act of their application; but they 
can become known focally only later, from an analysis of their application, and, 
once focally known, they can be applied by re-integration to guide subsidiarily 
improved performances of the process."^*
The breadth and complexity of the body of scientific knowledge is such that no one 
scientist can understand any more than a small fraction of the totality in any depth. 
Each member of the scientific commimity is competent to judge the work of 
colleagues working in the same or closely related fields and in this way, Polanyi 
believes, the self-regulating structure is established and maintained. Hence, there is 
a consensus across the scientific disciplines and within the confines of this 
consensus it is possible to say whether a new contribution is ’scientific' or not. In 
this way the more radical scientific debates are cast in the form of a conflict 
between established authority and a challenger to that authority; the one challenging 
may not be credited with the status of scientist -  at least with regard to the issue in 
dispute. It is important to realise that challengers do not attack the authority of 
scientific opinion in general but only in respect of a particular detail. Paradoxically, 
"[Ejvery thoughtful submission to authority is qualified by some, however slight, 
opposition to it."^  ^ Hence the advancement of the body of scientific knowledge is 
dependent upon challenges being made to it, while its stability is dependent upon a 
recognition, on the part of both scientists, and to some degree society as a whole, of 
the authority of the scientific tradition. Anyone who rejects the authority of the 
tradition in a general way would find no basis on which to resolve their 
disagreement with those who accept it.
When challenges are made to the consensus how are they resolved? Polanyi is 
aware that this is a question to which no complete and final answer can be given -  
in part because things have, in fact, been resolved in various ways on different 
occasions. A simple appeal to the 'facts' is entirely inadequate. In a scientific 
dispute there may well be disagreement on what the facts are, and there is yet more 
likelihood of disagreement of what is admissible as evidence. Also, as Polanyi sees 
so clearly, 'good science' is not a fact-collecting exercise. By way of illustration
Ibid. p. 163.
Ibid. p. 164.
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Polanyi writes, "Take Mach's principle of 'mental economy', according to which 
science is the simplest description or the most convenient summary of the facts. 
Imagine the puzzled examiners of de Broglie's doctoral thesis having recourse to 
this criterion as to the scientific value of the work. How could they? Most of the 
facts which the theory was eventually found to describe were yet undiscovered."^^ 
De Broglie's wave theory was founded not upon 'facts' but speculation which was 
guided by criteria of internal rationality and a deep familiarity with many relevant 
'phenomena'.
The question arises, 'how, given all these circumstances pertaining to the practice of 
science, could scientists fail to see the inadequacies of a philosophy of science in 
which the scientist has no substantive role to play?' Polanyi offers two responses. 
The first relates to the ideological power of the dominant philosophy. He suggests, 
"The decisive reason why such obviously inadequate formulations of the principles 
of science were accepted by men of great intellectual distinction lies in a desperate 
craving to represent scientific knowledge as i m p e r s o n a l .B u t  Polanyi also offers 
an explanation of how scientists can hold such views: "We owe this immense power 
for self-deception to the operation of the ubiquitous tacit co-efficient by which 
alone we can apply any articulate terms to a subject matter described by them. 
These powers enable us to evoke our conception of a complex ineffable subject 
matter with which we are familiar, by even the roughest sketch of any of its 
specifiable features. Put simply, an established scientist may be able to accept as 
true an inadequate description of his or her work by tacitly supplementing and 
'creatively interpreting' that description. This is a process which can certainly be 
extended beyond the realm of science and is akin to the phenomenon, well known 
to psychologists, that we have a considerable propensity to 'see' what we expect to 
see in a particular circumstance rather than what is actually there.
“ Ibid. p. 166.
“  Ibid. pp.l68f.
“  Ibid. p. 169.
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5. Indwelling
Polanyi is not opposed to the formulisation of science. What he claims is that the 
formalisation of science can never adequately represent scientific theory and 
practice. However instructive and valuable the explicit representations of science 
may be, they can never be a substitute for a genuine indwelling of the disciplines 
and skills which comprise the life of the scientific community. In a confessional 
statement Polanyi says:
Tlie discoveries of science have been achieved by the passionately sustained efforts of succeeding 
generations of great men, who overwhelmed the whole of modern humanity by the power of their 
convictions. Thus has our scientific outlook been moulded, of which these logical rules give a 
highly attenuated summary. If we ask why we accept the summary, the answer hes in the body of 
knowledge of which they are the summary. We must reply by recalling the way each of us has come 
to accept that knowledge and the reasons for which we continue to do so. Science will appear then 
as a vast system of beliefs, deeply rooted in our history and cultivated today by a specially organized 
part of our society. We shall see that science is not established by the acceptance o f a formula, but is 
part of our mental life, shared out for cultivation among many thousands o f specialized scientists 
throughout the world, and shared receptively, at second-hand, by many millions. And we shall 
realize that any sincere account o f the reasons for which we too share in this mental life must 
necessarily be given as part o f this life.^^
Polanyi is aware that the tradition of science as we know it is "[0]f recent origin 
and its tradition is rooted in a limited area."*^  ^ He is also aware that many other 
civilisations of equal richness and antiquity failed to produce a systematic natural 
science. From the perspective of the 21®^ century the credentials and stability of 
science may appear unassailable, but this appearance may be deceptive. Science 
grows within a society of fellow practitioners whose skills are predominantly 
unspecifiable. Because of the unspecifiability of the body of scientific knowledge 
(in Polanyi's terms, the ’tacit component'), the safe passage of the tradition from one 
generation to the next is by no means assiured. For the same reason it is difficult for 
science to take root in cultures and societies where it has not previously been 
practised. Polanyi claims, "Rarely, if ever, was the final acclimatization of science 
outside Europe achieved, until the government of the country succeeded in
Ibid. p. 171.
“ Ibid. p. 181.
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including a few scientists from some traditional centre to settle down in their 
territory and to develop there a new home for scientific life, moulded on their own 
traditional standards."^^
For Polanyi science is not a body of knowledge which can be abstracted from the 
life, community and beliefs which sustain it. It is an example of what Polanyi calls 
an ’articulate system’. This is an important term in Polanyi's philosophy, and it will 
receive some attention in this chapter, but two difficulties attend it. Firstly, to call a 
system (such as science) 'articulate' might well lead one to assume that it is a system 
which is 'articulated', i.e., it can be described. But this is not Polanyi's purpose. 
There is much in science which can be and is articulated, as we have acknowledged, 
but the innovation of Polanyi's philosophy is to show that such 'systems' cannot be 
fully articulated. A second difficulty is the sheer range of phenomena to which 
Polanyi attaches the term. He cites science, technology, mathematics,^^ works of 
aif^ ,^ morality^\ religious worship^^, a theory^^, and (more specifically), a scientific 
theory "^^ , a mathematical discovery^^, and a symphony^^. Such examples suggest 
not so much a broad category but a family of related categories. We must see that 
Polanyi is not attempting to establish similarities between these 'systems' per se, 
only that our 'participation' in them can be only partially represented in terms of 
explicit knowledge. Polanyi explains: "The universe of every great articulate 
system is constructed by elaborating and transmuting one particular aspect of 
anterior experience. An articulate system cannot be represented as a collection of 
'facts' which are explicitly known. They are the "happy dwelling places of the 
human mind."^^
The concept of'indwelling' reinforces the personal nature of knowing. A collocation 
of 'facts' is not knowledge. A collocation of 'experiences' is not knowledge. Facts
“  Ibid. p. 182. 
“  Ibid. p.203. 
™ Ibid. p.286. 
Ibid. p.286. 
Ibid. p.286. 
Ibid. p. 195. 
Ibid. p.286. 
Ibid. p. 195. 
""Ibid. p.195. 
Ibid. p.283. 
Ibid. p.280.
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and experiences represent knowledge only when we come to interpret them -  when 
we 'make sense of them'. Facts are not self-interpreting, they are interpreted by 
persons and interpretation is made possible through the indwelling of articulate 
systems. In other words, to interpret facts and experiences requires an uncritical 
acceptance, at least for the time being, of a 'framework'. In some circumstances a 
personal evaluation may be made as to whether a framework is one to be trusted and 
indwelt, in others we may be largely unaware of our indwelling except in terms of 
the way in which we are able to 'make sense' of things by means of it.
Participation in an articulate system, as an indwelling, is not to attain a fixed 
position but to participate in a heuristic vision. Not all scientific work reflects such 
participation: science has its quotient of routine work.^^ But the scientist's desire to 
press beyond the present frontiers of knowledge will be fulfilled through a vision 
which is facilitated by indwelling. By way of illustration Polanyi explains: 
"Astronomic observations are made by dwelling in astronomic theory, and it is this 
internal enjoyment of astronomy which makes the astronomer interested in the stars. 
This is how scientific value is contemplated from w i th in .H o w e v e r ,  this joy is 
qualified when astronomic formulae are used in a routine way: "It is only when he 
reflects on its theoretic vision, or consciously experiences its intellectual powers, 
that the astronomer may be said to contemplate astronomy.
Competence in an articulate system is gained through the acquisition of the skills 
already attained by those who are active participants -  indwellers of the system -  
whether this is theoretical knowledge or proficiency with the tools of 
experimentation. But such knowledge and skills are acquired not as an end in 
themselves hut in order that they can be used to contemplate further the realities 
from which the articulate framework is distilled. This process is certainly not 
limited to the sciences: "The task of inducing an intelligent contemplation of music 
and dramatic art aims likewise at enabling a person to surrender himself to works of 
art. This is neither to observe nor to handle them, but to live in them. Thus the
It must be acknowledged that even routine scientific work requires frameworks, although such 
frameworks are explicit and regulated in comparison with those which provide the potential for 
'heuristic vision'.
Polanyi Personal Knowledge, p. 195.
*‘ lbid. p.195.
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satisfaction of gaining intellectual control over the external world is linked to a 
satisfaction of gaining control over ourselves.
The impulse of science is to move beyond what is already known. An articulate 
framework, when indwelt in a creative and imaginative way, facilitates the 
contemplative experience of an entity or a phenomenon. It is within such 
contemplation that the potential for new discovery resides and new discoveries must 
lead to a revision of the articulate framework. An important and highly significant 
discovery may lead to the formulation of a radically different articulate framework. 
"Scientific discovery, which leads from one such framework to its successor, bursts 
the bounds of disciplined thought in an intense if transient moment of hemistic 
vision. And while it is thus breaking out, the mind is for the moment directly 
experiencing its content rather than controlling it by the use of any pre-established 
modes of interpretation: it is overwhelmed by its own passionate activity.
For Polanyi the desire of the scientist to ponder new problems is just a particulai* 
case of a more general urge present in human and, in some degree, higher animal 
life.^ "^  Humans are interested in puzzles and problems which challenge the body 
and the mind. It is, Polanyi's suggests, a 'craving for mental dissatisfaction'. He 
comments:
The most radical manifestation o f this urge to break tlirough all fixed conceptual frameworks is the 
act of ecstatic vision. When we abandon ourselves to the contemplation of the stars we attend to 
them in a way which is not an astronomical observation. We look at them with great interest but 
without thinking about them. For if we did, our awareness of the stars would pale into that of mere 
instances of apposite conceptions; the focus of our interest being shifted beyond them, our awareness 
of them would become subsidiary to this focus and their vivid impact on the eye and the mind would 
be lost.®"
For Polanyi contemplation is a unique form of experience. It, "dissolves the screen, 
stops our movement through experience and pours us straight into experience; we
Ibid. Polanyi. p. 196. Our emphasis.
Ibid. p. 196. This is essentially Polanyi's treatment of the phenomenon which Thomas Kuhn later 
takes up in his influential book on the history of science. See Kuhn Thomas, S. (1970). The 
Structure o f Scientific Revolutions. Chicago; London, University o f Chicago Press.
For example, a rat will attempt to devise a strategy to escape from a maze.
Polanyi Personal Knowledge. pp.l96f.
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cease to handle things and become immersed in them."^^ Contemplative experience 
represents the total participation of the person in that which is being contemplated.
As we have observed, articulate systems comprise a vastly diverse phenomena. 
What Polanyi calls 'the facts of experience' bear in differing ways upon a system. 
In the natural sciences, for example, the bearing is much more specific than would 
be the case in religion or the arts. In the light of this Polanyi speaks of the 
'verification' of science by experience while describing the process by which other 
articulate systems are tested and accepted as one of 'validation'. "Our personal 
participation is in general greater in validation than in a verification. The emotional 
coefficient of assertion is intensified as we pass from the sciences to the 
neighbouring domains of thought. But both verification and validation are 
everywhere an acknowledgement of a commitment: they claim the presence of 
something real and external to the speaker.
This discussion of the indwelling of articulate systems brings Polanyi to one of his 
key and radical propositions that the practice of science is dependent upon beliefs to 
which the members of the scientific community are, and must be, committed. 
Because this commitment is necessary to the working scientist, the work of science 
cannot be represented in non-committal terms. The logical rules and maxims of 
science point beyond themselves to a formulation of science which Polanyi calls 
'fiduciary'.
6. Faith and Doubt
Polanyi's desire to explore the fiduciary nature of science was a radical departure 
from the consensus of opinion. As he noted in an essay of 1947, "People who 
believe in science do not usually regard this as a personal act of faith. They 
consider themselves as submitting to evidence which by its nature compels their 
assent and which has the power to compel a measure of assent from any rational 
human b e i n g . T h i s  view of science emerged within an intellectual ethos
Ibid. p. 197.
Ibid. p.202. Polanyi's emphasis.
Polanyi, M. (1947). "Science: Observation and Belief." Humanitas 1: 10-15. p.lO.
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significantly shaped by its rejection of authority, and a rejection of the authority of 
the church in particular, as it had been exercised in Medieval Europe. But Polanyi 
suggests that this freedom from authority left a vacuum. This was filled, "as man 
tried to avoid the emptiness of mere self-assertion by establishing over himself the 
authority of experience and r e a s o n . B u t  it was precisely this that set us on the 
path to our present malaise. "[M]odem scientism fetters thought as cruelly as ever 
the churches had done. It offers no scope for our most vital beliefs and it forces us 
to disguise them in farcically inadequate terms.
We have already detailed some of Polanyi's reasons for conceiving the situation in 
this way, but we must now consider his response. In view of his criticisms of a 
scientism (which denied the role of authority) what, according to Polanyi, is the 
way out of the 'malaise'? Here what Patrick Grant has called 'the Augustinian 
component' of Polanyi's work comes to the fore.^  ^ The way forward, according to 
Polanyi, requires a glance backwards: "[W]e must now go back to St Augustine to 
restore the balance of our cognitive powers. In the fourth century A.D., St 
Augustine brought the history of Greek philosophy to a close by inaugurating for 
the first time a post-critical philosophy. He taught that all knowledge was a gift of 
grace, for which we must strive under the guidance of antecedent belief: nisi 
credideritis, non intelligitis."^^ This was the doctrine which directed the minds of 
Christian thinkers for a period of a thousand years until the decline of faith and the 
rise of the modem scientific world view. According to this post-Augustinian view 
belief is no longer associated with a higher power conveying to us that which is 
beyond the range of observation and reason but, minimally, a personal acceptance 
which falls short of empirical and rational justification. The scheme of Augustine is 
inverted and belief reduced to, "an imperfection by which knowledge fell short of 
universality."^^
Polanyi Personal Knowledge, p.265.
Ibid. p.265. Polanyi saw this 'scientistic' view of the world as responsible for the destructive 
tyrannies o f twentieth century Europe. It was a philosophy which denied the place o f the person in 
human knowledge. Polanyi claims that 'homeless passions' were commandeered by totalitarian 
ideologies which sought to justify themselves as 'scientific' and 'necessary'. His argumentation for 
this assertion is well developed. See, for example, Personal Knowledge pp.224-245 and The Tacit 
Dimension pp.56-63.
See Grant "Michael Polanyi: The Augustinian Component." pp. 438-463.
Polanyi Personal Knowledge, p.266.
Ibid. p.266.
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But Polanyi believes we must go back to Augustine and openly assert, once more, 
that belief is the source of all knowledge. He writes: "Tacit assent and intellectual 
passions, the sharing of an idiom and of a cultural heritage, affiliation to a like- 
minded community: such are the impulses which shape our vision of the nature of 
things."^"  ^ Only in this way can we escape from the problems inherent within the 
Enlightenment project. Polanyi explains:
This... is our liberation from objectivism: to realize that we can voice our ultimate convictions only 
from within our convictions -  from within the whole system o f acceptances that are logically prior to 
any particular assertion of our own, prior to the holding of any particular piece of knowledge. If an 
ultimate logical level is to be attained and made explicit, this must be a declaration of my personal 
beliefs. I believe that the function of philosophic reflection consists in bringing to light, and 
affirming as my own, the beliefs implied in such of my thoughts and practices as I believe to be 
valid; that I must aim at discovering what I truly believe in and at formulating the convictions which 
I find myself holding; that I must conquer my self-doubt, so as to retain a firm hold on this 
programme of self-identification.^"
Not surprisingly, Polanyi regards Augustine -  especially as he expresses himself in 
the Confessions -  as a fine example of one who has offered a consistent and 
systematic expression based upon beliefs. Although he gives an extensive 
autobio graphical account of his pre-conversion experience, this is done from the 
perspective of the beliefs which he established through his conversion to 
Christianity. Polanyi makes the point: "He seems to acknowledge that you cannot 
expose an error by interpreting it from the premisses which lead to it, but only from 
premisses which are believed to be true."^^
Polanyi, who spent the first half of his working life in pursuit of- scientific 
discoveries, conceives of the holding of beliefs as a necessary precondition for such 
an endeavour. An exploration of the new is the ongoing exposition of our beliefs: 
"Our fundamental beliefs are continuously reconsidered in the course of such a
Ibid. p.266.
Ibid. p.267.
Ibid. p.267.
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process, but only within the scope of their own basic premisses. Polanyi 
describes his position, somewhat provocatively, as 'an invitation to dogmatism'^^. 
This may be misleading if it is taken to be a denial of the heuristic function of 
beliefs, but this is not his intention. Polanyi uses the biblical imagery of the Garden 
of Eden to describe the present predicament of Enlightenment theories of 
knowledge:
Humanity has been deprived a second time o f its innocence, and driven out of another garden which 
was, at any rate, a Fool's Paradise. Innocently, we had trusted that we could be relieved of all 
personal responsibility for our beliefs by objective crkr^ ria of validity -  and our own critical powers 
have shattered this hope. Struck by our sudden nakedness, we may tiy to brazen it out by flaunting it 
in a profession o f nihilism. But modem man's immorality is unstable. Presently his moral passions 
reassert themselves in objectivistic disguise and the scientistic Minotaur is bom.®^
At the close of the chapter 'The Logic of Affirmation', the key section on faith in 
Personal Knowledge, Polanyi gives a summary of his proposal: "[T]o restore to us 
once more that power for the deliberate holding of unproven beliefs. We should be 
able to profess now knowingly and openly those beliefs which could be tacitly 
taken for granted in the days before modem philosophic criticism reached its 
present incisiveness. Such powers may appear dangerous. But a dogmatic 
orthodoxy can be kept in check both internally and externally, while a creed 
inverted into a science is both blind and deceptive.
Both his central assertion -  about the holding of unproven beliefs -  and his 
secondary comments about the possibility of 'keeping in check' a dogmatic 
orthodoxy will be of importance to us as we consider the significance of Polanyi for 
theological work.
Ibid. p.267.
See ibid. p.268. It is noteworthy that Thomas Kuhn spoke of'dogma' in science up until just 
before the publication o f The Stmcture of Scientific Revolutions. See his essay, 'The Function of 
Dogma in Scientific Research' in Crombie, A. C., University o f Oxford, et al. (1963). Scientific 
change: historical studies in the intellectual, social, and technical conditions for scientific discoverv 
and technical invention, from antiquitv to the present. London,, Heinemann, pp.347-369
Polanyi Personal Knowledge, p.268. This is an allusion to Polanyi's theory of'moral inversion'.
Ibid. p.268. In the reference to 'dogmatic orthodoxy' we discern something o f a polemical 
flourish. Any such 'orthodoxy' would have to be a 'post-critical' orthodoxy!
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Polanyi suggests that 'philosophical doubt' is the 'logical corollary' of 
objectivism/^^ "It trusts that the uprooting of all voluntary components of belief 
will leave behind unassailed a residue of knowledge that is completely determined 
by the objective evidence. Critical thought trusted this method unconditionally for 
avoiding error and establishing t ru th . " M o r e  than this, "Doubt has been acclaimed 
[in Enlightemnent thought] not only as the touchstone of truth, but also as the 
safeguard of tolerance. The belief that philosophic doubt would appease religious 
fanaticism and bring about universal tolerance goes back to Locke, and this belief is 
still vigorously alive in our own day."^^'
Polanyi claims that, notwithstanding the reverence in which it has been held since 
Descartes, the method of critical doubt has not -  indeed could not -  be rigorously 
followed in practice. Polanyi cites Hume as an example of a philosopher who was 
frank in this respect. He was prepared to set aside the conclusions of his own 
scepticism when he felt unable to follow them in an honest way. But Polanyi also 
criticises him because, "he failed to acknowledge that by so doing he was 
expressing his own personal beliefs; nor did he claim his right and accept his duty 
to declare such beliefs, when this amounted to the silencing of doubt and the 
abandonment of strict objectivity. His dissent from scepticism was strictly 
unofficial, forming no explicit part of his philosophy.
Polanyi's analysis proceeds by attempting to show the equivalence of doubt and 
belief. Polanyi comments: "The first point in my critique of doubt will be to show 
that the doubting of any explicit statement merely implies an attempt to deny the 
belief expressed by the statement, in favour of other beliefs which are not doubted 
for the time being."^^^ Polanyi suggests that the difference between a positive 
statement and its denial is merely a matter of how the statements are worded and the 
acceptance or rejection of either must be evaluated according to the same criteria. 
The fiduciary component is present, equally, in both the acceptance and the denial. 
By way of illustration Polanyi comments, "During the seventeenth and eighteenth
See ibid. p.269. 
’"2 Ibid. p.269. 
Ibid. p.271. 
Ibid. p.270. 
Ibid. p.272.
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centuries scientific beliefs have... opposed and discredited a whole system of 
supernatural beliefs and the authorities which taught these beliefs. We may regard 
this sceptical movement as altogether reasonable and be unaware of its fiduciary 
character until we are confronted with its b lunders" .Science has its own history 
of error and Polanyi recounts numerous stories in which evidence was ignored or 
overlooked because it pointed to something that was incompatible with the 
scientific world view of the time.^^  ^ It may be that a subsequent revision of a world 
view may admit to a more favourable re-evaluation of the evidence, but it is only 
from a perspective gained from within a world view that one may sustain a doubt 
about the reasonableness of a theory or a proposition. The perspective and the 
world view which supports it are warranted only by the belief of scientists.
If a scientist does not engage with the claim of another scientist it will likely be 
because he or she regards it as invalid. If he or she does engage with it the level and 
degree of that engagement will reflect his or her evaluation of its significance. The 
scientist can sustain an agnostic position only if he or she is not concerned with the 
field of investigation and generally one can only sustain an agnosticism if one lacks 
an interest in the subject. Polanyi concludes:
There exists... no valid heuristic maxim in natural science which would recommend either belief or 
doubt as a path to discovery. Some discoveries are prompted by the conviction that something is 
fundamentally lacking in the existing framework of science, others by the opposite feeling that there 
is far more implied in it than has yet been realized. The first conviction may be regarded as more 
sceptical than the second, but it is precisely the first which is more likely to be hampered by doubt -  
owing to the excessive adherence to the existing orthodoxy of science.'"®
7. Commitment, Calling and Universal Intent
Rooted within its Enlightenment heritage the traditional role of epistemology has 
been to define both truth and falsity in impersonal terms. The exclusion of personal 
commitments is required to justify claims to universal validity. Polanyi points out
Ibid. p.274. I
See, for example, Polanyi's accounts of F. A. Mesmer's work in Ibid. pp.51f ; 107f and Polanyi |
and Prosch Meaning, p. 146. i
Polanyi Personal Knowledge, p.277. Î
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the profound disparity between this view and his vision of fiduciary knowing. He 
writes, "The framework of commitment leaves no scope for such an endeavour; for 
its acceptance necessarily invalidates any impersonal justification of knowledge."^^^ 
Polanyi suggests the following dilemma for those who propose a standard of 
impersonal knowing: "The reflecting person is... caught in an insoluble conflict 
between a demand for impersonality which would discredit all commitment and an 
urge to make up his mind which drives him to recommit h im se l f . " B e r t r a n d  
Russell attempted to resolve this dilemma by defining truth as the coincidence of 
subjective belief and the actual facts, but it is impossible, within the terms allowable 
in Russell's schema, to know if or when this has occurred. Polanyi, with his 
fiduciary programme, shows that the dilemma can be resolved:
The answer is this. The 'actual facts' are accredited facts, as seen within the commitment situation, 
while subjective beliefs are the convictions accrediting these facts as seen non-committally, by 
someone not sharing them. But if  we regard the beliefs in question non-committally, as a mere state 
of mind, we cannot speak confidently, without self-contradiction, of the facts to which these beliefs 
refer. For it is self-contradictory to secede from the commitment situation as regards the beliefs held 
within it, but to remain committed to the same beliefs in acknowledging their factual content as 
frwe.'"
A scientist will pursue a discovery which remains elusive sustained by the 
conviction that the solution to the problem is hidden only because the approach 
adopted is somehow misguided. There may also be a tension between the 
conviction that something is known and the thought that the conviction might 
possibly be mistaken. In both cases there can be no Archimedean point from which 
the approach to the truth can be compared with the actual truth. It is only possible 
to compare different approaches -  the articulate systems which we indwell. Polanyi 
states: "According to the logic of commitment, truth is something that can he 
thought o f only by believing itf^^^
For Polanyi this affirmation is not solipsistic but it does recognise the profound 
relationship which exists between the commitments which we hold and the social
'""ibid. p.303.
"" Ibid. p.304.
'" Ibid. p.304. Polanyi's emphasis. 
Ibid. p.305. Polanyi's emphasis.
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and cultural contexts in which we are nurtured. Polanyi rejects the Cartesian cogito 
by asserting the communal co-efficient in human knowing. He writes:
Articulate systems which foster and satisfy an intellectual passion can survive only with the support 
of a society which respects the values affirmed by these passions, and a society has a cultural life 
only to the extent to which it acknowledges and fulfils the obligation to lend its support to the 
cultivation of these passions. Since the advancement and dissemination of knowledge by the pursuit 
of science, or technology and mathematics forms part of cultural life, the tacit coefficients by which 
these articulate systems are understood and accredited, and which uphold quite generally our shaping 
and affirmation of factual truth, are also coefficients of a cultural life shared by a community.""
Recognition of the communal coefficient of our intellectual passions alerts us, 
again, to the fact that when we assert the truth, and do so with universal intent, our 
convictions arise out of a particular context. In this we appear to be confronted by a 
dilemma that if we hold convictions on the basis of a received authority they do not 
appear to be our convictions. On the other hand, if we actively affirm them it 
appears that our affirmation is arbitrary: why these convictions rather than others? 
Further, as Polanyi notes, "The exercise of authority will tend to appear as bigoted 
or as hypocritical, if it asserts as universal what is only parochial.
Does this imply that every affirmation is made in bad faith? It will do so only if it 
is made on the basis of an ill-founded received authority or if, as the objectivist has 
done, we propose a standard of impersonal knowledge. Polanyi, by illuminating the 
fiduciary and tacit elements of knowing, has sought to show that such a standard is 
illusory and meaningless. Polanyi accepts that any particular cultural context will 
be limited but does not conclude that limitation implies either invalidity or 
relativism. He writes, "I accept these accidents of personal existence as the 
concrete opportunities for exercising our personal responsibilities. This acceptance 
is the sense o f my calling"^^^
Once the epistemic significance of our personal participation is established the 
question of the formation of our calling (culturally, intellectually, emotionally etc.)
Ibid. p.203. 
Ibid. p.204.115 Ibid. p.322. Polanyi's emphasis.
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will appear not only a valid concern but a necessary and urgent one. What is the 
'mechanism' by which human beings come to participate in a calling and how is a 
cultural heritage communicated? Polanyi suggests:
The affiliation begins with the fact that a child submits to education within a community, and it is 
confirmed throughout life to the extent to which the adult continues to place exceptional confidence 
in the intellectual leaders of the same community. Just as children learn to speak by assuming that 
the words used in their presence mean something, so throughout the whole range o f cultural 
apprenticeship the intellectual junior's craving to understand the doings and the sayings o f his 
intellectual superiors assumes that what they are doing and saying has a hidden meaning which, 
when discovered, will be found satisfying to some extent.""
The student must believe that the teacher possesses something which is both 
meaningful, communicable and true. The possibility of the transfer is contingent 
upon this belief. "The learner, like the discoverer, must believe before he can 
know."^^^ The submission of the student to the teacher is, "like an act of heuristic 
co n je c tu re " .H o w e v e r ,  the dynamic of submission is not one of absolute 
submission. "Every acceptance of authority is qualified by some measure of 
reaction to it or even against it. Submission to a consensus is always accompanied 
to some extent by the imposition of one's views on the consensus to which we 
submit." 'Conversely,  even the most radical dissent from a recognised authority 
or norm must be asserted in terms which will be recognisable to those who affirm it. 
Revolutionaries or radical reformers must provide a 'bridge' from that which they 
condemn to that which they affirm because, "dissent does not seek to abolish public 
authority, but to claim it for itself."'^''
Human nurture and formation occurs in particular contexts and it is only through 
such nurture and formation that we are able to participate and function effectively 
as human beings. These contexts provide ways'^' by which we endeavour to make 
sense of our lives and the world in which we live. They are, to recall an image used 
earlier in this chapter, our 'spectacles': they provide us with a way of seeing. But
"" Ibid. pp.207f. 
Ibid. p.208
"® Ibid. p.208.
"" Ibid.p.208.
Ibid. p.209.
These 'ways' are Polanyi's articulate systems.
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our knowledge of them is primarily subsidiary, not focal. We may render our 
knowledge of some aspects of them focal in certain circumstances (and may thereby 
consider some revision of them necessary) but this is exceptional, not typical. The 
'spectacles' used in different contexts and communities differ and, consequently, the 
meanings established through the use of them will be marked by a concomitant 
diversity. The distinctions between differing cultural spectacles are not easily 
understood because we are accustomed to evaluating their meaning by what we are 
able to see through them and not by looking at them.
Polanyi's view here represents no thoroughgoing relativism but an 
acknowledgement of the cultural particularity of a person's calling. Within that 
calling a person must bear his or her responsibility in the search for truth. 
Polanyi illustrates this point by reference to the role of the judge in the law courts.
By seeking the right decision the judge must find  the law, supposed to be existing -  though as yet 
unknown. This is why eventually his decision becomes binding as law. The judge's discretion is 
thus narrowed down to zero by the stranglehold of his universal intent -  by the power o f his 
responsibility over himself. This is his independence. It consists in keeping himself wholly 
responsible to the interests o f justice, excluding any subjectivity, whether o f fear or favour. Judicial 
independence has been secured, where it exists, by centuries of passionate resistance to intimidation 
and corruption; for justice is an intellectual passion seeking satisfaction of itself, by inspiring and 
ruling men's lives.
There are parallels between the work of the judge in making a decision and the 
course of scientific discovery'^"':
In both cases the innovator has a wide decision o f choice, because he has no fixed rules to rely on, 
and the range of his discretion determines the measure of his personal responsibility. In both cases a 
passionate search for a solution that is regarded as potentially pre-existing, narrows down discretion 
to zero and issues at the same time an innovation claiming universal acceptance. In both cases the 
original mind takes a decision on grounds which are insufficient to minds lacking similar powers of 
creative judgment. The active scientific investigator stakes bit by bit his whole professional life on a 
series o f such decisions and this day-to-day gamble represents his most responsible activity. The
This is the responsibility o f which objectivism sought to relieve us in its claims to impersonal 
objective knowledge.
Polanyi Personal Knowledge. pp.308f. Polanyi's emphasis.
Polanyi is concerned here with scientific discoveries and momentous legal decisions. Such 
phenomena should be distinguished from routine scientific work and general legal administration.
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same is true o f the judge, with the difference, o f course, that the risk is bom here mainly by the 
parties to the case and by the society which has entrusted itself to the interpretation o f its laws by the 
courts.'125
The scientist engaged in the pursuit of a discovery gropes towards that which is 
hidden but which he or she believes may be accessible. The choices made in this 
process are the scientist’s own but the scientist is constrained by the problem by 
which he or she is confronted.
Insofar as they are acting responsibly, their personal participation in drawing their own conclusions 
is completely compensated for by the fact that they are submitting to the universal status of the 
hidden reality which they are trying to approach. Accidents may sometimes bring about -  or prevent 
-  discovery, but research does not rely on accident: the continuously renewed risks of failure 
normally incurred at every heuristic step are taken without ever acting at random. Responsible 
action excludes randomness, even as it suppresses egocentric arbitrariness.'^"
Aliy significant scientific enquiry is bound up with uncertainty and the implications 
of new knowledge cannot be known from the beginning. What is referred to is 
believed to be real and, to use an idea to which Polanyi frequently returns, "to 
attribute reality to something is to express the belief that its presence will yet show 
up in an indefinite number of unpredictable ways."'^^
Polanyi's realism is to the fore in this part of his analysis. He writes, "An empirical 
statement is true to the extent to which it reveals an aspect of reality, a reality 
lai'gely hidden to us, and existing therefore independently o f our knowing it. By 
trying to say something that is true about a reality believed to be existing 
independently of our knowing it, all assertions of fact necessarily carry universal 
intent. Our claim to speak o f reality serves thus as the external anchoring o f our 
commitment in making a factual statement.
The scientist's intimations about the hidden reality are his or her own; they are 
personal and the product of the scientist's originality. But, as Polanyi wishes to
Polanyi Personal Knowledge. pp.309f.
'^ " Ibid. p.310.
Ibid. p.311. This is one of Polanyi's definitions of'reality'.
128 Ibid. p.311. Polanyi's emphasis.
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emphasise, "they are not a subjective state of mind, but convictions held with 
universal intent, and heavy with arduous p r o j e c t s . " F o r  the scientific discoverer, 
as with the judge, personal judgements -  which are intrinsic to the heuristic striving 
-  are balanced by the rigorous responsibility which must be exercised with regard to 
the reality which both scientist and judge endeavour to comprehend. But the 
personal component cannot be circumvented and every effort to present scientific 
discovery, or legal judgement, in impersonal terms can only serve to distort an 
understanding of the process. Polanyi explains:
Desisting henceforth from the vain pursuit o f a formalized scientific method, commitment accepts in 
its place the person o f the scientist as the agent responsible for conducting and accrediting scientific 
discoveries. The scientist's procedure is o f course methodical. But his methods are but the maxims 
of an art which he applies in his own original way to the problem of his own choice. Discovery 
forms part of the art o f knowing; it can be studied by precept and example, but its higher 
performances require particular native gifts appropriate to particular subjects.'""
Commitment provides a framework in which assent is delivered from randomness 
or egocentricity. A framework of commitment is the context from which 
affirmations can be made. Inherent within this framework is the existence of 
subsidiary affirmations which are relied upon and if objections to these subsidiary 
affirmations were made they could not necessarily be refuted. Thus such a 
framework, "allows us to commit ourselves on evidence which, but for the weight 
of our own personal judgment, would admit of other conclusions. We may firmly 
believe what we might conceivably doubt; and may hold to be true what might 
conceivably be f a l s e . P o l a n y i  believes this to be a decisive issue in 
epistemology. Every act of knowing entails a tacit contribution on the part of the 
knower and, crucially for Polanyi, "this coefficient is no mere imperfection, but a 
necessary component of all knowledge.
In visual perception it is possible to be confronted with a phenomenon which admits 
to two or more contradictory interpretations. We might think of the drawing used
Ibid. p.311.
'"" Ibid. p.3 Ilf. The function of the scientific community -  though not emphasised at this point 
must not be lost to view. The scientist is no 'Cartesian soloist'!
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by Wittgenstein which can be seen as the head of either a duck or a rabbit, 
depending on how one looks at it.'^^ We may be able to switch from one perception 
to the other, but cannot sustain both possibilities at once. Polanyi explains: "The 
only way to avoid being committed... is to close one's eyes. This corresponds to the 
conclusion reached before in my critique of doubt: to avoid believing one must stop 
thinking."'^"' This demonstrates that even in a 'primitive tacit act' such as perception 
there is an active search for the truth in which a conclusion may be drawn in the 
face of alternative possibilities.'^^ And Polanyi asserts: "There is... complete 
continuity between a perceptive judgment and the process by which we establish 
responsible convictions in the course of scientific research.
Of course, the perception which we form in the face of ambiguous phenomena may 
be mistaken. We can only do the best we can as we seek to make sense of what we 
are looking at; but to withhold making a decision resolves nothing: "To postpone 
mental decisions on account of their conceivable fallibility would necessarily block 
all decisions for ever, and pile up the hazards of hesitation to infinity. It would 
amount to voluntary mental stupor. Stupor alone can eliminate both belief and 
e r r o r . I n  many circumstances the integration which forms a perception is so fast 
that to speak of a 'postponement of a decision' is inappropriate. We may, on the 
basis of a subliminal doubt about the veracity of a perception, 'take another look' -  
as we might if  we think we recognise someone while entertaining the doubt that we 
might be mistaken. But in so many cases our perception is correct -  we recognise 
the pen, the paper, the book, the computer, the desk and chair etc., and we are able 
to get on with our work without difficulty.
Wittgenstein (1958). Philosophical Investigations. Oxford, Blackwells. p.l94.
Polanyi Personal Knowledge, p.314.
In many acts of perception the kind of ambiguity which we find in the case of the duck-rabbit is 
absent. Nevertheless, perception is what Polanyi calls an 'integrative' act and although it may be 
both unproblematic and almost instantaneous it does not exist apart from the action o f the knower. 
We will return to Polanyi's treatment of this theme in our treatment o f tacit knowledge in the present 
chapter and in the final chapter in the context o f a discussion about imagination.
Polanyi Personal Knowledge, p.314. We note here Polanyi's tendency to move freely back and 
forth between discussion o f perception and discovery. This is no oversight or inconsistency but part 
of the 'strategy' of his epistemological formulations. Polanyi writes, "I have tried to pursue 
systematically the kinship between perception and scientific discovery." Polanyi and Prosch 
Meaning, p.56.
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Commitment is necessary and yet any commitment held can neither defend itself 
against all objection nor make claims to incorrigibility on any other grounds: "To 
accept commitment as the framework within which we may believe something to be 
true, is to circumscribe the hazards of belief. It is to establish the conception of 
competence which authorizes a fiduciary choice made and timed, to the best of the 
acting person's ability, as a deliberate and yet necessary choice. The paradox of the 
self-set standards is eliminated, for in a competent mental act the agent does not do 
as he pleases, but compels himself forcibly to act as he believes he must."'^^
Despite the hazard of error, risks must be taken. "[T]o withhold belief on the 
grounds of such a hazard is to break off all contact with r e a l i t y . A g a i n  we may 
reject the charge that Polanyi's position is solipsistic. He affirms the existence of an 
external reality which may be approached and investigated by others. Polanyi 
resists strongly the suggestion that his position is relativistic on the basis that the 
external pole of human knowing is an external reality which makes a decisive claim 
upon all who would approach it.
Polanyi insists that we must distinguish between different types of error. On the 
one hand, there may be a competent line of enquiry which happens to be erroneous; 
on the other, there are mental processes which are 'illusory and incompetent'. The 
latter may represent conclusions drawn on the basis of an inadequate depth of 
participation within a discipline. Implicit in this distinction is the recognition that 
'knowing' is a skilful achievement. We might think, for example, of knowledge 
gained through complex scientific experimentation. This is the achievement of 
highly developed skills. An untrained person would not only be in danger of 
damaging experimental equipment but could not expect to draw competent 
conclusions from experimental data. Polanyi calls conclusions drawn on the basis 
of an inadequate participation in a framework or discipline 'subjective''"'''. Of
Ibid. p.315. Polanyi can speak in insufficiently differentiated terms about cognitive acts. In 
Personal Knowledge in particular he has a tendency to speak of conscious mental acts -  the outcome 
of a period of deliberation -  without noting the many circumstances in which the act is not 
deliberate. Indeed, most o f our visual perceptions are more or less instantaneous and although they 
may comprise tacit integrations which are intrinsically personal they can scarcely be called 
'decisions' or, indeed, 'passionate'.Ibid. p .315.
Note, here, Polanyi's distinctive use of the term.
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course, an experienced scientist may make an experimental error or may draw an 
incorrect inference on the basis of correct experimental data but such errors are, in 
Polanyi's view, to be distinguished from the errors of'subjectivity'.
We have already seen that the grounds on which we hold to a framework of 
commitment can be neither fully articulated nor defended from all doubt. Polanyi 
comments, "We must commit each moment of our lives irrevocably on grounds 
which, if time could be suspended, would invariably prove inadequate; but our total 
responsibility for disposing of ourselves makes these objectively inadequate 
giounds compelling."'""
A calling is not a rigid delimitation'"'^ but its pervasive influence must be 
acknowledged. It is meaningless to ask what someone would think or say had they 
been brought up in a different society or in a different age, had their 'calling' been 
otheiwise. Just as we must live and die in the bodies which have been given to us -  
with all their possibilities and limitations -  so it is with the social and cultural 
context into which we are bom. Polanyi believes that our calling is to be embraced 
positively because: "Within its commitments the mind is warranted to exercise 
much ampler powers than those by which it is supposed to operate under 
objectivism; but by the very fact of assuming this new freedom it submits to a 
higher power to which it had hitherto refused recognition."'"'^
Polanyi's rejection of an objectivism which divested people of the responsibility of 
holding beliefs explicitly reintroduces a recognition of the epistemic function of 
beliefs in knowing. Consequently we must say that what commitment offers, to 
those who will embrace it, is the legitimate grounds for affirming personal belief 
held with universal intent. On these grounds one can assert that one's participation 
is personal without being 'merely subjective' (to adduce Polanyi's pejorative use of 
the term). "While it... lies beyond our responsibility, it is yet transformed by our 
sense of responsibility into part of our calling."'"'"' Our calling is prescribed by our 
historical particularity and from it we draw the resources to aspire to affirmations
Polanyi Personal Knowledge. p.320.
>‘*2 must hold in mind that we are able to transcend the frameworks which we inhabit. 
Polanyi Personal Knowledge, p.323.
Ibid. p.324.
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which we will make with universal intent. Polanyi believes we must make a radical 
and decisive move. We must leave the distortions of objectivism behind and take 
hold of the responsibilities which are rightly ours.
8. Tacit Knowledge
Stefania Jha suggests Polanyi has often been misread. "[H]e was mistaken to be a 
scientist mystifying scientific discovery rather than one attempting to explain its 
nonexplicit a s p e c t s . " A s  we turn to consider Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge it 
will become apparent that such negative evaluation is scarcely sustainable.
Polanyi’s understanding of the tacit dimension of knowledge is clearly evident in 
Personal Knowledge, published in 1958. At that point he is already able to say, 
"The subsidiary or instrumental knowledge, as I have defined it, is not known in 
itself but is known in terms of something focally known, to the quality of which it 
contributes; and to this extent it is unspecifiable."'"'^ In The Study of Man, 
published in 1959, Polanyi asserts that, "tacit knowing is... the dominant principle 
of all knowledge."'"'^ The tacit dimension is in evidence in many ways (and not 
least in his analysis of language) in his earlier publications but this crucial element 
of his thought is worked out with greater precision in his article, "The Logic of 
Tacit Inference"'"'®, and his book The Tacit Dimension, both of which were first 
published in 1966. The ideas in these publications are reinforced and, to some 
degree expanded, in Meaning published in 1975. We will concern ourselves 
primarily with these works as we consider the theme of tacit knowledge.
Polanyi's starting point in The Tacit Dimension is a position which has already been 
established in his treatment of language in Personal Knowledge. In this later work
Jha, s. R. (2002). Reconsidering Michael Polanyi's Philosophy. Pittsburgh, University of 
Pittsburgh Press, p.4.
Polanyi Personal Knowledge, p. 8 8. |
Polanyi, M. (1959). The Studv o f Man: The Lindsav Memorial Lectures 1958. London, I
Routledge and Kegan Paul. p. 13. I
Polanjd, M. (1966). "The Logic of Tacit Inference." Philosophy XLI(155): 1-18. The article was |
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the insight becomes pivotal and Polanyi announces, "I shall [now] reconsider 
human knowledge by starting from the fact that we know more than we can tellfi^^^
That we know more than we can tell may be illustrated in various ways. We can be 
confident of recognising the face of someone known to us among a million and yet 
our capacity to describe the person is severely limited. We can recognise a person's 
mood from their face without being able to say -  except in a very vague way -  how. 
This phenomenon, far from being unusual, is a feature of a vast number of human 
actions in which we achieve things without being able to articulate how we do it.
Polanyi acknowledges his debt to Gestalt psychology which has shown how a 
whole is recognised by seeing its constituent parts in a particular way. hi 
perceiving the whole the parts are not seen as they would if  they were attended to 
individually because as the parts of a whole they assume a particular function. The 
parts cannot fulfil this function if they are being attended to directly; they can do 
this only as they are seen as part of a pattern. Gestalt shows that there are two 
distinct ways of 'seeing'. This insight is a clue to Polanyi's theory of tacit 
knowledge but he takes issue with Gestalt insofar as it assumes that the process of 
integration, by which the parts are seen as a whole, is the result of a spontaneous 
equilibration as the particulars make their impression on the retina. Polanyi 
contends that this is not a passive but an active process.'^" He writes, "I am looking 
at Gestalt... as the outcome of an active shaping of experience performed in the 
pursuit of knowledge. This shaping or integrating I hold to be the great and 
indispensable tacit power by which all knowledge is discovered and, once 
discovered, is held to be true."'^'
In introducing his account of the structure of tacit knowing Polanyi explains that it 
always involves two types of knowledge which he calls, 'the two terms of tacit 
knowing'. We rely on our knowledge of the first term in order to attend to the 
second. We may relate this to our second example by saying that the particular 
features of the face -  the many physical phenomena manifested in it -  comprise the
Polanyi The Tacit Dimension, p.4. Polanyi's emphasis. 
Typically one in which we can train and develop skills.
Polanyi The Tacit Dimension, p.6.
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first term of tacit knowledge and it is in our reliance upon these clues that we are 
able to establish the second term, which is the mood of the face indicated by them. 
"[I]n an act of tacit knowing we attend from  something for attending to something 
else."'^^ Polanyi suggests, additionally, the adoption of anatomical language in 
which the first term becomes the 'proximal’ and the second the 'distal'. "It is the 
proximal term... of which we have a knowledge that we may not be able to tell."'^^
Polanyi's reason for wishing to emphasise the intentional nature of an integration is 
that the achievement is always personal. Subsidiary elements are not integrated 
into a focal whole apart from the participation of the knower. "[Tjhis pair is not 
linked together of its own accord. The relation of a subsidiary to a focus is formed 
by the act o f a person who integrates one to the other. The from-to relation lasts 
only as long as a person, the knower, sustains this integration."'^"' Polanyi insists 
that, "knowing is action. Purposive action cannot be conceived in impersonal 
terms.
In "The Logic of Tacit Inference" Polanyi identifies two distinguishable instances of 
the integrative process. In the first he identifies the case in which an object is 
perceived as a coherent entity. A ball moving in the direction of the viewer will 
appear to become larger (and may change in appearance in other ways, too) but the 
viewer will likely be able to determine, because of many subsidiary clues, that there 
is one object and that it is not increasing in size but moving closer to the observing 
eyes. In this case the subsidiary clues are largely distinct from the focal object. But 
the situation is different when the distal term is located in the same place as the 
proximal clue, as in the case of a physiognomy. This is the second instance. The 
features of the face upon which we rely for recognition are, as it were, in the same 
spot as the focal term. We are aware of them only insofar as they bear upon that on 
which we are focussed: the face. Although it is by the features we recognise the 
face we cannot, except in a vague way, say how we do this. Something akin to the 
dynamic of this latter situation occurs when the discovery of a new theory integrates 
our observations into a new theoretical appearance. Despite the distinctions which
Ibid. p. 10. Polanyi's emphasis. 
'“ Ibid. p. 10.
Polanyi and Prosch Meaning, p.38. Polanyi and Prosch's emphasis. 
Ibid. p.42.
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must be made between these two forms of integration it must be noted that, "tacit 
knowing does exercise in both cases its characteristic powers of integration, 
merging the subsidiary into the focal, the proximal into the distal.
Polanyi analyses in some depth the relationship between the two terms of tacit 
knowing by identifying the different 'structures' implied in it.'^^ First is the 
functional structure. This is the way in which the proximal or subsidiary term of 
tacit knowing is subordinated to the distal or focal term. Polanyi comments that, 
"Since this functional relationship is set up between two types of awareness, its 
directedness is necessarily conscious."'^® We are uncertain whether Polanyi's 
emphasis on consciousness is well placed here. The great majority of integrations 
by which we perceive things are performed, as we have noted already, almost 
instantaneously. We concur with Polanyi that one of the reasons we are able to 
make them is because we possess perceptual skills which have developed over time, 
but far more often than not our perception is a performance in which the conscious 
effort required to make the integration is negligible. The critical point is not the 
degree to which the integration is conscious but that subsidiary clues can become 
the means by which focal knowledge is established through the application of such 
internalised skills.
A second structure is the phenomenal. This refers to that which appears in the act 
of tacit knowing. "A perceived object acquires constant size, colour and shape; 
observations incorporated into a theory are reduced to mere instances of it; the parts 
of a whole merge their isolated appearance into the appearance of the w h o l e . I t  
is in the appearance of the distal term (perceived as comprehensive entity) that we 
become aware of the proximal term of the integrative act.
A third aspect of the relationship between the two terms of tacit knowing is its 
semantic structure. It is by way of the elements of the proximal term of tacit 
knowing that the distal term appears and we say, in recognition of this appearance.
Polanyi "The Logic of Tacit Inference." p.3. Although Polanyi describes just two instances tliere 
are, presumably, many others.
See ibid. pp.3f, Polanyi The Tacit Dimension, pp. 10-13 and Polanyi and Prosch Meaning. pp.35f. 
Polanyi "The Logic of Tacit Inference." pp.3f.
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that the distal term is the meaning of the elements of the proximal term. A 
frowning countenance is comprised of a multitude of largely unspecifiable facial 
features: the meaning of these features is the frown as it is recognised as the distal 
term. Or, as Polanyi puts it elsewhere, "The subsidiaries of from-to knowing bear 
on a focal target, and whatever a thing bears on may be called its meaning."'^" 
Polanyi cannot speak of the meaning of a thing without acknowledging its 
reality
From these structures of tacit knowing emerges the final one -  the ontological 
structure. Here Polanyi's realism becomes explicit. "The act of tacit knowing... 
implies the claim that its result is an aspect of reality, which, as such, may yet 
reveal its truth in an inexhaustible range of unknown and perhaps still unthinkable 
ways."""^ For Polanyi an act of knowing, if it is valid, is contingent upon the 
existence of a reality which exists independently of the knower. This is what he 
calls the 'external pole''^^ or 'external anchoring''^"' of tacit knowing.
Polanyi believes that the processes of human perception may be extended to include 
the use of tools, probes and the like. Polanyi observes that our body is the 'ultimate 
instrument' by which we attain our practical and intellectual knowledge. He 
comments: "Our own body is the only thing in the world which we normally never 
experience as an object, but experience always in terms of the world to which we 
are attending from our body. It is by making this intelligent use of our body that we 
feel it to be our body, and not a thing outside. However, in the use of a probe, 
for example, the skilled surgeon does not handle the probe as an external object but 
uses it as an extension of his or her own body. The probe is held in the hand and 
the sensations that the surgeon picks up from the wall of the cavity being explored 
are mediated through the hand. But the surgeon does not attend to the sensations in 
his or her hand but from  them. In Polanyi's terms, the probe is made to function as
Polanyi and Prosch Meaning, p.35.
In an article dealing with Polanyi's 'realism' Phil Mullins has noted the close proximity of his 
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the proximal term of tacit knowing. We have already considered Polanyi's concept 
of indwelling but some repetition is justified at this point since it plays such a 
crucial role in his epistemology. He explains:
Wlienever we use certain things for attending fi'om tliem to other things, in the way in which we 
always use our body, these things change their appearance. They appear to us now in terms of the 
entities to which we are attending from  them, just as we feel our own body in terms of the things 
outside to which we are attending from  our body. In this sense we can say that when we make a 
thing function as the proximal term of tacit knowing, we incorporate it in our body -  or extend our 
body to include it -  so that we come to dwell in it.*^ ®
The functional relationship between the surgeon’s probe and the exploration of a 
cavity may readily be extended to include any number of practical tools but may be 
extended further to include the use of 'intellectual tools' -  theories, concepts, moral 
codes and so forth. Here we meet once more with Polanyi's important (if 
unfortunately named) concept of 'articulate systems'. As we have already noted, 
the articulate system is for Polanyi an extremely broad category (or family of 
related categories). The diversity contained within it makes generalisation difficult 
but, in the context of the present discussion, the significance of an articulate system 
is that it functions as the proximal term of tacit knowing. We do not look at the 
articulate system, we look with it. When we attend from an articulate system (we 
might think, for example, of a theory) in order to attend to something else we 
intériorisé it. It becomes, in effect, an extension of our own body and we indwell 
it.*^  ^ We might, for example, think of the heliocentric view of the universe. It was 
through his indwelling of this view of the universe that Newton was able to discover 
the laws of gravitation. In making his discovery Newton was not looking at the 
Copemican view but looking with it. Had he indwelt a Ptolemaic view he would 
not have made his discovery because what he was able to uncover was not implied 
in a geocentric view of the universe.
In addition to showing how an articulate system can be made to function as the 
proximal term in discovery this analysis also illuminates at least three other
Ibid. p. 16. Polanyi's emphasis.
'Body' ought to be understood as shorthand for 'mind-body', as when we indwell something the 
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important aspects of tacit knowing. The first is that to indwell an articulate system 
one must have developed an understanding of those aspects of the system which are 
explicit and which have been articulated^as well as an awareness of what is or 
may be implied by this knowledge. Again, it is difficult to generalise, but the 
indwelling of an articulate system will often be possible only after a period of 
apprenticeship, nurture or training. The second is that discovery is the imaginative 
indwelling of an articulate system. In addition to this indwelling there is the factor 
of creative genius by which a gifted person may see more of what is implied in a 
particular articulate system. The final point is that the potential for error is ever 
present. The ideas and theories that we must indwell in the pursuit of new horizons 
of discovery are not and cannot be known to be infallible even if they are known to 
be very effective. The theories and concepts which we may come to understand and 
subsequently, through the indwelling of them, rely upon for pursuing new 
discoveries, we trust as representations of what is real. But this is a fiduciary 
component in our heuristic endeavours. We can offer no final proof as we have no 
'direct' access to that reality. As we have noted, a theory, insofar as it is indwelt, 
functions somewhat like a pair of spectacles and, as Polanyi points out, "You cannot 
use your spectacles to scrutinize your spectacles."^^^ By wearing spectacles we are 
enabled to see things that would otherwise be unclear to us. We evaluate the 
function of the spectacles we wear on the basis of the perception that they facilitate. 
We accredit our perception on the basis of our faith in the spectacles.
Our inability to fully specify the proximal term of tacit knowing will, inevitably, 
appear to the objectivist as a limitation of knowledge. Polanyi disagrees. The 
critical point is not that there is a shortfall in our explicit knowledge of the proximal 
term, although there is clearly a sense in which this is so. (As we have seen, it 
might be possible for the elements of the proximal term to become part of our focal 
knowledge. But, insofar as this can be done, by looking at these features we 
exclude the possibility of looking^rom them.) Polanyi's analysis demonstrates the 
positive character of tacit integration. It, "brings home to us that it is not by looking
The formalised aspect o f science, for example.
Indwelling ftinctions at many different levels: Newton's indwelling of the Copemican view of the 
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at things, but by dwelling in them, that we understand their joint meaning."^^^ We 
may strengthen this point by reflecting upon the consequences of seeking focal 
knowledge of a proximal term by way of example. If we stare intently at a 
particular minute feature of a face we are no longer aware -  or are only hazily 
aware -  of the nature of the face's expression (to which the detail we observe makes 
some contribution). The surgeon can attend to the sensations of the probe in his or 
her hand but will thereby lose the facility to use the probe to attend to the cavity. In 
playing the piano, to introduce a further example, we may attend to the placement 
of our fingers on the keyboard, but this will interrupt our ability to play fluently. In 
these and any number of other circumstances a satisfactory performance or 
achievement can be re-established by interiorising the particulars once more. But 
Polanyi observes,
[T]his recovery never brings back the original meaning. It may improve on it. Motion studies, 
which tend to paralyze a skill, will improve it when followed by practice. The meticulous 
dismembering o f a text, which can kill its appreciation, can also supply material for a much deeper 
understanding of it. In these cases, the detailing of particulars, which by itself would destroy 
meaning, serves as a guide to their subsequent integration and this establishes a more secure and 
more accurate meaning o f them.'^^
The outcome of such a procedure is not always a happy one. Polanyi suggests that 
in other circumstances, "the damage done by the specification of particulars may be 
irredeemable. Meticulous detailing may obscure beyond recall a subject like 
history, literature and philosophy. What Polanyi opposes is the view that the 
particulars, because they are more tangible, offer a truer conception of things. In 
focussing upon the particulars we do not clarify but obfuscate their joint
174meaning.
At this point in Polanyi's analysis his opposition to the dominant views of the 
philosophy of science resurface once more. Modem science aims at establishing 
strictly detached, fully articulated, objective knowledge. But Polanyi has shown
Polanyi The Tacit Dimension, p. 18.
Ibid. p. 19.
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that, "tacit thought forms [are] an indispensable part of all knowledge. 
Consequently he believes that the declared and explicit aims of science, "turn out to 
be fundamentally misleading and possibly a source of devastating fallacies.
9. The Ubiquity of the Tacit
In the preface to Personal Knowledge Polanyi writes: "This is primarily an enquiry 
into the nature and justification of scientific knowledge. But my reconsideration of 
scientific knowledge leads on to a wide range of questions outside science. 
Evidence of Polanyi's background in science is never far from view in his writings 
but in his last book, Meaning, which he co-authored with Harry Prosch, his 
engagement with the implications of his epistemology for subjects outside science 
becomes more sustained, hi Meaning Polanyi explores an extension of his theory of 
tacit integration in specific areas including metaphor, art, myth and religion. We 
will consider his comments about religion in the next chapter but it will not be 
possible to give any consideration to the other themes in this context. All we will 
do in this brief section is note Polanyi's belief that his theory of tacit integration 
applies to all areas of knowing and that there is a much greater degree of continuity 
in the ways of knowing across a variety of disciplines than has generally been 
recognised.
hi Meaning Polanyi argues against the rigid distinctions which, it is supposed, 
separate the 'arts' and the 'sciences'. In the first place he insists that even in the 
empirical aspects of science the imagination of the 'artist' is at work: "We may 
conclude quite generally that no science can predict observed facts except by 
relying with confidence upon an art: the art of establishing by the trained delicacy 
of eye, ear and touch a correspondence between explicit predictions of science and 
the actual experience of our senses to which these predictions shall apply. He 
goes on to insist, "We must... amend our ideal of science by accrediting skills and 
connoisseurship as valid, indispensable, and definitive forms of knowledge. This
Polanyi The Tacit Dimension. p.20. 
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amendment... will open the way to a far-reaching relaxation of the tension between 
science and the nonscientific concerns of man."^^^
In one essay Polanyi suggests that his theory of tacit knowledge brings into question 
the sharp distinction supposed to exist between 'faith' and 'reason':
The traditional division between faith and reason, or faith and science... reflects the assumption that 
reason and science proceed by explicit rules o f logical deduction or inductive generalization. But I 
have shown that these operations are impotent by themselves. To know is to understand, and 
explicit logical processes are effective only as tools in search of the solution to a problem, 
commitment [sic] by which we expand our understanding and continue to hold the result. They have 
no meaning except within this informal dynamic context. Once this is recognized, the contrast 
between faith and reason dissolves, and the close similarity of this structure emerges in its place.
It is because of the essentially unspecifiable way in which our multifarious 
indwellings facilitate the integrations by which our focal knowledge is achieved that 
Polanyi is able to say that, "All knowledge is... either tacit or rooted in tacit 
knowing. If we see all of our knowledge in terms of such dynamic structures we 
cannot uphold the rigid distinctions which have been drawn between science and 
the humanities.
10. Language
An important aspect of our cultural life is our use of language. Polanyi devotes 
considerable attention to this topic in Personal Knowledge. Expanding his 
justification of the personal nature of knowledge Polanyi wishes to indicate the 
indeterminate and existential nature of language.
Words used in a sentence are confidently relied upon and used directly. A word 
used with quotation marks is being used in a sceptical or oblique way, unless an 
actual quotation is intended. Polanyi comments: "Since a word remains the same 
whether used directly or obliquely, the difference between uttering it confidently or
Ibid. pp.32f.
Polanyi, M. (1974). Scientific Thought and Social Realitv: Essavs. New York, International
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sceptically must lie wholly in the tacit coefficient of its utterance. This difference 
identifies formally the unspecifiable personal coefficient attached to the confident 
use of a descriptive term."^^^
In forming a definition of a word we must attend to the way in which we use it. We 
must have a sense of when the word is used authentically and when it is not. "The 
formalization of meanings relies therefore from the start on the practise of 
unformalized meaning. It necessarily does so also in the end, when we are using the 
undefined words of the definitions."^®^ Herein lies the inherent risk of what Polanyi 
calls the tacit co-efficient of meaning. To use a word in an oblique way is to draw 
attention to the fact that the meaning of the word is in question, but this can only be 
done in the context of a sentence in which the rest of the words are used with 
confidence. Without such confidence (which could conceivably be misplaced) we 
would be led into infinite regress.
When we use a word confidently and feel that it is appropriate for its purpose we 
make a personal choice. Polanyi suggests that, "When we say that a word is precise 
(or apt, or fitting, or clear, or expressive), we approve of an act of our own which 
we have found satisfying while carrying it out. We are satisfied by something we 
do in the same way as when we make sense of blurred sights or faint noises; or 
when we find our way or recover our balance.
Polanyi identifies the use of language^ as the primary reason for humanity's 
superiority over other animals. This observation may sound out of place from a 
philosopher who has emphasised and illuminated the importance of inarticulate 
knowledge, but this apparent incompatibility can be easily resolved: "The two 
conflicting aspects of formalised intelligence may be reconciled by assuming that 
the articulation always remains incomplete; that our articulate utterances can never 
altogether supersede but must continue to rely on such mute acts of intelligence as
Polanyi Personal Knowledge. p.250 
Ibid. p.250. Polanyi's emphasis.
184 Ibid. p.252. Polanyi's emphasis.
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we once had in common with chimpanzees."^®^ Polanyi goes on to suggest that: "If, 
as it would seem, the meaning of all our utterances is determined to an important 
extent by a skilful act of our own -  the act of knowing -  then the acceptance of any 
of our own utterances as true involves our approval of our own skill. To affirm 
anything implies, then, to this extent an appraisal of our own art of knowing, and 
the establishment of truth becomes decisively dependent on a set of personal criteria 
of our own which cannot be formally defined. "^ ®^
Polanyi wishes to demonstrate the significance of 'pre-linguistic' experience; the 
kind of experience which parallels other animals which do not have language. An 
anatomist exploring by dissection a complex topography may be using intelligence 
much like a rat in a maze. Like the rat, unable to explain how it has found its way 
out of the maze, the expert will be unable to offer a fully articulate account of what 
he or she has come to know. It is a knowledge which is ineffable. Polanyi observes: 
"We may say in general that by acquiring a skill, whether muscular or intellectual, 
we achieve an understanding which we cannot put into words and which is 
continuous with the inarticulate faculties of animals."^ ®® What is understood here 
has a meaning for the skilled anatomist and it has a meaning in itself, but this is not 
the meaning of a sign in denoting an object. Its meaning is what Polanyi calls 
'existential’. As animals lack language all animal knowledge is of this existential 
nature.
However, to say that we have knowledge which is ineffable is not to say that we are 
unable to speak of it at all. Rather, it is to say that we can only articulate part of 
what we know. Polanyi identifies a further aspect of the tacit co-efficient of 
language: not only does tacit knowledge go beyond what we are able to articulate, 
in the reception of what is articulated the receiver is directed not to what is 
contained in the symbolic forms of the articulation but, rather, to that to which they 
point. "Even while listening to speech or reading a text our focal attention is 
directed towards the meaning of the words, and not towards the words as sounds or
Polanyi Personal Knowledge. p.70. |
Ibid. pp.70f. This personal act cannot, o f course, be understood apart from the communal context |
or 'calling' in which it occurs.
Ibid. p.90. Polanyi's emphasis. I
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as marks on p a p e r ." P o la n y i draws attention to the possibilities and the dangers 
inherent in the use of language: "The mind which entrusts itself to the operation of 
symbols acquires an intellectual tool of boundless power; but its use makes the 
mind liable to perils the range of which seems also unlimited. The gap between the 
tacit and the articulate tends to produce everywhere a cleavage between sound 
common sense and dubious sophistication, from which the animal is quite free."^^°
It is thus clear that in their use of language humans commit themselves to a double 
indeterminacy. In the first place there is the gap between our knowledge and our 
articulation of it; and in the second place there is a gap between what we have said 
and our subsequent reflection upon it. "For just as, owing to the ultimately tacit 
character of all our knowledge, we remain ever unable to say all that we know, so 
also, in view of the tacit character of meaning, we can never quite know what is 
implied in what we say."^^^
We must also attend to the relationship between words and sensory perception. 
Polanyi talks of the way in which the meaning of denotative words is shaped in the 
process of applying them in particular situations over time. Polanyi comments, 
"These linguistic identifications are in fact based primarily on the sensory 
identification of objects at varying distances, under varying angles and varying 
illumination, and merely extend the theory of the universe implied in our sensory 
interpretations to the wider theory, implied in the vocabulary by which we talk 
about t h i n g s . T h i s  is the significance of sensory perception for the tacit 
components of articulate knowledge. In a limited way each new situation may be 
regarded as unprecedented. Not only do we see 'familiar things' in new 
circumstances but we are confronted by 'new things'. How do we 'make sense' of 
these? Polanyi explains:
The adaptation of our conceptions and of the corresponding use of language to new things that we 
identify as new variants o f known kinds of things is achieved subsidiarily, while our attention is 
focussed on making sense of the situation in front o f us. Thus we do this in the same way in which
Ibid. p.92.
Ibid. p.94.
Ibid. p.95.
Ibid. p.97.
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we keep modifying, subsidiarily, our interpretation of sensory clues by striving for clear and 
coherent perceptions, or enlarging our skill without focally knowing how by practising them in ever 
new situations. The meaning o f speech thus keeps changing in the act of groping for words without 
our being focally aware of the change, and our gropings invest words in this manner with a fund of 
unspecifiable connotations.
Polanyi points out that different languages represent different conclusions reached 
by different peoples at different points in history. As such they are distinct 
conceptual frameworks. "The confident use of nouns, verbs, adjectives and 
adverbs, invented and endowed with meaning by a particular sequence of groping 
generations, expresses their particular theory of the nature of things."^ "^^
At this juncture it is important to note the relationship between what has been said 
about language here and what was said in the previous chapter. In chapter 2 the 
influence of Wittgenstein's language philosophy was evident. It is surprising to find 
that in his explicit observations on Wittgenstein, Polanyi adopts a very negative 
tone. This is exemplified in a comment on Wittgenstein in Personal Knowledge: 
"The understatement that language is a set of convenient symbols used according to 
the conventional rules of a 'language game' originates in the tradition of 
nominalism, which teaches that general terms are merely names designating certain 
collections of objects -  a doctrine which, in spite of the difficulties admittedly 
attached to it, is accepted today by most writers in England and America, in 
abhorrence of its metaphysical a lternatives."Polanyi also criticises Wittgenstein 
for overstating the significance of grammar. All this suggests that Polanyi seriously 
misunderstood Wittgenstein, if he had read him at all, because there can be little 
doubt that Polanyi's project has close affinities with that of Wittgenstein. C. B. 
Daly is suiprised that Polanyi did not recognise in Wittgenstein an ally.
As we have seen, like Polanyi, Wittgenstein was aware of the complex relationship 
between life and language. He saw that words are not always used in the same way.
Ibid. p. 112.
Ibid. p. 112.
Ibid. p. 113.
This case is argued at length in an essay entitled 'Polanyi and Wittgenstein' by C. B. Daly. See 
Langford, T. A. and W. H. Poteat (1968). Intellect and Hope: Essavs in the Thought o f Michael 
Polanvi. Durham, N.C., Published for the Lilly Endowment Research Program in Christianity and 
Politics by the Duke University Press, pp. 136-168.
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and that in the differing usages we see 'family resemblances' but also distinctions. 
These arise because they are being used in different life contexts, or communities of 
practice. Wittgenstein's method is a posteriori — 'don't think, but look'. This is 
remarkably similar to Polanyi's approach. Using 'justice' as his paradigm case 
Polanyi writes: "we must use the word 'justice', and use it as correctly and 
thoughtfully as we can, while watching ourselves doing it, if we want to analyse the 
conditions under which the word properly applies. We must look, intently and 
discriminatingly, through the term 'justice' at justice itself, this being the proper use 
of the term 'justice', the use which we want to define. Polanyi goes on to explain
that simply looking at the word 'justice' can only destroy rather than establish its 
meaning. So for Polanyi, like Wittgenstein, it is in the use of the word that its 
meaning is to be discerned. Daly makes the comment that, "the most striking 
similarity between Polanyi and Wittgenstein in their philosophy of language is that 
both see language as meaningful only within the wider context of culture, tradition, 
and ways of human l iv in g .W i t tg e n s te in  is innocent of the conventionalism of 
which Polanyi accuses him. His purpose, like Polanyi's, is to confront positivistic 
theories of language by showing their inadequacy in describing language as it is 
used.
Polanyi's negative evaluation of Wittgenstein appears to rest upon a 
misunderstanding of his work. The philosophies of language of Polanyi and 
Wittgenstein are far more complementary than the former was able -  for whatever 
reasons -  to acknowledge.
Conclusion
As we noted at the beginning of the chapter, Polanyi does not, in any of the 
published works, present a systematically developed theory of knowledge by means 
of systematic argumentation. We would suggest that, rather than a limitation or a 
failing, this might be regarded, at least in some limited way, as an attempt to 
embody, methodologically, the content of his theory.
Polanvi Personal Knowledge, p. 116. Polanyi's emphasis. It must be emphasised that it is 
something akin to Wittgenstein's 'don't think, but look' which is in view here, and not the Platonic 
'Forms'.
Langford and Poteat Intellect and Hope, p. 146.
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Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge demonstrates that the standard of 
comprehensive lucidity, so reverenced in objectivist philosophies, is fallacious. 
Crucially it ignores the 'from-to' aspect of our knowing and the forms of indwelt 
knowledge implied in this. A focal knowledge of things is achieved through the 
integration of subsidiary elements and in the integrative process our knowledge of 
the subsidiary elements will be more than we can tell. We are not looking at this 
knowledge, we are l o o k i n g i t .
Polanyi adopts a variety of strategies for articulating his theory of knowledge. 
These strategies appear, perhaps inevitably, as the elements of his theory. As will 
be apparent from the exposition above, these elements of his thought frequently 
spill over into each other and any rigorous separation of them is inappropriate. We 
have grouped our reflections under ten sub-headings, but there is nothing of critical 
importance about this number, nor is there any particular significance to be attached 
to the sequence in which they appear. Our exposition of the theme 'problems and 
discoveries', for example, precedes that of 'passions' and it appears to me that there 
is an important logical link here. But the themes of 'indwelling' and 'tacit 
knowledge', among others, also exhibit important logical links with that of 
'problems and discoveries'. If there are elements of development to be discerned in 
the sequential appearance of the themes, and often this does seem to be the case, 
these are of minor significance in comparison with their collective function as the 
subsidiaries whose meaning is understood in terms o f our achievement o f tacit 
knowledge.
Polanyi attempts a rigorously a posteriori approach in his philosophy. His theory of 
knowledge is an attempt to make explicit the subsidiary elements which comprise 
our actual experience of coming to know things. A theory of knowledge is not a 
prescription for 'how to know things' but an attempt to articulate 'how things are 
known'. As such we must acknowledge that Polanyi's theory of knowledge -  in 
consistency with its own doctrine -  cannot be complete. It is an attempt to 
articulate the way in which we come to know things while acknowledging that this
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achievement is ineffable and that the theory is and can only be an 'attenuated
,199summary' .
Our ability to come to know things is not contingent upon our theory of knowledge. 
Nevertheless, as Polanyi's theory would suggest, there are circumstances in which 
by gaining focal awareness of the subsidiary elements in which we participate errors 
and falsities may be discerned and corrected. Our subsequent performance can then 
be improved, once the elements are allowed to resume their subsidiary function. 
Polanyi's passionate engagement in developing a new theory reflects his belief that 
the objectivist theories of knowledge which he opposed were not only mistaken but 
pathological.^^® A theory of knowledge may be, in Polanyi's own terminology, 'an 
attenuated summary' of how we come to know things, but such a term should not 
blind us to their destructive potential.^®  ^ For Polanyi the study of the theory of 
knowledge is not a philosophical pastime but a matter which has a significant 
bearing on the integrity of a culture and the various components of which it is 
comprised -  not least theological expression.
It is difficult to overstate the philosophical ambition and scope of Polanyi's work. 
He seeks to achieve nothing less than the radical reform of our understanding of 
knowledge as it has developed from the philosophy of Descartes, through the 
Enlightenment, and culminated in what was, for Polanyi, the contemporary thought 
of the logical positivists. This ambition is implied in the subtitle of his magnum 
opus, 'towards a postcritical philosophy'. Polanyi's work represents one of the first 
reactions to critical, objectivising thought and might appropriately to be regarded as 
an early 'postmodern' philosophy. We noted, in the last chapter, Colin Gunton's 
assessment of the achievement of Barth as, "something of a tour de force, plucked 
from the intellectual air by an act of intuitive genius."^®  ^It would not be out of place 
to attribute to Polanyi a similar accomplishment. It is doubtless because of the 
scope of Polanyi's work that it can, on occasions, lack certain nuances and runs
See Polanyi Personal Knowledge, p. 171.
Polanyi believed the destructive totalitarianisms of the 20“' Century were, to a significant degree, 
a product of objectivising and depersonalising epistemologies.
We recall that Polanyi discerned a cmcial epistemological component in the dynamics o f the 
destructive totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century.
Gunton, C. E. (1996). Theoloev Through the Theologians. Edinburgh, T & T  Clark, p.53.
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risks of overgeneralisation. We have noted, for example, the daunting breadth of 
the term 'articulate system' and yet Polanyi will often talk of our participation in 
such systems without differentiation. There may be important parallels between the 
ways in which we indwell 'a symphony', 'a scientific theory' and 'technology' but 
there are also differences! We are not attempting a detailed critique of Polanyi here 
but merely pointing to an example of his tendency to generalise.
It is clear that in his theory of knowledge Polanyi's paradigm case is scientific 
knowledge and, as an accomplished practitioner of scientific research, the 
observations he makes in respect of scientific knowledge are acute. It is here that 
Polanyi's philosophical method is most consistently a posteriori. In dealing with 
themes and subjects in which his own personal participation is less full and sure, his 
approach can be less finely attuned to the phenomena with which he is dealing. 
Here Polanyi's impulse towards an a posteriori method can be compromised by his 
desire to discern general patterns of epistemic processes. In these circumstances his 
insights can be considerably less acute. We shall see an example of this in the next 
chapter.
Page 154
Chapter 4. Polanyi and Religion 
Introduction
The task which Polanyi sets himself in Personal Knowledge, as we noted in the 
previous chapter, is to enquire into, "the nature and justification of scientific 
knowledge."^ Although, in his enquiry, he is led to consider a "wide range of 
questions outside science"^ his approach in the latter task is significantly influenced 
by the way in which he formulated the former. Personal Knowledge. Polanyi's 
magnum opus, typifies his work as a whole. He starts with science, and 
epistemological questions in science, and then moves on to consider other matters. 
One of the 'questions outside science' to which Polanyi is led is that of religion. 
How does Polanyi pose this question? We now turn to an exposition of the theme 
of religion in his work.
Polanyi's breadth of scholarship is often breathtaking. He has the ability to weave 
together diverse and complex themes within relatively small compass. It would be 
impossible to give an exhaustive account of everything Polanyi has written on 
religion but it is possible to point to the works which exhibit a concentration upon 
the theme.
1. Exposition
a) Personal Knowledge
(i) Ailiculate Systems
In Personal Knowledge there are two substantial passages in which we find 
exposition of religious themes. They are found between pages 195-202 and 279- 
286 under the headings, 'Dwelling In and Breaking Out' and 'Religious Doubt',
' Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. London, Routledge, 
and Kegan Paul, p.vii.
 ^Ibid. p.vii.
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respectively. Here the theme of religion is conceived in terms of Polanyi's 
'articulate systems' -  the "happy dwelling places of the mind"^.
Polanyi describes religious engagement in a typically elusive statement: "Religion, 
considered as an act of worship, is an indwelling rather than an affirmation. God 
cannot be observed, any more than truth or beauty can be observed. He exists in the 
sense that He is to be worshipped and obeyed, but not otherwise; not as a fact -  any 
more than truth, beauty or justice exist as facts. All these, like God, are things 
which can be apprehended only in serving them."'^ We note, here, Polanyi's linking 
of religion and worship.
Our choice to indwell an articulate system^ is a matter of faith: one cannot 
demonstrate the truth or falsity of an articulate system. This is so for any articulate 
system and it is true for religion. As we saw in the previous chapter, an articulate 
system is the elaboration of an aspect of anterior experience. In the case of religion, 
according to Polanyi, this is the 'supernatural'.® Polanyi suggests, "The convert 
enters into the articulate framework of worship and doctrine by surrendering to the 
religious ecstasy which their system evokes and accredits thereby its validity."^
Polanyi describes the Christian religious service®, "as a framework of clues which 
are apt to induce a passionate search for God."^ The Christian search is a heuristic 
impulse which in some degree parallels the experience of scientific discovery. This 
appears to imply that in religion, as in science, there is something to be found -  it is 
a valid enquiry: "A heuristic impulse can live only in the pursuit of its proper 
enquiry. The Christian enquiry is worship. The words of prayer and confession, 
the actions of the ritual, the lesson, the sermon, the church itself, are the clues of the
 ^Ibid. p.280. Although this is the dominant theme in Personal Knowledge another theme -  that of 
tacit integration -  is also strongly implied.
Ibid. p.279,
 ^It may be that in some cases our indwelling of an articulate system is less a choice and more to do 
with accidents of birth -  the age, location and family into which we are bom.
 ^This comment does not appear to be in harmony with his comments in Meaning, and various other 
places, unless one takes worship, and the kinds of integrations achieved in worship, to be 
'supernatural' in the sense that they contain 'supernatural aspects' and/or relate to 'supernatural 
realities'. (And this does, indeed, appear to be implied in some o f Polanyi's discussion of religion.)
 ^Polanyi Personal Knowledge. p.283f.
 ^We take it that Polanyi refers, here, to congregational worship.
 ^Polanyi Personal Knowledge, p.282.
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worshipper's striving towards God. They guide his feelings of contrition and 
gratitude and his craving for the divine presence, while keeping him safe from 
distracting thoughts."^®
As may be the case with other articulate systems by which we apprehend the world 
there is, in addition to our indwelling of it, an impulse to 'break out'. As we noted in 
the previous chapter, in contemplation our participation is, at least for a moment, 
changed and instead of 'handling' the things we experience we become 'immersed' 
in them. Polanyi writes, "Contemplation dissolves the screen, stops our movement 
through experience and pours us straight into experience; we cease to handle things 
and become immersed in them."^^ This is the moment in which we may come to 
see things differently and our conceptual grasp of that which we comprehend 
deepened or transformed in a more radical way. In this context Polanyi speaks of 
the experience of the religious mystic. The path to God is found in the sustained 
effort at detachment from all frames of knowledge:
The whole framework o f intelligent understanding... sinks into abeyance and uncovers a world of 
experience uncomprehendingly as divine miracle. The process is known in Christian mysticism as 
the via negativa and the tradition which prescribes it as the only perfect path to God stems from the 
Mystic Theology o f Pseudo-Dionysius. It invites us, through a succession of'detachments', to seek in 
absolute ignorance union with Him who is beyond all being and all knowledge. We see things not 
focally, but as part of a cosmos, as features o f God.'^
Polanyi conceives of this form of mystic contemplation in salvific terms: "The 
Christian's mystic communion with the world seeks a reconciliation which is part of 
the technique of redemption. It is man's surrender to the love of God, in the hope of 
gaining his forgiveness and admission into His p r e s e n c e . " F o r  Polanyi the 
experience of the Christian is unique: "the dwelling of the Christian worshipper 
within the ritual of divine service differs from any other dwelling within a 
framework of inherent excellence, by the fact that this dwelling is not enjoyed."^"  ^
Additionally, it is, "By these ritual acts the worshipper accepts the obligation to
Ibid. p.281. It is arguable whether all the elements o f a church service are always effective in 
keeping the worshipper safe from distracting thoughts!
“ Ibid. p. 197.
“  Ibid. pp.l97f.
“ Ibid. p. 198.
“ Ibid. p. 198.
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achieve what he knows to be beyond his own unaided powers and strives towards it 
in the hope of a merciful visitation from above."
In the previous chapter we made reference to the importance for human beings of 
puzzles and problems which draw us into an imaginative engagement with reality. It 
seems that, for Polanyi, Christian worship, in which we seek after God, is, in a 
sense, the most 'pure' form of this phenomenon in that it inspires a passion which is 
never resolved. The mystic's detached contemplation is his surrender to the love of 
God made in the hope of receiving forgiveness and being received into God's 
presence. But there is no resolution, "The ritual worship is expressly designed to 
induce and sustain this state of anguish, surrender and hope. The moment a man 
were to claim that he had arrived and could now happily contemplate his own 
perfection, he would be thrown back into spiritual emptiness."^® This is a striking 
feature of Polanyi's understanding of religion and one to which he gives 
considerable emphasis in Personal Knowledge. The believer's indwelling is 
perpetually uncomfortable and unresolved. Unlike the problems of the scientist, for 
whom a discovery resolves the tension, "Christian worship sustains, as it were, an 
eternal, never to be consummated hunch: a heuristic vision which is accepted for the 
sake of its unresolved tension."^® Polanyi suggests that the Christian worshipper 
may only be comforted by the image (though only the image) of 'a crucified God'^ .^
(ii) Doubt
As we participate or dwell within an articulate system we do not look at it but from 
it. We suggested in the previous chapter that, for this reason, the system functions 
somewhat like a pair of spectacles. By indwelling an articulate system we entrust 
ourselves to it and the vision it offers to us. It is with this in mind that we must read 
Polanyi's comments on faith and doubt in relation to religion:
“ Ibid. p. 198.
Ibid. p.198.
“  See ibid. p.324. 
Ibid. p. 199. 
Ibid. p. 199.
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As a framework expressing its acceptance o f itself as a dwelling place of the passionate search for 
God, religions worship can say nothing that is true or false. Words of prayer are addressed to God, 
and while other parts o f the service speak o f  God, they are mostly declarations o f interpersonal 
relations -  such as the praise of God. Some parts of worship, like the credo, admittedly make 
theological assertions, and the lessons from the Bible are couched in plainly narrative language. But 
the accent of the credo lies on the words: 'I believe' which emotionally endorse worship, while the 
extracts from the Bible are not quoted in the course o f a Christian religious service in order to convey 
information, but as starting points for teachings that sustain the faith. All such statements function as 
subsidiaries to worship.^®
Polanyi does not believe that the statement 'God exists' can be the subject of explicit 
doubt because it is an a-critical statement made by a person who makes it with a 
greater or lesser degree of confidence. Here we recall Polanyi's differentiation 
between acceptances in natural science -  where he speaks of verification -  and in 
'mathematics, religion or the various arts'^  ^ -  where he speaks of validation. Polanyi 
says that religious worship is a heuristic vision and stands alongside the great 
intellectual systems such as mathematics, fiction and the fine arts. We do not say 
that they are 'true' but we entrust ourselves to them (or withhold our trust) with a 
greater or lesser degree of confidence.
As we have mentioned, the aspect of anterior experience upon which the Christian 
articulate system is constructed is, for Polanyi, the supernatural. The biblical 
miracles are certainly in view here. In a discussion on the subject of miracles 
Polanyi criticises Hume and others who rejected miracles on the basis of a lack of 
factual evidence. He suggests to the contrary: "[I]f the conversion of water into 
wine or the resuscitation of the dead could be experimentally verified, this would 
strictly disprove their miraculous nature. Indeed, to the extent to which any event 
can be established in terms of natural science, it belongs to the natural order of 
things. However monstrous and surprising it may be, once it has been fully 
established as an observable fact, the event ceases to be regarded as supernatural."^^
A miracle must have happened if it is to be of any significance: "Of course, an event 
which has in fact never taken place can have no supernatural significance; and
Ibid. p.281 Polanyi's emphasis.
“  Ibid. p.202.
Ibid. p.284.
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whether it has taken place or not must be established by factual evidence. Hence the 
religious force of biblical criticism, shaking or, alternatively, corroborating certain 
facts which formed the main themes of Christianity."^^
Polanyi suggests that there are two important ways in which religious faith may be 
assailed by doubt. Firstly, its 'internal evidence' might be questioned in the way the 
meaningfulness of an innovative work of art might be questioned. Polanyi suggests 
that we may refuse or hesitate to indwell such articulate systems for fear that we 
may thereby lose or weaken our grip on r ea l i ty .T h e re  is, of course, no test that 
can be applied when we are faced with such a dilemma: "This kind of doubt is the 
hesitancy of an acceptance. Our reluctance to accept the habitation offered to our 
minds may be craven or wise, and so we may prove eventually to have been dull or 
rash".^® Secondly, doubt may attack Christian faith in that it is striving for that 
which cannot be attained. There is something of a paradox here. The lack of 
consummation, which Polanyi regards as intrinsic to the Christian faith, may 
increase to the degree where faith is destroyed altogether.
In the Western world, over a period of 300 years, the effect of advancing historical 
and scientific knowledge had the effect of substantially weakening religious belief. 
But, while reducing the religious meaning of things, such advances have offered no 
alternative meaning. Polanyi comments: "If the universe were in fact meaningless, 
the destruction of religious beliefs would have been fully justified. Since I do not 
believe that the universe is meaningless, I can admit only that the rejection of 
religion was reasonable in view of the grounds on which religious doctrines were 
asserted at the time,"^®
^ Ibid. p.284. Polanyi's meaning here is not clear to us. If a miracle 'happened' would it not be 
'observable' even if  it couldn't be 'experimentally verified'?
A fear that the 'spectacles' will distort rather than facilitate our seeing.
Polanyi Personal Knowledge, p.285.
Ibid. p.286. Polanyi's belief in the meaningfulness o f the universe is closely related to his theory 
of hierarchy. This is an important aspect of Polanyi's work but, given its limited bearing On the 
subject matter of the present thesis, we have had to forgo a treatment o f it. For a succinct summary 
of this theory in the context of the rest o f his work see, Polanyi, M. (1970). "Transcendence and Self- 
Transcendence." Encounter 53(1): 88-94.
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b) Meaning
In Polanyi's last published book, Meaning, which he co-authored with Harry 
Prosch, the subject of religion is revisited. The scope of Polanyi's concerns 
expressed in Meaning is very broad. Its approach may be distinguished from that of 
Personal Knowledge in that the emphasis shifts from the fiduciary component of 
knowledge and the indwelling of articulate systems to that of tacit integration. At 
the heart of this work is Polanyi's identification and description of the integrating 
processes involved in all knowing. Polanyi writes, "all meaningful integrations 
(including those achieved in science) exhibit a triadic structure consisting of the 
subsidiary, the focal, and the person. hi Meaning it is in the imaginative process 
of integration that the personal nature of knowledge (always central to Polanyi's 
project) emerges. Polanyi explores the nature of this integrating process in relation 
to metaphor, art and myth and, indeed, religion.
As we noted in the previous chapter, Polanyi is concerned to show that the triadic 
structure of tacit knowing is present in all knowing and in this regard no distinction 
may be made between the sciences, the arts, morality and religion. The role of 
imagination must be acknowledged for the sciences as it is for the arts, the 
humanities, morality and religion.^® Whatever other appropriate distinctions may be 
made, it cannot be claimed that science stands in a more sure or authentic relation to 
reality on the basis of the absence of personal participation and human imagination.
Polanyi suggests that for the contemporary mind an acceptance of these 
commonalities is problematic. It finds it difficult to conceive of intangibles, such as 
religion and morality, as having any existence independently of humanity. He says:
In order to hold these meanings securely in the reverence they seem to him to demand, contemporary 
man... needs a theory of these meanings that explains how their coherence is no less real than the 
perceptual and scientific coherences he so readily accepts. He needs to see how his obvious personal 
involvement with these meanings is necessarily and legitimately part and parcel o f the reality they
Polanyi, M. and H. Prosch (1975). Meaning. Chicago, University o f Chicago Press, p.64. 
Polanyi's emphasis.
We shall have more to say on this matter in the final chapter.
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actually have, that his personal involvement is not at all a reason to regard them as mere subjective 
fantasies/^
Polanyi deals at some length with the subject of myth, focussing primarily on 
creation myths^®. Polanyi wishes to make a distinction between the integrations 
achieved in myth and those achieved in science. The integrations required in 
making a discovery may be very considerable, but once they have been established 
we become accustomed to working with them and they become quite ’natural' to 
us^\ It seems that the difficulty of making the integrations fades with familiarity. 
But the integrations of myth^^ do not enter into our ordinary world and our ordinary 
lives. They do not 'work' in such a sphere. They must be detached fi'om our daily 
lives. The incompatible elements which we integrate in myth remain incompatible. 
They must be joined together in every new instance by an act of our imagination as 
we contemplate them. They do not, in Polanyi's view, become 'natural'. Such 
integrations Polanyi calls 'transnatural'.
Polanyi suggests that the myths of the 'primitive mind'^^ "bristle with absurdities."
It sustains views which, to the modem mind, seem extraordinary. But Polanyi 
believes that the cognitive processes involved in both archaic and modem minds are 
the same. The outcomes differ because the range of acceptable tacit integrations is 
far greater for the archaic mind than for the modem mind.^® It is only the range 
which is at issue since the integrative process is integral to all forms of human 
knowledge.^® We must not disregard the fact that all our empirical knowledge is 
rooted in subsidiaries which are, to a greater or lesser extent, unspecifiable. Are
^ Polanyi and Prosch Meaning, p.68. In this passage it appears that Polanyi is preparing a case for 
the 'independent reality' o f such entities. As his argument unfolds he does indeed claim that they are 
'realities' but what precisely he means by this is less than clear, as we shall see.
See ibid. pp.120-148.
For example, and even as non-scientists, we have little difficulty with conceiving the apparent 
rising and setting of the sun as the movement o f the earth around its axis. The difficulty associated 
with the discovery o f this was considerably greater!
Polanyi claims that the same is true o f poetry and art, although the integrations o f these are not as 
far-reaching or all-encompassing as the integrations in myth.
Polanyi does not expand on what is intended in this vague and undifferentiated term.
^  Polanyi and Prosch Meaning, p. 132.
Polanyi also suggests that the archaic mind has a greater disposition to see significance in events 
and is less likely to treat them as coincidental. This is the point o f distinction in which we believe 
the modem mind to be more correct in its evaluations.
Polanyi explains that when the process o f tacit integration in human knowledge is denied by the 
modem mind it commits itself to an essentially nonsensical way of conceiving things.
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such myths 'true'? For Polanyi the creation myths are certainly more true to our 
experience than the picture of 'barren atomic topography' offered to us by those who 
follow the ideal of detached observations.^^ Nevertheless, he acknowledges that 
such a view may not be acceptable to a modem generation.
We turn now to the explicit treatment of the theme of religion in Meaning. There is 
evidence to suggest that in chapter ten of Meaning, entitled 'Acceptance of Religion', 
Harry Prosch has substantially 'fleshed-out' rather than edited the material of 
Polanyi's with which he was working.^® Consequently we ought to be cautious in 
attributing to Polanyi the material on Holy Communion, ritual, praise and prayer to 
be found in the book. Nevertheless, it is apparent that it is only some illustrative 
material which might not be attributable Polanyi; the general stmcture of the 
argument certainly is.
Polanyi comments: "Religion... is a sprawling work of the imagination involving 
rites, ceremonies, doctrines, myths, and something called "worship." It is a form of 
"acceptance" much more complex, therefore, than any of the other forms we have 
been attending to."^  ^ He continues, "religion involves sacred myths that inform 
rites and ceremonies, imbuing their intrinsically metaphorical meaning with 
something more than a kind of poetic or artistic meaning they would possess simply 
as metaphorical works of art.""^ ® The sacrament of Holy Communion is identified 
as an important ceremony in Clnistian worship. The ceremony embodies several 
things:
We embody our own temporal, inchoate experiences, stretching over a long period of time, in the 
unification o f one moment -  which also embodies our unification with one another in the same 
moment. If this happens to be a traditional ceremony, hallowed by time, engaged at regular intervals
Here Polanyi has the reductionistic Laplacean view of the universe in mind. For a succinct 
exposition and comment on this view see Polanyi Personal Knowledge, pp.139-141.
Much o f the material in chapter 10 of Meaning is not to be found in the lecture manuscript (Texas 
and Chicago series, 1969) also entitled "Acceptance of Religion" on which the chapter was based. 
[See Polanyi Collection: Regenstein Library, University of Chicago. Box 40, Folder 1] We are 
unaware o f any similar material in any o f Polanyi's published or unpublished work. It is striking that 
Polanyi's lecture manuscript contains only six paragraphs at the end o f the piece which deal directly 
with religious matters. In Meaning, however, we find a large amount o f material about the Holy 
Communion, praise, prayer, ritual and worship.
Polanyi and Prosch Meaning, p. 152.
'‘"ibid. p. 152.
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-  perhaps by generations o f the same people and their descendants -  the ceremony will border upon 
the sacred or religious. Let us say rather that it could move easily into the obviously sacred or 
religious with the addition, in time, of a myth describing how the ceremony was "once upon a time" 
ordained by a god.‘“
In this way the Holy Communion is detached from the prosaic act of eating and 
drinking and from all temporal meanings. Through the myth we enter into the 
Great Time"*^  in which we are united not only with our forefathers but with the 
whole creation and we participate in the ultimate meaning of things."^  ^ hi Holy 
Communion there is a mutual embodiment of rite and myth. But it is detached from 
everyday life and, claims Polanyi, is made sacred in this detachment. Polanyi 
believes that the timing of such ceremonies is important. However, the action of the 
ritual has a meaning not in ordinary time but in the Great Time -  the time before 
all-time which has and needs no date. It is the myth which gives a rite its larger 
meaning and the rite is embodied in the myth. In a curious sense a myth itself has 
no body except the rites which they create. Expanding his comments on the Holy 
Communion Polanyi writes:
In general, bodily nourishment is thought to interfere to some extent with nourishment of the soul. 
This apparent fact is what lies behind the universally acknowledged efficacy of fasting for purposes 
of spiritual edification and progress. Yet the two supposed incompatibles (nourishment o f the body 
and of the soul) are combined in the rite of Holy Communion. There are also obvious 
incompatibilities involved in considering the same physical objects to be both flesh and bread, both 
blood and wine -  to say nothing of the impossibility of deriving an infinite supply of food from one 
finite human body. The whole ritual, combined with the myth, bristles with irresolvable 
incompatibilities. But it is the fusion of these incompatibles, accomplished by our imagination, that 
gives a meaning to the whole transaction and moves our religious feeling so powerfully -  if  we are 
Christian.'’*
Polanyi goes on to look at other incompatibles in Christian worship. He asks 
questions such as, How could God be pleased with our worship?' 'How can 
intercessory prayer be in anyway meaningful?''*® He compares such acts of worship
‘ Ibid, pp.l52f. Polanyi's emphasis.
A term which Polanyi borrows from Mircea Eliade. 
‘ See Polanyi and Prosch Meaning, p. 153.
'*'’ Ibid. p. 154.
See ibid. p. 155
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and prayer with a murder on stage in a theatrical production: in the latter what 
appears to be happening is actually not happening, while in the former case what 
appears not to be going on (because it makes no logical sense) "is actually going 
on"'"*.
Polanyi conceives of worship as a very particular kind of indwelling through which 
he claims, we "see God"'* .^ And we can only come to see God in this way. God's 
existence cannot be established on any other grounds. God is known in the worship 
of God. "Through our integrative, imaginative efforts we see him as the focal point 
that fuses into meaning all the incompatibles involved in the practice of religion. 
But, as in art -  only in a more whole and complete way -  God also becomes the 
integration of all the incompatibles of our own lives."'*® Polanyi envisages here the 
manifold aspects of our lives: pleasures and pains, hopes and fears, loves and hates, 
loose ends and blind alleys, etc.
In a practical sense these fundamental incompatibles are often resolved by throwing away one or the 
other. The megalomaniac rejects his frailties, the opportunist rejects his obligations, and the suicide 
rejects his hope. The sane man, we say, holds all these incompatible factors together in a sort of 
permanent tension, hoping that somehow he may be given the power to do what he knows he must, 
but living in the meantime, with the limits o f his capacities -  within his "calling" in the broadest 
sense o f this word. As a matter o f fact, this is the sort of faith and hope that a scientist has when he 
faces a problem he does not know how to resolve but which he tackles anyway.'*^
Polanyi believes that such a faith is necessarily blind and difficult to maintain, 
especially under pressure. He suggests that such imaginative fusions are given 
short shrift where it is thought 'pure reason' is the arbiter. "[I]t is easy for such faith 
and hope to be supplanted by the supreme arrogance of a Marxism, which forgets or 
denies human limitations, or by the freedom of a Sartre, which forgets the 
obligations we find in our position, or by the despair of a Camus, which abandons 
all hope as objectively groundless."®® Here Polanyi recognises what he elsewhere
Ibid. pp. 155f. Polanyi's emphasis. Polanyi does not expand upon or attempt to elucidate what he 
means by this statement.
Ibid. p. 156. This remarkably realist language sits uneasily with other things he says of God.
Ibid. p. 156.
Ibid. p. 156. Polanyi's emphasis.
Ibid. pp.l56f.
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calls the 'Pauline scheme' in which we must dwell in the hope of meeting with the 
grace of God:
Our myths tell us o f the Fall and o f how and why we are excluded from the Paradise we long for as 
our natural state. But they also tell us of the Redemption and o f the power and grace of God that is 
to be dispensed to us as needed. So we are freed from our worry about our (to us) insurmountable 
limitations. But we are not freed from obligation to "the Law", and therefore we cannot become 
complacent. Rather, we are humbled before God in the recognition of our dependence upon him for 
the ultimate victory through Christ.^’
But to this he adds (disappointingly) that, "None of these beliefs makes any literal 
sense. They can be destroyed as easily as the actuality of Polonius' death upon the 
stage, should anyone attempt to defend its reality in the world of facts. Both are 
works of the imagination, accepted by us as meaningful integrations of quite 
incompatible clues that move us deeply and help us to pull the scattered droplets of 
our lives together into a single sea of sublime meaning."®  ^ The content of the myths 
may appear entirely implausible and yet in the stories of creation, miraculous birth, 
crucifixion and resurrection there is, "a meaning that is bom and remains at the 
level of feeling but which is nonetheless a genuinely universal personal meaning 
and not merely a subjective personal meaning."®  ^ Polanyi continues:
[E]ven when all the representational details in the myths are clearly and frankly regarded as 
impossible... the import o f these details must still be thought to be plausible. For... the contents of a 
religion will have as their import the story o f a fundamentally meaningful world... Therefore, if  we 
can regard religious myth as plausible, the sort of world that religious myth represents -  a 
meaningful world -  must be thought by us to be plausible... In other words, it must be plausible to 
us to suppose that the universe is, in the end, meaningful. '^*
The meaningfulness so strongly implied in religious myth will not be acceptable so 
long as it is believed that the world is fundamentally meaningless. The meaning 
implied in the narrative myths of religion clashes with the meaninglessness implied 
in the reductionistic, atomistic philosophy embraced by modem culture. In 
Polanyi's view this clash is the source of popular disenchantment with religion.
Ibid. p. 157. 
Ibid. p. 157.53 Ibid. p. 159.
'^* Ibid. p.l59f, Polanyi's emphasis.
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In the chapter which follows, entitled 'Order', Polanyi argues for the meaningfulness 
of things on the basis of purposeful evolutionary achievement/^ By this argument, 
he suggests, "We might justifiably claim... that everything we know is full of 
meaning, is not absurd at all, although we can sometimes fail to grasp these 
meanings and fall into absurdities."^^ Polanyi concludes that: "The religious 
hypothesis, if it does indeed hold the world to be meaningful rather than absurd, is 
therefore a viable hypothesis for us. There is no scientific reason why we cannot 
believe it."^  ^ However, finding no scientific reason why not to believe in the 
'religious hypothesis' is not to believe it. We cannot be religious without having a 
religion any more than we can speak without having a language. Religious meaning 
can only be sought in the concrete form of a religious tradition.
This is a significant problem as many in Polanyi's day and since do not 'inherit' a 
religion. They will become believers only through conversion. Polanyi is not trying 
to effect religious conversion in what he writes but he does consider that his work 
might function as a prelude to it. He hopes that he might contribute to the 
'unstopping of ears' so that they may hear should a 'liturgical summons' come their 
way^ .^ But he agrees with St Augustine that it is not our part to initiate such a 
summons: "It is a gift of God and may remain inexplicably denied to some of us."^^
c) Other Significant Articles
We would like to make brief mention of three articles penned by Polanyi: "Faith 
and Reason"^®, "Science and Religion"^^ and an unpublished paper, "About
The 'function' of this chapter parallels Polanyi's purposes in the fourth part o f Personal Knowledge 
pp.327-405.
Polanyi and Prosch Meaning, p. 179. Polanyi's emphasis.
Ibid. p. 179. Polanyi's emphasis.
See ibid. p. 180.
Ibid. p. 180.
First published in Polanyi, M. (1961). "Faith and Reason." Journal of Religion 41: 237-247. 
Subsequently published in Polanyi, M. (1974). Scientific Thought and Social Reality: Essays. New 
York, International Universities Press, pp. 116-130.
Polanyi, M. (1963). "Science and Religion: Separate Dimensions or Common Ground?" 
Philosophy Today 7: 4-14.
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Religious Faith"^^. These articles are significant, but not in the way that one might 
expect. Despite their titles none of the three pieces deals with religious or 
theological themes except insofar as they illuminate an epistemological theme -  
which is their main concern.
"Faith and Reason" contains an exposition of Polanyi's distinction between focal 
and subsidiary knowledge. He looks at medical diagnostics, scientific discovery 
and goes on to challenge the traditional division which is made between faith and 
reason (scientific knowledge being associated with the latter) in which it is 
supposed that reason proceeds by logical deduction or inductive generalisation. 
Polanyi insists that our reasoning powers are void of meaning without a context of 
informal or tacit assumptions which we cannot fully articulate. Polanyi comments, 
"Once this is recognized, the contrast between faith and reason dissolves, and the 
close similarity of this structure emerges in its place. Polanyi's task in this article 
is to draw attention to the harmony between faith and reason and illuminate the 
continuities between scientific and religious knowing.
The scope of "Science and Religion" is somewhat broader. Here Polanyi rehearses 
the familiar themes of tacit and focal knowledge, indwelling, and the insights of 
Gestalt. However, he goes on to reiterate the themes of hierarchy and dual control, 
found in the latter part of Personal Knowledge and elsewhere, on the basis that, "an 
adequate theory of knowledge must involve a true conception of man and the 
universe and be supported by it."^  ^ Polanyi's hierarchical ontology leads on, he 
believes, to a cosmic vision which may resonate with some of the basic teachings of 
Christianity. Polanyi suggests, "If this project succeeds, it would achieve a more 
satisfactory reconciliation of human convictions, than would the acknowledgement 
of strictly separate dimensions for science and religion. Here, as in "Faith and
Polanyi Collection: Regenstein Library, University of Chicago. Box 42, Folder 11. Dated July 
1972
Polanyi Scientific Thought and Social Realitv: Essavs. p. 126.
Polanyi "Science and Religion: Separate Dimensions or Common Ground?" p.8. It must be 
acknowledged that it has not been possible to do justice to this aspect o f Polanyi's philosophy in the 
present work.
Ibid. p. 11.
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Reason", Polanyi wishes to demonstrate, "the close neighbourhood of science and 
religion to which a [i.e., Polanyi's] revised theory of knowledge leads us."^^
The final piece is "About Religious Faith". This was written at a time when 
Polanyi's mental powers were waning. Nevertheless, many familiar themes are 
present. In this paper he reflects on the disasters of European history, the 
phenomenon of moral inversion, the dangers of reductionism and the processes of 
tacit integration. However, in spite of the title, Polanyi barely touches on the matter 
of religion. We reach the final paragraph of the paper before Polanyi tells us, "This 
is briefly what I wanted to say; namely that the progress of science is less 
significant for our fates and ways, as we are immersed in a system of emotional 
powers by which -  or against and beyond which -  lies all that we can do for the 
sake of men and their religious existence. We are not entirely clear what Polanyi 
means, here, but he is clearly suggesting that religion has a weightier bearing than 
science on the meaning of human existence.
2. Evaluation
a) Working from Science to Religion
Polanyi, as philosopher, is tireless in developing epistemological themes and 
seeking to establish their significance across a broad range of concern. An 
important element in Polanyi's work is his desire to genera l ise .W e see this in the 
'articulate systems' of Personal Knowledge and the 'integration of incompatibles' of 
Meaning. In the first passage of Personal Knowledge in which Polanyi deals with 
religious themes^^ he considers mystical contemplation as a particular case of the 
general phenomenon of 'breaking out' of an articulate system. He has considered 
the significance of this scheme for scientific discovery, now he is looking to apply it 
in other spheres. In the second passage^® he considers the nature of doubt and
Ibid. p. 14.
Polanyi, M. (1972) About Religious Faith. Polanyi Collection: Regenstein Library, University of 
Chicago. Box 42, Folder 11 p.8.
As we shall see, his tendency is to generalise beyond the realm of natural scientific work on the 
basis of insights which he has established within it.
See Polanyi Personal Knowledge, pp.195-202.
Ibid. pp. 279-286.
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indwelling in relation to Christian worship, having reflected on the theme of belief 
and doubt and upon its significance in scientific progress. In Meaning the theme of 
integration of incompatibles, as a particular form of tacit integration, is applied to 
religious practice having been expounded in relation to art, metaphor and myth. 
We have also offered a very brief exposition of three articles which purport to 
address the theme of faith and religion but which, we would submit, do not deal in 
any substantial way with this theme.
Polanyi, as a systématiser, comes to religion with a generalising scheme in hand -  a 
scheme which is, more often than not, derived from his work in science.^^ He never 
starts with 'religion', 'religious belief, or 'Christianity' as a phenomenon, and nor 
does he appear to derive his generalising schemes (or interpretive frameworks) from 
an indwelling of the religious life. Polanyi typically starts with the nature of 
scientific knowledge and it is here, primarily, that his ideas emerge.
We must not forget that for the first half of his working life Polanyi was a physical 
chemist, a scientific researcher and, indeed, a researcher of international repute. 
Polanyi knows about science from his deep engagement with it and when he raises 
epistemological questions in relation to science it must be said, emphatically, that 
he knows what he is talking about (we might recall the biographical comment on 
Polanyi made by Maqorie Grene and quoted in the previous chapter). This is 
undoubtedly one of the reasons why his philosophising, insofar as it relates to 
science, is strongly a posteriori. But when he deals with religion he is far less 
grounded in his subject matter and the systems and schemes which he has 
developed, largely, in the context of the sciences, can become overly prescriptive.^^
See Polanyi and Prosch Meaning, pp. 149-160.
In his later writing, especially in Meaning, certain forms o f schématisation are drawn from his 
comparatively brief (though by no means insignificant) engagement with the study o f metaphor, art 
and myth.
An example of Polanyi's prescriptive method is to be found in his treatment o f the sacrament of 
Holy Communion in Meaning. Quite apart from his bizarre description of how the rite developed, in 
which he makes no attempt to engage with ecclesiological accounts, his suggestion that Holy 
Communion integrates various incompatible meanings of food (including a positive nutritional one 
for our bodies and a negative spiritual one for our souls) owes everything to his a priori scheme and 
very little indeed to any meaning which might be attributed to it by the church.
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b) Polanyi’s Failure to do Justice to the Phenomenon of Religion
Polanyi gives the appearance of being wary of dealing with the phenomena of 
religious faith, practice and tradition in a direct way/'^ When Polanyi refers to 
religious themes he is often following up a theme which has already been 
established in another context^^, or demonstrating the degrees of continuity in the 
way that we come to know across religion and science, faith and reason. In both 
endeavours the phenomenon of religious belief and practice is typically truncated or 
completely ignored.
In Personal Knowledge. Polanyi describes the search for God in terms of his theory 
of heuristic passion. But the desire to 'discover' God must be distinguished from 
others because it is a desire which cannot be ftdfilled. It is the discovery that can 
never be made. We do not deny that what he says may have some resonances with 
the kinds of things that might be said from within the religious traditions but, 
nevertheless, it is woefully inadequate. For example, from within the Christian 
tradition, the theme of ongoing pilgrimage must be balanced by those of God's 
acceptance, of knowledge of God and of the comfort of the Holy Spirit. There is no 
space, and, indeed, we do not think it is of great importance, to make detailed 
criticisms of what Polanyi does say about religion. In place of this we will make 
some summary remarks.
A central and surprising weakness in Polanyi's treatment of religion is his failure to 
recognise the corporate nature of its life and dissemination. This is a surprising 
failing because Polanyi's understanding of the communal aspects of science is 
acute. Indeed, his appreciation of the dynamics of the inculcation of skills, 
connoisseurship and the importance of the social coefficient of knowledge cry out
When Polanyi speaks o f ’religion' he seems, more often than not, to be referring to the Christian 
religion. This is typically implicit -  particularly in his later writings -  but there are occasions when 
he makes explicit reference to Christianity. He does, very occasionally, refer to Zen Buddhism but it 
may be assumed that a reference to religion is a reference to Christianity unless he states otherwise.
An example of this would be 'breaking out' in Personal Knowledge. See Polanyi Personal 
Knowledge, pp. 195-199.
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for consideration in his treatment of religion, but Polanyi fails to make the
connections/^
If we are to take Polanyi's comments on religion to refer primarily to the Christian 
faith, a further set of issues come into focus. Where, in Polanyi's exposition, do we 
hear of incarnation? Where do we find an acknowledgement of the God of 
revelation or the work of the Holy Spirit? Where does Polanyi explore the authority 
of Holy Scripture, the creeds and confessions of the church? He may touch on such 
matters in passing, hut they play no formative part in his analysis of religion. It 
seems that Polanyi tends to subsume Christianity under a generic 'religion'.
It has been debated at some length whether, for Polanyi, God exists independently 
of our thought about him^ .^ We doubt whether Polanyi sustains a consistent 
position on the question. But, to the extent to which a positive response can be 
given, Polanyi's God is one who may allow us to search for him but is hardly a God 
who takes the initiative -  a God who searches for us: a God of prevenient grace.
c) An Emerging Theme
Despite the serious inadequacies of Polanyi's treatment of religion one is often left 
with a sense that Polanyi has a positive disposition towards religion and to 
Christianity in particular. For periods of his life he attended Christian worship; he 
was part of J. H. Oldham's group, 'the Moot' -  which was largely attended by 
Christians. He had many Christian friends and acquaintances -  Oldham among 
them -  and in later life he developed a friendship with T. F. Torrance who became 
his literary executor. As we have seen, Polanyi had associations with Paul Tillich 
and worked closely with theologian Richard Gelwick towards the end of his life.
We think that Polanyi's positive disposition towards religion and Christianity is 
discernable both in the general trajectory of some of his arguments and in certain
To our general comment that Polanyi pays little heed to the Christian traditions when speaking 
about the phenomena o f Christian faith we would add that his failure to perceive the importance of  
community and the traditions of the community at this point is likely the result of the great emphasis 
which he places on the mystical tradition. (Polanyi has a highly individualistic interpretation of this 
tradition.)
See, for example, the articles in Zvgon 17 pp.3-87.
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specific comments. As we have already noted, the thrust of both. "Faith and 
Reason" and "Science and Religion" is to challenge the belief of modernity that the 
ways of knowing in faith and reason, and science and religion, are hmdamentally 
distinct. Polanyi's epistemology illuminates the role of belief in scientific 
knowledge and offers a radical critique of science conceived as an impersonal, 
value-free and objective endeavour. Polanyi shows that there is a greater degree of 
continuity between religious and scientific knowledge than has generally been 
acknowledged.
But as we have already suggested Polanyi is concerned with ontology as well as 
epistemology. Polanyi's hierarchical ontology affirms an essentially meaningful 
universe. Although we have not been able to expound this aspect of Polanyi's work 
it is implicated in his treatment of religion. For Polanyi perhaps the key to religion, 
as he sees it, is its affirmation, in its narrative myths, of a meaningM universe. He 
sees this affirmation running contrary to a dominant reductionistic and materialistic 
modem view which denies such meaning. It is precisely because of its affirmation 
of meaning that religion is rendered unpopular in the modem situation.
Polanyi sees religion as disempowered, but entertains the thought that if the 
distortions of modemity are corrected it may once more emerge as a force. This 
view is underlined in the last paragraph of The Tacit Dimension. Polanyi, reflecting 
upon humanity's need for a purpose bearing on etemity, writes, "Perhaps this 
problem cannot be resolved on secular grounds alone. But its religious solution 
should become more feasible once religious faith is released from pressure by an 
absurd vision of the universe, and so there will open up instead a meaningful world 
which could resound to religion. This theme of paving the way for religion finds 
a strong echo in Meaning. Polanyi concludes his consideration of the theme of 
religion in this book by commenting, "this present work is not directed toward 
effecting conversions to any religion. At the most, it is directed toward unstopping 
our ears so that we may hear the liturgical summons should one ever come our 
way."^ ^
Polanyi, M. (1983). The Tacit Dimension. Gloucester, Mass., Peter Smith, p.92. 
Polanyi and Prosch Meaning, p. 180.
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Polanyi's affirmation of religion is an affirmation of religion's claim that the 
universe is meaningful. In the light of this it is not difficult to see why he believes 
that (in an indeterminate and indirect way) he is working in the service of the 
emancipation of religion. As such it is, perhaps, unsurprising that Polanyi is happy 
to speak about rehgion without distinguishing between different religions, and 
speak, specifically, of the Christian faith while paying scant attention to its 
traditions of practice and doctrine. R. L. Hall makes the concomitant complaint that 
Polanyi's writing on religion is insufficiently grounded in history: if we are thinking 
of religion in the historical sense, that is, of the western experience, especially the 
Judaeo-Christian tradition, then Polanyi's account of religion simply will not do.^ ®
Polanyi's interest in religion may have a particular kind of validity but it must be 
acknowledged to be highly idiosyncratic. More particularly, it cannot be said to be 
an approach which is bom out of an indwelling of any particular religious tradition, 
which one would expect to be the sine qua non of a 'Polanyian' contribution to 
religious or theological understanding.
3. Polanyi and Theology
Having offered an exposition and evaluation of Polanyi's comments on religion, we 
must proceed to assess the possibilities of Polanyi's work for theology in 
anticipation of the more specific task of considering how his theory of knowledge 
might contribute to a doctrine of revelation.
It is clear why Polanyi has had a significant influence among theologians.^^ In both 
his employment of religious language ('faith' and 'belief) in his general 
epistemology and his attack on the dualisms of 'faith and reason' and 'science and 
religion' his contribution is a congenial one. However, because of his failure to 
deal, in any adequate way, with the phenomena of religious life and thought, and his 
tendency to approach religious themes in the light of a priori conceptualities forged
See Hall, R. L. (1977), "Michael Polanyi on Art and Religion." Zvgon 17. p.l7.
One list o f theologians influenced by the work o f Polanyi is found in Dulles, A. (1984). "Faith, 
Church, and God: Insights from Michael Polanyi." Theological Studies 45: 537-550. See the first 
two footnotes of this article.
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in the crucible of his engagement with scientific thought^^, he can disappoint the 
theological reader of his work.
It is not surprising that there has been a contentious debate about what Polanyi 
believed about religion.^^ As we have noted above, there have been disagreements 
about whether or not Polanyi held a realist understanding of the existence of God. 
Close collaborators came to quite different conclusions about Polanyi's personal 
Christian convictions and this is illustrated by the comments of T. F. Torrance and 
Harry Prosch '^ .^ On the one hand Torrance writes of Polanyi's, "deep Christian 
commitment influenced particularly by St Paul's teaching about redemption and 
Augustine's stress upon faith as the door to understanding."^^ On the other hand 
Prosch comments: "At one point Polanyi did seem to think of himself as a fully 
practising Christian. When I knew him he obviously was not one."^^
Martin Moleski is surely correct when he writes, "Because of Polanyi's lack of 
formal training in theology and because of his independence from any particular 
Christian tradition, it may be somewhat unfair to expect precision and clarity from 
him in his reflection on religious issues."^^ As such we believe the kind of enquiry 
which seeks to get to the consistent heart of Polanyi's position, or to establish 
Polanyi's position in relation to one strand or other of the Christian faith, is 
fundamentally flawed. While Polanyi sees the significance of religion for his work 
and, conversely, sees significance in his work for religion, these possibilities are not 
explored in relation to any explicit understanding of religion or (and more 
significantly) from any deep commitment to any particular religious tradition.
And to this we must add, with respect to Meaning, more perfunctory engagements in the study of 
art, myth and metaphor.
^ See, for example, the debate on this point between Harry Prosch and Richard Gelwick: Prosch, H. 
(1978/9). "Review o f The Way o f  Discovery: An Introduction to the Thought o f Michael Polanyi. By 
Richard Gelwick." Ethics 89.; Gelwick, R. (1982). "Science and Reality, Religion and God: A Reply 
to Harry Prosch." Zvgon 17: 25-40. and Prosch, H. (1982). "Polanyi's View o f Religion in Personal 
Knowledge: A Response to Richard Gelwick." Zvgon 17: 41-48.
Both writing of Polanyi when he was living in Oxford in the 1970s.
ToiTance, T. F. (2000-2001). "Michael Polanyi and the Christian Faith - A Personal Report." 
Tradition and Discoverv 27:2: 26-32.28.
Prosch "Polanyi's View o f Religion in Personal Knowledge: A Response to Richard Gelwick." pp. 
46f.
Moleski, M. X. (2000). Personal Catholicism: The Theological Epistemologies o f John Henrv 
Newman and Michael Polanvi. Washington, D.C., Catholic University o f America Press, p. 142.
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The great strength of Polanyi as a philosopher derived from his profound 
knowledge of practical science, as we have already acknowledged. This rich 
engagement in science must be contrasted with Polanyi's comparatively sparse 
involvement in the Christian church and the theological traditions of the church. He 
did have some knowledge of Christian worship and was aware of the work of a 
small number of theologians -  notably Paul Tillich -  but Polanyi's participation in 
and knowledge of these was very limited.
In our opinion Polanyi's comments on religion and theology have little to offer the 
theologian but this should not lead us to the conclusion that his work, as a whole, is 
to be disregarded by the theologian. Moleski makes the point that, "one may have 
an epistemology like Polanyi's but not share his theology. This is because, "The 
theological implications of epistemology derive from additional assumptions about 
the nature of divine reality and the possibility and content of divine revelation. 
Additionally -  and significantly -  a 'Polanyian theology'^® ought also to draw upon 
the forms of life and practice as they are found in the Christian church.
Polanyi's work has much to offer to the theological task. However, the way in 
which Polanyi is taken up in theology must, in our estimation, be subjected to 
careful methodological scrutiny. Any discipline must allow its methods to be 
formed and to develop in response to the object of its concern .T heology, too, 
must adopt a methodology wherein it is faithful to its object and to the extent to 
which theology does this it might be regarded as a 'science'. Indeed, according to 
Karl Barth, "The only way which theology has of proving its scientific character is 
to devote itself to the task of knowledge as determined by its actual theme and thus 
to show what it means by true s c i e n c e . A s  such theology does not forsake its 
theme by subjugating or correlating it to the concerns of the natural sciences but
Ibid. p. 142. Although Polanyi deals with certain theological issues we would question whether Ï
Polanyi has a 'theology'. Nevertheless, Moleski's point on epistemology is well made. |
Ibid. p. 143. Moleski's emphasis. We would be cautious about using the term 'assumptions' in this I
context since it might imply an a priori conceptuality. i
By which we mean, 'The kind of theology that Polanyi ought to have written'! j
This is perspicuously absent in Polanyi's approach to religion. {
Barth, K., G. W. Bromiley, et al. (1975). Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of the Word o f God 1.1.
Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, p. 10.
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ascribes the epithet of 'science' to theology precisely because it is faithful to its 
'object' and is so in a rigorous and a posteriori way.
Much more could be said about the 'object' of theology. We would certainly want 
to point to the importance of the church as the community of believers and the 
significance of participation in that community with its biblical, credal and 
doxological heritage and its various forms of life. Christian theology is reflection 
upon, and a humble attempt to purify and clarify, the church's language and practice 
which it ventures in response to the ways in which God has made himself known.
Polanyi's religious and theological views, even if they can be understood as a 
coherent whole, cannot, in our opinion, be received uncritically by the church. 
Indeed, if our evaluation of his contribution in this sphere is correct, it would be 
better if they were set aside. But Polanyi's epistemological insights are of a 
different order. It may be that many of them were established in relation to the 
concerns of the scientific community, but they illuminate philosophical distortions 
deeply rooted in the contours of western thought. Such distortions do not cease at 
the doors of the church or the desk of the theologian. Polanyi may not have done a 
good job in establishing the significance of his epistemological insights in theology 
and religion but this does not mean that the job cannot be done.
The task of theology is a human one although it must contend with God's self­
revelation and it cannot hold God in its hand as capital. It must deal with revelation 
-  recollecting the ways in which God has made himself known and thereby 
transfoimed and shaped the life, thought and language of a community. It must 
utilise language, concepts and philosophies which are ready to hand and it must 
develop practices which facilitate participation in what God has made known. Of 
course there is nothing absolute about any of these things: they will always be 
imperfect and inadequate for the task and they must be adapted, transformed in 
responsiveness to their source. Theology's task is, inevitably, an ongoing one. If 
Polanyi has identified errors into which western patterns of thought have fallen, his 
corrective will be of importance for theology to the degree to which it has itself 
fallen into the same errors.
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Polanyi believes, in taking up Augustine's motto, ^nisi credideritis, non intelligitis\ 
that he is returning to something that has been lost. He also realises that he is 
drawing from the wisdom of the Christian tradition even if he knows relatively little 
about its context. Trevor Hart makes the point that in drawing on Polanyi's thought, 
"we are reclaiming insights and emphases once borrowed from Christian theology, 
but which in the climate of modemity, theologians themselves have too often been 
afraid to own."^^
Polanyi, drawing on his experience of the scientific world, returned to science a 
clarity of self-understanding which had been significantly impaired by the 
contributions of the philosophy of science. He recognised that in his endeavour to 
establish and justify the nature of scientific knowledge he must consider many 
fields outside of science. We may wish that when Polanyi came to consider 
theology he might have brought the same depth of insight to this discipline as he 
had brought to the natural sciences. However, we must frankly acknowledge that 
Polanyi was not sufficiently equipped for such a task. Nevertheless, we see no 
reason why Polanyi's project, conceived primarily as one of epistemological 
correction, cannot be applied in theological studies as we will now seek to show.
93 Hart, T. (1995). Faith Thinking: The Dynamics of Christian Theology. London, SPCK. p.48.
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Chapter 5. Barth and Polanyi in Conversation 
Introduction
In chapter two we claimed that in Karl Barth's exposition of revelation in the early 
volumes of Church Dogmatics the themes of 'response' and 'participation', though 
understated, are present. It is important, for the purposes of this thesis, to 
demonstrate the importance of such human involvement if Barth's theology and the 
epistemology of Michael Polanyi are to be brought into conversation. Since this 
proposal upon which we depend has been contested by some scholars we might 
pause, before we proceed, to consider the kind of criticism of Barth in which the 
validity of such an approach is called into question.
In his description of revelation Barth will typically speak of the freedom and 
sovereignty of God on the one hand and human impotence (indeed, opposition) on 
the other. Such an emphasis is evident in a comment made by Barth noted in the 
first chapter, "When revelation takes place, it never does so by our insight and skill, 
but in the freedom of God to be free for us and to free us from ourselves, that is to 
say, to let His light shine in our darkness, which as such does not comprehend His 
light. In this miracle, which we can only acknowledge as having occurred, which 
we can only receive from the hand of God as it takes place by His hand. His 
kingdom comes for us, and this world passes for us."^ In such a description of 
revelation is there place for human 'response' or 'participation'? On the basis of 
such a statement alone it would seem that human 'response' may be affirmed, but 
limited to 'acknowledgement', but it is not clear how a place for human participation 
can be established since, "There is something God Himself must constantly tell us 
afresh."^ Ronald Thiemann, in many ways a sympathetic interpreter of Barth, 
writes:
Barth is so insistent that God's revelation takes place only when and where the sovereign God 
chooses that he sunders every connection between human speech and divine revelation other tlian
 ^Barth, K., G. W. Bromiley, et al. (1956). Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine o f the Word of God 1.2. 
Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, p.65.
 ^Barth, K., G. W. Bromiley, et al. (1975). Church Dogmatics: The Doctrme of the Word o f God I .l . 
Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, p. 132.
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that which God creates in the very act of revelation. Consequently there can be no grounds for 
Christian truth-claiming other than God's gracious electing will. From Barth's point of view 
theological justification o f God's provenience demands not an intellectual inquiry but simply a 
faithful acknowledgement o f God's gracious revelation when and where it occurs.^
Thiemann shares one of Barth's concerns that theology must distinguish clearly 
between the Word of God and innate 'fallen' human capacities and that it must resist 
any temptation to correlate them. But Thiemann, "cannot follow... [Barth's] radical 
disjunction between human speech and divine reality .T hiem ann believes that the 
price Barth's approach has paid is too high: "[it] solves the problem of revelation, 
viz., the relation of God to human concepts and categories, by severing all relations 
between the two and taking refuge in the miracle of grace to hring them together."^ 
Thiemann's counter-suggestion is that while no innate connection between human 
concepts and divine revelation should be sought, "Christian faith demands that once 
God has claimed a piece of creaturely reality as his own and bound himself to it, 
then we are warranted in accepting the God-forged link between the human and 
divine."^
There are two lines of response to Thiemann which we would like to take up. The 
first is a counter-contention: if Barth paid the 'high price' of severing the connection 
between God and human conceptions of him, it was in response to the 'high price' 
the liberal tradition had paid for asserting 'God-forged links between the human and 
divine'. It was on the basis of such claims that many of Barth's theological teachers 
sought to justify German engagement in the First World War and it was the 
acceptance (on the part of the German church and, in particular, its theologians) of 
German nationalism (which would emerge as a devastating force again in the 
1930s) which precipitated Barth's departure from the theological tradition in which 
he had been nurtured.^ The association of the will of God and a national identity is
 ^Thiemann, R. F. (1985). Revelation and Theoloev: The Gospel as Narrated Promise. Notre Dame, 
University o f Notre Dame Press, p.95. Thiemann's emphasis. Against Thiemann it might be said 
that Barth's Church Dogmatics (which is surely to be understood as a response to God's grace at 
some level) is more aptly described as an 'inquiry' than an 'acknowledgement'!
 ^Ibid. p.95.
 ^Ibid. p.95.
® Ibid. p.95.
 ^For a biographical account and theological comment on these events see McCormack, B. L. (1995). 
Karl Barth's Criticallv Realistic Dialectical Theoloev: Its Genesis and Development 1909-1936. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, especially pp. 111-117.
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possible without recourse to the concept of 'an innate human capacity'. The key 
question is not whether the capacity is innate but whether 'revelation' is considered 
to be at the disposal of human conceptuality. Once such a claim is made God's 
'revelation' becomes a human possession and God is no longer free in it. This is 
undoubtedly the kind of counter-criticism that Barth would make to Thiemann.
A second line of response is to ask whether Thiemann's criticism is adequate given 
other emphases which we find in Barth. Thiemann claims that Barth 'sunders every 
connection between human speech and divine revelation other than that which God 
creates in the very act of revelation' and that, as a consequence there are no 
enduring God-forged links between the human and the divine. In response to this 
several things may be said. Firstly we must say that because revelation is an event 
in which God establishes a relationship -  and not a datum which is passed from 
God to humanity -  Thiemann is correct in claiming that Barth denies that in 
revelation God is 'bound to a piece of creaturely reality' if by that we imply that 
God's revelation can become a possession. For Barth the life of faith is one in 
which the relation between God and creature must be constantly renewed. The 
believer lives in recollection of God's past revelation and in expectation of his 
future revelation. But does this, of necessity, imply that the only possible human 
response to revelation is 'acknowledgement'? While acknowledgement may be the 
first response it is apparent that Barth believes that much more can be said.
Contrary to Thiemann's claim, it seems that there is a clear sense in which Barth 
does uphold a connection between human speech and divine revelation. As we 
have noted in chapter 2, he insists that there is a positive relationship between 
revelation and human concepts. While we cannot claim parity between the two 
Barth explicitly rejects any view which would assert total disparity. Rather, what 
can be said of God in the event of his revelation is something positive, but partial. 
Furthermore, it is not possible to say how our words and concepts are related to 
God. God may reveal himself to us, and we may participate in the event in which 
this happens. But we cannot, as it were, observe our participation from outside it: 
we cannot 'observe our participation in this event', which would be a necessary 
(though not necessarily a sufficient) condition for determining the relationship 
between it and our words and concepts. T. F. Torrance illuminates the nature of the
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problem when he writes, "Even in revelation what is revealed remains mystery for it 
is not the kind of reality that can be brought under our human controlling or 
dividing and compounding -  it transcends us and remains exalted far above us even 
in being revealed and apprehended."^
Thiemann's criticism reflects a reading of Barth which firmly rules out the kinds of 
human participation which, at various places in the first three part volumes of 
Church Dogmatics. Barth explicitly rules in. We may note here as we have before 
that Barth is, in large part, responsible for such misreadings. In the early volumes 
of the Church Dogmatics in particular Barth's discussion of revelation is far more 
concerned to emphasise the sovereignty of God than explore responsive human 
participation in his revelation. Nevertheless, the latter element is not always absent 
as we shall see.
It is appropriate to acknowledge that there may well be a tension within Barth's 
theology in that some of the statements which he makes about the sovereignty of 
God in his revelation do not easily mesh with other strands of his thought in which, 
for example, he explores the significance of the Word of God becoming a human 
word. It is not necessary to regard such tensions as inconsistencies although it is 
not difficult to see why others have done so.^
Thiemann's critique does highlight this tension in Barth's doctrine of the Word of 
God but the solution he proffers appears to lead back into exactly the kind of 
difficulties from which Barth fought to extricate theology. We would contend that a 
more satisfactory development of the doctrine is to be found in an essentially
Torrance, T. F. (1965). Theology in Reconstruction. London, SCM Press. p.30.
 ^In reading Barth's Church Dogmatics it is appropriate, and indeed necessary, to bear in mind that 
his project is one which is carried out in conscious contradistinction to the theologies of liberalism in 
which he had been nurtured. Barth's doctrine of revelation is, as well as being a constituent part of 
liis dogmatics, the principal locus within which he is able to explicate the distinctiveness o f his line 
of approach in the context o f  the theological and ecclesial ethos in which it was written. We would 
contend that to read any theological dogmatics as 'timeless and context-less truths' can only hinder 
the reader's ability to understand an author's intention and meaning. In a situation in which a 
substantial and radical challenge is being offered to the dominant contours o f theological discourse -  
as was the case during the writing o f the early volumes of Church Dogmatics -  we might expect 
these issues to be of greater significance. In our opinion Thiemann has been insufficiently sensitive 
to this issue in his interpretation o f Barth's doctrine of revelation and has, consequently, failed to 
grasp the coherence o f Barth's position.
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sympathetic reading of Barth in which the kinds of human participation in the 
revelation of God of which he does speak are both extended and more fully stated.
We have considered at some length criticisms of Barth which imply that his 
description of revelation precludes the possibility of a responsive human 
participation in it. In response we have attempted to show that Barth's description 
of revelation is not inconsistent with such a possibility. It is apparent that Barth's 
primary task in describing revelation in the early sections of Church Dogmatics is 
polemical to a significant degree and by it he wishes to differentiate his own 
position from the liberal position against which he had reacted. He wants to 
emphasise that revelation is God's self-presentation to humankind and that, as such, 
it can never become a human possession. It cannot be captured or controlled but 
this does not preclude our participation in it.
The situation is clarified to a considerable degree when we turn from Barth's 
theological, we might say 'theoretical', treatment of revelation to a consideration of 
his own employment of it. When we consider a work of the scope of Church 
Dogmatics it is certain that we are dealing with more than an acknowledgement of 
revelation. But are we to conceive of Barth's dogmatic work as something other 
than a participation in revelation? To the contrary: Barth seeks to produce a 
dogmatic work in response to what God has made known in his revelation. As such 
it is entirely appropriate to conceive of his writing as a participation in revelation.
1. Bringing Barth and Polanyi into Conversation
A point which we have laboured in our discussion of Polanyi's epistemology is that 
his description of the way in which knowledge comes about is deeply rooted in his 
own experience of scientific research. Polanyi believes that the account which we 
offer of how we come to know things ought properly to derive from a reflection 
upon the way in which things have come to be known. His method is a posteriori. 
It is worthy of note that the points at which Polanyi's insights appear to be less 
secure are when he ventures to speak of areas away from science in which his 
paiticipation was less sure-footed. In chapter 4 we noted that this was the case 
when he dealt with theology and religion.
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It has been our contention that Polanyi's restricted participation in the life of the 
church and theology inevitably placed a severe limitation upon his contribution in 
this sphere. Although we believe that his epistemological insights have the 
potential to sharpen theology's self-understanding, "One cannot deduce theology 
from epistemology any more than one can deduce omelettes from eggs."^° And so 
we have sought to discern the significance of Polanyi's insights in the context of a 
more adequately articulated theology. For this we have delimited our task by 
focusing upon the doctrine of revelation and we have taken Barth's doctrine as our 
point of departure although we have modified and gone some distance beyond it.
Two significant reasons for choosing Barth as our primary representative theologian 
are his emphasis upon the doctrine of revelation and his commitment to work a 
posteriori. In this our theme comes into view and it does so in terms of a 
methodological approach which claims some significant affinities to that of Polanyi 
in that Barth wishes to speak of God a posteriori out of the knowledge of God. But 
the desire to claim the insights of Polanyi's philosophy (which is so deeply rooted in 
his concern for the physical sciences) for theology and the doctrine of revelation is 
not without its problems. Indeed, the very basis upon which this thesis has taken up 
its theme is confronted with challenges both from within and without.
From within we are confronted by Barth's desire to establish a clear differentiation 
between theology and the sciences. At the outset of his Church Dogmatics Barth 
issues an impassioned warning against the inclusion of theology among the 
'sciences'. He writes:
Since the days o f Schleiermacher, many encyclopaedic attempts have been made to include theology 
in the sciences. But the common objection may be made against all o f them that they overlook the 
abnormality of the special existence of theology and therefore essay that which is radically 
impossible. The actual result o f all such attempts has always been the disturbing or destructive 
surrender of theology to a general concept of science and the mild unconcern with which non- 
theological science, perhaps with a better sense of realities than theologians with their desire for 
synthesis, can usually reply to this mode of justifying science."
Moleski, M. X. (2000). Personal Catholicism: The Theological Epistemologies o f John Hem v 
Newman and Michael Polanvi. Washington, D.C., Catholic University o f America Press. p.l39. 
" Barth, Bromiley, et al. CD I . l . p. 10.
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Our response to Barth is to note that our purpose in engaging with what may be 
described as a philosophy of science is not for the purpose of systématisation. It is 
not our purpose to include theology under the same head as the other sciences 
(although we do not question that this has been done on many occasions and, no 
doubt, to bad effect, as Barth suggests). Our task is to consider (i.e., not to 
prescribe) the way in which we come to know things across the disciplines. There 
is no suggestion here of a commonality of approach: we freely acknowledge the 
distinctive themes of the various disciplines and that the way in which those themes 
are taken up ought properly to be determined by the nature of those themes. What 
we are attempting to do is to identify some quite fundamental distortions in our 
theory of knowledge which have been bequeathed to us by Enlightenment 
philosophy and which themselves serve to distort a properly differentiated approach 
in the various disciplines. This we believe to be Polanyi's contribution to a general 
epistemology. Consequently we can heartily agree with Barth in his assessment 
that, "The only way which theology has of proving its scientific character is to 
devote itself to the task of knowledge as determined by its actual t h e m e . I t  is 
only as we compare the methods of theology and the natural sciences as they are 
determined by their theme that we wish to comment upon similarities and 
dissimilarities. In adopting an a posteriori method we necessarily rule out any a 
priori judgement about the presence or absence of similarities between the way in 
which we come to know things in theology and the natural sciences. Rather we 
must look and see.
With regard to the challenges from without we have already noted at several points 
that critics of Barth have suggested that his doctrine of revelation is so formulated 
that it represents an eclipse of all human forms of knowing implying that, beyond 
the response of acknowledgement, there is nothing more to be said of an active and 
creative process by which we may engage in establishing a place for human 
participation on the basis of revelation. We have rejected such a line of criticism 
and we have offered our reasons and will not repeat them now.
12 Ibid. p. 10.
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It is worth acknowledging, however, that in our discussion of Barth's doctrine of 
revelation, the emphasis has been placed upon methodological questions of how we 
may speak of participation in revelation in broadly 'Barthian' terms. As such we 
have not paid much attention to how Barth conceived the formation of human 
knowledge as participation in the revelation of God. It is to an illustration of such 
work, in Barth's corpus, that we now turn. Here we will present Barth operating as 
a theologian in pursuit of the truth and, in some very significant ways, parallel to 
the scientist that Polanyi has in mind as he pursues the truth in his own discipline.
The work upon which we shall focus is Barth's treatment of 'confessions' in the 
church. This choice is of particular significance as Barth was very much involved 
in the drafting of the Barmen Declaration which addressed vital issues for the 
church in the wake of the Nazi regime's rise to power in Germany in 1933. 
Although the Barmen Declaration has not generally been regarded as a 'confession' 
of the church^it  is clear that its intentions are not radically distinct from those of 
the theological confession. And, more to the point, it dealt with a matter of gravity 
which might mean life or death for members of the church to which it was 
addressed. In this section of Church Dogmatics we see Barth reflecting upon this 
particular and acute form of theological expression, with its venerable history in the 
church, and doing so as a practitioner.^^ This is an example of Barth's 'responsive 
participation' in revelation and one in which epistemological issues are to the fore.
Our method, in this section, will be to represent Barth's description of church 
confession, and bring it into conversation with the insights of Polanyi's 
epistemology. As we proceed we will attempt to show several things: a) parallel 
insights shared by Barth and Polanyi, b) points at which Barth's exposition might be 
helpfully developed in the light of Polanyi's work and c) note the distinctions to be 
made between theology and the natural sciences which are necessitated by their 
distinct themes.
" We will focus upon Barth, Bromiley, et al. CD 1.2. pp.620-660.
" David E. Roberts notes that The United Presbyterian Church in the USA (now the Presbyterian 
Church in the USA) did adopt the Barmen Declaration into its book of confessions in 1967. See 
Hart, T. (2000). The Dictionarv o f Historical Theoloev. Carlisle, Paternoster Press. pp.52f.
" Barth had participated in the drafting o f the Barmen Declaration less than four years before 
penning this passage of the Church Dogmatics.
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2. Reiteration of Barth’s Method: Scripture and Revelation
For Barth the Holy Scripture is of paramount importance, not because it is 
revelation in and of itself, but because it witnesses to it. The authors do not speak 
of their spiritual wisdom (although they may have this), they speak of what has 
been revealed to them: That which we have seen and heard'. "Not every man can 
speak God's Word. For not every man has heard it. But those who have heard it 
can and must repeat it."^ *^  For Barth Scripture, as this witness, "is like the unity of 
God and man in Jesus C h r i s t . I t  is creaturely and yet it speaks with high 
authority because it speaks of the God who comes to it from beyond its own sphere. 
As the Bible witnesses to past revelation so it promises future revelation and as we 
read and hear it we may be drawn into participation in it. Barth insists that,
[0 ]f  itself the mere presence of the Bible and our own presence with our capacities for knowing an 
object does not mean and never will mean the reality or even the possibility o f the proof that the 
Bible is the Word of God. On the contrary, we have to recognise that this situation as such, i.e., 
apart from faith, only means the impossibility of this proof. We have to recognise that faith as an 
irruption into this reality and possibility means the removing of a barrier in which we can only see 
and again and again see a miracle.’®
Later Barth expands, "the miracle which has to take place if the Bible is to rise up 
and speak to us as the Word of God, has always to consist in an awakening and 
strengthening of our faith."
The eternal presence of Christ is concealed from us in our earthly existence. He is 
revealed in a sign expressed in the witness of apostle and prophet. But they are 
signs and human-temporal. They cannot stand by themselves for what they signify. 
Barth writes,
[T]he act of their institution as signs requires repetition and confirmation. Their being as the Word 
of God requfres promise and faith -  just because they are signs of the eternal presence of Christ. For 
if they are to act as signs, if  the eternal presence of Christ is to be revealed to us in time, there is a
Barth, Bromiley, et al. CD 1.2. p.491. 
" Ibid. p.501.
Ibid. p.506.
Ibid.p.512.
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constant need of that continuing work o f the Holy Spirit in the Church and to its members which is 
always taking place in new acts. If the Church lives by the Bible because it is the Word o f God, that 
means that it lives by the fact that Christ is revealed in the Bible by the work o f the Holy Spirit. That 
means that it has no power or control over this work. It can grasp the Bible. It can honour it. It can 
accept its promise. It can be ready and open to read and understand and expound it. All these things 
it can and should do. The human side of the life of the Church with the Bible rightly consists in all 
these things. But apart from these things, the human side of its life with the Bible can consist only in 
the fact that it prays that the Bible may be tlie Word of God here and now, that there may take place 
that work o f the Holy Spirit, and therefore a free applying of the free grace of God.^ *^
For Barth, "The door of the Bible texts can be opened only from w i t h i n . I t  is 
another matter whether we wait and knock at this door or whether we seek others. 
The very presence of the texts urges the former response: "The existence of the 
biblical texts summons us to persistence in waiting and knocking. Their concrete 
foiin is a challenge to concrete effort. We can sum up all that must be said on this 
point in the statement that faith in the inspiration of the Bible stands or falls by 
whether the concrete life of the Church and of the members of the Church is a life 
really dominated by the exegesis of the Bible.
Barth is aware that in presenting the Word of God in this way there is a danger that 
the Bible is asserted as the Word of God on the basis of our faith and that allows 
insufficient emphasis upon the objectivity of the Bible as the Word of God. This is 
a danger and must be acknowledged as such, but it is unavoidable. There is no 
external criterion which can be appealed to. Barth suggests we must trust, "that the 
action of God in the founding and maintaining of His Church, with which we have 
to do in the inspiration of the Bible, is objective enough to emerge victorious from 
all the inbreaks and outbreaks of man's subjectivity."^^
In this we see a parallel with Polanyi's epistemology which insists that in the 
general case our knowledge is based upon commitments (or 'faith') which cannot be 
defended. This is why in the general case Polanyi says, "An enquiry into oui" 
ultimate beliefs can be consistent only if it presupposes its own conclusions. It
^®Ibid. pp.513f. 
Ibid.p.533. 
Ibid. p.533. 
Ibid. p.534.
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must be intentionally circular, And, consequently, "the whole of my argument is 
but an elaboration of this circle; it is a systematic course in teaching myself to hold 
my own b e l i e f s . B a r t h  makes a strikingly similar comment when he writes of, 
"the circle of our freedom which as such is the circle of our captivity.
Barth claims, "Certainly it is not our faith which makes the Bible the Word of God. 
But we cannot safeguard the objectivity of the truth that it is the Word of God better 
than by insisting that it does demand our faith, and underlie our faith, that it is the 
substance and life of our faith. Barth goes on to say, "we have to understand the 
inspiration of the Bible as a divine decision continually made in the life of the 
Church and in the life of its members. That it took place once for all in the 
resurrection of Jesus Christ and in the outpouring of the Holy Spirit, as the 
establishment of the Church, is not disputed. But this is known and acknowledged 
in its objectivity by the fact that we recollect and expect the same divine decision in 
the preservation of the Church, and our fellowship with Jesus Christ and in the Holy 
Spirit."^*
At this point we must note an important distinction between theology and the 
natural sciences. For theology there is, and there always will be, a returning to the 
biblical witness with the expectation that in it God's Word will be spoken -  God 
will make himself known in the church. It is not so with the natural sciences. In 
these sciences we do not always return to the same textual source. The works of 
Ptolemy, Copernicus, Kepler, Newton, Clark Maxwell and Einstein may reflect a 
greater or lesser degree of continuity with respect to each other and the lives, as 
well as the works, of such great thinkers remain as an inspiration for future 
generations of scientists. However, within the bodies of knowledge which evolve in 
the natural sciences there is no 'fixed textual point' to which the scientist must return 
in the way that the theologian must return to Holy Scripture.
^ Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. London, 
Routledge, and Kegan Paul, p.299.
Ibid. p.299.
^  Barth, Bromiley, et al. CD 1.2. p.535.
Ibid. p.534.
Ibid. pp.534f.
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Although Holy Scripture is not the revelation of God, Barth's clear intention is to 
suggest that we can have every expectation that the Word of God will be spoken to 
the church and to its members through it. Barth believes that it is precisely this for 
which the church and its members must pray, wait and listen. We can also say that 
our participation in revelation is linked to Scripture in this way.
Barth's discussion of the 'confessions' of the church presupposes that the Word of 
God will be spoken through the Scriptures. As we consider Barth's discussion of 
'confessions' all that has been said in these introductory comments is presupposed. 
Here we find the theological practitioner reflecting upon the way in which the truth 
is established -  as a human endeavour -  in his own discipline. In this regard we 
find Barth engaged in his discipline in a way that parallels Polanyi in significant 
respects: the skilled practitioner describing what it is like to do the job.
3. Barth on Church Confession: A Polanyian Reading
It is Barth's belief that, notwithstanding time and place, the church confesses the 
same God who makes himself known in the Bible. This is the basis upon which the 
church can make a united confession and upon which it may seek to express a 
common faith. But what does Barth mean by 'confession'? In venturing a definition 
he writes, "A Church confession is a formulation and proclamation of the insight 
which the Church has been given in certain directions into the revelation attested by 
Scripture, reached on the basis of common deliberation and decision.
The point of departure for Barth is the fact that God reveals himself. The first thing 
we might note about Polanyi's epistemology is that it claims that this is how we 
come to know anything?^ It is necessary to pay careful attention to the nuances of 
Polanyi's critical realism. He distinguishes clearly between 'real' and 'tangible'. 
What is tangible is real, but not all that is real is tangible. He speaks of the 
'profundity' of a reality. In comparing the profundity of a tangible cobblestone and 
a less tangible person he writes, "Persons... are felt to be more profound, because
Ibid. p.620.
In chapter four we remarked upon the irony that Polanyi adopted religious imagery to depict a 
self-revealing universe while denying the same kind of power to a self-revealing God.
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we expect them yet to reveal themselves in unexpected ways in the future, while 
cobblestones evoke no such expectation."^^ Polanyi relates this to epistemic 
processes as he continues, "This capacity of a thing to reveal itself in unexpected 
ways in the future I attribute to the fact that the thing observed is an aspect of 
reality, possessing a significance that is not exhausted by our conception of any 
single aspect of it. To trust that a thing we know is real is, in this sense, to feel that 
it has the independence and power for manifesting itself in yet unthought of ways in 
the future."^^ This is the way in which Polanyi expresses the transcendence of 'the 
real' in respect of any concept of it. Notwithstanding the veiling which is 
concomitant with the unveiling in God's self-revelation it is the similarities, rather 
than the dissimilarities, which stand out in this comparison of the knowledge of God 
and the knowledge of other things.
Barth proceeds by expanding upon the characteristics of a confession explaining, 
"[It] involves the expression of an insight given to the Church. Holy Scripture has 
been given to the Church as the source of its knowledge of divine revelation. It is 
not individuals, or any group of individuals, but the Church itself, represented by 
those who can and must speak in its name, which has to give an account of its faith 
to itself and the world in the confession of the Church."^^
Scripture, as the creaturely resource through which the Word of God is made 
known, has been given to the church. There are not many churches but one church 
because the church proclaims the Word of God and it must do so on the basis of the 
Scripture which has been given as a witness to this Word. Barth is conscious of the 
fallibility of what must be ventured. He writes, "There is no confession without... 
risk and danger. And obviously for those who venture to come before the Church 
with a confession, there is also the danger that they will have the witness of Holy 
Scripture in their favour, but that in the rest of the Church they will speak to deaf 
ears and therefore isolated with the Word of God, they will necessarily be in their 
Church heretics and oddities, unauthorised innovators or even invincible
Polanyi, M. (1983). The Tacit Dimension. Gloucester, Mass., Peter Smith, p.32. While Polanyi is 
right in claiming that persons are more profound than cobblestones, he is wrong to imply (as he does 
here) that our knowledge o f cobblestones is exhaustive and that we can have no expectation to learn 
more of them.
Ibid. p.32 Polanyi's use of'observation' ought to be extended to include other forms of perception.
Barth, Bromiley, et al. CD 1.2. p.622.
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react ionar ies .Bar th suggests that, "The courage to accept the risk involved is at 
least one test of the genuineness of their enterprise."^^Barth suggests that, "However 
limited and oppressed the authors of a confession may be in the church, if they 
really have to confess, i.e., to confess the Word of God, they cannot possibly speak 
of themselves and from their own small comer, or in order to secure recognition for 
themselves and this comer.
We will consider the matter of fallibility later. Here we note the close parallels 
between Barth's comments and Polanyi's conviction that the consummation of a 
scientific discovery is to be found in the embracing of that discovery by the 
scientific community. The claim of the scientist, who believes that he has made a 
discovery, is made with 'universal intent'. There can be no suggestion that the 
scientist has attained a private insight which will merely satisfy his own curiosity. 
The intellectual passions which gave rise to the new vision seek a response and in 
the absence of such a response fiiere is strife. "[W]e suffer when a vision of reality 
to which we have committed ourselves is contemptuously ignored by others. 
Scientific discoveries are made, as Polanyi has shown, not through following an 
explicit 'mechanistic' procedure but through a passionate personal grappling with a 
problem. Furthermore, they are not made apart from the scientific community but 
through a profound participation or indwelling within it -  in all its forms of life: 
theoretical, practical and social. For a discovery, which could only have been 
conceived of in the context of participation in such a community, to be rejected by 
fellow participants can only be the source of much discomfort.
Barth writes, "The confession of the Church involves an insight which is given or 
gifted to the Church. This is bound up with the fact that it has not invented its 
content, but discovered it in Holy Scripture and as a gift of the Holy Spirit. 
There is something 'of the moment' in a confession. It is not a theological summary 
or synopsis but something of urgent concern to the whole church. "We can confess 
only if we must confess. Theological work of a theoretical or practical kind is not
Ibid. pp.622f. 
Ibid. p.623.
36 Ibid. p.623.
Polanyi Personal Knowledge, p. 150. 
Barth, Bromiley, et al. CD 1.2. p.624.
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the instrument of this compulsion. Theological work as such is quite unable to 
produce a Church confession, although it is indispensable to its formation when a 
confession arises, and if it is serious its final goal must always be the Church's 
c o n f e s s i o n . T h e  situation which demands confession is not so much one in 
which the church discerns a truth but one in which the truth finds the church.
If the Church's confession involves an insight given to the Church, then the confession cannot 
understand itself or rightly let itself be understood as an exposition of favourite ideas, or convictions, 
or the so-called reflections of faith. It certainly rests on exegesis, but it is more than biblical inquiry. 
It certainly arises only with a dogmatic consciousness, but it will proclaim more than a 
theologoumena. It is certainly proclamation, but its power will not be only that of edification. The 
faith of its authors will be heard in it, but it will not be because o f this subjective faith that it has the 
right to be heard.'*®
Here it seems that we find a contrast between the task of the confessor and that of 
the natural scientist (although we would affirm a parallel in respect of general 
dogmatic work). As we shall consider later, this distinction is not only appropriate 
but necessary because, in contradistinction to the case of the natural sciences, the 
object is also subject. Nevertheless the participation of the confessor, like the 
scientist, involves the taking up of particular skills. The 'grounding' in general 
theological work is, to adopt Barth's word, 'indispensable'. As such Polanyi's 
understanding of skills comes into view. In acknowledging that error is always 
possible he wishes to distinguish between two types of error. There is the error 
made by the one who participates deeply in the tradition in its practical and 
theoretical forms; and there is the error of one who does not so participate. The first 
kind of error is inherent in the human condition and the ways in which we come to 
know but those of the latter are 'illusory and incompetent' -  not as a result of a lack 
of intellectual ability (although this might be so) but because the one who makes 
them is does not participate (by way of the skills which are implied in such a 
participation) in a form of life."^ ^
Ibid. p.624.
'*® Ibid.pp.624f.
This is precisely the kind of criticism which we have made of Polanyi with respect to his writing 
on theology and religion.
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There is no sense in which the confession is 'sourced' by human skills but skills are 
necessary for its expression. One cannot make a church confession unless one is 
committed to the form of life which is to be found in the church and unless one 
participates in the discipline of theology which seeks to serve it. Anyone claiming 
to speak to and for the church from outside such 'commitment situations' would be, 
on that basis, discredited. Their voice would not deserve to be heard. Barth writes, 
"The confession of the Church always involves the statement and expression of the 
insight given to the Church in definite limits. This limitation does not contradict 
either the intended universality of the confession or the certainty proper to it as 
Church dogma. On the contrary, it is in this very limitation that it is universal and 
Church dogma, and therefore has ecclesiastical a u t h o r i t y . W h a t  Barth expresses 
here implies at least some part of the critique of objectivism as we find in Polanyi's 
writing. How do we come to know things? We come to know things as persons 
and as persons existing at a particular time, in a particular place and within 
particular communities. If such particularities (or 'limitations', as Barth calls them) 
invalidated our efforts to acquire knowledge there would be no knowledge. (The 
objectivist's standard of'indubitable knowledge', implying a 'view from nowhere', is 
an unattainable one for human knowing, as Polanyi has shown.) No. This is the 
way in which we do come to know things. The 'limitations' are genuine limitations 
but they provide us, at the same time, with our possibilities and without them we 
can know nothing. These 'particularities' take many forms. There is the general 
socio-cultural context in which we are nurtured in early childhood -  what Polanyi 
describes as our 'calling'. Barth says, "It cannot be denied that the definite limits 
which can be seen in all confessions stand in a constantly shifting relationship to 
political, cultural and economic groupings and m o v e m e n t s . B u t  of prime 
significance in this context is the life of the church. In its concrete form the life of 
the church manifests not only many continuities but also considerable diversity. 
But the source of its life does not. It is the Word which is made known in the 
church in its diverse forms through Holy Scripture. The power of the confession to 
unify the church is found in the Word of God.
Barth, Bromiley, et al. CD 1.2. p.625. 
Ibid. p.626.
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What Barth does not say, but which finds full expression in Polanyi's work, is that 
these 'particularities' or 'limitations' are, 'indwelt'. Our knowledge of them is not, 
for the greater part, explicit but tacit. Because they are forms of life which we 
indwell we do not attend to them but with them. They become, to adopt Polanyi's 
description, 'an extension of our own bodies'. Or, as we suggested in chapter 3, they 
represent the spectacles through which we see the world. Therefore, although we 
are able to say things about the forms of life that we indwell, much of what we 
know is tacit. Indeed, according to Polanyi, "All knowledge is... either tacit or 
rooted in tacit knowing.
Confession arises in the context of conflict. Barth writes, "A Church confession 
with Church authority has always arisen in a definite antithesis and conflict. It 
always has a 'pre-history'. "It consists... in controversies in which the existing 
confession of the common faith and therefore the existing exposition and 
application of Holy Scripture is called in question because the unity of the faith is 
differently conceived, and there is such different teaching on the basis of the 
existing unity that the unity is obscured and has to be rediscovered."*^^ As such the 
church must express itself more precisely if it wishes to preserve unity.
The example of the theological liberalism of the 18* and 19* centuries is an 
interesting case in point. It saw itself in dialectical relationship with the 
conservative counter-movement. However, in face of opposition, "liberal 
toleration has, of course, usually reverted very quickly to a fairly extreme 
intolerance.""^  ^ Barth sees this as inevitable; "How can it be otherwise than that 
heresy, if only in the attenuated form of a general doctrine of toleration, should 
want to be not merely one opinion, but the doctrine of truth, the expression of 
Church unity, and that therefore it is bound to be intolerant whether it will or no?""^  ^
Consequently Barth writes, "The battle of confession must be waged. . . a s  a battle 
for the very substance, a battle for the life and death of the Church. There is no 
question that there are battles and conflicts within the natural sciences but such
Polanyi, M. and H. Prosch (1975). Meaning. Chicago, University o f Chicago Press. p.61.
Barth, Bromiley, et al. CD 1.2. p.628.
Ibid. p.628. I
Ibid. p.629. I
Ibid. p.629. i
Ibid. p.629. Ï
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battles must be distinguished from those with which the church confession engages. 
The conflicts which emerge within science do not challenge the identity of the 
scientific community at the same depth. The confession confronts a challenge to 
the well-being of the church in a way in which the discoveries of a Newton or an 
Einstein (and the conflicts associated with them) do not challenge the well-being of 
the scientific community. This is a function of the fact that the identity of the 
church is sustained by the Word of God as it returns time and again to the witness 
of Holy Scripture in a way unparalleled in science. The identity of science may be 
significantly changed by a Newtonian or Einsteinian 'revolution', but such 
discoveries are not only integrated into an enlarged 'scientific world view' but come 
to be seen as significant stages in the progress of science. In Polanyian terms, a 
new discovery, once established and integrated, becomes part of the tacit 
knowledge which is indwelt by scientists who venture to new insights. While new 
insights may be gained in the church (and old insights lost!) the idea of progress 
must be distinguished from the progress which is known in the sciences. There is a 
dogmatic core in the thought of the church which, were it surrendered, would be 
tantamount to the surrender of the Christian faith.
In order to think of a parallel in science to the kind of challenge to which the church 
confession responds one would have to envisage a challenge to what we think of as 
'modern science', as it has developed over several centuries, by a credible 
alternative. It is interesting to note that Polanyi considers this to be a serious 
possibility. Modem scientific knowledge is largely unspecifiable. It is passed from 
one generation of scientists to the next, from master to apprentice, through the 
transference of largely tacit skills. If this transference of skills was to be seriously 
interrupted the seemingly unassailable position of 'modem science' could be 
challenged. It is worth noting that Polanyi discemed such a challenge in the Soviet 
Union's co-option of science into the service of the Five Year Plan. It is instructive 
to note that in attacking the totalitarian position and defending the freedom of 
science Polanyi adopted a style which strongly resembles that of the church 
confession. It was impassioned, highly focussed and addressed to the widest 
possible audience. We would suggest that the similarities are far from incidental.
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Barth writes, "In the form of a decision a new expression of the old unity of faith 
must now be sought and found: an expression which brings out the other way and 
direction, in which (unlike the representatives of the counter-doctrine) we find 
ourselves bound by Holy Scripture, an expression which makes manifest the 
judgment of Holy Scripture in the current controversy as the confessors claim to 
have heard it."^ ® But he warns, "It is not a matter of an academic or an individual 
decision but before and behind the confession stands the actual life of the Church. 
Preaching and instruction will correspond to the confession. It is, therefore, a part 
of the recurrent worship and congregational life of the Church which is voiced in 
the confession.
If we may speak in general terms, the kinds of conflict which arise in the natural 
sciences make only a modest impact upon the general population regardless of the 
tmhulence that they may cause within the scientific community. The issues implied 
in the genesis of a church confession, by comparison, are typically the concern not 
only of the theologically trained but of the 'person in the pew' also. It is instructive 
to reflect upon some of the disturbances, which have emerged within the Church of 
England, for example, which have troubled the British churches since the Second 
World War: The 'Honest to God' debate initiated by Bishop John Robinson; the 
discussion of the nature of the resurrection of Jesus, initiated by Bishop David 
Jenkins; the debate about the ordination of women and, more recently, issues 
relating to human sexuality. All these issues have been the concern not just of 
clergy and theologians but of a great many other church members. Although these 
concerns have not been met by church confession, they illustrate the way in which 
issues that might become the concern of church confession touch the lives of the 
many rather than those of an intellectual sub-culture.
Barth does not disguise the inherently conflictual nature of the church confession. 
The confession expresses both a 'Yes' and a 'No'. The confession speaks with 
conviction in the uncertainty and confusion of a particular contemporary situation to 
call the church back to clarity and unity on the basis of what the Word of God says 
through the witness of Scripture. It comes as an unwelcome word to those who
Ibid. p.629.
Ibid. p.629.
Page 197
defend the ideas or doctrines which are condemned. However, the confession is not 
expressed in order to destroy a unity. Rather, it makes clear where, or on what 
basis, unity could be found. The confession must speak with authority. Barth 
writes, "If we have not the confidence (or the explicit confidence) to say damnamus, 
then we might as well omit the credimus, confitemur and docemus and return to the 
study of theology as before. The time is not ripe for confession. This all serves 
to highlight both the weight of a confession and the consequences which attend it. 
Is the damnamus pronounced not on the basis of the Word of God but on the basis 
of 'strife of opinions and emotions'? A condemnation or, indeed, a false affirmation 
which is the expression of ephemeral human opinion will bring further danger to the 
church. The dangers lie on both sides because on either side the unity of the Church 
is threatened.
Since the confession is always occasioned by what the confessors take to be an 
error, although it is based on Holy Scripture it is in the form of a reaction. (It is 
directed at the antithesis which has been rejected.) Barth asks, "And does not that 
limit the insight expressed in it -  not to speak of the fallibility of its authors, the 
temporal limitation of their exegetical and dialectical methods, their power of self- 
expression? When we consider all these points together, the spatial, temporal and 
material limitations of all confessions, we may well ask how in these circumstances 
there can ever be any authority at all in any conf ess ion .Mi gh t  it not be the case 
that what is said in confessions may all be reduced to such 'limiting factors'? Does 
not the whole enterprise collapse into a kind of cultural-cum-ecclesial relativity? Is 
it not all a matter of subjectivity -  or cultural relativism? Barth suggests that if we 
see things in such a way we have not seen the positive human aspect: "It means that 
we have not yet understood this limitation as a mark of the particular humanity of 
the confession, and it is important that it should be understood in that way. The 
particular humanity of the Church's confession consists in the freedom, the joy of 
responsibility, the certainty and the love, in which it has always taken place in spite 
of the limits of those who make it."^ "^
Ibid. p.630.
Ibid. pp.633f.
^Ubid. p.634.
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Such a response is strongly supported by Polanyi's affirmation of the personal and 
communal coefficient of our knowing. Knowledge, according to Polanyi, has no 
meaning apart from persons. And persons are only able to make truth claims (that 
they have come to know things) out of the social and intellectual contexts which 
they indwell. Apart from such indwellings we would be able to say nothing. Our 
search for the truth arises out of a particular context for which we can make no 
absolute claims; but, Polanyi asserts, "I accept these accidents of personal existence 
as the concrete opportunities for exercising personal responsibilities. This 
acceptance is my sense o f  calling
It is out of this 'calling' we seek the truth. But our explorations, although facilitated 
by the limited perspectives which we inhabit, are not determined by them. In our 
search for the truth we are confronted with a reality which, if  we are to grasp it, 
must be allowed to 'shape' the way in which we conceive it. We cannot say 
anything we like. We must say what we find ourselves constrained to say as we 
submit to the pressure which the reality exerts upon us — as we respond responsibly 
to that pressure. Our 'calling' represents the 'internal pole' of our knowing^^ but this, 
in a responsible personal act, is brought into relationship with an 'external pole' 
which is the reality which we seek to know. Because of the transcendent nature of 
this reality -  its existence is independent of our knowledge of it -  what we say of it 
is not 'free' but delimited by that reality. As such we speak of it with universal 
intent. The confession in the church acknowledges the Word of God, as it is 
mediated to us through Scripture, as a reality which exists independently of our 
knowledge of it. What is said in confession must be responsible in its 
acknowledgement of this.
Polanyi's recognises a sense in which all things can be known only insofar as they 
give themselves to be known. But he is well aware that this language must be used 
in a metaphorical way. Polanyi distinguishes between the way in which, for 
example, inanimate matter reveals itself and the way human persons reveal 
themselves. We deal with much greater depth of reality in relation to the latter. Our 
knowledge of a person is significantly determined by what they wish to reveal of
Polanyi Personal Knowledge, p.322. Polanyi's emphasis. 
Understood communally rather than individualistically.
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themselves. The subjective disposition of the 'object' is of considerable 
significance. In the theological position which we have articulated God is enclosed 
in his subjectivity in such a way that we may know him only insofar as he gives 
himself to be object to us and then in the paradoxical ways of veiling and unveiling.
Barth suggests that if God's Word and will are the real subject of what happens in 
Church history a different picture arises: "If we... agree on this, then we will 
certainly not deny the varied limitations of all Church confessions, but we will also 
reckon with the fact that they have a meaning not only from below, but also from 
above, in the fact that it is the Word and the will of God and not creaturely powers 
and forces which have imposed upon these confessions their different limits."^^ In 
this respect we ought appropriately to speak of the will of the 'external pole' of our 
knowledge of the Word of God. According to Barth it is Holy Scripture which 
speaks to the church in this time and this place, or in that time and that place; and in 
this way the will (of God) which is established above is communicated. If we may 
speak of God's Word and will as the subject of the history it is not unreasonable to 
think of church confession carrying the authority of the church and doing so, as 
Barth points out, "in the very thing which seems to compromise it, i.e., in the 
limitation^^ which betrays its humanity. What is human and limited is 
confronted, challenged and transformed in its responsive participation in the Word 
of God.
The authority of a confession is, and must be established, within such constraints. It 
will be clear enough whether a confession is Western or Eastern, old or new and 
what particular passing concern provides the focus for its expression. But if it is 
tested by Scripture and therefore the Word and will of God, and if it bears the 
character of obedience, the perception of truth breaks through the contextual 
constraints (or limits). It may be seen that, "the confession arose under the 
compulsion of a necessity, which as such was also a permission, that the limit of its
Iinsight is that marked out by the Word of God and therefore does not merely i
Barth, Bromiley, et al. CD 1.2. p.635. 
We prefer 'constraint' to 'limitation'. 
Barth, Bromiley, et al. CD 1.2. p.635.
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humble the confessors but strengthens and encourages them in the human venture of 
their credimus, confitemur, docemus, and also their damnamus
In what Barth says here we discern strong resonances with Polanyi's position. Both 
recognise that the communal aspect of our knowing is both essential and fallible 
and both recognise the potential for transcendent realities to transform the ways in 
which we understand and speak of them (although Polanyi clearly does not 
acknowledge the Word of God as a reality in the way that Barth does).
Barth believes that it is required of a confession that the majority of the Church 
members are able to affirm it and consequently the discussion and conclusion which 
relate to it should be on 'the widest possible basis'. "A confession has to speak in 
the name of the Church and to the Church. Therefore two or three must be gathered 
together -  with some order and willingly and publicly -  if  what is said is to be a 
confess ion.Bar th writes, "If there is no consensus ecclesiae there is no ecclesia, 
and therefore no confessio ecclesiastica."^^
Origination
However, if in the processes which led to the establisliment of a confession there is 
little order -  indeed, if  there is disorder and violence! (as was famously the case at 
Nicaea) -  however deplorable this may be it does not per se invalidate its outcome. 
"What really decides its authority is simply its content as scriptural exposition, 
which is necessarily confirmed or judged by Scripture itself. This content can 
impart something of its own value and significance even to a confession which is 
open to question on formal g r o u n d s . T h i s  is not to say that the church ought to 
be unconcerned about the origination of a confession. Indeed, every effort must be 
made to establish orderly procedure. However, the force of the confession comes 
not from the good order in which it was initiated nor is the lack of force attributable
Ibid. pp.636f.
Ibid. p.637.
Ibid. p.638. Historically it seems that such a consensus can be extremely difficult to establish. 
Ibid. p.638.
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to bad order. In each case the matter will be decided by whether what is said is 
confirmed in the church by the Word of God.
Ratification
By the nature of the confession it is necessary that it is published as broadly as 
possible, "A confession demands publicity. Once again, the challenge which is 
implied in it will not go away. "But where the confession is obedience, the anxiety 
implied in this question is removed, for it is self evident that the confession should 
be made public.
For confession there is a question of whether it speaks the right word at the right 
moment with the right 'weighting'. Barth writes that, "What is to be proclaimed by 
a herald has to be not only right but important. Here Barth appears to be 
referring to an idea that parallels in some ways Polanyi's discussion of 'selective 
passions'. For Polanyi it is the selective passion of the scientist (the 'wise neglect' of 
many observations) which ensures that science does not become lost in a forest of 
trivialities. As confession is concerned with the Word and will of God the decision 
cannot be reduced to the theological skill of the confessor, but for Barth, the 
theological skill of the confessor is certainly in view since he affirms that, "There 
can be no confession without the background of solid, theological work."^^
The seriousness of the confession must always be before us: "it says Yes and No -  
not as God says Yes and No, but in the human sphere, and yet in that sphere with an 
appeal to God Himself, and therefore with a definite assertion and denial of the 
unity of the Church, and with a definite indication in what sense and within what 
limits there is or is not fellowship with God."*^  ^ The counter-pressure against the 
confession always represents a temptation. The desire for a 'quiet life' may distract 
the confessor. But to limit the degree to which the confession is published is 
tantamount to affirming that which is condemned within it.
Ibid. p.639. 
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[WJith all the mutual strangeness and division in the Church, where there is real Church there is also 
unbroken continuity between the Church then and now and an unbroken connexion between the 
Church there and here. There is no Church where fellowship is completely lacking in even one of  
these two dimensions, where in what appears to be a Church there are no fathers behind us and no 
brethren beside us. But having both, in both directions we hear the voice o f a Church confession, 
within definite limits and on a definite road we take part in the story of the exposition and 
application of Holy Scripture, and we have therefore a definite responsibility to definite decisions 
made earlier and elsewhere in the Church.®®
Our responsibility to the ’fathers' and to the 'brethren' is our responsibility before 
God in recognition of the fact that the truth which we seek, within the limited 
context of our particular historical and geographical situation, is the truth which was 
sought by those of other times and other places. Again, we note that the particular 
dynamic of the confession is to be distinguished from that which is operative in the 
natural sciences because across history and geography the confessor returns to the 
witness of Scripture. It is important to note, however, that there is a strong parallel 
insofar as the task of confession and the task of natural scientific work are tasks 
which are conducted within community. Barth writes, "No one has ever read the 
Bible only with his own eyes and no one ever should.
When we think of confession in the present we can and we must remember the 
other confessions of the church. What they say has a weight which we do not 
ascribe to other voices. It is not something which stands between the Word of God 
and the word of man, "but a human word figuratively ranked before all other human 
words -  is the confession or dogma of the C h u r c h . B a r t h  makes the barbed 
comment, "It is a pure superstition that the systematising of a so-called historico- 
critical theology has as such a greater affinity to Holy Scripture itself and has 
therefore in some sense to be heard before the Apostles' Creed or the Heidelberg 
Catechism as a more convincing exposition of the biblical witness.
Barth believes that, after Holy Scripture, the confessions should be given first place 
in the church. When we have heard them, then we must be ready to hear other
®® Ibid. p.647.
™ Ibid. p.649.
Ibid. p.649.
Ibid. pp.649f.
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voices or draw from our own insight. But we must remember that in listening to the 
witness of the church confessions what we say (having heard what we must hear) is 
still our responsibility. As the confessors (of whom we hear) fulfilled their 
responsibility in giving their reading of Scripture we fulfil our responsibility with 
our own reading of the Scriptures. We are not bound to the confessions as to a law 
but that does not mean that we do not respect them. They become, as it were, our 
starting point. "For at this point it takes a third and genuinely spiritual form. It 
becomes a constant antithesis, the horizon of our own thinking and speaking. 
Naturally, within this horizon it is a question of our own free thinking and speaking, 
for which we must bear the responsibility, which is not bound by any law except 
that of its object, and therefore only by Holy Scripture.
This is the way in which Barth sets forth and also delimits the freedom in which we 
may move. We are not, of course, free to say what we wish. We must listen for the 
Word of God in Scripture. We must also listen to the previous confessions of the 
church -  not as a final authority but as a venerable guide. We cannot seek the truth 
as these confessions had not been spoken. As Barth puts it, "in this sphere we are 
not sovereign in the sense that we are alone, with no antithesis, no horizon. We 
cannot think and speak as in the absence, but only as in the presence of the 
confession.
It is of considerable interest to note that Barth does acknowledge that the force of 
previous confession comes through to succeeding generations of the church not 
only through the explicit articulation. In what reflects at least part of a Polanyian 
insight Barth acknowledges ways in which the confessional insights come to inhabit 
the tradition in less explicit forms and exert their authority in such ways.^^ Barth 
writes:
We can make this plain by the external fact that the Christian worship in which our own exposition 
and application of Holy Scripture is most solemnly expressed usually takes place not freely or in a 
neutral place, but in a "church" which even by its architecture and furnishings more or less directly
Ibid. p.651. 
^'•ibid. p.651.
It would be incorrect to imply, however, that Barth's acknowledgement o f the tacit dimension 
reflects anything approaching the depth o f treatment it receives in Polanyi's writings.
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and faithfully reminds those who gather in it... o f their "confessional position." Even if  it is mainly 
a witness to the helplessness o f the 19®‘ century the "Church" confronts us with Church history. And 
what happens in it happens not only in the presence of God and His angels, not only in the presence 
of the departed spirits o f the past, but also -  with whatever freedom and responsibility -  in the 
presence of the confession, by which in strength or weakness, in loyalty or apostasy, our "Church" is 
this particular "Church". In the same way the hymn book which, good or bad, is always used in 
worship, confronts us with Church history. Together with the text of the Bible our own exposition 
and application of the word of the Church's praise is a third trigonometrical point, and at a varying 
distance behind it there always stands the Church's confession. Finally, even the order of worship 
can more or less definitely play the same role.’®
In this way Barth does acknowledge that the explicit statement of the church 
confession does not exhaust its influence upon the church. He does discern, if not 
in a particularly developed way, that there are ways in which the confession 
confronts us indirectly. The force of the confession can be pervasive in its indirect 
forms. Barth expands, "We cannot avoid this fact of the -  noted or unnoted -  
presence of the Church's confession in every present aspect of the Church's life. If 
we think that we are so free or so committed that after hearing the confession we 
must go our own way independently of it, the confession does not cease, directly or 
indirectly to speak, tacitly opposing its word to our word, not as any kind of voice, 
but as the voice which has been peculiar to our Church from its inception and still 
characterises its being to this day."^^ What Barth is saying here clearly 
acknowledges that the confession, in its influence upon the church, cannot be 
limited to its form as an explicit statement. As such he points, in some significant 
ways, towards an understanding of knowledge as an indwelling.
An important aspect of the Church's confession is its ability to speak across the ages 
and geography. Despite the limitations of context and the particularity of the 
concerns of a confession it may have the potential to speak in the present. Barth 
asks, "What can explain it except that it is a document of obedience to the Holy 
Spirit of the Word of God and therefore an instrument of His power and His 
ruling?"^^ Our reception of the Word of God is both made possible and limited by 
the particularity of our calling. But despite the diversity of contexts out of which
’® Barth, Bromiley, et al. CD 1.2. p.651. 
”  Ibid. pp.651 f. Our emphasis.
Ibid. p.653.
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the church has listened for the Word of God in Scripture the God who makes 
himself known in this way is the same God. While we do not deny the significance 
of our context in responding to God's revelation we nevertheless assert that in it 
God's being shows through and what was received and expressed in the form of a 
confession 'there and then' has authority for us in the 'here and now' in that it is the 
same God who speaks and makes himself known through the witness of Holy 
Scripture. Barth suggests, "To have and be authority in this sense and therefore to 
confirm its imperative and binding and normative character, it needs only -  but very 
earnestly — to be seen and understood as the silent but present antithesis of the 
Church's daily life, as the horizon within which -  under the lordship of the Word of 
God -  it is conducted.
Barth insists that there is a unity in faith. The confession speaks of this unity to the 
end that the church will find itself in it. The confessions of the church point to 
particular times and places where the way has been shown towards unity in the face 
of that which disturbed it. Barth points out that even when we feel compelled to 
hold to something apparently or actually opposed to a confession, the statement of 
the confession remains before us, with all its weight and authority. In this way it 
cannot be forgotten even though we feel unable to affirm or repeat what it says. It 
does not cease to affect us, and even in our opposition to it (at whatever point) we 
continue to respect it.
In making a distinction which again hints at the tacit dimension Barth writes, "It is 
not by agreeing with these statements and appropriating them, but by learning the 
direction from these statements that we respect the authority of the confession."^® 
Although Barth leaves us in no doubt that, after Scripture, he attributes to the 
confession the highest of human authority it is, nevertheless, a human authority and 
fallible as such. Revelation is not 'captured' in the confession. In speaking of the 
direction of the confession, Barth implies a tacit understanding which transcends 
what is explicitly stated in the confession. He is not simply pointing to the gap 
between the event of revelation and human reflection upon it (although this is 
certainly in view). He is suggesting that there is something to be discemed in the
Ibid. p.653.
Ibid. p.655. Our emphasis.
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confession which is not fully articulated in the words and propositions which it 
adopts. This appears to be what Polanyi would describe as our tacit understanding 
and the way in which Barth expands upon this theme only lends support to such an 
inteipretation. Barth proceeds to suggest that there are times when we must depart 
from the confessions in some -  or even many -  of their statements out of a 
discernment of this 'direction'. He writes:
A certain positive criticism of the confession cannot be avoided when we respect its authority, when 
therefore we go further in tire dhection indicated by it, and therefore in our own responsibility in 
relation to the Church in the here and now. Even if  there is no cause to oppose them directly, its 
statements have at all points to be extensively interpreted. They have to be read with underlinings 
and emphases and accentuations which they never had then, which they do not have when 
considered "historically," but which they necessarily acquire when they are the antithesis and the 
horizon of the present day Church. The necessity of this positive criticism of the confession may 
lead to the emergence o f a new confession, i.e., a confession which repeats the old one according to 
die new knowledge of the present-day Church. This is not merely reconcilable with the authority of 
the confession, but may even be demanded in some way by the authority of the confession as rightly 
understood, in that it does not bind us to itself but to Holy Scripture, in that it does not challenge us 
primarily to agreement with its statements, but to persistence in the unity o f faith and only for that 
reason and in that sense to agreement with its statements.**
In this statement it is the limitations of the confession which come to the fore. 
Everything that the church may say comes under the limit of a particular time and 
place. The problem is not that we can never ascribe to a confession the status of an 
infallible authority. Perfection is not reached within the limits of our temporal 
strivings. Barth suggests, "in practice we have to recognise that every Church 
confession can be regarded only as a stage on a road which as such can be 
relativised and succeeded by a further stage in the form of an altered confession. 
Therefore respect for its authority has necessarily to be conjoined with a basic 
readiness to envisage a possible alteration of this kind."^^
If we regard the confessions of the church and the many ways in which what they 
imply has shaped the church's life we may appropriately adopt Polanyi's language 
of indwelling. In our listening for the Word of God in Scripture in the 'here and
** Ibid. p.656.
*** Ibid. pp.658f.
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now' we do not focus upon the confessions to which we hold (in any case, our 
understanding of them transcends what we are able to say about them). Rather we 
focus with them. This is the way in which, according to Polanyi, the scientist 
relates to the scientific theory upon which he draws in order to make a new 
discovery. He does not look at it, but with it. We contend that there is a parallel 
here with the church confessions. They provide, as it were, the 'spectacles’ which 
we wear in approaching Holy Scripture.
But, as Polanyi points out, as well as dwelling in theories there is, within the 
scientist, a desire to 'break out’. The theories upon which we generally depend in 
order to come to new understandings are fallible and may be mistaken. Polanyi 
suggests that in contemplation -  when we become absorbed in the realities which 
our theoretical understanding seeks to represent -  our facilitating, but also 
delimiting, theoretical grasp is relaxed and in this moment we may gain a new 
insight into the reality with which we are engaged. This, for Polanyi, is part of the 
process of scientific discovery in which our understanding of the world is modified. 
It seems that there is a parallel in the way in which we seek the truth in Scripture. 
As we reflect upon Scripture our seeing (and hearing) is powerfully conditioned by 
the confessional perspective which we indwell. But this limit is no absolute limit. 
The Word of God, as it speaks through Scripture, may call into question, in some 
way, the understandings which we indwell and we may have to reconsider whether 
some element of what we wish to confess explicitly is in need of revision. This, in 
Polanyi's terms, would be an example of 'breaking out' and it appears that Barth has 
some such idea in mind in his discussion of confessional revision.
As well as parallels we also note a dissimilarity here between the case of the natural 
sciences and the church's confessions. We are caused to reflect again upon the 
crucial distinction between the respective themes of the natural sciences and church 
confession. The former is concerned with natural physical phenomena while the 
latter is concerned with the Word of God. One of Polanyi's more startling 
suggestions is that even inanimate physical phenomena may 'reveal' themselves in 
such a way that our conceptualisation of them is called into question. On the basis 
of the belief that the Word of God, as well as being object to us, is also the subject
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of the church's history it seems less contestable that it should challenge the 
conceptualities which we have of it.
Concluding Comment
In this chapter we have sought to explore the significance of the epistemological 
thought of Michael Polanyi for our understanding of participation in revelation in 
the form of a 'Polanyian' commentary upon Barth's discussion of 'church confession' 
in his Church Dogmatics. In doing so we have sought to demonstrate ways in 
which the insights of Polanyi, which have been articulated primarily in the context 
of the natural sciences, can illuminate the processes involved in the kind of 
theological task in which Barth is here engaged. It is interesting to note that many 
of the themes which comprise Polanyi's post-critical philosophy are, to a degree, 
acknowledged in Barth's work. However we would contend that the Polanyian 
reading which we have offered extends the reflexive insights contained within 
Barth's own exposition and is suggestive of yet further developments.
One reason for engaging with Barth's treatment of church confessions is, as we 
noted at the outset, to gain insight into the way in which he seeks to speak in 
response to the revelation of God -  to consider one way in which he seeks to 
'participate in revelation'. As we have seen, there are theologians who have argued 
that Barth's doctrine of revelation, as it is expressed in the early volumes of Church 
Dogmatics, leaves little room for human participation beyond 'acknowledgement'. 
In expounding this excerpt from Barth's work we see not only that this is not the 
conclusion that Barth has drawn, but also some of the contours of his constructive 
method. We would contend that the methodology which Barth adopts at this point 
ought to inform any interpretation of his doctrine of the Word of God. Such a 
strategy would certainly preclude some of the conclusions drawn by a theologian 
such as Thiemann.
Having offered this Polanyian reading of Barth we must proceed in the next chapter 
to consider a variety of other ways in which the insights of Polanyi might be 
adopted in attempting to articulate a fuller understanding of human participation in 
revelation. Given the lack of space we will have to adopt a high degree of
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selectivity. What can be done in building on the work of the present chapter is to 
offer a selection of examples of how Polanyian insights might be brought to bear as 
well as indicating how this might work at different levels. Torrance, as we have 
seen, has offered a careful and thorough account of the 'semantic level' of our 
participation in revelation; we shall now seek to consider aspects of our theme 
which are not adequately articulated under this heading -  not least the 'bodily' and 
'epistemic'.^^
** The meaning which we attach to these categories will emerge in the context o f the next chapter 
and we will defer any attempt to anticipate this at the present juncture.
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Chapter 6. Revelation and Polanyi's Epistemology: Forms of Participation 
Introduction
The structure of chapter 5 was derived from Barth's discussion of the confession of 
the church in volume 1.2 of Church Dogmatics. In it we offered what we described 
as a 'Polanyian exposition' of Barth's work. As such the scope of its content was 
largely delimited by the structure of Barth's own writing on the theme. This line of 
approach was useful not only in demonstrating ways in which Polanyi's insights 
offer scope for extending and reformulating Barth's representation of the theme, but 
also for illuminating the degree to which Barth was already operating with ideas 
which parallel strands of Polanyi's post-critical thought. Although Barth would 
undoubtedly have had little time for Polanyi's theological and religious writings, it 
is not difficult to see how his epistemological work would have proved fruitful in 
the kind of project in which Barth was engaged.
Barth's discussions of church confession might be described as a study of the 
method by which the church participates in revelation, as it seeks to articulate 
theological truth in the context of doctrinal conflict, by looking to the witness of 
Scripture and seeking the illumination of the Spirit. This provides one example of 
what Barth believes we can and, indeed, ought to say on the basis of revelation. We 
have already noted that some of Barth's explicit treatment of the doctrine of 
revelation in the early parts of Church Dogmatics might call into question the 
legitimacy of speaking of 'participation in revelation'.^ We would contend, 
however, that what he says explicitly of the doctrine of revelation must be 
interpreted in the light of what he is trying to achieve in the rest of his theological 
writings. After all, it would be extraordinary to suggest that Barth did not conceive 
of his work as it is expressed Church Dogmatics and elsewhere as a response to, or 
participation in, revelation.2 jf
* This is the view o f Ronald Thiemann, for example.
 ^Barth is, o f theologians, one of the most vehemently opposed to theology conceived in terms o f  
human religious insight apart from revelation.
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This state of affairs offers good reason for revisiting and reconsidering Barth's 
doctrine of revelation. Thus after articulating Barth's position in chapter 1 we 
sought to critique and reformulate a broadly 'Barthian' doctrine of revelation in 
chapter 2. In doing so we drew substantially upon Alan Torrance's work^ in which 
he seeks to move on from what he describes as Barth's 'revelation model' to a 
'worship model'. The latter model identifies ecclesial worship as the event in which 
the community of the church is drawn into participation in the trinitarian 
communion. An important emphasis here is participation.^ Through this model 
Torrance is able to expand upon Barth's description of revelation as 'event'. The 
'worship model' recasts Barth's somewhat undifferentiated revelation 'event' in the 
form of an identifiable human activity in which persons are drawn by God into 
fellowship with himself. This participation, which God makes possible, is a 
transformative one and Torrance's principle focus is upon the semantic aspects of 
this transformation (metanoia).
hi completing chapter 2 we did not complete what we have to say about the revision 
or restatement of the doctrine of revelation. While affirming Torrance's work as a 
valuable extension of Barth's doctrine we believe that his 'worship model' is itself in 
need of further extension. The continuation of our development of the doctrine of 
revelation was interrupted by an exposition of the epistemology of Michael Polanyi 
in chapter 3.  ^ It was here we sought to establish resources for extending this work. 
The resources which we assembled in chapter 3 have already been put to work in 
the exposition of Barth in chapter 5 but now we return to the continuation of our 
more explicit development of the doctrine of revelation in the light of insights 
which we have gained from Michael Polanyi's theory of knowledge.
1. Critical Engagement with Torrance
ToiTance's description of semantic participation in revelation represents a 
significant development of Barth's doctrine of revelation. His comments on
* Torrance, A. (1996). Persons in Communion: Trinitarian Description and Human Participation. 
Edinburgh, T & T Clark.
'* We note, in parenthesis, that this participation is a participation in that which is offered by Christ 
as the incarnate one on our behalf.
® And an exposition of Polanyi's theological and religious writings in chapter 4.
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language as a communal phenomenon contain crucial insights for guiding us away 
from a distorting Cartesian individualism. At various points Torrance speaks of the 
importance of the community of the church as the context in which semantic 
revision occurs in response to God's revelation. He suggests that, for example, 
"[T]he use of a theological term presupposes a community which provides the 
context of its use, that is, the rules of the use of the term. Terms are used in the 
context of social participation with respect to which certain rules apply."® But, 
while Torrance deals with the transformation of human language -  and the human 
metanoia associated with this dynamic -  in the ecclesial context, he does not go on 
to consider the pre-linguistic, supra-linguistic and non-linguistic aspects of ecclesial 
life. The importance of these forms of life for semantic participation are 
acknowledged by Torrance from time to time^ but, while his analysis of semantic 
participation is nuanced and thoroughly developed, the significance of other forms 
of participation in the ecclesial community is not. We contend that it is necessary to 
develop the detailed explorations of these other forms of participation that we find 
in Torrance's treatment of the semantic.^
It is clear that there is 'conceptual space' in Torrance's work for development along 
such lines. For example, he speaks of, "the priority of participation over 
interpretation"®, and significantly, "The 'performative' logic of grace as held forth in 
infant baptism."^® According to Torrance, baptism is, "irreducibly bound up with its 
purpose of training a child (in and through its being brought up to understand what 
its baptism means) in the 'skill' of interpreting the world from the perspective of the 
paradigms associated with the ontological and existential realities held forth in 
baptism."*^ Although this is not developed, it is implicit in such a comment that not 
only does Torrance wish to speak of semantic participation (which is, substantially, 
the burden of his book) he also acknowledges the development of particular
® Tonance Persons in Communion, p.336.
’ As Torrance adopts a substantially 'Wittgensteinian' position it is not surprising that other aspects 
of participation enter the picture although this appears to be largely tacit -  implied rather than 
articulated.
* In the context o f this thesis it is possible to give little more than a suggestion of how such an 
approach might be developed. As we proceed we shall offer examples but what is offered can be no 
more than suggestive o f a much larger project.
® Torrance Persons in Communion, p.339.
*® Ibid. p.339.
** Ibid. p.339.
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cognitive 'skills' as other forms of participation in revelation. Indeed, with regard to 
his discussion of infant baptism it seems that he is concerned with what we might 
call 'epistemic' participation and transformation. Torrance, in embracing the 
'priority of participation over interpretation' distances himself from the 
individualistic Cartesian cogito and aligns himself with the view, embraced by 
Wittgenstein among others, that our interpretation, including our understanding of 
language, is always established in relation to our participation in particular life 
contexts.*^
In chapter 3 we noted similarities between Wittgenstein and Polanyi (of which the 
latter seemed to be unaware). Both men concurred that if we are to understand a 
word we must look to the way it is used in a particular context or community. 
Polanyi and Wittgenstein both reject a nominalism which attaches 'fixed' or 'general' 
meanings to words in abstraction. They assert that words are (to borrow Torrance's 
technical term for a more general purpose) 'commandeered' within a particular 
context and that the meaning of a word cannot be separated from this context 
without loss of meaning.
For Torrance, Wittgenstein and Polanyi, it is on the basis of our participation in a 
particular form of life that the possibility for reflection upon it arises. Our explicit 
knowledge arises from within a life-context. The unique insight of Polanyi (which 
finds no direct parallel in the work of Wittgenstein) is to be found in his theory of 
tacit knowledge. As we saw in chapter 3, Polanyi identifies and differentiates two 
terms of tacit knowing: the focal and the subsidiary. We can know something 
focally only by way of subsidiary knowledge upon which we rely. When we 
consider language in the light of this general epistemological insight we notice two 
distinct lines of application. Firstly, in our use of language we are only subsidiarily 
aware of the shape of the words on the page or the sound of the words as they are 
spoken. Such symbols and sounds point beyond themselves to the things which 
they denote and with which we are focally concerned. We must indwell the 
symbols and sounds of language in order to attend to their meaning. Secondly, 
when we use language what is said explicitly must inevitably draw upon a reservoir
This insight is also acknowledged in Gilbert Ryle's distinction between knowing how and knowing 
that. See Ryle, G. (1949). The Concent o f Mind. London, Penguin, pp.26-60.
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of tacit knowledge. What we bring to explicit articulation is, in this respect, the 
focal term, but in doing so we rely upon our tacit knowledge (of which we are only 
subsidiarily aware) which has developed through our participation in a particular 
form of life.
In theology we are concerned with the church. The language which the church 
adopts is in view here, but we must be aware that this language is irreducibly bound 
up with various forms of ecclesial life. Many of these contain a linguistic 
component but, in participating in them, we participate in more than language.*^ 
Torrance, in following Wittgenstein, may be correct in asserting that we cannot 
think of language in terms of attaching words to things which are already known 
'pre-linguistically' in what amounts to a 'one-step process', but we follow Polanyi in 
his insistence that there is knowledge which cannot be articulated. 'We know more 
than we can tell'. It is to a consideration of the knowledge which cannot be 
articulated that we now turn.
We recall the example of the anatomist, which we noted in the section, 'Language' 
in chapter 3.*"* The anatomist possesses knowledge which is 'ineffable': it is more 
than can be told. The anatomist is able to speak of what he knows but can express it 
only in part. To borrow Ryle's terminology, the anatomist may speak of his 
knowledge that but cannot speak in the same way of his knowledge how. And it is 
this latter knowing which is, in many ways, the most interesting and important. The 
only way in which the anatomist can convey his knowledge how (his 'know-how') is 
indirectly through nurturing another in the skills he possesses.*® Language will 
have a part in this but it will be a limited part. When two skilled anatomists 
converse with one another they communicate, of course, by using language but the 
'success' of their communication depends upon a tacit coefficient in which, on either 
side of the conversation, what is said is supplemented by a whole body of
** Here we have in view the whole gamut o f ecclesial practices: from the forms o f worship, with 
their liturgies, hymns, songs, prayers, Bible readings, physical postures etc., to their engagement in 
the wider community in service, evangelism and prophetic witness (and any number of other 
practices besides).
*“* The illustration is drawn from Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical 
Philosophy. London, Routledge, and Kegan Paul. p.90.
In the development of many skills (in medicine and the natural sciences, for example) there is the 
need to acquire physical sensitivity and dexterity. Such skills can only be developed by way of 
'hands-on' experience.
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knowledge which is shared. Such knowledge cannot readily be made explicit but it 
is nevertheless knowledge which is depended upon. We know more than we can 
tell.
We have sought to establish the need to extend Torrance's understanding of 
semantic participation in such a way that other forms of participation are explicitly 
acknowledged and brought into view. Such an extension is necessary because of 
the interrelatedness of the semantic with these other forms of participation. We do 
not know the Word apart from the flesh.*®
So, in the light of Polanyi's understanding of language, Torrance's exposition of 
semantic participation in revelation must be expanded to include correlate 
participatory functions. Torrance has shown us that the trinitarian communion of 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit is a communion into which human persons are also 
drawn. The community of this communion is the church. As this community's 
forms of life are established in this relationship into which it has been drawn, it is 
necessary that the language which it adopts is transformed through participation in 
this relationship. But it is not only its language which must be open to such 
reverent reconfiguring; its other 'forms of life' must also come into view. Metanoia 
is not limited to semantics!
In the remainder of this chapter we will attempt to identify particular loci in which 
Polanyi's insights offer promising lines of development and to work these out in 
some detail. These will have to stand as representative examples of what would 
comprise a much more extensive project. In our selection of loci we attempt to 
indicate something of the variety of ways in which Polanyi's work might be taken 
up in the exposition of our theme. This will serve to suggest the breadth of 
possibilities which could be followed up as an extension to the present work.
*® See 1 John4.2f.
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2. Ëpistemic Participation
a) The Historical Jesus
In the chapter 2 we noted a tendency for Barth’s two-natures doctrine to 'underplay' 
the significance of the life of Jesus of Nazareth in articulating his doctrine of 
revelation. We noted there Hart's comment, "If Barth's Logos becomes sarx, the 
particular way in which the 'becoming' or the union between the two is consistently 
construed in his theology nonetheless risks reducing it to the point where it loses all 
purchase in the real world, thereby robbing it of any genuine redemptive and 
revelatory force, and finally robbing theology of both its theme and its form as talk 
about God."^^
Nevertheless, Barth speaks of Christ's priestly office in his discussion of 'the 
readiness of man'. As we noted in chapter 1, Barth affirms that, "In our flesh God 
knows himself. Therefore in Him it is a fact that our flesh knows God Himself." 
Part of what is implied in our affirmation that God was in Christ is that in him we 
see the readiness of man for God. "In Him the enmity of man against the grace of 
God is o v e r c o m e . " C h r i s t  becomes our 'kinsman redeemer' and in our 
incorporation into his life we may speak of our readiness for God -  not as an 
autonomous 'capacity' but on the basis of our being 'in him'. Placing emphasis upon 
this incorporation does not imply a marginalisation of the particularity of Jesus 
Christ. As God's hypostatic presence in the realm of creation as a human being, his 
life is of quintessential importance for an understanding of our own humanity.
We may restate the point made earlier that we cannot simply say that Jesus of 
Nazareth is the revelation of God; this would fail to take into account that God is 
veiled in his unveiling. However, we must take account of the fact that it was this 
man -  in all that he said and did -  in which God revealed himself and made himself 
known.
Hart, T. (1999). Regarding Karl Bartfa. Carlisle, The Paternoster Press, p.4.
Barth, K., G. W. Bromiley, et al. (1957). Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of God ILL p.151. 
Ibid. p. 153,
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Jesus called, and nurtured his disciples in the context of a dynamic community. 
This was his 'teaching method'.^^ It was in and through their participation in this 
fonn of life that the disciples came to participate in what the Father was making 
known to them in the Son by the Spirit. In this participation we see a process of 
human transformation which undoubtedly implies semantic revision but entails 
more beside. Polanyi had little time for the concept of revelation^^ and yet, despite 
this, we may detail aspects of his thought which help 'call out' or 'illuminate' the 
way in which the disciples of Jesus came to participate in revelation.
As we have seen, one of Polanyi's key insights is that human knowledge cannot be 
rendered wholly explicit. Indeed Polanyi's view is that, "tacit knowing is... the 
dominant principle of all k n o w l e d g e . W h a t  we can come to know locally is 
facilitated by subsidiary knowledge: knowledge that we indwell. For Polanyi our 
'calling' is that 'indwelling' into which we are nurtured during early years of life 
when, as children, we come to participate in the language, mores, and ethics of the 
family and society into which we are bom. There are circumstances in which a 
person may come to participate in other forms of life by becoming involved, for 
example, in a political, cultural or sporting community. Again, the nature of our 
participation in such groups cannot be fully represented or described in explicit 
terms. So, if it can only be partially explained or described, how can the 
participation come about? In The Tacit Dimension Polanvi discusses the ways in 
which an apprentice assimilates the skills of a master in the achievement of a 
physical performance:
He must try to combine mentally the movements which the performer combines practically and he 
must combine them in a pattern similar to the performer's pattern of movements. Two kinds of 
indwelling meet here. The performer co-ordinates his moves by dwelling in them as parts of his 
body, while the watcher tries to correlate these moves by seeking to dwell in them from outside. He 
dwells in these moves by interiorizing them. By such exploratory indwelling the pupil gets the feel 
of the master's skill and may leam to rival him.^^
^ In this regard we must acknowledge Christ's 'office' as nurturer as well as that of priest.
In The Tacit Dimension he spoke of, "the enfeebled authority of revealed religion." Polanyi, M. 
(1983). The Tacit Dimension. Gloucester, Mass., Peter Smith, p.62.
Polanyi, M. (1959). The Studv of Man: The Lindsav Memorial Lectures 1958. London, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul. p. 13.
Polanyi Tacit Dimension. pp.29f.
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The relationship between apprentice and master is not limited to the acquisition of 
physical skills. Polanyi points out that, "Chess players enter into a master's spirit by 
rehearsing the games he played, to discover what he had in mind."^"  ^ As the 
apprentice rehearses the moves of the master, which are articulate and explicit, he 
or she may come to appreciate why they were made without being able to fully 
explain why. Polanyi indicates that this method of imitating a master is the only 
way for an apprentice to participate in a skill in the way that the master does.
At this point we turn to consider the way in which Jesus' disciples learned from 
him. It is not possible to offer an exhaustive treatment of this theme but we can 
proffer some ideas that will be suggestive of fuller development.
At the commencement of his public ministry Jesus called a group of people around 
him who were to form an 'inner circle' of his followers or disciples. One of the 
striking elements of this call is that it appears to imply that those who responded to 
it left their ordinary employment in order to be part of this group.^^ Jesus' method 
of teaching and nurturing his disciples was one in which they were 'immersed' in a 
form of life that would be in significant ways discontinuous with what they had 
known before. The 'method' which Jesus adopted was to incorporate his disciples 
into a community of practice which was participation in the ministry to which Jesus 
had been called by the Father.
In the context of first century Palestine it was not unusual for rabbis to have a 
following of disciples with whom they would share much of their lives. This aspect 
of Jesus' relationship with his disciples was not unique. What was unique was the 
particular form in which this relationship was established, as we shall see. 
Nevertheless, from the perspective of contemporary western society this form of 
nurture does strike one as being unfamiliar. This is not typically the pattern 
according to which students are taught -  or, perhaps more to the point, this is not 
the way in which things are seen to be. This is not surprising. The dominant 
conception of knowledge -  as that which can be made explicit -  renders the need 
for such a richly relational form of teaching obscure. As a result the relational
^"ibid. p.30.
See, for example, Matthew 4.18-22.
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aspects of our learning (which will be present in some way or another) are 
bracketed-out of our pedagogical theory and regarded as peripheral, incidental 
phenomena?^ In circumstances where a more obvious form of apprenticeship has 
been sustained (in the case of clinical medical studies, for example) explicit 
epistemological conceptualisations have been set aside in tacit recognition that such 
a conceptuality is inadequate to 'do the job'.
The gospels witness to Jesus' practice of teaching his disciples 'on the job'. What 
Jesus did and what he taught were closely connected.^^ We notice this tight linking 
of what Jesus did and what he taught in the brief description of his life in the 
prologue to the Acts of the Apostles.^^ Jesus taught the Kingdom and in his actions 
offered signs of its presence and reality. Jesus also taught 'ethics' and the 
interpretation of Torah, not in abstract but in the context of events in which he was 
involved. Here we might think, by way of illustration, of the incident of the woman 
caught in the act of adultery.
What was unique was that Jesus' teachings and acts provided for his disciples, and 
for others with eyes to see, intimations of a radically new reality. But this was not a 
reality which was necessarily apprehended. In order to 'see' this new reality it is 
necessary, according to John's gospel, to be 'bom again'. This is the work of the 
Spirit of God. A great deal of Jesus' teaching as we find it in the gospels is 
parabolic. It is significant that this is an 'indirect' form of teaching. The parables 
contain images of characters, events and situations which his hearers could readily 
identify. But, typically, they are subversive stories in which the hearers' 
associations and assumptions are called into question. It is their indirectness which 
renders the hearer more susceptible to the message they contain. There is no space 
to expand on this but a point to be noted is that these stories were told to provide, 
for those with eyes to see, part of a vision of the Kingdom of God. It is implicit that 
the Spirit is at work in the telling and the hearing of these stories. The parables 
provide a vehicle through which the hearer can conceive of the world differently
This issue comes to the fore in 'distance learning' and 'web-based' courses. 
See. For example, Matthew 4.23.
Acts 1.1-2.
John 8.1-11.
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and thus they provide the means of 'epistemic' transformation of a very particular 
kind.
Such a transformation was also necessary with regard to the disciples' expectations 
of Messiah and Israel. In Mark's gospel, for instance, it is immediately after Peter's 
confession of Jesus as the Christ that Jesus confronted him with a vision of the 
suffering which he would have to undergo. Here, in a very direct way, Peter's 
conceptions and beliefs were challenged and he, having received the revelatory 
insight that Jesus was the Christ, found himself unable to comprehend what Jesus 
had to tell him. The disciples' confused reception of Jesus' teaching is a recurrent 
theme in the gospels.
Jesus often taught by example. It was after one of the disciples had seen Jesus at 
prayer that he was prompted to ask Jesus how to pray.^ ® In response Jesus gave the 
form of the 'Lord's Prayer'. But the disciples would have had a much broader 
picture of Jesus' prayer life than could have ever been expressed in the words of a 
'formula' prayer. They would have known when and where he prayed; they would 
have known about the physical posture which he adopted and they would have 
known something of his attitude towards it and perhaps some insight into how 
prayer affected him. Presumably it was this knowledge which prompted the 
question.
Much more could be said about the ways in which Jesus nurtured and taught his 
disciples. The central point which we want to make here is that his 'teaching' 
cannot be understood apart from his invitation to join him in his way of life. It was 
in the life of this small community -  in the midst of its relationships, tasks and 
tensions -  that Jesus taught his disciples. In direct and in indirect teaching, by 
signs, miracles, symbolic gestures and all manner of 'life practices' Jesus presented 
a challenge to the way in which they understood their lives, the destiny of Israel and 
their understanding of 'Messiah', and nurtured them in a distinctive pattern of life.
30 Luke 11.1-6.
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It is evident that far from all of what Jesus taught during his time with his disciples 
was assimilated and often the disciples were left in a state of confusion. But such 
transformation as there was, and such transformation as occurred following the 
death and resurrection of Jesus and the coming of the Spirit at Pentecost, is 'shaped' 
by the practices in which the disciples were nurtured in the presence of Jesus. Jesus 
showed his disciples a way of life and it was this that the disciples learned during 
their time with him. As a consequence the disciples' perspective on their own 
religious heritage did change: they did come to see things differently. But it seems 
that their 'theoretical' grasp of the meaning of this way of life and their appreciation 
of the didactic instruction of Jesus was halting and uncertain.
The vitality of the community which Jesus established cannot be understood apart 
from the relationship between Jesus and 'his Father', The synoptic gospels 
demonstrate this by referring to Jesus' habit of withdrawing from the community 
and the wider public for prayer^ ^ and the form and content of that prayer is 
indicated in John's gospel.^^ There was an important sense in which the disciples 
were on the 'outside' of the relationship between Jesus and 'the Father'. When, in 
John's gospel, Jesus is represented as saying to his disciples, "I have food that you 
do not know about"^^, they do not understand what he is talking about. This is one 
of the techniques which the gospel writer adopts for demonstrating that the disciples 
were far less than fully aware of that in which they had become involved. 
Nevertheless, Jesus taught his disciples to pray, "Our Fa the r " . Under  the tutelage 
and guidance of their master the disciples came to participate in a form of life -  
even though there was much that they did not understand and misunderstood.
In washing his disciples' feet Jesus told the disciples that they did not know what he 
was doing, but that later they would understand.^^ While the comment relates to a 
specific incident it is clear enough from the gospels that there were many occasions 
when the disciples had little understanding of Jesus' teaching and actions. 
However, a time was coming when they would understand much more.
See, for example, Matthew 14.13 & 23 and Luke 5.16. 
Especially John 17.1-26.
John 4.31.
Matthew 6.9. Thereby Jesus included his disciples in this relational participation with 'the Father' 
and taught them to consider themselves so included.
See John 13.7.
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b) The Early Church
Two dominical commands which were given to the disciples, one before the 
crucifixion and one before the ascension, have been of crucial importance for the 
church. We will consider them and the forms of life which have sprung from them.
i. The Lord’s Supper
The first was given in the institution of the Lord's Supper which may well have 
occurred in the setting of an established habit of eating together and table- 
fellowship. This event is recorded in the three synoptic gospels (Matthew 26.26-28; 
Mark 14.22-24 and Luke 22.17-20) and in Paul's first letter to the Corinthians
11.23-25. Before his arrest, at the Passover meal with his disciples, Jesus offered 
them bread and wine as 'his body' and 'his blood' in the establishment of a 'new 
covenant'. Luke and Paul emphasise that Jesus said, 'do this in remembrance of 
me.' There is something to remember and something to do. This is not the place to 
enter into the debate about the nature of the bread and wine in the Eucharistie 
celebration. Our interest is in drawing attention to some aspects of this event which 
are not contested.
It is surely significant that at this crucial moment Jesus addresses his disciples at 
table in the context of a fellowship meal. Jesus tells them that they must repeat 
what they do in this upper room in order to remember him. Two aspects of this 
which are both uncontroversial and highly significant are the communal and 
symbolic nature of the event. The 'locus' of the commemoration is a communal 
meal, which implies the corporate nature of what Jesus intends. The 'remembering' 
is that of the community as it comes together to share a meal. The other aspect 
which we must note is its symbolism. Jesus does not explain himself beyond 
calling the bread his body and the wine his blood. He does not explain what is 
about to happen to him and how this meal relates to it. Jesus' command is simply 
that they eat this meal together in order to remember him.
Why a meal? Why bread? Why wine? Why doesn't Jesus offer his disciples a 
clearly formulated theological explanation of the significance and meaning of the
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events which are about to unfold? The church has spilt much ink engaged in this 
task down the centuries. Why wasn't Jesus more 'explicit'? We would suggest that 
no such teaching was delivered to the disciples because that was not the way in 
which Jesus sought to teach. The kind of 'remembering' Jesus required of his 
disciples was a 'doing': the coming together of community for a meal -  as they had 
come together so many times before. In instituting the 'Lord's Supper' Jesus' 
primary intention was not to convey concept or theory but to achieve something 
much more concrete -  to cause the disciples to continue to do something in which 
they had been nurtured by him during the time of his three year ministry.
There has been much heated ecclesial debate over the Lord's Supper^^ but it is 
intriguing that, transcending many disagreements, the followers of Christ have 
come together and shared bread and wine in remembrance of him. The 
contemporary Christian who partakes in the Eucharistie bread and wine may have 
no direct knowledge of the form of life which the first disciples learned at Jesus' 
feet but, drawing on Polanyi's understanding of how skills and traditions are 
transmitted down generations, we can see how Eucharistie practice has been passed 
down generations. In this way it is meaningful to say that contemporary Eucharistie 
practice is a participation in that which was originally instituted by Christ. The 
'remembering' of the contemporary church is through this 'doing'.
We have noted before that in their participation in the circle of Jesus' close 
followers the disciples were often confused by what Jesus did and said and not 
infrequently they tried to persuade him that he was mistaken. Gospel accounts 
suggest that the disciples knew very little of what was about to happen to Jesus after 
the 'Lord's Supper' -  much less did they have a theological understanding of what 
those events might mean. What the disciples did have was knowledge of the way of 
life in which Jesus had nurtured them, the centrality of Jesus in this, and some 
awareness of the relationship which Jesus had with the one he called 'Father'.
This is not to deny the crucial significance o f the events o f Jesus crucifixion, death, burial and 
resurrection. These events would come to be seen by the disciples as decisive for their 
understanding of Jesus. But even these decisive events have their meaning in the context of what the 
disciples had learned in the presence o f Jesus of a period o f three years. If only these final events of 
Jesus' life are of significance the reasons for Jesus calling together a band o f followers are unclear.
Also, 'Eucharist' or 'Mass'.
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The disciples, among others, discerned in him one who spoke and acted with 
authority/^ They may have substantially failed to penetrate the meaning and 
coherence of this. Much of what Jesus said and did did not resonate with many of 
the expectations and assumptions which they held; indeed Jesus said and did many 
things which disturbed and discomforted them. The gospels suggest that after Jesus' 
death the disciples resumed their old patterns of life and work in many ways -  they 
were not able to 'inhabit' the way of life in which they had been nurtured without 
Jesus’ presence with them. It was in the outpouring of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost 
that the disciples were enabled to take up again the forms of life in which they had 
been nurtured -  in the power of the Spirit.
We may discern a parallel here with the way in which Polanyi describes how a child 
is nurtured in a family and a society and, more specifically, the way in which 
language is learned. Children, if they are to leam language, must believe that the 
sounds which they hear are meaningful. On the basis of such a belief a child will 
try to discern patterns of sounds and meanings. For the disciples to understand the 
meaning of the life which they had shared with Jesus it was necessary to believe 
that it was meaningful -  but its meaning could not be discerned apart from the 
disciples' incorporation into the trinitarian fellowship. As Jesus' life was marked hy 
his fellowship with the Father through the Spirit, so the disciples -  in their taking up 
again the forms of life in which Jesus had nurtured them -  were drawn into 
communion with the trinitarian God.
ii. The Great Commission
A second dominical command issued to the disciples after the resurrection of Jesus 
is recorded in Matthew's gospel. Before his ascension Jesus appeared with his 
disciples on a mountain in Galilee and said to them: "All authority in heaven and on 
earth has been given to me. Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, 
baptising them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and
See Matthew 7.29.
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teaching them to obey everything that I have commanded you. And remember, I 
am with you always, to the end of the age."^^
Many things could be said in connection with this passage. In the context of our 
own developments it seems particularly relevant to draw attention to Jesus' 
command to 'make disciples'. The implication of this is that the task with which 
Jesus charges his close circle of followers is to extend their numbers by nurturing 
others in the patterns of life which he had established. This task is not exclusively -  
or even primarily -  one of communicating concepts, ideas or doctrines but one in 
which this small group of Jesus' followers must apprentice others in ways in which 
they had been nurtured by him. Jesus' charge is to 'make disciples'. He commands 
his disciples to teach new disciples to obey 'everything that I have commanded you', 
but it is difficult, if  not impossible, to conceive of what this might mean apart from 
the life context in which Jesus taught them.
A further point which can be made is that the command which Jesus issues to his 
disciples is not delimited to any one social, religious or cultural grouping but to 'all 
nations'. The implication of this is that the form of life which the disciples had 
learned from Jesus, and in which they are to apprentice others, is one of universal 
rather than parochial significance.
For the disciples the form of life in which they were discipled entailed a 
reorientation of life. It would be misleading to conceive of this transformation 
(metanoia) as anything other than a transformation of their whole lives. Their 
religious and theological beliefs (as first century Palestinian Jews) were challenged, 
but so were their socio-political conceptions and semantic practices. But such 
transformations cannot be conceived apart from the way of life (in all its 
concreteness) in which Jesus had apprenticed his disciples.
In this section we have attempted to describe how Jesus nurtured his disciples in a 
distinctive form of life and one in which Jesus' first circle of followers was
See Matthew 28.16-20.
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commanded, in turn, to nurture o t h e r s . I t  is implicit that participation in this fonn 
of life is a participation in the life of the trinitarian God as well as one of ecclesial 
fellowship. It is a transformative way of life. We affirm Torrance's claim that this 
is a community of semantic transformation but, beyond this, and following the 
insights of Polanyi, we would wish to place some emphasis upon the fact that those 
who participate in this transformative community know more than they can tell.
3. Bodily Participation
Without doubting the importance of language in human formation and, indeed, the 
significance of semantic transformation implied in the Christian gospel, it does 
seem that Torrance, in Persons in Communion, has a tendency to overstate it. This 
is indicated when, in drawing upon Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge toward the 
end of his book^\ he concludes with the thought that, "The most essential or 
fundamental tool for our indwelling the world would appear... to be language. 
But, as we have seen in our exposition of Polanyi in chapter 3, Polanyi -  while 
acknowledging the significance of language -  speaks of the ''bodily roots of all 
thought.
Polanyi offers many examples of knowledge which is 'ineffable'. It is not that we 
may not speak of such knowledge but that in speaking of it we are only able to 
convey part of what we know. Through the development of perceptual skills -  in 
certain circumstances aided by the skilful use of tools or instruments -  we are able 
to 'make contact with reality' and to know it in ways which transcend our capacity 
to articulate it. Over against Torrance we would contend that it is our bodies ~ in 
the many ways in which we may skilfully use them -  that provide us with our most 
fundamental tool for indwelling the world.
In the final section of tins chapter we will show why diversity is necessarily implied in the living 
of this 'form of life'.
In the context o f this discussion the book which Torrance cites is Polanyi's The Tacit Dimension. 
Torrance Persons in Communion, p.352,
Polanyi The Tacit Dimension, p. 15. Our emphasis.
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Mark Johnson's The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination 
and Reason" "^^ offers a substantial treatment of the relationship between our bodies 
and oirr knowing which appears to harmonise with Polanyi's claim about the bodily 
roots of thought. Johnson makes the point that as rational animals, human beings 
are rational animals. He claims, "The centrality of human embodiment directly 
influences what and how things can be meaningful for us, the ways in which these 
meanings can be developed and articulated, the ways we are able to comprehend 
and reason about experience, and the actions we take.""^  ^ Even what might be 
regarded as abstract meanings, Johnson notes, depend upon schemes of thought 
which derive from our bodily experience.
Johnson argues that the prepositional and conceptual content of our speech is 
possible because of the existence of a complex web of what he calls 
'nonpropositional schematic structures' which derive from bodily experience. We 
have a meaningful physical interaction with the world, hi part this precedes our 
attempts to speak and establish conceptualisations of it and little (perhaps none) of 
our conceptual and linguistic engagement with the world can occur without it. Here 
Johnson affirms the point made by Polanyi about the bodily roots of our knowing. 
He writes, "Once meaning is understood in this broader, enriched manner, it will 
become evident that the structure of rationality is much richer than any set of 
abstract logical patterns independent of the patterns of our physical interactions in 
and with our environment.""^^
By way of illustration Johnson discusses the idea offorce as it is used both literally 
and metaphorically. He suggests that, although it is a point which is easily 
overlooked, its usage depends upon publicly shared meaning structures which 
derive from our bodily experience of force. Such experiences may first occur in the 
womb and proceed to accumulate after birth. A haby's body is subject to various 
forces (gravity, water in the bath tub, being dressed, etc.). As well as being acted 
upon by various forces the baby also learns to exert force as it pushes its hottle 
away or grabs its soft toy and its parent's spectacles. "We develop patterns of
Johnson, M. (1987). The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis o f Meaning. Imagination and 
Reason. Chicago and London, University o f Chicago Press.
Ibid. p.xix.
Ibid. p.5.
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interacting forcefully with our environment.”"^  ^ The baby will sometimes succeed in 
an attempt to exert force and will sometimes fail. But in these experiences, all of 
which precede the process of language acquisition, the baby is learning about the 
meaning of force in relationship to its environment. Johnson makes the important 
point that:
In each o f these motor activities there are repeatable patterns that come to identify that particular 
forceful action. These patterns are embodied and give coherent, meaningful structure to our physical 
experience at a preconceptual level, though we are taught names for at least some of these patterns, 
and can discuss them in the abstract. Of course, we formulate a concept o f "force," which we can 
explicate in prepositional terms. But its meaning -  the meaning it identifies -  goes deeper than our 
conceptual and prepositional understanding.'*®
All the words and ideas which cluster around the concept of 'force' cannot be 
understood apart from these bodily experiences"^  ^ of force which accumulate from 
the earliest experiences of our lives. Jolinson suggests that such early encounters, 
"reveal patterned recurring relations between ourselves and our environment. Such 
patterns develop as meaning structures through which our world begins to exhibit a 
measure of coherence, regularity, and intelligibility."^® This suggests that in 
speaking of 'force' we speak of a concept which is meaningful to us. But it is only 
meaningful to us because of the various bodily experiences of force of which we 
have spoken. In the absence of such bodily experiences the concept of force would 
be void of meaning. Thus the concept, malleable and useful as it may be for the 
purposes of articulate communication, is rooted in an understanding of force which 
is bodily.
This is just one example of how a concept can be meaningful only because of the 
bodily experience out of which it arises. What our bodily indwelling means to us 
transcends what we are able to tell but, if Polanyi and Johnson are correct, oiu 
concepts can be meaningful only insofar as they arise out of this 'bodily-involving 
knowing'. As such we would affirm not only that all knowledge is personal but that 
it involves our bodily engagement with the world. Knowledge does not exist in
Ibid. p. 13. And we come to indwell those patterns.
Ibid. p. 13.
With all their developing 'knowings' and 'know-how'.
Jolinson The Bodv in the Mind, p. 13. This will inevitably include a substantial tacit component.
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abstract apart from persons and persons depend upon their bodies in order to come 
to know things.
We will now extend the idea of ’bodily-rooted knowledge' to subjects of 
considerable significance within the ecclesial context. We will consider the 
significance of the eating of bread and the drinking of wine in the Eucharist and the 
use of water in baptism but, before we deal with these themes we consider the 
significance of song in the context of the church's liturgical practice.
a) Why Sing?
Steven Guthrie, in an article entitled, "Singing, in the Body and in the Spirit"^% asks 
why the use of song is so widespread in ecclesial practice. "In a liturgical universe 
of extraordinary diversity, music is one of the handful of practices which has been 
and remains an almost universal feature of Christian worship."^^ Why sing?
Guthrie reminds us that within the Christian tradition the attitudes towards singing 
of some significant authorities have caused the place of music in ecclesial worship 
to be cast in a somewhat ambiguous light. Augustine acknowledges the capacity of 
music to intensify the force of the word which is conjoined with it. But, according 
to Augustine, there is a danger: "my physical delight [delectatio carnis], which has 
to be checked from enervating the mind [mentem], often deceives me when the 
perception of the senses [sensus] is unaccompanied by reason [rationem], and is not 
patiently content to be in a subordinate place. The pastoral conclusion that 
Augustine reaches, in respect of singing in church, is that "it is to be approved, so 
that through the delights of the ear the weaker mind may rise up towards the 
devotion of worship."^"  ^ But his ambivalence about the matter is evident in his 
subsequent remark, "Yet when it happens to me that the music moves me more than 
the subject of the song, I confess myself to commit a sin deserving punishment, and
Guthrie, S. R. (2003). "Singing, in the Body and in the Spirit." Journal o f the Evangelical 
Theological Society 46(4): 633-646.
Ibid. p.633.
”  Quoted in ibid. p.634.
Quoted in ibid. p.634.
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then I would prefer not to have heard the singer. Augustine's ambivalence 
towards music derives from what he perceives as its potential to promote the desire 
for sensual satisfaction and his belief that human beings ought to be led by rational 
thought rather than bodily sense.^® John Calvin also has a certain ambivalence 
towards music in worship. While warmly commending its use he also warns that 
the worshipper must guard against being more 'moved' by the sensual experience of 
the music than the spiritual meaning of the words. He cautions, "such songs as have 
been composed only for sweetness and delight of the ear are unbecoming to the 
majesty of the church and cannot but displease God in the highest degree. 
Guthrie also draws our attention to the thoughts of Dietrich Bonhoeffer on the 
subject in which, again, the subservience of the music to the words is emphasised. 
"All devotion, all attention should be concentrated upon the Word in the hymn... 
[W]e do not hum a melody; we sing words of praise to God, words of thanksgiving 
and prayer. Thus the music is completely the servant of the Word."^^
Such views cast the value of music in Christian worship in a most uncertain light. 
For Augustine its potential for stirring the emotions -  which may be of benefit, 
especially for those of more limited rational powers (!) -  is attached to an inherent 
risk that it may also promote sinful sensuality. For Calvin there is the fear that 
music will be a distraction and become an end in itself rather than a medium for 
worship, and for Bonhoeffer the positive function of music is less clear than its 
negative propensity for distracting attention from the words which it accompanies. 
On such a view the value of music seems to be in question. It may distract from the 
meaning of the words and, although it can stir the spirit, it can do so only with the 
concomitant danger of promoting carnality. So, why sing? Would it not be safer 
and more sober to avoid music in Christian worship?
In contradistinction to this ambivalent evaluation of music Guthrie reminds us of 
the exhortation in the Ephesian epistle to "sing psalms and hymns and spiritual
Quoted in ibid. p.634.
It is clear that Augustine's view of the relationship between bodily sense and rational thought is 
quite at odds with the one explored by Mark Johnson in The Bodv in the Mind.
 ^ Quoted in Guthrie "Singing, in the Body and in the Spirit." p.636.
Quoted in ibid. p.636.
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songs among yourselves, singing and making melody to the Lord in your hearts. 
Guthrie makes the significant point that the author's exhortation to engage in music 
follows on directly from an exhortation to renounce debasing sensual activity.®® He 
writes, "to a Christian community surrounded by ignorance and immorality; to a 
people who were themselves prone to the blindness and indulgence of their former 
way of life; at the conclusion of a passage warning against irrationality and sins of 
the flesh -  Paul urges singing and music making."®  ^ Guthrie notes that this line of 
reasoning appears to run counter to the positions that we have reviewed. He writes, 
"To put it very crudely, Augustine says: "Irrationality is bad. Sensuality is bad. 
Therefore be careful about music." Paul on the other hand says, "Foolishness is 
had. Sensuality is bad. Therefore you had better sing.""®^
If Guthrie's exegesis is correct, the author of Ephesians is suggesting that music, far 
fr om being a snare, is an antidote to dehumanising, sinful sensuality. Consequently 
he develops the thesis that, "the children of light are singing people, not despite, but 
because music engages body and sense."®  ^ This is, of course, contrary to the many 
elements in Christian theological tradition which have to a greater or lesser degree 
regarded bodies as an impediment to the sanctifying work of the Spirit. Guthrie 
suggests that the biblical tradition "does not limit or even focus the redemptive 
activity of the Holy Spirit on the "mind" ("Come, visit every pious mind"). Rather, 
the Holy Spirit of God is also revealed as the incarnating Spirit -  the One who 
creates, vivifies, and restores bodies."®"^
For Guthrie, to conceive of sanctification as a process of 'mind transformation' 
which is in danger of being impeded -  or even reversed -  by 'sensual' experience is 
mistaken. Rather both body and mind must be transformed in the sanctifying work 
of the Holy Spirit. Further, in view of the text from Ephesians, it appears "the 
sensualist, the one who has abused body and sense, more than anyone needs to have 
body and sense engaged by the Spirit."®® For this reason the author of the epistle
Ephesians 5.19. See also Colossians 3,16. 
See Ephesians 5.3-18.
Guthrie "Singing, in the Body and in the Spirit." p.638.
Ibid. p.638. Guthrie assumes Pauline authorship of the epistle. 
^ Ibid. p.639. Guthrie's emphasis.
Ibid. p.640.
Ibid. p.641.
Page 232
exhorts his readers to song. The senses are not to be suppressed; they are to be 
redirected and transformed.
The imagery which is adopted earlier in Ephesians serves to reinforce this 
interpretation. The sinfulness of a distorted sensuality -  engaging in what some 
would call 'excess' -  has the effect of 'desensitising' (resulting in 'loss of sense'), 
which is dehumanising.®® The sanctifying work of the Spirit is one of 'resensitising' 
-  of regaining sense -  in order that true humanity may be restored. The author of 
Ephesians suggests that songs of praise may be part of that reorientation.
Perhaps the most intriguing and suggestive part of Guthrie's paper in consideration 
of our own work, is his exploration of how our bodies are used in singing in the 
ecclesial context. He states that, "sensitivity and responsiveness to the created order 
and to other human beings... characterizes the Holy Spirit's work among the 
children of light."®  ^This is precisely what happens in good music making where the 
body-involving aspects of our participation are of very considerable significance;
As we sing together we attend to the activity o f our own bodies in making sound, and we regard and 
respond to our own song as we hear it resonate in the space around us. We hear and attune ourselves 
to the sound of others' voices. We respond not only to people, but to the physical qualities of the 
sound we are creating with others and the physical and acoustical properties of the space in which 
we are singing. Moreover, we submit ourselves together to a tempo, a pattern o f melody and 
rhythm, and we respond dynamically to the shape and movement of our musical interaction.'*®
What Guthrie is saying is that in our music-making we must be sensitive -  to our 
own bodily participation, to those with whom we make music, to the sounds we 
make and to the physical environment in which this happens. This is a way in 
which persons can be in communion; it is an activity in which we encounter and 
respond to one another and, if the music is good, one in which this occurs with a 
measure of sensitivity. Guthrie claims, "It is not accidental that the commands to 
sing in Eph 5:19 lead on to the exhortation in verse 21: "Submit to one another out
See Ephesians 4.19.
Guthrie "Singing, in the Body and in the Spirit." p.642. 
'*® Ibid. p.642.
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of reverence for Christ.""®  ^ Commenting upon the phenomenon of congregational 
singing Guthrie notes, "From the many voices that sing together, a new entity 
emerges -  the voice of the church; a sound which has qualities and properties which 
the individual voices of which it is composed do not have."^® Guthrie goes on to 
say, "Music is both an image and a means of attaining to this unity. So the 
stmcture of the letter to the Ephesians leads us on to the affirmation that the "Spirit 
uses song in leading us from a life of self-absorbed sensuality out into a life of 
others-orientated sensitivity."^^ Clearly there are many other activities which are 
communal and require for their performance an embodied interpersonal sensitivity, 
but music -  not least congregational singing in an ecclesial context -  provides a 
compelling example of the phenomenon.
It is not that in singing the church and its members look to their own activity or 
performance as the source of transformation, but that it is an important locus in 
which God's transforming presence and activity through the Spirit are known. As 
such it is one of the ways in which we ought to speak of the church's participation in 
revelation.
b) Why Bread, Wine and Water?
We have already considered some questions of epistemic participation and 
transformation associated with the sacramental life of the church. We will now 
reflect, briefly, upon the significance of the 'physicality' of these practices.
We would contend that one of the significances of the re-enactment of the last 
supper in the Eucharist is intrinsically linked to its physicality. Why does the 
church 'do this in remembrance'? Why is it not sufficient to have a public reading 
of the gospel and a sermon in which its theological significance is articulated? 
Undoubtedly one reason is that it is an act of obedience in response to what is 
understood as a dominical command. But perhaps we can say more. Drawing upon 
Mark Johnson's analysis we ought to note the significance of the fact that since the
69 Ibid. p.642, 
™ Ibid. p.644. 
Ibid. p.642. 
Ibid. p.642.
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form of remembering which Jesus required of his disciples was a meal, its meaning 
to us will be connected to ideas which cluster around our understanding of meals. 
We might think, for example, of sustenance, satisfaction of hunger, the quenching 
of thirst, table fellowship, time to discuss, reflect and share stories and personal 
experiences, or celebration. All these ideas, and many others beside, we associate 
with 'meal’ and inevitably the breadth and depth of such associations transcend what 
we are able to articulate of them. But more specifically for the first disciples of 
Jesus, the eating of bread and the drinking of wine is a symbolic reminder of that 
way of life in which Jesus had nurtured them and in which they, in turn, now 
nurture others in response to the Great Commission.
The second dominical command concerns water and baptism. Those who respond 
to the invitation to Christian discipleship are to be baptised in the name of the 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Again so much could be said about this and we have 
space only to offer a few suggestions about how this practice is to be interpreted 
and understood. Why use water? Is it not adequate for one who comes to faith to 
make a public statement or sign a document affirming allegiance to the Christ? 
Again we might say that it is adopted in the church in obedience to the dominical 
command. But it seems that, as with the Lord's Supper, what is required by the 
command reflects an appreciation that as a physical action the rite of baptism makes 
connections with deeply rooted hodily experience. The most obvious symbolic 
connection is with washing by which we remove dirt from our bodies. This is 
extended, symbolically, to the washing away of sin.^ ® This, as with eating, is a 
bodily experience into which we enter from earliest childhood -  before its purpose 
is explicitly known to us. Whatever else we may wish to affirm of baptism an 
association with this bodily experience with its tacit associations will be present. A 
further particular association which overlays the symbolism of washing and 
cleansing is the idea that in going down into the water the person being baptised is 
identified with the death and burial of Christ; and, in emerging from the water, with 
the resurrection of Christ from the dead.^ "^
See, for example. Acts 22.16.
See Romans 6.3f and Colossians 2.12.
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Our purpose here, as will be apparent, is not to develop a sacramental theology but 
merely to acknowledge that the physical elements of bread and wine in the 
Eucharist, and water in baptism, are meaningful to us in that they draw, in symbolic 
association, upon bodily experiences and the body-involving knowledge -  
predominantly tacit -  associated with them. In sustaining this emphasis we 
circumvent the mistaken and misleading belief that our 'abstract', 'theoretical' or 
'doctrinal' articulation is meaningful and perhaps in some sense more pure apart 
from its association with such bodily 'know-how'.
Polanyi's consistent emphasis that all knowledge is personal implies (and, as we 
have noted, this point is one which he often makes explicit) that all knowledge is 
knowledge of embodied persons. Thus to conceive of knowledge apart from such 
embodiment can only serve to distort our understanding of it.
One of the consequences of the failure to appreciate the significance of our 
embodiment, and the tendency to conceive of knowledge as (exclusively) that 
which can be articulated, is that it has led to an impoverished view of the 
physicality of sacramental practice. There may even be some element of 
embarrassment associated with it, because if our knowledge is taken to be that 
which can be fully articulated ('we can tell what we know') it is difficult to see what 
significance bread and eating; wine and drinking or water and baptising can have.^ ® 
The church may continue to use bread and wine at the Eucharist and water at 
baptism (in various volumes) in obedience to the dominical command and in 
continuity with an unbroken tradition but, in the absence of an acknowledgement of 
the importance of 'body-involving' knowledge, it will be hard pressed to find other 
cogent reasons for its practice.
In this section we have sought to incorporate the insights of Polanyi and Johnson 
with regard to the bodily roots of human knowledge in order to suggest some 
preliminary answers to the deceptively problematic questions about the practices 
that the church has adopted in its sacramental life and in its use of song in worship. 
Only by supplementing Torrance's account of semantic participation with what we
As it is difficult to see what music can add to the words of a hymn or a song in terms o f human 
knowledge.
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have called (somewhat unsatisfactorily) bodily participation and transformation has 
it been possible to do this. As in the previous section we have shown that our 
participation in revelation is far from exhausted in its semantic aspect.
4. Hermeneutical Participation
It is important, as we have argued, to recognise the significance of the trans- 
linguistic or pre-linguistic aspects of our knowledge. But, as we reflect upon the 
sacramental practice of the church, we need to recognise that both the Eucharist and 
baptism are set in a liturgical context which is substantially linguistic. The 
sacramental liturgies locate the baptismal and Eucharistie events in the broader 
narrative of the Judeo-Christian history and tradition. Torrance talks of the "'skill' 
of interpreting the world from the perspective of the paradigms associated with the 
ontological and existential realities held forth in baptism."^®
Rather than dealing with Eucharistie and baptismal liturgies, in the concluding 
section of this chapter we will briefly consider the broader issues associated with 
the 'interpretation of the world' of which Torrance speaks. Here we are concerned 
with what we shall call 'hermeneutical' participation. Here the question of the 
ecclesial community's interpretation of its Scripture is posed.
There is no scope to deal with the issues of biblical interpretation and hermeneutics 
in any depth. The limit of what we can hope to achieve in the present context is to 
outline some ways in which the canonical Scriptures can be conceived as forming 
and shaping the ecclesial community and, thereby, its self-understanding and we 
will attempt to indicate the function of the tacit dimension in this process. In 
concluding the chapter in this way, we will open up the question of the significance 
of the imagination in this interpretive work in preparation for the final chapter in 
which we will explore some aspects of the function of imagination in our 
participation in revelation.
76 Torrance Persons in Communion, p.339.
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The New Testament scholar, N.T. Wright has suggested a paradigm for biblical 
interpretation which we believe to be particularly helpful/^ Wright, in trying to 
establish the sense in which the biblical texts can be understood as authoritative, 
rejects approaches which amount to 'biblicistic proof-texting'^^ and suggests an 
approach in which we reflect upon the significance of the predominance of 'story' in 
the biblical literature -  not least in the New Testament. Wright offers the following 
suggestion for the interpretation of the biblical literature:
Suppose there exists a Shakespeare play, most o f whose fifth act has been lost. The first four acts 
provide, let us suppose, such a remarkable wealth of characterization, such a crescendo of 
excitement within the plot, that it is generally agreed that the play ought to be staged. Nevertheless, 
it is felt inappropriate actually to write a fifth act once and for all; it would freeze the play into one 
form, and commit Shakespeare as it were to being prospectively responsible for work not in fact his 
own. Better, it might be felt, to give the key parts to highly trained, sensitive and experienced 
Shakespearian actors, who would immerse themselves in the first four acts, and in the language and 
culture o f Shakespeare and his time, and who would then be told to work out a fifth act for  
themselves. ‘79
In this scenario the first four acts play a decisive role in shaping the fifth. The 
credibility of the rendering of the fifth act could be questioned on the basis that it is 
incommensurable or inconsistent in some way with the earlier part of the play. But 
the fifth act could not, of course, be criticised for failing to repeat the earlier parts 
of the play; indeed, an 'authentic', or at least a credible, fifth act could not possibly 
be a repetition of what had gone before. What would be required of the actors 
would be, "a firee and responsible entering in to the story as it stood, in order first to 
understand how the threads could appropriately be drawn together and then to put 
that understanding into effect by speaking and acting with both innovation and 
consistency."^®
This model of biblical interpretation, far from being a matter of looking up 'right 
answers' (or something of the sort) is a creative entering into and extrapolating fr om
See Wright, N. T. (1992). The New Testament and the People of God. London, SPCK. pp. 139- 
143.
And, in particular, the view that the Bible contains a store of eternal, absolute 'propositional' truths 
which need simply to be identified and applied in each new situation.
Wright New Testament, p. 140. Wright's emphasis.
Ibid. p. 140.
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the biblical text. To use Polanyi’s terminology, we would have to say that authentic 
biblical interpretation comes not from following a rule-based stratagem but from an 
imaginative extrapolation facilitated by a profound indwelling of the text. It is a 
question of 'faithful performance'. "A good fifth act will show a proper 
development, not merely repetition of what went before."®^
Wright makes the point that there might be an analogy here with any work of art or 
story which is left incomplete.^^ However, he suggests that this analogy is 
particularly apposite. Wright explains:
Among the detailed moves available within this model... is the possibility of seeing the biblical story 
as itself consisting of five acts. Thus: 1-Creation; 2-Fall; 3-Israel; 4-Jesus. The writing of the New 
Testament -  including the writing o f the gospels -  would then form the first scene o f the fifth act, 
and would simultaneously give hints (Romans 8, 1 Corinthians 15, parts of the Apocalypse) of how 
the play is supposed to end. The fact of Act 4 being what it is shows what sort o f a conclusion the 
drama should have, without making clear all the intervening steps. The church would live under the 
'authority' o f the extant story, being required to offer an improvisatory performance o f the final act as 
it leads up to and anticipates the intended conclusion. The church is designed, according to this 
model, as a stage in the completion of the creator's work o f art.®®
This model suggests that in biblical interpretation we are not looking to quarry 
timeless truths, or looking for pre-packaged authoritative answers to questions but, 
rather, trying to discern our vocation as the people of God and the appropriate 
practices, skills, commitments etc., to be associated with it. On such a view it is not 
possible to sustain (for example) the view that the Bible is an inerrant source of 
guidance which tells us what to do in all circumstances. The model opposes the 
kinds of ideas of biblical interpretation — much influenced by the objectivising 
epistemological strategies of the Enlightenment which we discussed earlier in the 
thesis -  that from the text 'objective' truths can and, indeed, ought to be 'distilled 
out'. The problems of the interpretation of the ancient text associated with both the 
historical and contemporary horizons of its meaning suggest caution in speaking of
®* Ibid. p. 141.
®® As it may also be the case for other inherited traditions. 
®® Wright New Testament, pp. 14If.
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'the plain meaning of the text'. Trevor Hart writes, "The Bible does not often wear 
its meaning obviously, like a flower waiting to be plucked from its stem."^ "^
Kevin J. Vanhoozer, in an essay entitled 'The Voice and the Actor'^®, suggests an 
approach to biblical interpretation which parallels Wright's approach in some 
important respects. Vanhoozer's concern is to guard against, on the one hand, a 'de- 
verbalising' of revelation which places exclusive emphasis on the acts of God,^® and 
on the other an 'over-verbalising' which places an exclusive emphasis upon the 
written witness. He believes that it is important to hold word and act together. 
"Divine revelation... is God in communicative action."^^ It is out of this concern 
that Vanhoozer suggests the metaphor of 'drama' for the gospel. He writes, "The 
task of theology... is to enable hearers and doers of the gospel to respond and 
coiTespond to the prior Act and Word of God. The Triune God is the primary 
speaker and actor, but the people of God have been given the privilege and the 
responsibility not only of thinking God's thoughts after him but of speaking God's 
words and acting God's acts after him as well."^^ But what is the process which 
enables this thinking, speaking and acting 'after God'? Vanhoozer's response to this 
question (in which his proximity to Wright's position is apparent) is that it occurs, 
"tlrrough an apprenticeship to the biblical texts."®® It is through this apprenticeship 
that we gain 'theological wisdom'.
Redemption is, according to Vanhoozer, a 'drama'.®® The drama comprises both the 
initiative of God and the human response. The purpose of theology is to aid 
disciples, "to participate fittingly in the drama of redemption by making canonically 
competent judgements about what to say and do as disciples of Christ in new 
situations."®* Rather than thinking of Holy Scripture as a source book from which 
we simply read-off truths and directives it is conceived as a collection of texts 
which contribute to a way of seeing things. As such 'Christian wisdom' -  which
^ Hart, T. (1995). Faith Thinking: The Dynamics o f Christian Theology. London, SPCK. p. 136.
Published in Stackhouse, J. J. (2000). Evangelical Futures: A conversation on theological method. 
Grand Rapids, Mich., Baker Books, pp.61-106.
A move of which some believe Karl Barth is guilty.
Stackhouse Evangelical Futures. p,72.
®® Ibid. p.69.
Ibid. p.82. Note the resonances with Polanyi's ideas and terminology here.
And it seems implicit that revelation and our participation in it can also be understood in this way. 
*** Stackhouse Evangelical Futures, p. 104.
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Vanhoozer calls a spiritual and intellectual habitus -  is gained, "through an 
apprenticeship to the diverse forms of biblical literature."®^
Vanhoozer regards authentic human participation in the drama of redemption 
(which we will call participation in revelation) in terms of 'faithful performance'. In 
summarising his position he writes:
Being biblical is not a matter of repeating biblical passages word for word, or even of summarizing 
the use of particular terms found throughout the bible, but making judgments that are informed, 
reformed, and transformed, as the case may be, by the wisdom embedded in biblical literature. 
Canonical-linguistic theology cultivates Christian wisdom: the ability to fit appropriately into the 
drama of redemption by saying and doing the right thing, by exemplifying right practical reason -  in 
sum, by performing the wisdom of Christ.
This apprenticeship occurs in the context of ecclesial communities. Vanhoozer 
suggests (following Lesslie Newbigin), that the local congregation is the 
'hermeneutic of the gospel' in that it 'lives out' the meaning of the text. But as 
Vanhoozer and Wright both maintain, the 'faithful performance' has no fixed and 
determined abstract form against which the 'correctness' of any particular ecclesial 
performance can be judged and evaluated. It is, rather, an improvisation which is 
based upon what has gone before. Such an improvisation is facilitated by an 
indwelling of the biblical texts as they have found form and expression within faith 
communities. Faithful performances are anything but a matter of repetition or 'the 
letter of the law'; they are the imaginative and creative responses to what is given in 
the Word and act of God. As such they are, among other things, 'risky' 
undertakings for which the communities and individuals involved must accept 
responsibility.
One of the consequences of this view is that we must expect to find distinctive and 
differentiated 'performances' in different places and at different times. It will be 
apparent that that not all 'performances' will be the same; but the existence of 
diversity, although it is likely to be the source of tensions and suspicion, does not
Ibid. p. 104.
Ibid. p. 104.
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necessarily imply disunity. Vanhoozer suggests, rather, a ’plural unity'. "^  ^ He 
comments, "I for one would be sorry if everyone thought just like me. I would 
deeply regret it if there were no Mennonite, or Lutheran, or Greek Orthodox voices 
in the world. Why? Because I think that truth would be better served by their 
continuing presence. As such Vanhoozer recognises the plurality of contexts -  
ecclesial contexts -  which provide the possibility for such performances. It does 
not follow from this that 'anything goes' but it does require that we recognise the 
significance of those contexts (ecclesial and otherwise) in which persons are 
nurtured.
In the models which Wright and Vanhoozer offer, the pneumatological may not be 
to the fore, but it is not difficult to see how this is necessarily a crucial aspect of the 
overall picture. The 'performance of the gospel' as a participation in revelation is 
simply not possible apart from its incorporation into the 'performance' of Jesus 
Christ. The ecclesial community participates, through the Spirit, in that which is 
offered by the Son to the Father. Its performance in temporal existence is 
provisional. It exists in anticipation of eschatological fiilfilment.
Concluding Comment
In this chapter, as we have already made clear, we are not attempting to offer 
anything more than suggestions of how the epistemology of Michael Polanyi might 
be brought to bear upon our understanding of participation in revelation. Many of 
the themes which we expounded in chapter 3 have been revisited in this chapter and 
we have seen something of their potential for clarifying what is involved in 
participation in the revelation of God. In particular the bodily roots of human 
understanding (with all the practices and skills which are implicated in them), the 
significance of participation within a community for human epistemic 
transformation and the importance of the tacit dimension have come to the fore.
In the latter part of this chapter we have begun to bring out more explicitly the 
importance of imagination in the church's interpretation of Holy Scripture as it
Ibid. p.80.
Ibid. p.80.
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participates in the revelation of God. In the final chapter we will seek to give fuller 
expression to this facet of human participation.
The theme of imagination has had a chequered history in theology. The final 
chapter will include an exposition of the work of Gordon Kaufman (for whom 
imagination is a central theme), which is a 'wrong turn' and an example of how far 
astray from the truth the theme can lead us. This will be followed by a counter­
suggestion which we believe is both harmonious with the understanding of 
participation in revelation which we have developed, and a reinforcement and 
extension of the themes that we have already explored in this thesis.
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Chapter 7. Revelation, Participation and Imagination 
Introduction
In the final section of chapter 6, in our discussion of hermeneutical participation in 
revelation, the question of imagination was explicitly raised. The substantially 
overlapping models of 'dramatic performance' proposed by Wright and Vanhoozer 
suggest that the ecclesial interpretation of Holy Scripture and, indeed, ecclesial life 
be understood in terms of 'improvisation' seeking 'faithfiil performance'. On such a 
view we suggested that it is implicit that the church's participation in revelation 
involves a significant imaginative component.^
However, although we do not have the space to trace its history, we must note that 
the place of imagination in the church and in theology has often been contested. In 
bringing our thesis to a conclusion we will seek to offer some preliminary 
suggestions about what might be said about imagination as a component of our 
participation in revelation.
As an extended preliminary to this we will consider in some detail the work of 
Gordon Kaufman who has written substantially on the role of imagination in 
theology. Our reasons for selecting Kaufman's work for framing our approach to 
the question of imagination are several: Kaufman is a significant figure in 
contemporary American theology today and, as David Bryant suggests, "his 
emphasis on the imaginative nature of theological work confronts us, in a way that 
we cannot ignore, with the question of what it means to say that theology is a 
human enterprise that involves imagination. That is, he has made it clear that 
theology must accept the imagination as a central component of its work and must 
come to terms with the implication of this increasingly inescapable fact."^
But despite Kaufman's affirmation of the place of imagination in theology, the most 
perfunctory reading of his proposals reveals a profound incommensurability with
 ^This does not suggest that issues relating to imagination are not implied elsewhere -  only that they 
remained largely implicit.
 ^Bryant, D. J. (1989). Faith and the Play o f Imagination: On the Role of Imagination in Religion. 
Macon, Ga., Mercer, p.54.
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the thesis that we have developed. He conceives the relationship between 
imagination and revelation in terms of mutual exclusivity and Kaufinan's 
enthusiastic employment of the former is, consequently, made at the cost of his 
rejection of the latter.^ If we are to speak of 'an imaginative participation in 
revelation' -  which is our intention -  we will have to demonstrate that the 
dichotomy between imagination and revelation which Kaufman adopts can be 
subjected to an effective challenge.
This chapter will begin with an exposition of Kaufinan's understanding of 
theological imagination in which we will allow Kaufman to 'speak for himself with 
minimal interruption. This will be followed by an assessment and critique of his 
position."  ^ In the context of this critical review of Kaufman's work we will develop 
some of the contours of an alternative conceptualisation in which it is not only 
possible but necessary to speak of the imaginative component of our participation in 
revelation. In this task we shall, once again, draw upon the epistemological insights 
of Michael Polanyi.
We turn now to an exposition of Kaufinan's views.
1. Gordon Kaufman and the Theological Imagination
a) Theology as Imaginative Construction
In the following exposition we will outline the principal strands of Kaufman's 
thought which are pertinent for our theme. We will focus primarily on his book. 
The Theological Imagination: Constructing the Concent of God.^
 ^Although it ought to be noted that in an earlier phase of his theological development Kaufman 
adopted a positive attitude towards the concept o f revelation. For an account o f his earlier position 
see, for example, Ibid. pp. 13-32.
Such a task is rendered difficult because o f the idiosyncrasy o f Kaufman's theology and, in our 
opinion, the variety o f ways in which he is mistaken. An important example o f this is Kaufman's 
reading of Kant. Although we make no claim to expertise with regard to the work of Kant it is 
apparent that Kaufman's reading is often far from reliable. We will not attempt to critique 
Kaufman's reading o f Kant but rather allow what Kaufman writes to be our point o f departure.
 ^Kaufman, G. D. (1981). The Theological Imagination: Constructing the Concent of God. 
Philadelphia, Westminster Press.
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In the preface to The Theological Imagination Kaufinan states, "I have become 
persuaded that theology is (and always has been) essentially a constructive work of 
the human imagination, an expression of the imagination's activity helping to 
provide orientation for human life through developing a symbolical "picture" of the 
world roundabout and of the human place within that world. This is the heart of 
Kaufman’s proposal and the fundamental presupposition of his theological method. 
Theological work is concerned with the 'concept of God' and this concept is a 
human construction through and through. This is so, according to Kaufinan, 
because:
God is not a reality immediately available in our experience for observation, inspection, and 
description, and speech about or to God therefore is never directly referential. Thus, we are unable 
to check our concepts and images o f God for accuracy and adequacy through direct confrontation 
with the reality God, as we can with most ordinary objects of perception and experience; instead, our 
awareness and understanding here is gained entirely in and through the images and concepts 
themselves, constructed into and focused by the mind into a centre for the selfs devotion and 
service.’
Kaufinan acknowledges that this process must not be understood individualistically. 
We do not construct the concept of God 'from scratch'. Inevitably we build on the 
work of others and of previous generations. We inherit a plethora of ideas from 
those believers, prophets, poets and thinkers who have gone before us. Above all 
(and far from problematically as far as Kaufinan is concerned) there is the influence 
of the Bible. "[T]he Bible's significance for Western thinking about God has gone 
far beyond mere informal influence of this sort. The Bible was long regarded as the 
locus of God's revelation to humanity (the "word of God"); it therefore carried an 
authority powerful enough to override ordinary human experience and rational 
argument."^
It was through this function of the Bible that God's being and activity came to be 
conceived (quite wrongly in Kaufinan's view) in objective terms. It was because 
the Bible imposed itself as a primary source of normative images that other
 ^Ibid. p. l l .
’ ibid. p.21.
® Ibid. p.23.
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possibilities were thwarted. Rather than seeing the writings of the Bible as part of 
an ongoing process of imaginative theological construction the scriptural record was 
cast into the role of an authority and came to function as a limit and so hiding (or 
disguising) the constructive nature of theology.
Concomitant to this objectification of the biblical tradition is the positing of God as 
an unconstructed objective being. Kaufman believes that in the highly unified 
world-view of any monotheistic religion the reification of the concept of God into 
an independent existing being is likely. It is, nevertheless, a serious theological 
error:
It is a mistake... to regard qualities attributed to God (e.g., aseity, holiness, omnipotence, 
omniscience, providence, love, self-revelation) as though they were features or activities of such a 
particular being. Rather, in the mind's construction o f the image/concept of God the ordinary 
relation of subject and predicate is reversed. Instead o f the subject (God) being a given to which the 
various predicate adjectives are then assigned, here the descriptive themes themselves are the 
building blocks which the imagination uses in putting together its conception.^
Kaufinan accepts that much of such 'God-language' was, indeed, adopted in the 
belief that it was somehow referential but disposes of this as a 'mistaken 
understanding'. The presence of such a strategy in Christian history should alert us, 
all the more, to the need for a critical attitude towards our inherited vocabulary.
Although he does not argue the point, Kaufman does not believe that the concept of 
revelation is viable. But he is aware of the fundamental question that this raises, 
and asks: "If we can no longer assume that theology is working from an 
authoritative divine revelation, how are we to proceed?" He also asks, "Is it really 
possible to set out a meaningful concept of God once the radically constructive 
character of theology is acknowledged?"^^ Clearly he believes we can but, he 
contends, we are only justified in doing so when we have recognised and 
acknowledged the fundamentally constructive nature of the task. We must now
 ^Ibid. p.29. Kaufman's emphasis.
Ibid. p.30.
"Ibid. p.31.
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consider what is implied by this use of the term 'construction' in Kaufinan's 
proposal for constructing the concept of God.
As we move on it is worth noting that part of the difficulty in grasping what 
Kaufman has to say is to be located in his eccentric employment of familiar 
theological language and terminology. One must always keep in mind that for 
Kaufinan all theology is imaginative construction. Theology, in its talk of God, 
constructs. For Kaufinan this means that it doesn't refer -  at least not in the way 
that it has generally been assumed to refer in the history of Christian theology.
b) Constructing the Concept of God
Kaufinan believes that the concept of God can provide possibilities for humanity 
that are otherwise absent. Crucially, the concept of God can serve the purposes of 
humanisation. He explains, "To speak of God's "reality" or "existence" -  i.e., to 
speak of the validity or truth of the theistic perspective -  is to maintain that the 
modes of life made possible, when existence is oriented according to this 
perspective, are a full and genuine realization of the actual potentialities of human 
nature, are in accord, that is to say, with "how things are.""
In constructing the concept of God Kaufman stresses the need both for 
transcendence and immanence. God is both the mysterious one who is beyond all 
human knowing and the one who is the humanising centre of orientation for human 
life.
With regard to transcendence Kaufinan avers, "What seems to be at stake here is a 
claim that human individuals and communities need a centre of orientation and 
devotion outside themselves and their perceived desires and needs if they are to find 
genuine fulfilment. As finite beings seeking security and satisfaction, we all too 
easily make ourselves the centre of life, rearranging all else so that it simply 
conforms with our wishes."^^ It is this relativising image which counters our human
Ibid. p,49. Kaufman's concept o f  how things are' is linked to an idea of evolutionary emergence 
which will be discussed below.
" Ibid. pp.35f
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narcissism and confronts the 'tumed-in' character of human existence. The point is 
not that the image of the transcendent God points to some being to be understood on 
its own terms, but rather, "it functions as the principal focal point of an overall 
world picture, and it is in terms of that interpretive frame that it must be 
understood."^"^ The God of the Bible functions as the principal actor in that vast 
historical movement from the creation to the eschaton,
Kaufrnan suggests that "it is as true to say that the meaning of human life is found 
within the ongoing movement of (God's) history as to say that it is found in relation 
to God -  for the two expressions come down to the same thing. Living within the 
world-view which has God as its focus is no different from living in significant 
relation to that God who is the focal centre for this w orld-view ."However, in the 
contemporary situation -  and mindful of the dangers of reifying the concept of God 
into an independent being -  the former alternative is preferable. "For it provides a 
way to speak of an independence and otherness and even aseity over against the 
human -  the requisite condition for breaking our narcissism and anthropocentrism 
and drawing us out of ourselves -  without positing a particular existing being 
(named "God") as that in which this otherness is lodged.
If transcendence is important in constructing the concept of God, 'immanence' is no 
less so. Here we have to do with God's active concern for the fulfilment of life. 
Kaufman points to evolutionary processes which led to the emergence of the human 
species and the emergence of values and ideals in human existence as realities in 
which we discern the fatherly guidance and care of God. "One can... speak of a 
movement of cosmic history which has eventuated in the production of the human 
and the humane, and one might hope for a further development of this historical 
tendency towards a more genuinely humane society -  what in the traditional 
mythology was expected as the "kingdom of God.""^^ God symbolises the 
evolutionary-historical process in which human life and, in time, humane life 
emerges. Hence, in looking beyond ourselves, we have intimations of the 
possibilities of the future.
Ibid. p.37
Ibid. p.38
Ibid. p.38 
" Ibid. p.40
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The ideas of transcendence and immanence are both important. Kaufman believes 
that the concept of God, constructed in this way, can be both meaningful to and 
serviceable for humanity, "The image... of a divine Person who has created us, and 
who is seeking our full realization (our salvation), presents vividly and 
meaningfully to human consciousness that to which we should be devoted, if the 
further realization of our human potential is to be achieved. "God" is a symbol that 
gathers up into itself and focuses for us all those cosmic forces working toward the 
fully humane existence for which we long."^^
c) Christology
Kaufman identifies three categories which are of fundamental importance for 
theists: God, humanity, and world. But in Christianity there is a fourth category, 
Jesus Christ. He allows that, in some sense, it is this category which qualifies the 
other three in the case of Christian belief. But is this concept helpful in contributing 
to a concept of God that is truly humanising?
[We must ask] whether the Christian fourfold categorical scheme is any longer viable or whether the 
time has come drastically to transform it. How does the Christian worldview stand up in comparison 
with Buddhist and Jewish, Marxist and liberal humanist and other perspectives? Has the time come 
to drop the category God or the category Christ -  or both o f them -  from the fundamental places they 
occupy in the Christian scheme? Should they be replaced by other symbols with quite different 
metaphorical foundations and metaphysical implications; or should the categorial scheme be 
expanded beyond four to include important dimensions of life and reality which these categories 
cannot accommodate? Or has the time come to dispense with the Christian categorial scheme 
altogether in favor of some more adequate framework for orienting human life?^^
Once the fundamentally constructive nature of the theological enterprise is 
embraced the possibilities of radically reconstructing the tradition are apparent. 
Indeed, "Whether or how "Jesus" can properly continue to be central in a 
contemporary theological position is something to be established, not something to 
be taken for granted. Whether the concept Jesus is to be retained or not is our 
decision. Kaufman writes, "if Jesus Christ is to be given a significant position -  or
Ibid. p.50.
Ibid. p. 121.
Ibid. p. 125.
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any position at all -  in our theology, this will be because of needs and reasons 
which we ourselves, in a contemporary attempt at theological understanding and 
construction, find compelling."^^ In Kaufman's view the contemporary 
consciousness has carte blanche to dispose of received tradition as it sees fit -  be 
that to adopt, adapt or reject it. The function of inherited tradition is to serve the 
purposes of humanity and those purposes are conceived quite independently of any 
inheritance from tradition.
Although the constructive nature of this process is clearly expressed by Kaufman, 
the criteria which he offers are decidedly vague. He suggests, for example, that 
"[Wjhen we adopt a model or an image of the human and make it normative in 
theological construction, we must be able plausibly to claim (a) that it "truly" or 
"accurately" expresses or represents human nature, its potentialities and its 
problems, and (b) that it can be intelligibly understood in the context of, and in 
significant interrelationship with, what we take to be the "real world".
Kaufman affirms that Jesus is an historical figure (however difficult it may be to 
establish the facts of his life). The difficulty is in establishing how to construct a 
theology in relation to this figure. Kaufman is extremely critical of the "mythic" 
picture of Jesus as a divine being who came down from heaven and was resurrected 
after his death. Kaufman criticises Barth in this regard:
In the present century Karl Barth has gone the farthest in trying to develop a tlieology expressing this 
traditional understanding o f Jesus Christ. However subtle and sophisticated Barth's working out o f  
the details may be, for him faith is understood essentially as buying into and accepting this 
traditional Christian myth, and the work o f the theologian is directed largely to analysing and 
imaginatively elaborating the meaning o f that myth for our understanding o f God and humanity.
He suggests that such an approach is untenable since it grounds the theological 
enterprise in 'an arbitrary starting point which must be accepted frdeistically.' "Once 
it is recognized that theology is (and always has been) an activity of human
Ibid. p. 128.
Ibid. p. 134.
^ Ibid. p. 138. The 'mythic' in Barth's writing -  insofar as Kaufman explicates the term -  is to be 
associated in particular with the idea of incarnation objectively conceived.
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imaginative construction, it is no longer acceptable to begin our theological work 
with an authoritarian starting point, however venerable and revered that foundation 
may be."^ "*
It is an error to attribute definitive significance to an inherited tradition. Whether it 
be the canon of Scripture, the creeds, the teachings of the Church Fathers, or the 
theology of the Reformers, what we are dealing with is human constructs. However 
valuable or functional that tradition may (or may not) have been in another epoch it 
must not be afforded an over-privileged position in our own. "To give expressions 
and constructions of earlier generations such authoritative and uncriticizable 
standing -  once we have recognized that this is what we are doing -  is out-and-out 
idolatry, an intolerable position for theology seriously attempting to speak of 
Kaufman declares, "[M]ost Christian talk about Jesus as divine or "Jesus as 
God and Saviour" is idolatrous.
What Kaufman sees in the historical figure of Jesus is the exemplification of self­
giving love; a life given in service to others. But other examples or paradigms are 
available to us: Julius Caesar, Socrates, Buddha, Henry Ford etc. We may choose to 
commit ourselves to one of these or, indeed, to a paradigm which is less 
individualistic in which various different images of community are in view.
Kaufinan suggests that every religion offers some form of ’salvation'. Implicit in 
the notion of salvation is the idea that our humanity is either distorted or 
insufficiently developed. The purpose of religion is to draw us toward resolution. 
This is what religion is for. Kaufman says that the only God we can afford to 
worship is the God who will further our process of humanisation, the God who will 
make possible the creation of universal and humane community. Kaufman believes 
that the image of a suffering God -  the Christ of the cross -  is serviceable in this 
endeavour.
^Ibid. p.138.
Ibid. p. 138. Kaufman's emphasis.
26 Ibid. p.205.
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A difficulty with Kaufman's position is that his concept of 'humanisation' is 
profoundly underdeveloped?^ It is difficult to imagine any religious or secular 
world-view which would claim to be opposed to a process of humanisation. The 
problem is in establishing any degree of unanimity about what 'humanisation' 
means; what might facilitate it and what might hinder it.
d) Kaufman and Kantian Influences
In the chapter 'Metaphysics and Theology' Kaufinan lays claim to a Kantian 
influence in his project.^^ He explains,
Kant saw that the central ideas with which metaphysics works -  ideas like "God" and "world" and 
"self -  function differently in our thinking from concepts dealing with objects o f direct experience, 
concepts like "tree" or "man." While the latter are used to organize and classify elements of 
experience directly, thus helping to make experience itself possible and serving as vehicles through 
which experience is cognized, the former "metaphysical" notions function at a remove from direct 
perception or experience: they are used for ordering and organizing our conceptions or knowledge 
(rather than what is directly experienced) and function, thus, principally as "regulative ideas."^^
The concept of God is, for Kaufinan, a human construction. "God" is the mind's 
highest and most profound creation. It is through this concept that every dimension 
of life is brought into unity. He goes on to say, "To regard God as some kind of 
describable or knowable object over against us would be at once the degradation of 
God and a serious category error. Kaufman believes that Kant made a key 
contribution to theology: "For our purpose, the importance of Kant was his 
discovery that such central metaphysical concepts as God, self, and the world are 
imaginative constructs, created by the mind for certain intramental functions."^^
Here we might well raise the question of metaphysics. Kaufinan believes that the 
ideas of metaphysics evolve over the generations as humanity seeks to make sense 
of its experience in terms bequeathed to it by its ancestors. Concepts serviceable in
This is, perhaps, unsurprising as any development would surely be highly controversial.
As we mentioned above Kaufman's reading of Kant can be questioned but this is not a task which 
we will take up in this chapter. I
^  Kaufman The Theological Imagination, p.242. 1
Ibid. p.244. I
"  Ibid. p.244. I
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one particular historical epoch may be quite unserviceable in another. A style of 
metaphysical conceptualisation which was appropriate in the Middle Ages may be 
most inappropriate for understanding the culture and reality of our own time. But 
what is metaphysics trying to do? Kaufman suggests that metaphysics endeavours 
to expose the structures of meaning and concepts which underlie the patterns of 
thought and practice (including customs, institutions, etc.) of a culture. In bringing 
such cultural presuppositions to conscious awareness it is possible to gain some 
freedom from them and thereby take on a more responsible role. In this way 
metaphysics helps liberate humanity from determination by the powers and forces 
of that nature from which it has emerged. Kaufman comments: "[T]he breadth and 
abstractness of this question [of how conceptualisations promote human freedom] is 
immense, and assessing different metaphysical positions with reference to it will not 
be easy, but surely the diverse claims of Whitehead and of Heidegger, of James and 
Marx and Hegel, can be analyzed in terms of their effectiveness in raising human 
consciousness about its overall situation and thus in furthering human liberation.
Metaphysicians are concerned with reality and truth claims, but, according to 
Kaufman, they face substantially the same epistemological problems that confront 
theologians. He writes, "In the case of ordinary sciences, analysis and 
experimentation are carried on within the framework of concepts and theory which 
determines the objects to be investigated, specifies the methods and objectives of 
the investigation, and defines what will count as true or valid results. In the case of 
metaphysics, however, none of these matters are specified; they are themselves the 
very subjects to be investigated."^^ In the realm of metaphysics, Kaufman explains, 
we are forced to acknowledge the centrality of imagination. "The elaboration of a j
metaphysical position... is not so much the working out of the scientific theory of |
the nature of the whole as it is the expression of a, faith that this or that model or j
metaphor drawn from experience can properly serve as a paradigm in terms of j
which the world can be gr asped . Kauf inan  describes the kind of check which can |
be placed upon the metaphysician as 'quasi-empirical'^^ and he is optimistic about Î
the possibilities of this form of verification. Empirically convincing metaphors i
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I
Ibid. p.257. i
Ibid. p.246. Î
Ibid. p.247 Kaufman's emphasis.
See ibid. p.249. ;
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must be the basis of the principal metaphysical concepts and those concepts must 
order and interpret the actual facts of experience in a convincing way.
If the task of both theology and metaphysics is constructive and imaginative where 
do we establish a distinction between the two disciplines? Kaufman's answer is that 
theology, unlike metaphysics, constructs its concept of the world "under God". The 
concept of God is that which distinguishes theology from metaphysics. To do away 
with God is to do away with theology. Nevertheless, metaphysics and theology are 
confronted with methodological problems which are epistemologically similar. For 
Kaufinan the value of a theological world-view (a particular imaginative construct 
of the concept of God) is to be determined on the basis of whether it is true to 
reality. (By which Kaufinan means that it has a capacity to facilitate 
'humanisation'.) Metaphysics is not in a privileged position with respect to theology. 
Any metaphysical construct must be evaluated on exactly the same basis.
Kaufinan suggests that if metaphysics and theology appear to be very different it is 
because theology has attempted to ground its work in Holy Scripture and tradition. 
As we have seen, Kaufinan views this as an error because the writings of 'Scripture' 
and the testimony of tradition are themselves instantiations of imaginative 
construction. What the authors of the 'Scriptures' and creeds were doing is on a par 
with the work of contemporary theologians. To attribute an authority or a priority 
of the writings of the former over the latter is to misconceive the constructive nature 
of theological work. "None of... [the] biblical authors or the anonymous myth 
makers who live behind their work, have seen God "face-to-face" and are thus in a 
position simply to report what they have experienced."^^
Kaufinan suggests that in our time the metaphysicians have fared rather better than 
the theologians in terms of establishing respect in the academy. The diagnosis he 
offers for this is that metaphysics has felt free to employ a wide variety of 
metaphors and concepts because it was explicitly aware o f the imaginative process 
in which it was involved. Theology was largely ignorant of the imaginative nature 
of its work and, assuming that it was in various ways constrained by tradition, failed
Ibid. p.250.
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to grasp ftilly the nature, and thereby the possibilities, of the work in which it was 
engaged. Kaufinan summarises his point:
It is my contention... that the allegedly "scientific" character o f metaphysics, which gave it a claim 
to cognitive superiority over theology, is a myth (as many contemporary philosophers would also 
acknowledge), and that the theologians' claim of a direct revelatory foundation for their work is 
equally a myth. When this is recognized, it becomes clear that metaphysics and theology are in fact 
very similar activities. Both are concerned with imaginative construction o f a concept or image of 
the overall context (the "world") within which human life transpires, and neither can claim to base 
tliat construction on direct inspection o f "the nature o f things," for the simple reason that such direct 
inspection is impossible.^’
e) The Problem of Pragmatic Criteria
Kaufinan is aware that in pressing pragmatic criteria the continuing viability of the 
'religious outlook' will be continually called into question:
If... Marxist or materialist conceptions encourage and enable human life o f a better and more 
fulfilling quality, in the long run they will be the ones that prevail, and the theistic view will 
gradually die out. To the extent that the Christian claim, that true human fulfilment is to be found in 
the self-sacrificing love epitomized in Jesus' crucifixion, has led to repression o f the human (Freud) 
and to slavishness (Nietzsche), it stands today under heavy criticism for its pretensions. If the 
Cliristian understanding of life and the world is not to become increasingly irrelevant in modem 
culture, or even totally to die out, a much more realistic reconception of its central claims will need 
to be made.^*
According to Kaufman both metaphysical and theological concepts must be tested 
by the effects which they have upon the character and quality of human life. One of 
the consequences of this is that only religious views held by a significant proportion 
of a population are pragmatically testable. Other views, regardless of their potential 
for humanisation, are redundant. This is why Kaufinan believes that the concept of 
"God" is of such significance for the West — on a level unparalleled by any other 
metaphysical concept. Kaufinan makes the claim that (despite shortcomings and
Ibid. p.254.
Ibid. pp.257f.
Page 256
failures) the Christian church and theology have made significant contributions to 
human growth and liberation in the past, whatever may happen in the future.
Theology would dissolve if the symbol of "God" was jettisoned, and Kaufman feels 
that it would be inappropriate to make such a move in our present situation. This 
does not mean that this symbol should not be subjected to radical revision and he 
believes that the continuing value of the concept of God is indeed contingent upon 
the effectiveness of such revisions. The humiliation of theology before the 
philosophers in recent centuries is, in large part, due to the fact that theologians 
have not felt sufficiently free to reconstruct, in a radical way, central theological 
conceptuality.
f) Concluding Thoughts
Kaufman believes that the concept of God (as a human construct) continues to be a 
fruitful one. But theology must be judged, "in terms of the adequacy with which it 
is fulfilling the objectives we humans have set for it."^  ^ "[A]ll religious institutions, 
practices and ideas -  including the idea of God -  were made to serve human needs 
and to further our humanization (what has traditionally been called our "salvation"); 
humanity was not made for the sake of religious customs and ideas.
Kaufman remains optimistic about the possibilities of the concept of God and he 
concludes his work with certain confessional affirmations. "God" being the 
ultimate point of reference for all understanding is also the object of devotion for all 
human life. If anything which is not God is made into the absolute point of 
reference it will necessarily become an idol. Whereas idolatry is destructive and 
dehumanising, the concept of God is idolatry's negation. "[B]y "God" we mean that 
reality which rescues us from all these enslavements into which we continually fall, 
that reality which brings human life to its full realisation.
Ibid. p.264. We do not hear from Kaufman how 'we humans' determine what the objectives will 
be, but we can guess that they will probably have much to do with the generic and ubiquitous goal of 
humanisation.
Ibid. p.264. Again Kaufman does not identify the human needs which are to be served in order to 
further our humanisation.
'"ibid. p.268.
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To the extent that parts of our lives remain unrelated to God (those things for which 
God is not the ultimate reference point) we are not worshippers of God. God is the 
one who relativises all false absolutes. He is the one who unmasks the idols. As 
the concept of God becomes clearer to us, we see more clearly where we have been 
inhuman, depersonalising and destructive of our humanity.
2. Critique of Kaufman's 'Theological Imagination'
Introduction
As we noted at the beginning of the chapter, Kaufinan is a theologian who has 
played a significant role in placing imagination on the theological agenda. We wish 
to affirm such a move although, for reasons which have already been mooted, we 
have significant and serious concerns about the way in which he does this. We 
would echo David Bryant's sentiments when he writes, "The issue is not whether 
faith is imaginative but what the imagination is and how it operates, that is, whether 
faith is a construction of the subject's imaginative inventions or the result of an 
imaginative attunement to the disclosive power of the Christian tradition. This is 
a possibility which Kaufman does not appear to consider.
As we noted at the beginning of the chapter, one of the most fundamental 
incompatibilities between Kaufinan's position and the one we are seeking to 
develop is that it conceives of imagination in such a way that revelation is 
necessarily eclipsed by it. Part of the task which is before us now is to demonstrate 
why we need not be constrained by such a dichotomy. The first matter with which 
we will concern ourselves is whether, when we speak of God, there is a referent.
a) God: Is there a Referent?
Kaufinan warns against the objectification of the concept of God for two reasons. 
Firstly, he claims it mistakenly takes the concept of God to correspond to an 
available referent along the lines in which we know ordinary objects (a dog, a man,
Bryant Faith and the Plav o f Imagination, p. 162.
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a book, a tree etc.). Kaufinan rejects this and claims that the 'available referent' is 
not an 'existent being' but a human construct -  and only a human construct. 
Secondly, he believes that in reifying the concept of God the essential procedure of 
imaginative construction in theology is obfuscated. Once God has been objectified 
this 'object' can be (and has been) enslirined in a tradition and functions as an 
authority which delimits the scope of the theological enterprise, eclipsing and 
thwarting its creative and imaginative function.
For Kaufinan the 'available referent', in speaking about God, is a human construct 
which enables us to see all other aspects of our reality in humanising perspective."^  ^
In this way finite objects do not become idols. In as far as all aspects of our lives 
are brought into relationship with this concept of God we are saved from the 
dehumanising effects of idolatry. Kaufman simply presupposes that if God does 
exist independently of our imaginative concept of him there is no means of either 
knowing or speaking about such a being. The pertinent point to be made is that for 
Kaufman the 'God' o f whom we speak in theology could not have such a being as its 
referent.
But why is it not possible to affirm, as Kaufinan does, a transcendent God -  one by 
whom everything else in our lives is to be understood -  while maintaining that this 
God can be the referent of this term? Kaufinan appears to believe that in asserting 
that the concept of God is a human construct it is implied that revelation can have 
no place in theology. But what if God is a 'self-existent being' who is able to reveal 
himself to humanity?"*"^  Commenting on Kaufinan Alvin Plantinga writes, "If God 
is omnipotent, infinitely powerful, won't he be able to manifest himself in our 
experience, bring it about that we experience him? He will be unable to do so, 
presumably, under those conditions, only if it is logically impossible (impossible in 
the broadly logical sense) that an omniscient and omnipotent being should be able 
to make himself heard. But so far as I can see, there isn't even the slightest reason
Kaufman's use o f the term 'available referent' in this context appears awkward and unsatisfactory. 
This is precisely the position which Paul the Apostle, for example, held: "For I want you to know, 
brothers and sisters, that the gospel that was proclaimed by me is not of human origin; for I did not 
receive it from a human source, nor was I taught it, but I received it through a revelation o f Jesus 
Christ." Galatians 1:1 If.
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to think that; certainly Kaufinan gives us none.""^  ^ Indeed, and more generally, 
Kaufinan offers us very little by way of explanation of why the possibility of 
revelation is ruled out.
If Kaufinan is saying that finite humanity has no capacity to know a transcendent 
God he articulates a position in harmony with that of Karl Barth. But, as Plantinga 
helpfully points out, the critical question is whether the transcendent God has the 
capacity to reveal himself to humanity. Kaufinan does not give this matter serious 
consideration. As distinct from objects such as a dog, a man, a book, a tree etc., 
there is no 'direct' experience of God. We do not 'see' God as we see these other 
objects. Kaufinan appears to conclude from this that if  we are to speak of God we 
must speak of a concept the content of which is exclusively our own imaginative 
work. His assumption appears to be that revelation must be understood in terms of 
God making himself known in the way that a dog, a man, a book or a tree are 
known and, therefore, such a concept must be rejected."^  ^ However, it will be 
recalled from the first chapter of this thesis that while Barth affirms that God does 
indeed make himself known in the sphere of fleshy reality the means by which this 
occurs must be radically distinguished from the means by which other objects are 
known."^  ^ This is a view which is widely held within the Christian tradition.
If it is impossible for a self-existent God to make himself known to humanity then it 
is not unreasonable to suggest, as Kaufinan does, that to construct a theology on the 
basis of the idea that God has revealed himself is inauthentic, self-deceptive and, 
indeed, idolatrous. However, Kaufinan does no more than assume this to be so. 
What Kaufinan does is to map out what is implied by the assumptions he makes 
while presenting his programme as a refutation of revelation and belief in a pre­
existent God. But Kaufman has not made his case.
Plantinga, A. (2000). Warranted Christian Belief. New York, Oxford University Press, p.34.
It might be noted that quantum physics deals with concepts which cannot be perceived like a dog, 
a man, a book, a tree etc. But this does not mean that such concepts are purely imaginative.
Here we have in view the role o f the Holy Spirit as the subjective reality o f revelation and the 
paradoxical nature o f revelation in which God is veiled in his unveiling.
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b) Starting Points
Kaufinan is critical of Barth who has gone to such lengths to establish a traditional 
'mythical' view of Jesus Christ. "[F]or him faith is understood essentially as buying 
into and accepting this traditional Christian myth, and the work of the theologian is 
directed largely to analysing and imaginatively elaborating the meaning of that 
myth for our understanding of God and humanity. Kaufinan's charge against 
Barth is that: "Such a procedure forces us to ground our theological work on an 
arbitrary starting point which must be accepted frdeistically.""^  ^ As such Kaufinan 
accuses Barth of idolatry.
We have already noted that Kaufinan has not demonstrated the incoherence of the 
concept of revelation; he has assumed it. If there is a revelation of the Word of 
God, as Barth holds, to allow such a revelation to be the 'starting position' for our 
understanding of God might seem less arbitrary. It is worth noting that Barth 
attributes to Holy Scripture -  as the prime witness to revelation -  the status of 
canon because it imposes itself as such.^  ^ It is an event in which we are confronted 
by God. If we are to talk of 'grounds', there are no grounds on which Barth's 
understanding of canon can be accredited and established outside its own sphere: it 
is self-grounding. In this sense Barth's position might be described as 'arbitrary'. 
But to say this is to say no more than we would have to say of any disclosure event. 
Our understanding of things which are disclosed to us will generally and 
appropriately start with the event in which the disclosure occurs.
Kaufiman believes that Barth's theology is 'idolatrous' and his method 'arbitrary'. 
But what is his alternative proposal? If we ask Kaufitnan about where one starts in 
constructing the concept of God, he replies that the fimdamental criterion is
Kaufman The Theological Imagination, p. 138. It is interesting to note that Kaufman does 
recognise the imaginative component of the work of a theologian such as Barth even if  he does 
regard his basic theological orientation as being misconceived.
Ibid. p. 138. Our emphasis.
Bruce McCormack, reflecting upon Barth's zealous and lifelong commitment to promoting fidelity 
to the First Commandment, describes Kaufman's accusation as, "one of the richer ironies o f the 
history o f theology." See McCormack, B. L. (1984). "Divine Revelation and Human Imagination; 
Must we Choose Between the Two?" Scottish Journal o f Theoloav 37: 431-455. p.451.
Barth, K., G. W. Bromiley, et al. (1975). Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of the Word of God 1.1. 
Edinbuigh, T. & T. Clark, p. 109.
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'humanisation'. Kaufman believes that this criterion is not arbitrary because it is 
'true to the way things are'.^  ^ If we ask Kaufinan, 'How are things?', he explains that 
there are cosmic forces which are carrying us towards a more humane existence (for 
which we long).^^ For Kaufinan it is because of this that we look to the historical 
figure of Jesus and see in him -  in his life and works -  something, "expressive of an 
agape at the deepest levels of Reality. But this view of reality is not a percept: it 
is not like a dog, a man, a book, or a tree. What is more, many people see the world 
very differently.^^
Kaufinan's assertion is that the process of humanisation is somehow written into the 
evolutionary process. As such it is appropriate to use the concept of humanisation as 
the starting point in constructing the concept of God. He doesn't, however, make a 
case that this 'movement of cosmic forces' is self-evident (and is doubtless wise in 
his choice not to do so) but the question inevitably arises as to how he knows this to 
be the case. Certainly Kaufinan makes no attempt to 'ground' his selection and 
hence the criterion is set forth in a way which looks, itself, suspiciously arbitrary. 
As McCormack points out, "The tension (contradiction?) in Kaufman's thought is 
that he is both denying the referential character of God-talk and at the same time, 
affirming that the symbol of 'God' refers to a metaphysically real ground of 
reality. Consequently it is hard to see why Kaufman's 'starting point' is any more 
'grounded' than Barth's. Indeed, one would have to wonder whether it was 
considerably less well grounded.
Kaufinan sets the problem up in terms of 'starting points'. If we go with him in this 
regard we must say that if theology is to be 'done' it has to start somewhere and it 
seems as reasonable (if not more reasonable) to us to think of the concept of 
revelation as a starting point than the concept of humanisation. But is Kaufman's 
framing of the problem satisfactory? For him it is crucial for theology to have the
See Kaufman The Theological Imagination, p. 134. 
See ibid. p.50.
54 Ibid. p. 144.
It must surely be acknowledged that there are other views of the world. For many the 
preponderance of evil and suffering precludes any idea o f progress towards 'humanisation' (whatever 
that might be) regardless o f whether or not there are 'cosmic forces' at work. ('Change and decay in 
all around I see.' -  Henry Francis Lyte.)
McCormack "Divine Revelation and Human Imagination." p.441. McCormack's emphasis.
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correct 'starting point' and for Kaufman this point is a concept. The point that we 
would make is that we do not start with concepts: we 'staiT with our participation in 
a form of life and it is only out of this participation that our conceptual 
understanding can arise. As such we would not contend that the starting point of 
theology is the concept of revelation: we would say that we must 'start with' the life 
of the church as it participates in revelation. (Whether we can call this a 'starting 
point' is another and less significant matter.) We will have more to say about the 
priority of the conceptual in Kaufman's theology later in the chapter.
c) Kaufman and Kant
Kaufman's reasons for opting for 'imaginative construction' flow from a particular 
form of Kantian commitment. As we have already noted, following Kant Kaufman 
draws a clear distinction between the central ideas of metaphysics ("God", "the 
world", etc.) and concepts relating to objects of ordinary experience ("a dog", "a 
book", etc.). The latter are used in a 'direct' way to organise experience but the 
former cannot be used in this way. They operate at a remove to order conceptions 
of knowledge. For Kaufman we can only talk about 'description' where there is a 
correspondence between concepts and percepts. The concept of 'God', which is 
central to theological language, is a regulative idea and does not correspond to a 
percept and hence, for Kaufinan, it cannot be descriptive; it must be imaginatively 
constructed. The concept of God must always be a construct of the imagination.
But how viable is this dichotomous understanding in which concepts which relate to 
percepts are conceived as descriptions, while regulative ideas (and here we have the 
concept of 'God' in mind in particular) are regarded as purely imaginative 
constructs? In attempting to answer this question we will draw, again, on the 
insights of Michael Polanyi.
Polanyi's triadic epistemological framework demonstrates, as we have seen in 
chapter 3, that the perception of 'ordinary objects' occurs in the action of a 
perceiver. Focal knowledge is achieved by drawing upon subsidiary knowledge 
which, in the act of perceiving, cannot be articulated. The 'from-to' nature of 
human knowing implies that in order to perceive or know we necessarily rely upon
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knowledge which, in the act of knowing, functions in a tacit way as an extension of 
ourselves. Like the spectacles we wear, we do not focus on such knowledge, we 
focus with it. So, as we have seen, Polanyi claims that we indwell such knowledge.
We cannot -  at least insofar as we continue to indwell such knowledge -  
demonstrate its veracity; we can only trust its veracity.
This insight calls into question the kind of distinction which Kaufman draws.^^
Polanyi notes, however, that Kant did have some partial insight into this
epistemological dynamic even though it was not integrated systematically into his
theory. Polanyi comments:
Kant... occasionally admitted that into all acts of judgment there enters, and must enter, a personal 
decision which cannot be accounted for by any rules. Kant says that no system of rules can prescribe 
the procedure by which the rules themselves are applied. There is an ultimate agency which, 
unfettered by any explicit rules, decides on the subsumption of a particular instance under any 
general rule or a general concept. And o f this agency Kant says only that it 'is what constitutes our 
so-called mother-wit'... [A]t another point he declares that this faculty, indispensable to the exercise 
of any judgment, is quite inscrutable. He says that the way our intelligence forms and applies the 
schema of a class to particulars 'is a skill so deeply hidden in the human soul that we shall hardly 
guess the secret trick that Nature here employs.^^
This was a matter which puzzled Polanyi and he continues:
One may wonder how a critique of pure reason could accept the operations o f such a powerM  
mental agency, exempt from any analysis, and make no more than a few scattered references to it.
And one may wonder too that generations o f scholars have left such an ultimate submission of 
reason to unaccountable decisions unchallenged. Perhaps both Kant and his successors instinctively 
preferred to let such sleeping monsters lie, for fear that, once awakened, they might destroy their 
fundamental conception of knowledge. For, once you face up to the ubiquitous controlling position |
o f unfbrmalisable mental skills, you do meet difficulties for the justification of knowledge that |
cannot be disposed o f within the framework of rationalism. :
In Personal Knowledge Polanyi frequently describes such knowledge in terms of'articulate 
systems'.
Wliich he believes he borrows from Kant.
Polanyi, M. (1962). "The Unaccountable Element in Science." Philosophv 37(139): 1-14. p .l. 
Ibid. p.2. It may be that Polanyi overstates his case here, as it is not clear that he takes into 
consideration Kant's treatment o f imagination in his Critique of Pure Reason.
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This is the problem which Polaayi addresses in his theory of tacit knowledge. In it 
he challenges the kind of clear distinction which Kaufman draws between our 
concepts of'ordinary objects of perception' (which seem to make no demands upon 
the imagination), and regulative ideas such as 'God' (which necessarily do). The 
triadic structure of Polanyi's epistemology shows that in all human knowledge and 
perception there is present an integrative process in which the knower draws upon 
indwelt, tacit knowledge in an imaginative act.
Polanyi deals with the theme of imagination in some depth in his final book 
Meaning. In order to illuminate the point we are making we must now offer a brief 
exposition of Polanyi's understanding of the place of imagination in epistemology.
d) Polanyi and the Imagination
As we have already noted in chapter 3 under the subheading "The Ubiquity of the 
Tacit", it is important to emphasise that in the integrative process in which things 
are perceived and known there is an action which is performed by the perceiver or 
knower in relation to the thing known. In describing the process by which 
subsidiary knowledge is integrated into focal knowledge Polanyi emphasises the 
centrality of human mediation in the process. "[Tjhis pair is not linked together of 
its own accord. The relation of a subsidiary to a focus is formed by the act o f a 
person who integrates one to the other. The ffom-to relation lasts only so long as a 
person, the knower, sustains the integration."^^
For Polanyi this process always involves the imagination. Of course, not all 
integrations require the same degree of imagination. For example the level of 
imagination required to make a significant scientific discovery is far greater than 
that required to recognise an 'ordinary object' such as a dog, a man, a book or a tree. 
Nevertheless, human imagination is implied in any integrative act.
The example of scientific discovery is a significant one. Since, as it would appear, 
Kaufinan believes that the knowledge of which science speaks is not purely
Polanyi, M. and H. Prosch (1975). Meaning. Chicago, University o f Chicago Press, p.38. 
Polanyi's emphasis.
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imaginative but 'refers', what Polanyi has to say about scientific discovery may be 
of considerable importance. How does the imagination 'work', according to 
Polanyi, in the pursuit of scientific discovery? Polanyi explains, "The scientist's 
imagination does not roam about, casting up random hypotheses to be tested. He 
starts by thrusting forward ideas he feels to be promising, because he senses the 
availability of resources that will support them; his imagination then goes on to 
hammer away in directions felt to be plausible, uncovering material that has a 
reasonable chance of confirming these guesses."^^ Here the disciplined use of 
imagination comes to the fore in a way which finds no parallel in Kaufman's 
discussion.
The process is purposeful, not random or arbitrary, although the scientist will not be 
able to offer anything other than a sketchy account of how it is he or she is going 
about his task. This is because he or she is drawing upon vast resources of 
scientific theory and experimental skill (knowledge which is indwelt) which 
functions as subsidiary knowledge in the task. First of all it is clear that this 
imaginative work is profoundly constrained by the reality which it seeks to uncover. 
"When the imagination goes into action to start a scientific inquiry, it becomes not 
only more intense but also more concrete, more specific. Although it thrusts 
towards a target that is as yet empty, the target is seen to lie in a definite direction. 
The target represents a particular problem, pointing vaguely, but still always 
pointing, to a hidden feature of reality.
Discovery, if and when it comes, does not come as the inevitable outcome of a 
sequence of logical deductions but as an achievement of a rich and imaginative 
indwelling of the scientific traditions -  theoretical and practical -  out of which 
hitherto unnoticed connections are discerned or unrecognised patterns seen. What 
is achieved represents, "a leap of a logical gap.
“  Ibid. p.58.
Ibid. pp.58f. Polanyi acknowledges not only the importance o f imagination, but intuition, also. "It 
seems plausible to assume... that two functions of the mind are jointly at work from the beginning to 
the end o f an inquiry. One is a deliberately active power of the imagination; the other is a 
spontaneous process o f integration which we may call intuition." ibid. p.60.
Ibid. p.62.
ii64 I
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In view of this account of discovery Polanyi asserts, "Scientific inquiry is... a 
dynamic exercise of the imagination and is rooted in commitments and beliefs about 
the nature of t h i n g s . I t  is out of an essentially trusting and imaginative indwelling 
of the scientific tradition that significant scientific discovery will be made. In this, 
Polanyi claims, we ought to discern profound continuities between knowledge 
gained in the sciences and the humanities. He writes:
The understanding o f science we have achieved... enables us to see that the study of man in 
humanistic terms is not unscientific, since all meaningful integrations (including those achieved in 
science) exhibit a triadic structure consisting o f the subsidiary, the focal, and the person, and all are 
thus inescapably personal. This observation... can be understood to constitute the first step in 
bridging the gulf that supposedly separates scientific ftom humanistic knowledge, attitudes, and 
methods. In view of what we have now seen... we can surely bridge this gulf completely. We now 
see that not only do the scientific and humanistic both involve personal participation; we see that 
both also involve an active use of the imagination. That the various humanities are heavily 
entangled with the imagination has always been very clear to almost everyone; but that imagination 
has an essential role to play in science as well has rarely even been glimpsed.^*’
Polanyi does not deny the distinctions which must he made between the subject 
matter of science and the humanities but he does show the ubiquitous presence of 
the imagination in both and, significantly for our purposes, the presence of 
imaginative human participation as a facilitator in our endeavours to make contact 
with reality. Given the ubiquity of both personal and imaginative participation 
Polanyi is able to conclude that, "meanings created in the sciences stand in no more 
favoured relation to reality than do meanings created in the arts, in moral 
judgements, and in religion. At least they can stand in no more favoured relation to 
reality on the basis o f the supposed presence or absence o f personal participation 
and imagination in the one rather than in the other.
This penetrating analysis of Polanyi shows that Kaufinan's dichotomous schema 
will not do nor will his vague and undifferentiated conception of imaginative
Ibid. p.63.
^  Ibid. pp.63f. Polanyi's emphasis.
Ibid. p.65. Our emphasis.
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fimction.^^ Against Kaufman we would affirm, firstly, that imagination, in the 
varying ranges of its powers, is present in all of our attempts to 'refer' and, secondly, 
that imagination is a function of our disciplined indwelling of received traditions 
with all the skills and 'know-how' that this implies.
Kaufinan adopts an essentially critical stance towards the various expressions of the 
Christian tradition on the basis that they offer arbitrary and perhaps idolatrous 
starting points. Instead he proffers the suggestion that there are forces at work 
which will bring about a more humane future. This, he claims, is 'true to the way 
things are', but the claim is not substantiated. In view of the horrors of the twentieth 
century -  with wars of unprecedented destruction, the holocaust and the promise, at 
the dawn of the twenty-first century, of a new era of international terrorism -  we are 
persuaded that Bruce McCormack is nearer the mark in his suggestion that the 
evidence is against this claim and that Kaufinan's view amounts to little more than 
"shallow optimism.
We believe that Kaufman is fundamentally mistaken in claiming that we must 
choose between revelation and imagination.^® He appears to imply that if  God did 
reveal himself the revelation would be a percept akin to those of other 'ordinary 
objects'. This is presumably the reason why he makes the point that the biblical 
authors did not see God 'face to face'. But, as we have seen, such a notion is far 
from the understanding of revelation which we have been developing in this thesis 
(or, indeed, of that which has been widely held within the Christian tradition). We 
have argued that God's presence in the sphere of contingent reality is a paradoxical 
one. God is veiled even in his unveiling; he hides himself even as he makes himself 
known. God is present to us -  and really present -  but present as that which is 'not 
God'. Hence in his revelation God takes on form, but the form cannot be equated
^ McCormack points out that it is entirely unclear what controls exist to regulate the use o f  
imagination in Kaufman's theology. See McCormack "Divine Revelation and Human Imagination." 
p.434.
^^Ibid.p.441.
In practice Kaufman does not so much suggest a choice as assume that a necessary affirmation of 
the role of imagination in theology implies a rejection of revelation.
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directly with revelation/^ However, the form which God does take (and we think 
of this primarily as the event of incarnation) carries great significance for us/^
Far from being an alternative to imagination revelation is God's appeal to our 
imagination: there is no possibility of participating in revelation apart from a 
profound imaginative engagement with it. In assuming non-divine form God adopts 
something akin to the strategy of the poet. The poet's work draws upon the poet's 
imagination but it also calls forth an imaginative response from the reader of the 
work. It is apparent that to take the poet's words 'literally' is to miss the point. The 
poet has something to say which transcends what the words (used in a 'direct' way) 
can 'do'. But the poet has only the words to do the job and so they must be used in 
such a way as to point beyond themselves to the meaning that the poet intends. The 
similarities between poetics and revelation now come into view -  as does the 
inherently imaginative nature of our participation in poetics and revelation.
We have already made reference to the importance of Jesus' parabolic teaching in 
which Jesus adopts familiar images with which his hearers can readily identify in 
order to convey a radically new and subversive message. The parables of Jesus do 
not teach in a 'direct' way but invite those with ears to hear to begin to learn how to 
think along new lines which are opened up by them. Jesus' parables of the 
Kingdom do not describe God's eschatological purposes for his creation 'directly' 
for the obvious reason that they describe a reality which is only partially and 
paradoxically present to us. So Jesus repeatedly speaks of the Kingdom of God 
'being like' this or that. Of course the Kingdom of God is not 'this' or 'that', but it is 
a bit like 'this' or 'that': just use your imagination. And, of course, this 'invitation to 
imagine' does not stand alone but is made in the context of all that Jesus is saying 
and doing. The form of life which he establishes is both an embodiment of that 
which he teaches and becomes for his followers an interpretive paradigm.
It is also apparent, in contradistinction to Kaufman, that the kind of imaginative task 
in which we are engaged in theology^^ is not the 'free' creativity of human
John 5.37 "You have never heard his voice or seen his form." 
John 14.9 "Whoever has seen me has seen the Father."
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consciousness (whether that consciousness is understood individualistically or 
collectively), but the disciplined response to what is opened up for us as human 
beings in God's revelatory activity in which he draws persons into fellowship with 
himself.
If we are to understand the function of imagination in general, and its significance 
for theology in particular, we must reject Kaufman's empty and generalising 
concept of it. It will be necessary, for example, to be far more specific about the 
particular function of imagination in differing contexts, and to be aware of the 
various kinds of discipline to which it must be subjected, in our responsible use of 
it. We have already considered significant examples of such practice earlier in this 
thesis.
In chapter 3 we noted Polanyi's comments about the role of the judge in the law 
courts. The judge must be independent in that he or she serves the law and not the 
interests of a particular party. The judge is in this sense, free. But the requirements 
of justice demand that the judge be both knowledgeable of the law (pertinent to the 
cases in which he or she must pass judgement) and skilled in the interpretation of it. 
Where a judgement requires the establishment of new law the judge, far from being 
free to do whatever he or she likes, must draw deeply from his or her legal 
knowledge (much of which will be functionally tacit) in order to a reach a proper 
decision. This is certainly an imaginative activity but one which requires the 
disciplined application of a highly developed legal mind.^ "^
We may discern something of a parallel task in the work of the church confessor. 
Barth's description of church confession shows that the articulation of what must be 
said in a particular place at a particular time cannot be derived by the route of 
logical argumentation from the text of Scripture alone. We will not repeat the 
description of chapter 5 here save to emphasise that the work of the confessor is 
necessarily an imaginative one. In this case it is an imagination which must be 
'sourced' by a rich knowledge of the scriptural texts, an understanding of the earlier
Which, as a second-order reflective activity, is always contingent upon a form o f life which is 
itself an imaginative, responsive participation in revelation.
This does not preclude, o f course, the possibility o f an error o f judgement.
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confessions of the church's history, a well-developed dogmatic understanding of the 
faith and an acute awareness of the nature of the particular crisis which confronts 
the church. Again we see a task which requires imagination -  a disciplined, trained, 
responsive imagination.
Having criticised Kaufman for his failure to recognise the responsive and 
disciplined nature of the theological imagination, we must now question his overly 
conceptual understanding of what is implied in the task of theological work. In 
adopting an essentially negative attitude towards tradition, Kaufinan fails to 
recognise the primary significance of the forms of life in which we participate. As 
we seek to bring this chapter to a conclusion we must take issue with what we 
believe is another substantial failing in Kaufinan's work.
3. Conclusion: Revelation, Participation and Imagination
David Bryant makes the observation that Kaufinan treats tradition "as one of the 
instruments that controlling subjects use to reach the goals they decide are 
important. Consequently, "the disclosive power of tradition can play no more 
than a very subordinate role."^^ As we have already noted, Kaufinan's prioritisation 
of conceptual formation runs counter to the argument of this thesis in which we 
have suggested that concepts are articulated and authenticated from within a 
particular life practice as it engages with reality. Bryant makes substantially the 
same point: "It is... a mistake to think of disclosure in primarily conceptual terms, 
just as it is wrong to limit it to brief ecstatic moments of insight. In this light, it is 
possible to speak of being grasped by the disclosive power of a tradition even 
before reflecting on it in any conscious way."^^
The ecclesial forms of life, in which we may speak of participation in revelation, 
provide a dwelling place in which we may find our home. From within this 
dwelling it will be possible to articulate in conceptual terms something of what this 
participation means: its phenomenological form, its historical formation and
Bryant Faith and the Plav o f Imagination, p.46. 
Ibid. p.46.
77 Ibid. p. 123.
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development, its internal rationality, etc. But in view of what we have established 
in this thesis we must acknowledge that this can be no more than an 'attenuated 
summary' of what we know. We know more than we can tell. Furthermore, this 
task (among others) is an imaginative one but, over against Kaufman, its essential 
responsive nature must be recognised and acknowledged. Bryant writes, "Christian 
faith arises out of the disclosive power of the expressions of faith that are found in 
the Bible and in the rest of the Christian t r a d i t i o n . A n d ,  as Barth was so aware, 
that 'disclosive power' came from 'disclosive participation' in the revelatory activity 
of God.
The theories of biblical interpretation put forward by Wright and Vanhoozer 
(adopting, for example, the theatrical metaphor of 'improvisation') clearly entail an 
imaginative engagement with the text. But the 'kind' of imagination required in 
biblical interpretation (calling as it must upon the use of many skills and disciplines 
acquired and indwelt) is an imagination which is responsive to the text. It is not the 
case that 'any performance will do'. What is required is a 'faithful performance'.^^
In a faithful 'performance' of biblical interpretation the imaginative component of 
the process is one in which there is a rigorous and nuanced responsivity to the text. 
But the interpreter is a person -  located in a particular place and time (Polanyi 
would say 'calling'). The 'situatedness' of the interpreter (as we have seen in our 
exposition of Polanyi in chapter 3) is of considerable significance in at least two 
respects. Firstly it provides the place, or 'dwelling' out of which engagement with 
the text is facilitated. In the case of an ecclesial reading of the biblical text we must 
note that the form of life -  with its distinctive 'language-games', practices, 
conceptual understandings, etc. -  will 'shape' the way in which the text is read and 
influence the aspects of the text which will receive attention. To adopt another 
Polanyian term, it provides a cluster of'articulate systems' which Christians indwell.
Ibid. p. 129.
^ Although it is impossible to articulate fully what is meant by 'faithful performance', this does not 
mean that it is impossible to distinguish between a good 'performance' and one which is not. Rather 
it acknowledges that the parameters on the basis o f which a judgement can be made are significantly 
tacit and it is upon this tacit knowledge we must necessarily draw in making any judgement.
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These are the "happy dwelling places of the human mind"^® which facilitate a 
reading of the text.
Although such 'indwellings' are necessary for an engagement with the text what 
they provide for the interpreter is no infallible guide. Indeed, they may be in error 
in any number of ways. To adopt a couple of metaphors; they are tools for getting 
on with the job or spectacles which enable one to see. There is no guarantee that 
the tools will be adequate for the job or that the spectacles will be the right 
prescription (and, even if they are, we might not always use them well). This brings 
us to the second point which is that in the reading of the text the church looks, 
listens and waits for the God who promises to be present to it by the Holy Spirit, in 
order to hear afresh the word of reconciliation in which it hopes for transformation 
and renewal. This event, we must emphasise, is not one in which human faculties 
are eclipsed but one in which they are engaged by God and by which new 
possibilities are opened up. Bryant states the case well when he writes:
[0]ne experiences a revelatory encounter with God when one takes the God to whom the biblical 
texts point to be the transcendent reality that grounds, limits, and defines one's world. The 
involvement of the imagination means that such a revelation does not occur without the constructive 
engagement of our creative capacities. On the other hand, this constructive engagement occurs 
within the process o f our imaginative attunement to the ongoing play of tradition and the present 
situation, so that construction works hand in hand with, and is dependent on, the receptive powers o f  
the imagination.*^
On such a view of biblical interpretation as a participation in revelation, the 
imaginative component is integral but it is one which, far from free creative 
expression, is disciplined and responsive to the text (in which the interpreter must 
'dwell' to a considerable degree) if it is to be faithftil, authentic interpretation. 
Revelation makes present new possibilities for human existence but God does not 
impose himself and efface human will in making himself known. McCormack 
comments, "It is an autonomy in which the theologian freely chooses to respond in
Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophv. London, 
Routledge, and Kegan Paul. p.280.
To extend the metaphors we might say that the tools can be improved, as can our skill in using 
them and lenses can be re-ground to improve our vision.
Bryant Faith and the Plav of Imagination, p. 164. Bryant's emphasis.
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obedience to that which he/she hears. Such obedience is necessary if  arbitrariness is 
to be avoided.
McCormack complains that, "Kaufman does far too little to show concretely how 
theonomy might condition autonomy. We have noted, at various points, that in 
his explicit treatment of the theme of revelation Barth exhibits the tendency to 
understate autonomy. What is required, given the doctrine of revelation for which 
we have argued, is a more adequate attempt to show how autonomy is conditioned 
and how the themes of autonomy and theonomy are related. This is what we have 
endeavoured to do in this thesis.
In this final chapter we have shown that it is not only meaningful, but necessary to 
speak of an imaginative participation in revelation. In this we have voiced our 
opposition to theological strategies which would either ignore the role of 
imagination or displace revelation in the assertion of an autonomous theological 
imagination. The examples we have offered, and the suggestions we have made, 
are relatively few. Nevertheless, as well as being significant in themselves, they are 
suggestive of much broader development. Indeed, we believe that what has been 
presented offers some significant pointers toward the construction of an authentic 
'theology of the imagination'.
In reflecting upon imagination we have both exposed one particular 'blind alley' in 
the form of Kaufman's project of imaginative theological construction, and 
suggested some more fruitful lines of development.
McCormack "Divine Revelation and Human Imagination." p.446. 
*" Ibid. p.453.
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Closing Remarks
It was noted at the outset that this thesis would not resolve in a grand synthesising 
conclusion. The reason for this is not a negative one; it is not that the task is too 
onerous or complex to fulfil within the limited space available. Rather it is implied 
in the methodological stance which we have attempted to adopt in relation to our 
theme. Theology is, and ought to remain, ongoing and open-ended (c.f. Barth's 
Church Dogmatics!).
In this thesis we have argued that a doctrine of revelation must be developed, not 
according to an a priori scheme, but as reflection upon what we have come to know 
of God through what has revealed to us, and how we have come to know it in the 
chui'ch. Here, as elsewhere, we can articulate and formalise what is known but in 
doing so we can only partially represent our knowledge. This is so because, as 
Polanyi has taught us, we know more than we are able to tell.
This crucial tacit component in our knowledge is gained through our engagement 
with the world as embodied and social persons. Our knowledge is forged through 
the acquisition of many diverse skills as we are nurtured, trained, socialised or 
discipled in the communities which represent the contexts in which our lives are 
lived. Our participation in these contexts is ineffable\ This does not mean that we 
cannot say things -  important and necessary things -  about such processes.^ What 
it does mean is that what we do say -  our 'knowledge that' -  is, and must always be, 
sourced by our 'knowledge how'.
In view of this insight we have argued that in developing a doctrine of revelation, in 
which we seek to speak of our knowledge of God, we must pay attention to the 
many and diverse ways in which God draws us into fellowship and participation in 
his own intra-trinitarian life. In agreement with Barth we say that such participation 
is a possibility only in and through the sovereign and gracious initiative of God. 
But, in that God has been gracious to us, there is a reality in which we participate. 
It is the task of a doctrine of revelation, as a second-order activity, to reflect upon
* In the sense in which we have use this word in the thesis,
 ^The extent to which we can render our knowledge varies according to the nature o f the matter.
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and articulate this reahty. As such it is necessarily an ongoing task undertaken in 
the eschatological hope of the consummation of God's purposes for us.
This thesis has sought to explore some of the possibilities in bringing the thinking 
of Michael Polanyi and Karl Barth into conversation. In doing this we have noted 
some significant kinships between the two thinkers. Certainly, both thinkers have 
contested the distorting rationalisms of Enlightenment thought, and both have 
sought to adopt a posteriori methodologies. It is clear, as we argued in chapter 4, 
that Polanyi's religious and theological writings are misdirected but it is clear to us 
that his epistemological insights can be^ a rich source of insight for Christian 
theology. It is our conviction that the conversation which we have convened 
between Barth and Polanyi has been a constructive one which promises to bear yet 
more fruit.
Barth struggled, as we noted in chapter 5, with his concern that theology is always 
in danger of being distracted from its theme insofar as it engages in dialogue with 
the sciences. We would contend that any such distraction is absent in our 
engagement with Polanyi. Ironically, Polanyi -  as a scientist -  adopted many 
images drawn from the heart of the Christian tradition in order to subvert the 
ingrained misconceptions which he discerned in thought about science -  and in the 
philosophy of science, in particular. As a consequence he has been accused, by 
some scientists and philosophers of science'*, of subverting the theme of science by 
smuggling into its midst alien religious, theological and mystical themes!
We believe that such concerns -  on either side -  are misconceived. The 
conversation between Polanyi and the theologians in general, and with Barth in 
particular, has already shown its creative and corrective potential. Long may it 
continue.
 ^And, indeed, have already been.
We are thinking, here, o f some o f those who continue to sustain a significantly 'objectivistic' view
o f science.
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